Documents franchising 8 results

"Franchise jobs are often viewed as epitomizing a "low-road" employee-management approach characterized by high turnover and several practices that are deemed unsophisticated, such as low investment in training, deskilling of work, and little encouragement of employee involvement. Research on franchise operations suggests, however, that the basic operating principles and practices of franchises tend to be more sophisticated than those of equivalent independent operators. Might their employee management practices be more advanced as well, notwithstanding the stereotype of franchise jobs? This study uses data from a national probability sample of establishments, drawn from surveys conducted in the mid-1990s, to examine the relationship between franchise status and employment practices. Descriptive statistics suggest that franchise operations used low-road practices, but once industry, size, and other control variables are included in the analysis, these operations appear to have offered better jobs with more sophisticated systems of employee management than did similar non-franchise operations."

"Recent studies document pervasive noncompliance with basic labor standards in industries with high concentrations of low-wage workers. The authors examine how franchising, a common form of business organization in low-wage industries, affects compliance. They estimate the effect of franchise ownership on compliance with federal minimum wage and overtime standards in the fast food industry using unique data on Top 20 branded restaurants. Franchised outlets have far higher levels of noncompliance than comparable company-owned establishments. The authors argue that observed differences arise from internal incentives facing franchisees versus franchisors rather than from external enforcement pressures facing the parties."

"For much of the twentieth century, large companies employing many workers formed the bedrock of the U.S. economy. Today, on the list of big business's priorities, sustaining the employer-worker relationship ranks far below building a devoted customer base and delivering value to investors. As David Weil's groundbreaking analysis shows, large corporations have shed their role as direct employers of the people responsible for their products, in favor of outsourcing work to small companies that compete fiercely with one another. The result has been declining wages, eroding benefits, inadequate health and safety conditions, and ever-widening income inequality.
From the perspectives of CEOs and investors, fissuring—splitting off functions that were once managed internally—has been a phenomenally successful business strategy, allowing companies to become more streamlined and drive down costs. Despite giving up direct control to subcontractors, vendors, and franchises, these large companies have figured out how to maintain quality standards and protect the reputation of the brand. They produce brand-name products and services without the cost of maintaining an expensive workforce. But from the perspective of workers, this lucrative strategy has meant stagnation in wages and benefits and a lower standard of living—if they are fortunate enough to have a job at all.
Weil proposes ways to modernize regulatory policies and laws so that employers can meet their obligations to workers while allowing companies to keep the beneficial aspects of this innovative business strategy."

"Le contrat de franchise consiste à transmettre au franchisé le savoir-faire du franchiseur, moyennant des contreparties financières. Cependant, la transmission de ce savoir-faire va au-delà de la simple mise à disposition d'une « recette ». Elle se prolonge par une assistance de tous les instants délivrée par le franchiseur au franchisé. À certains égards, cette relation contractuelle ne ressemble-t-elle pas à celle d'un employeur avec le salarié ?Cet article étudie la relation émanant de ce contrat à l'aide des facteurs juridiques (le caractère subordonnant de la relation contractuelle) et économiques (la puissance économique du franchiseur) qui la structurent. L'étude s'appuie tant sur une analyse sociojuridique de la jurisprudence québécoise (1994-2016) au moyen d'une appréhension du contenu relationnel de ce contrat, que sur la littérature économique dans le but de comprendre les éléments de subordination et de puissance économique qui empreignent cette relation.Le constat révèle que la relation de franchise comporte de fortes composantes de subordination et d'inégalité de puissance économique pour le franchisé, engendrant un assujettissement aussi réel que celui mis en place par le salariat, même s'il n'est pas institué formellement par le contrat de franchisage. Plusieurs pistes d'action sont proposées. Si la requalification de certains contrats de franchise en contrat de travail semble une avenue préconisée par plusieurs pays, nos tribunaux y sont peu enclins. La deuxième piste d'action résiderait dans l'adoption d'une loi encadrant l'établissement et le contenu des contrats de franchise afin de réduire l'asymétrie informationnelle existante entre franchiseur et franchisé, ainsi que de mieux encadrer les qualités du « concept » sur lequel s'appuient les franchiseurs pour séduire les franchisés. Une troisième piste serait de reconnaître l'inégalité de puissance économique, point de départ de la reconnaissance « d'un droit de la dépendance dans l'indépendance » capable d'appréhender ces multiples situations d'entrepreneuriat dépendant dont la franchise n'est qu'un exemple."

"Two remedial orders by the prefectural Labor Relations Commissions (Rodo Iinkai) in Japan1 that affirmed the worker status under the Labor Union Act (LUA) of “owners” of convenience stores who work in the stores they manage, have raised new interpretative issues in terms of franchisees being qualified as workers. Although the remedial orders of the Commissions seems basically reasonable, the unique characteristics of franchise agreements were not fully taken into account. In a franchise agreement, the “franchise package” entails the obligation to follow directions and orders from which worker status could be inferred. On the other hand, the franchisee increases opportunities to gain profits as a business trader. In overall judgment of worker status, the amount of income obtained ought to be a deciding factor, and thus it depends on respective convenience store “owners” as to whether they can be regarded as “workers” under the LUA. If labor unions organizing “owners” of convenience stores are recognized as legitimate labor unions meeting the requirements under the LUA, collective bargaining agreements concluded by such unions will be the content of franchise agreement by the effect of Article 16 of the LUA. In other words, franchise agreements will be recognized as “labor contracts.” However, even if the worker status of convenience store “owners” under the LUA is accepted, in the author's opinion, their worker status under the Labor Standards Act (LSA) is not affirmed because with respect to franchise agreements, “equivalent protections” under a unique set of occupational and work regulations are provided as judicial precedents contributing to the protection of franchisees are being accumulated. Nonetheless, the relative nature of the definition of “worker” causes confusion in practice. Greater consistency of the definition of “worker” will be needed in labor legislation regulating the content of contracts. In the future, a regulatory framework for exemption for convenience store “owners” from application of the LSA/LCA should be drawn up. Meanwhile, there are problems in that convenience store “owners” who has the worker status under the LUA, in the author's opinion, cannot be qualified as “enterprises” under the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (the Antimonopoly Act), and seemingly should be excluded from protections from abuse of superior bargaining position (the Antimonopoly Act, Article 19). But as collective agreements in Japan differ from those in Europe regulating working conditions for the industry as a whole, regulation of abuse of superior bargaining position will continue to be applied to the entire franchise system."