Documents Turner, David 14 results

"World trade growth was rapid in the two decades prior to the global financial crisis but has halved subsequently. There are both structural and cyclical reasons for the slowdown. A deceleration in the rate of trade liberalisation post 2000 was initially obscured by the ongoing expansion of global value chains and associated rapid emergence of China in the world economy. Post the financial crisis global value chains started to unwind and, possibly associated with this, Chinese and Asian trade weakened markedly. These structural changes were compounded by insipid demand due to anaemic growth of global investment, as well as intra-euro area trade, both of which are trade intensive. The slowdown in world trade growth post crisis, if sustained, will have serious consequences for the medium-term growth of productivity and living standards. Trade policy has significant potential to reinvigorate trade growth but the political environment for reforms is difficult, with a growing polarisation of OECD electorates into pro- and anti- globalisation supporters. Further trade and investment policy liberalisation should be introduced as part of a wider package of structural reforms to spread the benefits of freer trade and investment more widely."

"The paper describes revisions to the trend labour efficiency component of the production function underpinning long-term economic scenarios. The main goal of the revision is to add more policy and institutional determinants in the equation to enrich the scenarios that can be constructed. In the proposed equation, equilibrium trend labour efficiency depends on a broad measure of the quality of institutions and governance (the World's Bank rule of law indicator), human capital (based on average years of schooling attainment), product market regulation (PMR), openness to trade adjusted for country size, the stability of the macroeconomic framework (based on inflation and its variance), income inequality (based on GINI coefficients) as well as domestic and global research and development (via accumulated stocks of R&D). Apart from the innovation effects, the sizes of the other effects are jointly estimated in a conditional convergence framework with a sample of about 120 countries, without the use of country fixed effects. Rule of law and openness are also estimated to influence the speed of convergence toward the long-term equilibrium."

"New variants of the virus are spreading which, together with seasonal effects, are estimated to be able to raise effective reproduction numbers by up to 90%. Meanwhile, many countries are rolling out vaccination programmes, but at varying speeds. Hence the race is on to beat the variants with the vaccines. Vaccination is very powerful at reducing virus transmission: fully vaccinating 20% of the population is estimated to have the same effect as closing down public transport and all-but-essential workplaces; fully vaccinating 50% of the population would have a larger effect than simultaneously applying all forms of containment policies in their most extreme form (closure of workplaces, public transport and schools, restrictions on travel and gatherings and stay-at-home requirements). For a typical OECD country, relaxing existing containment policies would be expected to raise GDP by about 4-5%. Quick vaccination would thus help limit the extent to which containment policies need to be escalated in future epidemic waves, providing huge welfare benefits both in terms of fewer infections and stronger economic activity."

"The OECD framework for estimating potential output is combined with previous OECD empirical research to analyse the causes of recent weak productivity growth. Current weak labour productivity growth in many OECD countries reflects historically weak contributions from both total factor productivity (TFP) growth and capital deepening. The slowdown in trend productivity growth in the pre-crisis period is mostly explained by a long-established slowdown in TFP growth, but since the crisis, the further deceleration is mainly due to weak capital deepening, a development apparent in practically every OECD country. Much of the weakness in the growth of the capital stock since the financial crisis can be explained by an accelerator response of investment to continued demand weakness, leading in turn to a deterioration in potential output via a hysteresis-like effect. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a misallocation of capital in the pre-crisis period also contributed to the slowdown in capital stock growth, particularly among the most severely affected countries. In many OECD countries, declining government investment as a share of GDP has further exacerbated post-crisis weakness in capital stock growth, both directly and probably indirectly via adverse spillover effects on business investment. Finally, at a time when the use of conventional macro policy instruments has become increasingly constrained, the slower pace of structural reform represents a missed opportunity, not least because more competitionfriendly product market regulation could have boosted both investment and potential growth."

"Inflation has become much less sensitive to movements in unemployment in recent decades. A common explanation for this change is that inflation expectations have become better anchored as a consequence of credible inflation targeting by central banks. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, the paper compares two competing empirical specifications across all OECD economies, where competing specifications correspond to the ‘former' and ‘new' specification for deriving measures of the unemployment gap which underlie the OECD's Economic Outlook projections. The former OECD specification can be characterised as a traditional ‘backward-looking' Phillips curve, where current inflation is partly explained by an autoregressive distributed lag process of past inflation representing both inertia and inflation expectations formed on the basis of recent inflation outcomes. Conversely, the new approach adjusts this specification to incorporate the notion that inflation expectations are anchored around the central bank's inflation objective. The main finding of the paper is that the latter approach systematically out-performs the former for an overwhelming majority of OECD countries over a recent sample period. Relative to the backward-looking specification, the anchored expectations approach also tends to imply larger unemployment gaps for those countries for which actual unemployment has increased the most. Moreover, the anchored expectations Phillips curve reduces real-time revisions to the unemployment gap, although these still remain uncomfortably large, in the case of countries where there have been large changes in unemployment."

