Documents IMK 95 results

"Compared to other euro area countries, Ireland has been one of the countries most heavily hit by the worldwide financial crisis, yet, also one with the strongest and quickest recovery. Foreign controlled affiliates of multinational companies dominate economic activity, attracted by low corporate taxation rates. Low Irish tax rates contribute to downward competition of taxation in the EU and constitute a beggar-thy-neighbour-policy. Effects on Ireland are neither clearly positive: Profits of foreign affiliates do not necessarily stay in the country. A consequence is the huge difference between GNI and GDP: GNI per capita is by about 15 percentage points lower than GDP per capita. Hence, GDP can be misleading, when judging the recovery since the financial crisis. The paper instead concentrates on the development of national income, employment, and wages. Judged by these indicators, the Irish recovery ceases to be successful compared to other crisis countries. The benefits to Irish citizens are nevertheless questionable: GNI decreased stronger than GDP. Even worse are labour market developments since the recent crisis: employment and wages are still to recover, and the wage share decreased by more than 10 %-points."

"Das IMK analysiert regelmäßig mittels Daten von Eurostat die Entwicklung der Arbeits- und der Lohnstückkosten in Europa. Dabei wird die Entwicklung der Arbeitskosten in der Privatwirtschaft, im privaten und im öffentlichen Dienstleistungssektor und im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe in wichtigen europäischen Ländern sowie dem Euroraum und der Europäischen Union als Ganzes dargestellt. In dieser aktuellen Auswertung wird auch der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit die Einführung des allgemeinen gesetzlichen Mindestlohns im Jahr 2015 in Höhe von 8,50 € pro Stunde in Deutschland Einfluss auf den Anstieg der Arbeitskosten insgesamt hatte. Im Anschluss daran wird die Entwicklung der Lohnstückkosten untersucht und den Auswirkungen auf die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nachgegangen.Im Jahr 2015 kostete in Deutschland eine Arbeitsstunde in der Privatwirtschaft 32,7 Euro. Wie im Vorjahr belegt Deutschland damit im europäischen Länderranking den achten Platz. Mit einer Veränderungsrate von 2,7 % stiegen die Arbeitskosten in Deutschland im Jahr 2017 stärker als im europäischen Durchschnitt. In den meisten Krisenländern stagnierten oder sanken die Arbeitskosten erneut. In Deutschland sind im Jahr 2015 die Arbeitskosten im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe mit 2,7 % genauso stark gestiegen wie im Privaten Dienstleistungssektor. Damit hat sich der prozentuale Abstand zwischen beiden Wirtschaftsbereichen zwar nicht erhöht, beträgt aber immer noch wie im letzten Jahr über 21%. Das ist der größte Abstand zwischen den Sektoren von allen EU Mitgliedsländern.Die Anpassungsprozesse der Krisenländer haben sich auch im Jahr 2015 fortgesetzt, so dass die durchschnittliche Lohnstückkostenentwicklung des Euroraums mit 1% deutlich unter der Zielinflationsrate der EZB von knapp 2 % lag. Damit entwickelt sich der Euroraum als Ganzes nicht stabilitätskonform. In Deutschland stiegen die Lohnstückkosten um 2 %. Da die deutschen Lohnstückkosten aber seit Beginn der Währungsunion deutlich schwächer gestiegen sind, als mit dem Inflationsziel der EZB vereinbar, sollten die Löhne in Deutschland über mehrere Jahre hinweg deutlich überdurchschnittlich steigen, um den Anpassungsprozess der Krisenländer zu unterstützen."

"Analysiert werden die vielfältigen Auswirkungen der Sozialversicherungsfreiheit der Entgeltumwandlung auf die verschiedenen Zweige der Sozialversicherungen und die Anpassungsprozesse, die sich aus den Mindereinnahmen in Folge des Entfallens von Beitragseinnahmen ergeben. Zudem werden die sozial- und verteilungspolitischen Konsequenzen der unterschiedlichen Auswirkungen erörtert.Es zeigt sich, dass auch detaillierte Rechnungen auf einzelwirtschaftlicher Ebene keine eindeutige Überlegenheit der betrieblichen Entgeltumwandlung gegenüber einer privaten Rentenversicherung oder einem Festbetragssparen aufweisen, solange sich die Arbeitgeber nicht daran beteiligen. Das Ergebnis hängt vom individuellen Status (ledig, verheiratet), der Höhe des Einkommens und dem Krankenversicherungsstatus ab. Auf jeden Fall schwächt die Entgeltumwandlung das Sozialversicherungssystem, und hier vor allem die soziale Rentenversicherung. Der Entzug beitragspflichtiger Lohnbestandteile führt zu Beitragsausfällen und vor allem zu einer Minderung der Renten aller Versicherten."

"Exploiting official historical records of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the German statutory pension insurance scheme, we construct a narrative of legislated social security changes for Germany between 1970 and 2013 in order to identify important discretionary shocks to the social security system. The historical account covers major changes in transfers and social security benefits and contributions for pensions, health care, long-term care and unemployment insurance on the German federal level and thus complements the tax narrative of Uhl (2013). Based on the provided information we are able to code a rich bottom-up time-series of fiscal policy shocks for empirical macroeconomic analysis, addressing the identification problem. Therefore, we collect information regarding the underlying motivation, the dates of the legislative process and the prospective financial impact, closely following the methodology of Romer and Romer (2010) and Uhl (2013)."

