Documents Decreuse, Bruno 5 results

"We analyse the efficiency of schooling choices in a wage-posting search equilibrium model with on-the-job search. The workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education determines the scope — or adaptability— of individual skills. Individuals obtain schooling to leave unemployment more quickly and to climb the wage ladder rapidly through job-to-job mobility — that is, to speed up job shopping. Education reduces firms' monopsony power in the wage determination by improving workers' mobility. As a result, the wage distribution shifts rightward with aggregate schooling. However, the ratio of vacant jobs to job seekers also falls in each sector. Either one or the other externality may dominate, implying, respectively, under- or over-education. A combination of minimum wage and schooling fee can decentralize the efficient allocation."

"This paper examines the impact of labor market institutions covering the risk of unemployment on the nature of educational investment. We offer a matching model of unemployment in which individuals of a given education determine the scope (or adaptability) and intensity (or productivity) of their human capital before entering the labor market. Our model features an increasing relationship between match surplus and the return to adaptability skills. This relationship explains why matching frictions promote adaptability skills instead of productivity skills, and why unemployment benefits and job protection create the incentive for productivity skill acquisition."

"This paper studies the efficiency of educational choices in a two sector/two schooling level matching model of the labor market where a continuum of heterogenous workers allocates itself between sectors depending on their decision to invest in education. Individuals differ in working ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and there is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education causes composition effects in the distribution of skills across sectors. This in turn modifies the intensity of job creation, implying the private and social returns to schooling always differ. Provided that ability and schooling cost are not too positively correlated, agents with large schooling costs — the ‘poor' — underinvest in education, while there is overinvestment among the low schooling cost individuals — the ‘rich'. We also show that education should be more taxed than subsidized when the Hosios condition holds."