Documents Palombarini, Stefano 2 results

"This article presents a simple formal model of institutional complementarity (IC) applied to industrial relations, and develops two important aspects of IC. We first develop a formal definition for the static and dynamic aspects of IC and then relate these to the interaction between financial relations and the outcome of a wage bargaining between firms and trade unions. Trade unions and firms have the choice between a cooperative negotiation targeting at the long-term success of the firm and a conflictual relation targeting at maximizing the current share. One important determinant in this game will be the time horizon financial investors have as they influence the realization of future gains of cooperation between workers and firms. When financial investors are patient, a pareto-superior cooperative equilibrium can be attained. On the other hand, whenever one of the two bargaining parties gets too weak, the viability even of the long-term equilibrium is threatened."

"This article proposes a theoretical approach to the political economy of institutional change and comparative capitalism. It argues that the firm-based approach of the Varieties of Capitalism literature cannot satisfactorily integrate the political aspects of institutional change and must in one way or another rely on some type of economic functionalism. By linking explicitly political strategies and demands for institutional change, a neorealist approach can exploit the concepts of complementarity and hierarchy of institutions. Different types of institutional change may take place in situations of political equilibrium, political crisis or systemic crisis."