"It is by now a widely shared insight that fiscal policy needs to be re-strengthened as a macroeconomic policy instrument within European macroeconomic policies: Recent experiences with austerity policies, new research regarding the size of the fiscal multiplier and the fact that monetary policy is obviously overstrained have led to this conclusion. As a consequence, increases in public investment are particularly necessary. Against this background this contribution discusses and proposes the introduction of the traditional public finance golden rule into the EU/Eurozone fiscal framework (Stability and growth pact (SGP), Fiscal Compact (FC)). Such a rule would exempt public (net) investment suitably defined from the relevant deficit targets of both the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP as well as the FC. That way, fiscal policy would be upgraded and receive larger room for manoeuvre and public investment as a particularly growth enhancing public expenditure category would be strengthened. Different definitions are discussed and a pragmatic definition based on the national accounts with some modifications is proposed. The standard reservations against a golden rule are critically assessed, but mostly discarded. However, the potential limits of the golden rule are examined by way of pragmatic multiplier-based macroeconomic assessments: Would a golden rule have prevented the austerity crisis since 2010? Would other expenditure categories - particularly spending on social policy - have necessarily suffered? Would a golden rule leave sufficient fiscal leeway for expansionary fiscal policy in the current situation? The results are encouraging, yet they show, that the golden rule alone would not be sufficient to stabilise the Euro area economies."

"This paper examines the relationship between inequality and growth in the neo-Kaleckian and Cambridge growth models. The paper explores the channels whereby functional and personal income distribution impact growth. The growth - inequality relationship can be negative or positive, depending on the economy's characteristics. Contrary to widespread claims, inequality per se does not impact growth through macroeconomic channels. Instead, both growth and inequality are impacted by changes in the underlying forms and pattern of income payments. However, inequality is critical at the microeconomic level as it explains differences in household propensities to consume which are at the foundation of neo-Kaleckian and Cambridge growth theory."

"There is a large body of literature analyzing the onset of the Great Depression or the factors influencing economic recovery in the 1930s, especially the New Deal. The role of income inequality before and during the Great Depression, however, has almost never been discussed thoroughly. This paper attempts to answer two questions. Firstly, was inequality perceived as a problem by the Roosevelt administration? Secondly, did the New Deal incorporate these concerns such that economic policy design did take seriously the problem of inequality? Using official documents such as transcripts of Roosevelt's inaugural speeches, fireside chats and press conferences, this paper finds that top-end inequality was not recognized as a major political topic. Restoring the purchasing power of workers and farmers, however, appears to have been a political goal of the administration. The impact of New Deal policies on top-end income inequality or the wage share, however, can only be considered as modest. Only World War II and the long-term legislation of the New Deal may be considered successful in reducing top income and wealth shares and raising the wage share."

"Die stark expansive Geldpolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank zeigt positive Wirkungen. Die Zinsen sind weiter gesunken, die Kreditvergabe erholt sich etwas und der Euro hat abgewertet. Allerdings ist die Inflation weiterhin deutlich zu niedrig und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung zu schwach, um eine zügige Verringerung der Produktionslücke im Euroraum zu ermöglichen. Erschwerend ist, dass im Falle einer weiteren Abwertung die globalen Ungleichgewichte und die Schwäche der Weltwirtschaft verstärkt würden. Die Geldpolitik benötigt daher dringend Unterstützung durch die Fiskalpolitik.Der Euroraum hat zudem ein zentrales Problem, das nicht nur die Effektivität der Geldpolitik beeinträchtigt, sondern auch die Fiskalpolitik behindert und darüber hinaus die künftige Stabilität des Euroraums gefährdet. Mit der Entscheidung, Staatsanleihen als sichere Anlagen aufzugeben, verliert der Euroraum einen wesentlichen Stabilitätsanker einer entwickelten Volkswirtschaft."

"Based on Eurostat data the Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) regularly analyses the development of labour costs and unit labour costs in Europe. This report presents labour cost trends in the private sector, disaggregated for private as well as public services and manufacturing industry, for a selection of European countries, the Euro Area and the European Union. In addition the development of unit labour costs in Europe is analysed, so allowing for labour productivity. Subsequently, the report examines the development of unit labor costs and the relationship between price competitiveness, export prices and unit labor costs.In 2014 hourly labour cost in the German private sector averaged 31.9 Euros. The German economy is in eighth position in the ranking of EU countries as in the previous year. With an annual rate of change of 1.8 %, the rise in labour costs in the German private sector was slightly above the European average. In the so-called European crisis countries hourly labour costs decreased again. Hourly labour costs in German manufacturing rose by 2.5 %. This is a slightly faster rate than in private services, where labour costs grew by 1.7 %. Consequently, the difference in labour costs between the two sectors diverged further and is now equal to 21 %, the largest intersectoral wage gap of all the EU countries.The adjustment process in the European crisis countries continued in 2014. Hence, the average rate of change in unit hourly labour cost in the Eurozone of 1.2 % was significantly below the ECB's inflation target of slightly below 2 % per annum. Therefore, the development of unit labour costs in the Euro Area as a whole does not comply with the ECB's inflation target. In Germany unit labour costs rose by 1.9 %. Overall, since the start of the currency union the rate of growth of unit labour costs in Germany was substantially below the ECB's inflation target. Therefore, wages in Germany should grow at an above average rate for several years to support the adjustment process in the European crisis countries."

"How do economic policy mistakes happen? One view is that policy makers are benevolent, and errors arise because economic theories are inadequate. Another is that policy makers pursue sectional interests that may have no relation to any academic consensus on good policy. This paper examines a third alternative: policy makers want to do the right thing (although they have political preferences), and the academic consensus is correct, but policy makers do not follow it because they rely on imperfect intermediaries. I use this framework to examine the global switch to fiscal austerity in 2010."