Documents labour market reform 489 results

"Over the last two decades in Latin America and in Peru the political, social context; but especially the economic, influenced the behavior of Labor Law and Social Security. Globalization and neoliberalism worldwide, hyperinflation, dictatorships and social violence in Latin America, particularly in Peru, substantially marked the labor reforms of the 90's. The later years were more favorable in political and economic matters; but in Peru we did not take advantage of this trend. We have started a new decade with an economic slowdown in Latin America compared to previous years and with a strange feeling in Peru that the past decade was a lost opportunity. Therefore, this is a crucial historical moment in which it is necessary to make additional efforts to improve and solve the problem of employment and social security."

"Ces vingt dernières années en Amérique Latine et au Pérou, le contexte politique, social, mais surtout, économique a influencé l'évolution du Droit du travail et de la sécurité sociale. La mondialisation et le néolibéralisme, l'hyperinflation, les dictatures et la violence sociale en Amérique Latine, et en particulier au Pérou,ont considérablement marqué les réformes du travail des années 90. Bien que ces dernières années aient été plus favorables d'un point de vue politique et économique, le Pérou ne profite pas de cette tendance. Une nouvelle décennie a été entamée avec un ralentissement économique en Amérique Latine par rapport aux années précédentes, et avec l'étrange sensation, que le Pérou a laissé passer sa chance lors de la décennie précédente. Il s'agit donc d'un moment crucial de l'histoire nationale, où des efforts supplémentaires sont nécessaires afin d'améliorer et de résoudre le problème de l'emploi et de la sécurité sociale."

"This paper evaluates Spain's 2012 labour market reform concerning the reduction in severance pay from 45 to 33 days of wages per year of seniority and the introduction of a new subsidised permanent contract. We also compare this policy with the introduction of a single open-ended labour contract with increasing severance payments for all new hires. We use an equilibrium search and matching model to generate the main properties of this segmented labour market. Our steady-state results show that this reform will reduce unemployment (by 10.5%) and job destruction (by 7.5%). However, in terms of wage subsidies, the cost of implementing this reform will be very high. A cheaper and more effective way to decrease the duality in the labour market could be to eliminate temporary contracts and introduce a single contract. Unemployment and job destruction in this case could be reduced by 31.5% and 35%, respectively. Most interestingly, tenure distribution could be even smoother than under the designed reform, as 22.5% more workers could have tenures of more than three years and there could be 38.5% fewer one-year contracts. The transition shows that both policy measures would benefit a majority of workers: only 7.4% would experience a decrease in tenure under the approved reform (5.5% in the transition to the single contract) due to the improvement in job stability."

"Les réformes du marché du travail espagnol ont consisté en l'adoption de mesures favorisant la flexibilité interne comme alternative à la destruction des emplois et rétablissant la conception archaïque de l'entreprise comme territoire de gestion patronale exclusive. Par ailleurs, l'anéantissement progressif des fonctions traditionnelles de la négociation collective a transfiguré cet outil en appareil au service des intérêts patronaux ; véritable porte ouverte à la détérioration des conditions de travail des salariés."

"In the 1990s, Spain approved two labor reforms aimed at reducing the unemployment level and its volatility. Overall, these reforms involved two measures designed to induce firms to meet their labor needs via adjustment of permanent positions: restricting the use of temporary workers and reducing the amount of severance payments. This paper empirically assesses the impact of these reforms on the allocative efficiency of the labor input employing Petrin and Sivadasan's (2011) value of the marginal product-marginal cost gap methodology. We find a statistically significant increase in within-firm permanent labor gaps following the reforms. These results suggest that restrictions on the use of temporary workers (increasing the probability of hiring fragile workers for permanent positions), when coupled with uncertainty about enforcement of reduced severance payments, could more than offset the reduction in severance payments; hence, the net effect of the reforms could be to increase adjustment costs for permanent positions."