"Over the past decades, the level of regulation of fixed-term contracts has been in flux. Many reforms deregulating these contracts were followed by a regulatory countertrend, a puzzling finding considering influential theoretical expectations like the ones developed by the dualization and liberalization literatures. This paper draws on the comparative employment relations and comparative political economy literatures to identify the drivers of pro-outsider reforms. Furthermore, it develops an innovative argument claiming that governments may rely on support from a ‘domestic coalition' including workers in permanent contracts, or they can leverage the European link to support their intention of conducting a pro-outsider reform. Each of these paths relies on the assemblage of distinct pro-reform coalitions of policy actors. To test our argument, the paper uses fsQCA. We compare 38 reforms enacted in 16 European countries between 1985–2019. After the fsQCA analysis, we conduct a qualitative discussion of the different paths."

This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Support: Digital