Documents energy policy 388 results

"The aim of this paper is to showcase different decarbonization pathways for Germany and Europe with varying Carbon dioxide (CO2) constraints until 2050. The Global Energy System Model (GENeSYS-MOD) framework, a linear mathematical optimization model, is used to compute low-carbon scenarios for Europe as a whole, as well as for 17 European countries or regions. The sectors power, low- and high-temperature heating, and passenger and freight transportation are included, with the model endogenously constructing capacities in each period. Emission constraints differ between different scenarios and are either optimized endogenously by the model, or distributed on a per-capita basis, GDP-dependent, or based on current emissions. The results show a rapid phase-in of renewable energies, if a carbon budget in line with established climate targets is chosen. In the 2° pathway, the power and low-temperature heat sectors are mostly decarbonized by 2035, with the other sectors following. Wind power is the most important energy source in Europe by 2050, followed by solar energy and hydro power. The heating sector is dominated by biogas and heat pumps, while electric vehicles emerge in the transportation sector in the later periods. Differences in renewable potentials lead to different developments in the regions, e.g., converting Germany from a net exporter of electricity into an importing country by 2050. In the 1.5° pathway, not all calculations are feasible, showcasing that especially countries like Poland or the Balkan region that heavily rely on fossil fuels will face difficulties transitioning away from their current generation capacities. It can, however, be shown that the achievement of the 2° target can be met with low additonal costs compared to the business as usual case, while reducing total emissions by more than 30%."

"The central questions and main contextual background explored by this year's issue of Benchmarking are, at their core, fairly straightforward. Europe is at a crossroads, painfully navigating four transitions at once: a (perhaps less than obvious) economic policy transition best exemplified by the debates surrounding the EU economic governance framework (COM(2022) 583 final); a geopolitical transition, increasingly shaped by the ‘open strategic autonomy' debate (Akgüç 2021) and, of course, by the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine; and the two more readily acknowledged green and digital transitions. It is, however, becoming increasingly clear, as explored in greater detail in the following chapters, that these four transitions imply important trade-offs and have significant ramifications for the social dimension of the European project and for the livelihoods of European workers. These consequences are currently being ignored by the principal institutional actors that are shaping them and that, at times, have conflicting priorities.

The current inability on the part of governments and policy-makers, at a national and supranational level, to resolve the tensions inherent to these transitions is a major factor in determining what the following pages of this issue refer to as a ‘polycrisis'. We understand the current conjuncture as a ‘polycrisis' due to the presence of a series of multiple, separate crises happening simultaneously (e.g. a climate crisis, a cost-of-living crisis, a geopolitical crisis, etc.), due to the way in which these separate crises interact with each other (for instance the energy crisis and the climate crisis), and due to the extent to which they thus amplify each other's effects, in particular social and economic effects (the extent to which strained supply chains and externally driven inflationary pressures tend to magnify the shortcomings of current fiscal policies, for instance, as noted in the opening chapter). There is also a growing perception that resolving any of these crises in isolation may be a particularly arduous task and that cumulative responses must be identified.

This polycrisis is intimately linked to the inability of the ruling class to engage with what we identify here as the missing transition: the social transition. This issue of Benchmarking Working Europe engages critically with these four transitions and their effects and posits that only a transformative and ambitious social transition can break the current cycle of crisis after crisis and instead institutionalise what the issue refers to as ‘sustainable resilience'.

The four transitions – and the missing one
We are arguably witnessing four major discernible and disruptive transition processes that are shaking the kaleidoscope of the European project as it is currently still enshrined in the (fragile) constitutional consensus embodied by the Lisbon Treaty. The rather more obvious (but no less challenging) processes are the green and technological transitions. Yet, it is arguable that, most visibly since the suspension of parts of the Stability and Growth Pact, we have also been experiencing an economic policy (including a monetary policy) transition and – in connection with the supply chain shortages caused by Covid‑19 and its aftermath, and more markedly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine – a geopolitical transition linked to the developing concept of ‘open strategic autonomy'"

"In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future.

In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU.

First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly.

Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue.

Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage.

Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability."

