Documents crowd work 734 results

"This contribution explores a lesser discussed provision in the new Platform Work Directive (PWD): Article 3 on ‘intermediaries'. Article 3 is possibly the most ambiguous provision in the Directive, for three reasons: the unusual drafting history of Article 3, the wording of Article 3 itself, and the amount of flexibility left to Member States to interpret Article 3 as they choose. Ultimately, this means that Article 3 will likely have very divergent impact in practice. Article 3 provides that individuals providing work for an intermediary should enjoy the same level of protection ‘pursuant to the Directive' as those contracting directly with digital labour platforms. There is also reference to joint and several liability, ‘where appropriate'. At the very least under Article 3, the employment presumption in Article 5 should also apply to intermediaries and the provisions on algorithmic management should apply directly to those in a subcontracting chain. The contribution details the unusual drafting history of Article 3, then contrasts Article 3's fit with other EU provisions on ‘subcontracting', before discussing whether it was intended as, or might be interpreted as, alternatively a provision on joint liability or on joint employment. The final section provides a brief reflection on the concept of the employer, in light of the PWD."
This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

"Automated decision-making (ADM) and monitoring are central features of platform work and undoubtedly shape platform workers' working conditions. Yet, platform workers are often unaware of how they are monitored, how their actions influence working conditions, and on what basis and how the decisions affecting them are made. Increasing the transparency of ADM and monitoring systems can raise the awareness of platform workers and allegedly improve their working conditions. The Platform Work Directive (PWD) seeks to improve platform workers' conditions by strengthening their rights to transparency in ADM and monitoring. However, it remains uncertain whether the PWD offers a substantive advancement over existing legal frameworks. This article examines whether the PWD enhances the transparency of algorithmic management in platform work and thereby improves the position of platform workers. We compare the transparency regulation in the PWD with the relevant provisions in the General Data Protection Regulation, the Platform to Business Regulation, the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive and the Artificial Intelligence Act."

This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

"Die EU-Richtlinie zur Plattformarbeit markiert einen bedeutenden Schritt zur Regulierung digital vermittelter Erwerbstätigkeit. Sie zielt darauf ab, Scheinselbstständigkeit zu verhindern, mehr Transparenz beim algorithmischen Management zu schaffen und den Zugang zu Interessenvertretungen zu erleichtern. Die empirische Analyse des Beitrags zeigt, dass in Deutschland Stakeholder aus Gewerkschaften, Verbänden und Plattformunternehmen die Richtlinie unterschiedlich bewerten: Während Gewerkschaften sie als notwendige Maßnahme zur Stärkung von Arbeitsrechten begrüßen, befürchten Unternehmen sowie Branchen- und Selbstständigenverbände Überregulierung und Wettbewerbsnachteile. Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie bietet jedoch ein Gelegenheitsfenster für weitergehende arbeitsmarktpolitische Weichenstellungen. Zugleich besteht die Gefahr eines regulatorischen Flickenteppichs in Europa, da nationale Spielräume zur Umsetzung unterschiedlich gefüllt werden könnten. Die Etablierung kohärenter Standards, die sowohl den Schutz von Plattformarbeitenden als auch faire Wettbewerbsbedingungen gewährleisten, bleibt damit eine zentrale Herausforderung."

"In recent years most of the discussion among labour law scholars about platform workers has concentrated on their employment status. However, it is unclear which norms regulate platform work in cases in which the worker is classified as an ‘employee'. Platform work resembles temporary agency work (TAW) due to its fixed-term and triangular nature, giving rise to the question of whether provisions regulating TAW should be applied to platform work. The aim of this article is to analyse whether it is possible to apply the Temporary Agency Work Directive (TAWD) to platform workers and whether it would improve their employment conditions. It is argued that the automatic application of the TAWD to platform workers would be complicated and would not improve their employment rights. The main obstacles include the problems arising from the assignment of supervision and direction to the user; issues relating to the determination of working time; the identification of a comparator for the purposes of equal treatment, and the derogation from the principle of equal treatment based on qualifying periods. Other possibilities for the regulation of platform work need to be identified."

"Major changes in technology, economic contexts, workforces and the institutions of work have ebbed and flowed since well before the first industrial revolution in the 18th century. However, many argue that the changes we are currently facing are different, and that the rise of digitalized production will entirely transform our ways and views of working. In this collaborative project, funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers, researchers from the five Nordic countries have studied how the ongoing transformations of production and labour markets associated with digitalization, demographic change and new forms of employment will influence the future of work in the Nordic countries. "

"With the Platform Work Directive still under negotiation and the ETUC calling for an EU Directive on Algorithmic Systems at Work, groundbreaking research into the Spanish-Italian Glovo-Foodinho firm, a digital labour platform, has opened up an alternative path for workers wanting to scrutinize application and access their rights in digitalised workplaces, governed by algorithmic management. This involves closed cooperation between trade unions, reverse engineering and Data protection authorities (DPA).

