"This article argues that the requirement of group disadvantage in indirect belief discrimination is incompatible with the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The latter protects sincerely held beliefs even if they are not shared by others or part of group orthodoxy. