Documents enterprise level 836 results

"Le principe de la pluridisciplinarité en matière de santé au travail s'est progressivement affirmé dans le droit du travail : il n'est plus possible d'analyser un accident du travail ou une maladie professionnelle sous l'angle d'une seule discipline. Depuis la loi de modernisation sociale du 17 janvier 2002, la pluridisciplinarité est une obligation juridique qui incombe aux entreprises et aux services de santé au travail. Mais la démarche pluridisciplinaire peut prendre plusieurs formes. L'article examine la loi et la réglementation du droit de la santé au travail, puis les modalités possibles de collaboration entre les acteurs impliqués. Le décret du 24 juin 2003 prévoit le recours à un intervenant qui peut être un salarié de l'entreprise ou du service de santé, ou une personne ou un organisme extérieur. Les différentes formes de pluridisciplinarité offriront-elles les mêmes garanties d'indépendance des acteurs de la prévention ?"

"Recent empirical work has found evidence that the elasticity of labor supply to individual firms is finite, implying that firms may have wage setting power. However, these studies capture only single snapshots of the elasticity. We are the first to study how the elasticity of labor supply to the firm changes between economic contractions and economic expansions. We study two manufacturing firms operating in geographically distinct labor markets during the volatile inter-war period. Our analysis suggests that the elasticity of labor supply to the firm is lower during recessions than during expansions, providing evidence of differential wage setting power over the business cycle. This differential wage setting ability provides an explanation of the pro-cyclicality of real wages."

"Bargaining sequences, though vital to the real-world business strategies, are often treated as exogenously given. We examine bargaining sequences in the setting where a downstream firm makes a merger decision with an upstream partner and faces a negotiation with a union. When the downstream firm's power in the wage bargaining is weak, separation results and the input price bargaining proceeds prior to the wage bargaining. When the downstream firm's power in both negotiations is relatively equal, firms opt for separation and both negotiations keep on simultaneously. When the downstream firm's power in the wage negotiation is strong, the firms merge."