Documents Di Carlo, Donato 6 results

"We analyse wage developments in Germany during the inflation shock years of 2021–2023 from three perspectives: cost of living, supply-side cost pressure, and relational. With an export-led growth model, Germany is dependent on a favourable real effective exchange rate. Because of its above-average exposure to the energy crisis and low unemployment, Germany was particularly vulnerable to strong wage demands, putting at risk its cost competitiveness. In response to the inflation crisis, moderate collective bargaining outcomes have resulted from widespread use of one-off payments, longer duration of collective agreements, and ‘zero-month' clauses, which have delayed wage increases. As in all other eurozone countries, employees have suffered real wage losses, but nominal wage increases at the lower end of the labour market fared better than average. Major competitiveness shifts have occurred in the eurozone, particularly to the detriment of Eastern European countries and the Baltics, but not Germany."

"This article compares the responses of the governments and social partners in Italy and Spain to the inflation crisis of 2021–2023. Faced with a common exogenous shock and sharing a comparable institutional setting in the labour market, the two countries' responses to the inflation crisis differed substantially with regard to the policy mode of crisis response and the types of policy intervention. First, social partners' involvement was far more significant in Spain, where peak-level agreements were signed setting a three-year trajectory for negotiated wage increases. In contrast, Italian governments proceeded unilaterally, with no attempts at collective bargaining coordination. Secondly, while the Italian government disbursed more fiscal resources through targeted compensatory measures, the Spanish government relied primarily on energy price controls and minimum wage revaluation, with lower overall fiscal expenditure. Finally, the distribution of inflation costs across population groups differed, with inflation in Spain being lower and having less regressive distributional effects than in Italy. We attribute the differing policy responses to the different partisan compositions and ideological orientations of the two governments."

"This special issue analyses governments' and social partners' responses to the cost-of-living crisis of 2021–2023, and dynamics of coordination and conflict underlying them. The study of inflation responses needs updating. First, because compared to the 1970s–1980s, the recent inflation crisis was hardly intensified by high wage demands. Secondly, because industrial relations and collective bargaining institutions have over the last three decades undergone liberalisation reforms that have eroded coordination capacities. Contributions to this special issue show cross-country variation in real wage dynamics, inflation's distributional impacts and governments' policies to tackle them. The interaction between government policies, collective bargaining institutions and social partners' strategies largely accounts for this variation. In most cases, governments no longer coordinate with social partners nor use them to enforce wage restraint to internalise inflation shocks. Rather, governments actively manage inflation through direct intervention, framing policies and steering them to either shield competitiveness, support domestic demand or reduce inequalities."

"This article examines the political foundations of industrial policy amid the return of state economic interventionism. Comparing the United States' Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the European Union's Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP), it shows that contrasting industrial policy strategies were ultimately shaped by differences in the two polities' legislative rules. In both cases, geopolitical pressures sparked renewed interest in green industrial policymaking. However, procedural mechanisms for majoritarian decision-making in the U.S. Senate enabled the government to overcome partisan veto players and compelled the design of the IRA as a budgetary instrument centered on fiscal subsidies. By contrast, unanimity requirements in the EU's joint decision-making system prevented the Commission from overcoming Member State veto players in the Council, precluding supranational fiscal instruments and resulting in a regulation-based, decentralized approach via national state aid. The findings contribute to the burgeoning debates on the return of industrial policy and state activism by showing how political institutions contribute to shaping not only the scope but also the form of economic interventionism within different polities."

This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

"German public sector wage restraint has been explained through the presence of a specific type of inter-sectoral wage coordination in the industrial relations system – i.e., export sector-led pattern bargaining. This paper has a twofold ambition. First, as a literature-assessing exercise, I review the literature in industrial relations and comparative political economy (CPE) and find that (1) the origins and mechanics of inter-sectoral wage coordination through pattern bargaining have never been laid out clearly; (2) the mechanisms of the pattern bargaining thesis have never been tested empirically; and (3) the CPE literature reveals a limiting export-sector bias. Second, as a theory-testing exercise, I perform hoop tests to verify whether the pattern bargaining hypothesis can really account for wage restraint in the German public sector. I find that Germany cannot be considered a case of export sector-driven pattern bargaining. These findings challenge core tenets of a longstanding scholarship in both CPE and industrial relations. Most importantly, they open a new research agenda for the study of public sector wage-setting that should shift its focus to public sector employment relations, public finance, public administrations, and the politics of fiscal policy."

"German public sector wage restraint has been explained through the presence of a specific type of inter‐sectoral wage coordination in the industrial relations system—that is, export sector‐led pattern bargaining. First, as a literature‐assessing exercise, this paper reviews the literature in industrial relations and comparative political economy (CPE) and finds that (i) the origins and mechanics of inter‐sectoral wage coordination through pattern bargaining have never been laid out clearly; (ii) that the mechanisms of the pattern bargaining thesis have never been tested empirically; and (iii) that the CPE literature reveals an export‐sector bias. Second, as a theory‐testing exercise, hoop tests are performed to verify the pattern bargaining hypothesis. The key finding is that Germany cannot be considered a case of export sector‐driven pattern bargaining, opening a new research agenda for the study of public sector wage setting centred on public sector employment relations, public finance, public administrations and the politics of fiscal policy."