Documents recruitment 304 results

"Comment se construit la confiance sur un marché du travail non qualifié lorsque la main-d'œuvre est a priori dépourvue des signaux habituels de la qualification ? Sur la base d'enquêtes de terrain menées dans le secteur de l'hôtellerie-restauration, nous montrons que les opérations de recrutement liées aux emplois non qualifiés sont investies de façon très inégale selon les espaces de qualification dans lesquels se définit la non-qualification. Dans le « pôle professionnel », l'emploi non qualifié se situe aux marges d'une activité principalement exercée par des gens de métier. Dans la mesure où la confiance se construit en amont des transactions, l'embauche repose sur la reconnaissance de qualités préalablement sanctionnées, ce qui rend problématique le recrutement de la main-d'œuvre dépourvue des signaux de qualification attendue. À l'inverse, le « pôle commercial » mobilise une main-d'œuvre a priori plus substituable. La dépendance des employeurs envers le marché du travail les conduit à davantage se confronter à des candidats inconnus. Il en résulte des opérations de sélection pouvant aboutir au recrutement de profils improbables, ce qui conduit à nuancer l'image d'un secteur réputé pour ses discriminations."

"Using the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) 2008, I investigate how looks affect an individual's labor supply decision. My results are, by and large, in line with predictions derived from the neoclassical model of labor supply. Applying regular probit, bivariate probit, Tobit and Heckman selection regression models, I find that good looks go hand in hand with higher employment probabilities and more hours of market work. Furthermore, physical attractiveness is positively associated with spousal income and spousal employment. Hence, beauty appears to affect labor supply decisions both directly and through the marriage market."

"Using a representative establishment dataset, this paper is the first to analyze the incidence of wage bargaining and wage posting in the matching process from the employers' side. We show that both modes of wage determination coexist in the German labor market, with more than one-third of hirings being characterized by individual wage negotiations. Wage bargaining is more likely for more-educated applicants, for jobs with special requirements, and in tight regional labor markets. Wage posting (in the sense of a fixed offer) dominates in the public sector, in larger firms, in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements, and in jobs involving part-time and fixed-term contracts. Job seekers who are unemployed, out of the labor force or have just finished an apprenticeship are also less likely to have a chance to negotiate."

"This study investigates the effect of the introduction of the public employment agency's Internet-based service on the duration of employer search. The analysis exploits the introduction of a web-based service by the Finnish Employment Agency in October 2002. The results, based on information on job vacancies announced via the public employment agency between 2002 and 2003, indicate that the introduction of the web service, in general, shortened the duration of employer search. However, we find that the introduction of the web-based service shortened the average duration of vacancies in some regions but not in others. In addition, employers in urban areas were more likely to benefit from the introduction of the online service."

"This paper introduces a model that examines the effects of unions on pay and hiring gaps between non-unionized men and women in the context of imperfect competition. Although the model does not question the advantages unions obtain for their members, it does show that (1) unions increase wage and occupational discrimination for non-unionized workers; (2) the non-unionized sector does not constitute a good comparison group for use in analysing the impact of unions on gender discrimination; and (3) public policies targeting gender differences in occupational sorting can also have a positive impact on gender wage differentials."

"This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital."

"This paper proposes a principal–agent model of labour market discrimination. In this model, the firm manager is a taste-based discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder's profits, because workers differ in skill. The model shows that performance-based contracts may moderate the manager's propensity to discriminate, but that they are unlikely to fully eliminate discrimination. Moreover, the model predicts that sectors with high skill leverages discriminate less. Finally, the impacts of a wage gap between groups and of a diversity premium are investigated."