Documents van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. 11 results

"We compare the results from a recent global expert survey on climate policy with answers to the same survey by the online artificial-intelligence chatbot ChatGPT. Such a study is timely and relevant as many people around the world are likely to use ChatGPT and similar language models to inquire about climate solutions, which in turn might influence public opinion. The comparison provides insights about performance criteria, policy instruments, and use of information from distinct academic disciplines. With a few exceptions, responses by ChatGPT are informative and of high quality. We find that ChatGPT answers questions with less bias than experts from various scientific disciplines. The latter may also be a disadvantage as it seems to weight all the information available equally without accounting well for relevance, which arguably may require human rather than artificial intelligence. On the other hand, experts from distinct disciplines show difference in average responses, with some even expressing opinions inconsistent with objective evidence, meaning there is no consistent and unbiased expert opinion on climate policy. As a new way of synthesizing large amounts of academic and grey literature, ChatGPT can serve policymaking. However, since the procedure that it follows for collecting and summarizing information remains a black box, it is best regarded as a complement rather than a substitute to traditional literature reviews and expert surveys."

"Climate policy has been mainly studied with economic models that assume representative, rational agents. However, it aims at changing behavior associated with carbon-intensive goods that are often subject to bounded rationality and social preferences, such as status and imitation. Here we use a macroeconomic multi-agent model with such features to test the effect of various policies on both environmental and economic performance. The model is particularly suitable to address distributional impacts of climate policies, not only because populations of many agents are included, but also as these are composed of different classes of households driven by specific motivations. We simulate various policy scenarios, combining in different ways a carbon tax, a reduction of labor taxes, subsidies for green innovation, a price subsidy to consumers for less carbon-intensive products, and green government procurement. The results show pronounced differences with those obtained by rational-agent model studies. It turns out that demand-oriented subsidies lead to lower unemployment and higher output, but perform less well in terms of carbon emissions. The supply-oriented subsidy for green innovation results in a significant reduction of carbon emissions with a slight reduction of unemployment."

"In this paper we present a sector-based approach to investigate whether green growth – combining economic growth with environmental sustainability – is feasible. Our approach considers the relation between on the one hand carbon dioxide emissions per dollar of output (what we will call carbon intensity) and on the other growth in economic output and labor productivity, at the level of production sectors. Carbon intensity (CI) is calculated in two ways: as direct CO2 emissions from each sector, which can be seen to immediately result from the processes in the respective sector; and as total, direct plus indirect, emissions, by using environmentally-extended input-output tables. The analysis covers Denmark, Germany and Spain for the period 1995-2007. We calculate correlations over time between sectoral CIs and a range of economic indicators: sectoral total and relative output, final demand, value added, and so-called output and valued-added productivity indicators, and their change. The findings are similar for the two types of CI indicators. The bad news for green growth is that relatively clean sectors do not seem to be more productive than dirtier ones, and neither show higher productivity growth. Sectors associated with high carbon intensity grew more in absolute terms than those with low carbon intensity. The share of these sectors increased suggesting that green growth requires a very rapid pace of decarbonization, or the economy as a whole to shrink. Longer-term sectoral growth on the other hand, as expressed by a change in value added, does not seem to be positively correlated with carbon intensity."

"We raise fundamental questions about macroeconomics relevant to escaping the financial and economic crisis and shifting to a sustainable economy. First, the feasibility of decoupling environmental pressure from aggregate income is considered. Decoupling as a single environmental strategy is found to be very risky. Next, three main arguments for economic growth are examined: growth as progress, growth to avoid economic instability, and growth to offset unemployment due to labour productivity improvements. For each, we offer orthodox, heterodox and new responses. Attention is paid to progress indicators, feedback mechanisms affecting business cycles, and strategies to limit unemployment without the need for growth. Besides offering an economy-wide angle, we discuss the role of housing and mortgage markets in economic cyclicality. Finally, interactions between real economic and financial-monetary spheres are studied. This includes money creation, capital allocation and trade-offs between efficiency and operating costs of financial systems. Throughout, environmental and transition implications are outlined."

