Documents Rusticelli, Elena 10 results

"This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which raising public investment can sustainably lift growth without deteriorating public finances. To do so, it relies on a range of simulations using three different macro-structural models. According to the simulations, OECD governments could finance a ½ percentage point of GDP investment-led stimulus for three to four years on average in OECD countries without raising the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium term, provided projects are sound. After one year, the average output gains for the large advanced economies of such a stimulus amount to 0.4-0.6%. However, the gains are particularly uncertain for Japan. Reprioritising spending in later years would lead to average long-term output gains of between 0.5 to 2% in the large advanced economies. Those gains depend on the assumptions made on the rate of return. Hysteresis reinforces the case for an investment-led stimulus. Output gains will also be higher if the stimulus is combined with structural reforms and if countries act collectively."

"World trade growth was rapid in the two decades prior to the global financial crisis but has halved subsequently. There are both structural and cyclical reasons for the slowdown. A deceleration in the rate of trade liberalisation post 2000 was initially obscured by the ongoing expansion of global value chains and associated rapid emergence of China in the world economy. Post the financial crisis global value chains started to unwind and, possibly associated with this, Chinese and Asian trade weakened markedly. These structural changes were compounded by insipid demand due to anaemic growth of global investment, as well as intra-euro area trade, both of which are trade intensive. The slowdown in world trade growth post crisis, if sustained, will have serious consequences for the medium-term growth of productivity and living standards. Trade policy has significant potential to reinvigorate trade growth but the political environment for reforms is difficult, with a growing polarisation of OECD electorates into pro- and anti- globalisation supporters. Further trade and investment policy liberalisation should be introduced as part of a wider package of structural reforms to spread the benefits of freer trade and investment more widely."

"This paper compares the short-term forecasting performance of state-of-the-art large-scale dynamic factor models (DFMs) and the small-scale bridge models routinely used at the OECD. Pseudo-real time out-of-sample forecasts for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States during and after the Great Recession (2008-2014) suggest that large-scale DFMs are not systematically more accurate than small-scale bridge models, especially at short forecast horizons. Moreover, DFM parameters appear to be highly unstable during the Great Recession (2008-2009), making forecast revisions between successive vintages difficult to explain as revisions cannot be fully attributed to news on specific groups of indicators. The implication for OECD forecasting practice is that there would be no gain from switching from the current small-scale bridge models to large-scale DFMs."

"Membership of the European Union has contributed to the economic prosperity of the United Kingdom. Uncertainty about the outcome of the referendum has already started to weaken growth in the United Kingdom. A UK exit (Brexit) would be a major negative shock to the UK economy, with economic fallout in the rest of the OECD, particularly other European countries. In some respects, Brexit would be akin to a tax on GDP, imposing a persistent and rising cost on the economy that would not be incurred if the UK remained in the EU. The shock would be transmitted through several channels that would change depending on the time horizon. In the near term, the UK economy would be hit by tighter financial conditions and weaker confidence and, after formal exit from the European Union, higher trade barriers and an early impact of restrictions on labour mobility. By 2020, GDP would be over 3% smaller than otherwise (with continued EU membership), equivalent to a cost per household of GBP 2200 (in today's prices). In the longer term, structural impacts would take hold through the channels of capital, immigration and lower technical progress. In particular, labour productivity would be held back by a drop in foreign direct investment and a smaller pool of skills. The extent of foregone GDP would increase over time. By 2030, in a central scenario GDP would be over 5% lower than otherwise – with the cost of Brexit equivalent to GBP 3200 per household (in today's prices). The effects would be larger in a more pessimistic scenario and remain negative even in the optimistic scenario. Brexit would also hold back GDP in other European economies, particularly in the near term resulting from heightened uncertainty would create about the future of Europe. In contrast, continued UK membership in the European Union and further reforms of the Single Market would enhance living standards on both sides of the Channel."

"Inflation has become much less sensitive to movements in unemployment in recent decades. A common explanation for this change is that inflation expectations have become better anchored as a consequence of credible inflation targeting by central banks. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, the paper compares two competing empirical specifications across all OECD economies, where competing specifications correspond to the ‘former' and ‘new' specification for deriving measures of the unemployment gap which underlie the OECD's Economic Outlook projections. The former OECD specification can be characterised as a traditional ‘backward-looking' Phillips curve, where current inflation is partly explained by an autoregressive distributed lag process of past inflation representing both inertia and inflation expectations formed on the basis of recent inflation outcomes. Conversely, the new approach adjusts this specification to incorporate the notion that inflation expectations are anchored around the central bank's inflation objective. The main finding of the paper is that the latter approach systematically out-performs the former for an overwhelming majority of OECD countries over a recent sample period. Relative to the backward-looking specification, the anchored expectations approach also tends to imply larger unemployment gaps for those countries for which actual unemployment has increased the most. Moreover, the anchored expectations Phillips curve reduces real-time revisions to the unemployment gap, although these still remain uncomfortably large, in the case of countries where there have been large changes in unemployment."

