"We analyze the relationship between gender-specific social norms and firms' pay-setting behavior. We combine information about regional voting behavior relative to gender equality laws, as a measure for gender-specific social norms, with a large data set of multi-branch firms and workers. The results show that multi-branch firms pay more discriminatory wages in branches located in regions with a higher social acceptance of gender inequality than in branches located in regions with a lower acceptance. Voter approval rates account for about 50% of the entire variation of within-firm gender pay gaps across regions. By investigating a subsample of performance pay workers for whom we are able to observe their time-based and performance pay component separately, we show that unobserved productivity differences within firms across regions cannot explain the relationship between social norms and within-firm gender pay gaps. As performance pay is more closely related to workers' productivity than time-based pay, gender-specific productivity differences would manifest in the workers' performance pay component. However, as the relationship between social norms and within-firm gender pay gaps manifests only for the time-based pay component but not for the performance pay component of the same workers, unobserved gender-specific productivity differences cannot explain our findings. The results support a strong relationship between social norms and the discriminatory pay-setting behavior of firms."

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