As illustrated in this report, the current GDPR legislative framework has proven to be both robust and flexible. The report also reveals the details of the collaboration between ETUI and a technical team of experts led by Claudio Agosti into the so-called 'black box'. It details how the algorithmic management systems used by Foodinho, an Italian subsidiary of the Spanish food delivery company Glovo, works to control its workforce, namely:

1.Tracking riders' location outside working hours.
2.Sharing the location (both outside and during working hours), along with other personal data, with undisclosed third parties not mentioned in the app's documentation.
3.Generating a score associated with the rider's personal profile, a value inconsistent with the documented ‘Excellence Score' provided by Glovo-Foodinho: a hidden score.

Background:

In 2019, algorithm analyst, Claudio Agosti, started to work with the ETUI Foresight Unit on research and training courses aimed at understanding the ‘technicalities' behind Artificial Intelligence. Five years later, the ETUI is releasing a technical report which meticulously outlines the techniques used by researchers to observe the internal logic of the app used by riders in Italy and documents its actual behavior in terms of harvesting their personal data.

The technical analysis was made in 2021-2022-2023, after Italian DPA, responsible for enforcing the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) fined the company 2,600,000 euros in 2021 for failing to protect the digital rights of its workers. Glovo appealed. They did not pay the fine and as released in this report, they have continued the same unregular practices. Finally, these new evidences have been reported to the Italian DPA.

New challenges for workers' rights:

According to the authors of this ETUI report, collecting evidence about algorithmic management is critical for workers seeking to enforce their rights by filing complaints with national DPAs or the competent courts. The availability of technical expertise can also help improve workers' negotiating positions in a collective bargaining context. “Ultimately, we believe that, by helping workers understand the apps that control them, we can give them the key to unlocking their rights, thus building a fairer future of work for all.”

"The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in the workplace is reshaping labour processes by automating managerial functions such as task assignment, supervision and evaluation, deepening power imbalances and creating new worker vulnerabilities. Platforms are central to this debate, remaining key sites where algorithms structure and control work. In response, the EU introduced its first comprehensive AI regulatory framework in 2024: the AI Act and the Platform Work Directive (PWD). These initiatives are expected to play a decisive role in shaping platform governance, while the AI Act also extends more broadly to algorithmically managed workplaces. However, the AI Act allows industry self-assessment, limits oversight and provides minimal worker protection. By contrast, the PWD addresses algorithmic risks more robustly, including correct worker classification and greater transparency, though its scope is limited to platform workers. This creates a fragmented framework: broad but weak protections under the AI Act versus stronger but narrower rights under the PWD. This article critically assesses the EU's regulatory framework, arguing that dominant approaches reduce worker participation to symbolic gestures, based on an assumed harmony between labour and capital. As an alternative, it advances a worker-centred perspective grounded in the recognition of conflict and the view of technology as a contested space. This approach offers an alternative understanding of platform governance while simultaneously aiming to strengthen workers and trade unions across sectors by broadening the scope of transparency information rights, veto powers, and collective bargaining cut in half keeping reference to platform governance as a key part of the debate."

This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

"Cet article s'intéresse à une nouvelle forme d'organisation du travail, le crowdworking. Cette expression désigne le travail réalisé à partir de plateformes en ligne qui permettent à des individus d'accéder (via internet) à des organisations (ou à des individus) pour résoudre des problèmes spécifiques et offrir des produits et des services en échange d'une rémunération. Notre problématique consiste à s'interroger sur le potentiel de développement de cette pratique et à repérer les enjeux que le crowdworking met en exergue pour l'analyse économique. Pour ce faire, nous analysons la question de l'arbitrage entre le salariat et le travail indépendant au prisme des grandes théories de la firme en distinguant deux catégories de plateformes, celles qui font appel à du travail peu qualifié et celles qui mobilisent du travail qualifié. Nous montrons que la théorie économique permet de dégager trois variables de cet arbitrage : la nature des actifs humains engagés, la séparabilité des tâches, et la nature des connaissances. L'étude de ces trois variables donne à voir une dynamique d'organisation du travail qui devrait, en principe, rester favorable au salariat donc à l'entreprise. "