"Segmentation of survey respondents is a common tool in environmental communication as it helps to understand opinions of people and to deliver targeted messages. Prior research has segmented people based on their opinions about the relationship between economic growth and environmental sustainability. This involved an evaluation of 16 statements, which means considerable survey time and cost, particularly if administered by a third party, as well as cognitive burden on respondents, increasing the chance of incomplete responses. In this study, we apply a machine learning algorithm to results from past surveys among citizens and scientists to identify a robust, minimal set of questions that accurately segments respondents regarding their opinion on growth versus the environment. In particular, we distinguish three groups, called Green growth, Agrowth and Degrowth. To this end, we identify five perceptions, namely regarding ‘environmental protection', ‘public services', ‘life satisfaction', ‘stability' and ‘development space'. Prediction accuracy ranges between 81% and 89% across surveys and opinion segments. We apply the proposed set of questions on growth-vs-environment to a new survey from 2020 to illustrate its use as an efficient instrument in future surveys."

"There is an ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of carbon pricing, with a strong division between optimists and pessimists. A recent review study by Lilliestam, Patt and Bersalli (2021) of the impact of carbon pricing on low-carbon innovation and deep carbonization concludes that there is no evidence for such an impact. We evaluate this study and identify various shortcomings of it, which together cast strong doubts on its main conclusion. Instead, we conclude, based on the studies reviewed by the authors and additional, overlooked literature, that carbon pricing has had a small but positive and significant effect on low-carbon innovation. Our evaluation provides lessons for undertaking a systematic and objective review of research on this topic. Since the main goal of carbon pricing is changing choices by firms and consumers that affect carbon emissions, we also point the reader towards recent evidence for the broader effectiveness of carbon pricing."

"It remains unclear how COVID-19 has affected public engagement with the climate crisis. According to the finite-pool-of-worry hypothesis, concern about climate change should have decreased after the pandemic, in turn reducing climate-policy acceptance. Here we test these and several other conjectures by using survey data from 1172 Spanish participants who responded before and after the first wave of COVID-19, allowing for both aggregate and within-person analyses. We find that on average climate concern has decreased, while acceptance of most climate policies has increased. At the individual-level, adverse health experiences are unrelated to these changes. The same holds for negative economic experiences, with the exception that unemployment is associated with reduced acceptance of some policies. Complementary to the finite-pool-of-worry test, we examine three additional pandemic-related issues. As we find, (1) higher climate concern and policy acceptance are associated with a belief that climate change contributed to the COVID-19 outbreak; (2) higher policy acceptance is associated with a positive opinion about how the government addressed the COVID-19 crisis; (3) citizens show favorable attitudes to a carbon tax with revenues used to compensate COVID-19-related expenditures. Overall, we conclude there is support for addressing the global climate crisis even during a global health crisis."

"Ambitious climate mitigation policies face social and political resistance. One reason is that existing policies insufficiently capture the diversity of relevant insights from the social sciences about potential policy outcomes. We argue that agent-based models can serve as a powerful tool for integration of elements from different disciplines. Having such a common platform will enable a more complete assessment of climate policies, in terms of criteria like effectiveness, equity and public support."

"Many countries have carbon pricing in place, in the form of a tax and/or market. Generally, this involves low price rates, incomplete emissions coverage, and price reductions for particular sectors. This raises the question whether the label “carbon price” – in the environmental-economics textbook sense – really applies. To answer it, we assess the authenticity of 31 national carbon prices, calculating average carbon prices and their gap with advertised prices, at both national and sector levels. The results indicate a poor level of authenticity. This means that the carbon prices published by sources such as the World Bank provide a misleading representation of the actual national policy pressure on emissions. Countries show considerable differences regarding the average carbon price level and the gap with advertised prices. Moreover, there is not a one-to-one relationship between advertised and average carbon prices, suggesting the former are not a good basis for international comparison of policy effectiveness. Across countries, the mean carbon price equals €7.90/ton of CO2 while the mean price gap is 57.7%. Most noticeably, the highest advertised price for Sweden should be interpreted with care as it goes along with a price gap of almost €100 to the average price. In addition, Switzerland and Finland show relatively high price gaps. To illustrate the relevance and non-triviality of our indicators, note that Sweden occupies a 3rd position in terms of average carbon price (after Norway and Switzerland), 27th in terms of price gap, and 16th in terms of effective rate (i.e. sum of implicit and explicit carbon prices). We further find that implicit carbon prices dominate explicit ones for most countries, notably in road transport, whereas the reverse holds for industrial and electricity sectors. Combining our findings with recent empirical evidence for carbon-pricing effectiveness highlights the potential of the instrument to combat climate change, provided implementation is improved and internationally harmonized. Shifting the attention from advertised to average carbon prices might help in this regard."