"This paper estimates potential output losses from the global financial crisis by comparing recent OECD published projections with a counter-factual assuming a continuation of pre-crisis productivity trends and a trend employment rate which is sensitive to demographic trends. Among the 19 OECD countries which experienced a banking crisis over the period 2007-11, the median loss in potential output in 2014 is estimated to be 3¾ per cent, compared to 2¾ per cent among all OECD countries. The crisis hit does, however, vary widely across countries, being more than 10% for several smaller European, mainly euro area, countries. The largest adverse effects come from lower trend productivity, which is a combination of both lower total factor productivity and lower capital per worker. Despite large increases in structural unemployment in some countries, the contribution of lower potential employment to the crisis hit is limited because the adverse effect on labour force participation is generally much less than might have been expected on the basis of previous severe downturns. This may partly reflect pension reforms and a tightening up of early retirement pathways. Pre-crisis conditions relating to over-heating and financial excesses, including high inflation, high investment, large current account deficits, low real interest rates, high total economy indebtedness and more rapid growth in capital-per-worker are all correlated with larger post-crisis potential output losses. This suggests that underlying the potential output losses was a substantial misallocation of resources, especially of capital, in the pre-crisis boom period. On the other hand, more competition-friendly product market regulation is associated with smaller crisis-related losses of potential output, suggesting it facilitates a reallocation of resources across firms and sectors in the aftermath of an adverse shock and so helps to mitigate its consequences."

"A simple econometric framework is presented linking current account balances of euro area countries to intra and extra euro area competitiveness, cyclical positions, fiscal positions and the oil price. The framework is then used to cyclically-adjust observed current account balances and illustrate the scale of the additional adjustments to competitiveness and/or fiscal balances required in the euro area periphery to bring structural current account balances to levels compatible with sustainable net external debt levels. In Spain and Portugal, cost competitiveness relative to the rest of the euro area would need to improve by about 30%, and by more than twice that in Greece. In peripheral countries, a combination of structural reforms to boost productivity and enhance the flexibility of labour markets, ambitious fiscal consolidation and reductions in labour taxes could substantially facilitate the rebalancing process and reduce the extent to which the burden of adjustment is reliant on further prolonged demand weakness. Surplus and/or strong competitiveness countries could help by likewise making labour and product markets more flexible, accepting above-normal inflation for an extended period and boosting demand, perhaps through reduced fiscal austerity."

"The paper describes the fiscal framework used in long-term economic scenarios, with some emphasis on revisions made since the 2013 vintage of the long-term model. Long-term projections for public spending on pensions, health and long-term care are now separate from other primary expenditure and sourced from previous OECD work taking account of population ageing and other cost pressures. Other primary expenditure are assumed to remain constant in real terms on a per capita basis, rather than remaining stable as a share of GDP. This difference is important for long-term fiscal projections because government finances are sensitive to the employment rate, whereas expenditure is linked to the total population. A fiscal rule adjusts government revenue to ensure that public debt eventually stabilises as a share of GDP, making government revenue as a share of GDP the preferred indicator of future fiscal pressure."

"Current weak labour productivity growth in many OECD countries reflects historically weak contributions from both total factor productivity (TFP) growth and capital deepening. The slowdown in trend productivity growth in the pre-crisis period is mostly explained by a long-established slowdown in TFP growth, but since the crisis the further deceleration is mainly due to weak capital deepening, a development apparent in practically every OECD country. Much of the weakness in the growth of the capital stock since the financial crisis can be explained by an accelerator response of investment to continued demand weakness, leading in turn to a deterioration of potential output via a hysteresis-like effect. For the most severely affected economies, the financial crisis is estimated to have reduced potential output by more than 2% via this transmission mechanism. In many OECD countries, declining government investment as a share of GDP has further exacerbated post-crisis weakness in capital stock growth, both directly and probably indirectly via adverse spillover effects on business investment. Finally, over a period when the use of conventional macro policy instruments was constrained, the slower pace of structural reform represents a missed opportunity, not least because more competition-friendly product market regulation could have boosted both investment and potential growth."

"This paper presents long-run economic projections for 46 countries, extending the short-run projections of the Spring 2018 OECD Economic Outlook. It first sets out a baseline scenario under the assumption that countries do not carry out institutional and policy reforms. This scenario is then used as a reference point to illustrate the potential impact of structural reforms in alternative scenarios, including better governance and educational attainment in the large emerging-market economies and competition-friendly product market and labour market reforms in OECD economies. Flexibility-enhancing labour market reforms not only boost living standards but, by raising the employment rate, also help alleviate fiscal pressures associated with population ageing. Another scenario illustrates the potential positive impact of linking the pensionable age to life expectancy on the participation rate of older workers, and in particular that of women. Additional scenarios illustrate the potential economic gains from raising public investment and spending more on research and development. A final ‘negative' scenario shows how slipping back on trade liberalisation – returning to 1990 average tariff rates – might depress standards of living everywhere."