"This paper provides estimates of the potential effects on exports, imports, production, factor demand and GDP in Ireland of an exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), focusing on trade and FDI channels. Owing to the high uncertainty regarding the final trade agreement between the negotiating parties, the choice has been made to assume a worst-case outcome where trade relations between the United Kingdom and EU are governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) most favoured nation (MFN) rules. In doing so, it provides something close to an upper bound estimate of the negative economic impact taking into account the potential for some firms to relocate to Ireland. Any final trade agreement that would result in closer relationships between the United Kingdom and the EU could reduce this negative impact. The simulations use two large-scale models: a global macroeconomic model (NiGEM) and a general equilibrium trade model (METRO). These models are used to quantify, both at the macroeconomic and the sectoral level, two key channels through which Ireland would be affected: trade and foreign direct investment. The simulation results highlight that the negative effect on trade could result in Ireland's GDP falling by 1½ per cent in the medium-term and around 2½ per cent in the long-term. The impacts are highly heterogeneous across sectors. Agriculture, food, and some smaller manufacturing sectors experience the largest declines in total gross exports at over 15%. By contrast, financial services exports increase slightly. The modelling suggests that any positive offsetting impact to the trade shock from increased inward FDI to Ireland is likely to be modest."

"The increase of emerging market economies in international trade and rapid rise in global trade intensity over the past three decades has been accompanied by growing, regionally concentrated, discontent with trade in advanced OECD countries. One of the main concerns is the negative effects of growing import competition on employment. This paper focuses on manufacturing sector employment because of its high trade exposure and potential for wider spillovers. It finds that while trade appears to have only a minor association with manufacturing employment shares at the national level compared with technology, trade has an important role in regional labour market developments due to the geographical concentration of industrial activities. The "sticky" nature of manufacturing employment and sometimes inefficient inter-regional migration mean that trade shocks to local manufacturing can affect entire regional labour markets, leading to widening regional inequalities. Policies should, in particular, focus on boosting regional resilience to industry related shocks, whether they come from trade or technology by building local capacity, both in terms of people – more educated labour is more mobile across jobs – and innovation."

A statistically significant relationship between the unemployment gap and inflation can be found for a clear majority of OECD countries, but the magnitude of the effect is typically weak. A corollary is that the effect of labour market slack on inflation can often be dominated by other shocks, including imported inflation. The current Secretariat Phillips curve specification assumes inflation expectations are anchored at the central bank's target, although some experimentation suggests that alternative proxies for expectations sometimes work better and there is some evidence that persistent under-shooting of inflation has led to some de-anchoring of expectations from the target, especially in the euro area. For most OECD countries, a measure of the global output gap is both statistically significant and strongly preferred to a domestic gap measure in explaining the wedge between headline and core inflation, although domestic gaps are strongly preferred in explaining core inflation. Various forms of non-linearity in the Phillips curve provide possible explanations for recent weak inflation outcomes, but statistical testing provides only limited support for such explanations."

"The COVID-19 outbreak and the resulting disruptions in supply chains of some manufacturing and medical products have renewed the debate on costs and benefits of globalisation and, particularly, on risks associated with international fragmentation of production in global value chains (GVCs). While GVCs helped addressing supply shortages in several cases already during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, much of the policy debate has concentrated on whether the gains from expanding international specialisation in GVCs are worth the associated risks of transmission of shocks and even whether governments should use policy tools to ‘re-localise' GVCs. But re-localising may also mean less diversification and thereby limit the scope for cushioning shocks. This paper builds on on-going OECD analysis and aims at providing empirical evidence to inform and guide discussion on these questions. First, it reviews briefly the key issues and lessons learnt from the past, and identifies the main features of world trade and GVC participation that influence exposures to risks in supply chains. Subsequently, it presents key results of a set of economic model simulations conducted using the OECD's computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade model METRO to shed light on the consequences of a stylised re-localisation policy scenario. In this scenario, countries are less exposed to foreign shocks, but they are also less efficient and less able to cushion shocks through trade. Quantitatively, the latter effect tends to dominate: re-localising GVCs would make the economy in most countries both less efficient and less stable. The economic case for policy-induced reshoring of GVCs is therefore weak. There is nevertheless scope for governments to join efforts with businesses to improve risk preparedness."