"On‐demand service firms secure market power by cultivating and operationalising calculative asymmetries between the platform and labour. In this article, I analyse dynamic (or ‘surge') pricing as an exemplary calculative technique. I show how the asymmetrical application of price‐setting allows firms to leverage control at the aggregate level while maintaining the façade of autonomy at the individual level, thereby legitimising workers' classification as independent contractors but solving the coordination problems that the classification introduces. The article complements and extends previous critical research into the platform or ‘on‐demand' service economy by analysing how management scientists model and simulate on‐demand marketplaces. I consider management science to be a calculative technique for optimising operational efficiency. A critical review of management science provides novel insights into platforms' efforts to monopolise calculative agency at the expense of other market participants. The article concludes by considering implications for broader critiques of platform labour management."

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