"The economic expansion witnessed in the last 0,08% of modern human history is an anomalous event. It has been compared to a "rocket ship that took off five seconds ago, and nobody knows where it's going." This paper explores the destiny of this rocket ship. It shows that economic growth cannot continue indefinitely and critically reviews Green Growth and Degrowth as responses to planetary overshoot. It concludes that neither Green Growth nor Degrowth will stop overshoot. Moreover, Degrowth may worsen the environment, is a costly method to reduce carbon emissions, is a form of austerity for the working class, is redundant, and is politically infeasible. Finally, a third approach beyond Green Growth and Degrowth is outlined: acceptance of an inevitable societal collapse (as a feature, and not a bug, of complexity) and managing such a collapse to minimise harm, and to get rid of obsolete structures. This may lay the foundation for rebound growth, and a transition to a new kind of economy, which could be as qualitatively different from the current global economy as the industrial world differed from the hunter-gatherer world."

"The European Green Deal will trigger a deep transformation of the way we live, work and produce, the so-called green transition. This will require substantial investments in greening the economy, which could also lead to job growth if supported by the right policy mix. The policy mix could include reliable political long-term targets for a green transition, financial incentives and support for greening of industry, investment in ecosystem restoration, incentives and awareness raising for greener consumption, funding programmes to create jobs, skills training, and others."

"This edition of the Global Energy and Climate Outlook (GECO 2023) presents an updated view on the implications of energy and climate policies worldwide to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement, and contributes to JRC's work in the UNFCCC policy process. This report provides insight into the investment and related new jobs required by the transition to a low-carbon economy. Current climate policy pledges and targets imply a rapid decline in greenhouse gas emissions. Still, there remains both an implementation gap in adopting policies aligned with countries' mid-term Nationally Determined Contributions and Long-Term Strategies, and a collective ambition gap in reducing emissions to reach the Paris Agreement targets of pursuing efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Global emissions are projected to peak during the current decade, but failing to implement additional policies puts the world on a trajectory towards a long-term temperature increase of 3°C. The current decade is key for keeping the 1.5°C target possible. GECO 2023 highlights the global investment needs of the 1.5°C scenario. Accelerated decarbonisation efforts are needed across all sectors of the economy. Energy sector investments need to triple this decade, doubling energy efficiency rates and bringing renewables deployment to 11 TW by 2030. This transition comes along with substantial investment spill-over and stimulus effects, boosting investment and employment across value chains, e.g. in the construction and electrical and equipment goods manufacturing."

"Given the political significance of this European election year, ETUI and ETUC have chosen to provide a retrospective assessment of the state of Social Europe. Using fact-based evidence and analysis, the new edition of the yearly Benchmarking working Europe demonstrates that the new impetus for Social Europe which we have witnessed over the past five years has led to important and long-awaited policy initiatives such as the adoption of the Directive on Adequate Minimum Wages in October 2022. However, progress in this field remains fragile.

According to the authors of the Benchmarking Working Europe, the 'revival' of Social Europe has been driven by three factors: the Social Pillar; a novel approach to EU spending and temporary relaxing of the EU fiscal framework; and the commitment of the European Green Deal to just transition. While each chapter in these reports highlights how each of these drivers has been essential in relaunching the process of a more social European integration, it also shows the inherent fragility of the project itself.

Among the relevant legislative decisions, initiated by the adoption of the European Socle of Social Rights in 2017 and taken in the context of unexpected events, such as the Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the inflation and cost-of-living crisis, the report quotes:

-the Adequate Minimum Wages Directive
-the Platform Worker Directive
-the Pay Transparency Directive
-the Women on Corporate Boards Directive
-the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive
-the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive
-and several Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Directives, including the revision of the Asbestos Directive.
Background
The yearly ETUI-ETUC report Benchmarking Working Europe (henceforth ‘Benchmarking') has the ambition, since 2001, to diminish the knowledge gap about the world of labour and social affairs by providing a genuine benchmarking exercise, with workers' concerns at the centre of its analysis and policy proposals. "

"The decarbonization of European economies is an established reality that has been accelerating in recent years. The focus of EU policy is on the dynamic transformation of the energy balances of Member States, which most significantly impacts economies reliant on coal. In the context of emerging megatrends, this study sets out to determine the extent of changes occurring in the economies of European Union countries in relation to the Green Deal paradigm. The objective of this article is to introduce a comprehensive method developed by the authors for assessing the dynamics of energy transformation in the European Union countries under study. This method is divided into two phases. Initially, countries are classified according to the energy transformation dynamics matrix. Subsequently, the actual assessment of energy transformation dynamics is conducted using a novel composite indicator, the ETPI (Energy Transition Progress Index), based on analyses for 2022 and 2013 using Eurostat data. The results identify leaders in energy transformation, such as Sweden, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands, while highlighting significant challenges facing Poland and Bulgaria."