Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies
Dobbins, Tony ; Dundon, Tony ; Cullinane, Niall ; Hickland, Eugene ; Donaghey, Jimmy
2017
156
3-4
December
395-422
labour relations ; regulation ; workers participation ; market economy ; case study
Labour relations
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x
English
Bibliogr.
"This article analyses the impact of information and consultation regulations – specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive – on worker participation or “employee voice” in liberal market economies (LMEs), providing both empirical and theoretical insights to complement existing research on the Directive. Using game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework, and empirical data from 16 case studies, the authors explain why national legislation implementing the Directive is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual‐gains cooperation in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Three theoretical explanatory propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of information and consultation regulations in LMEs."
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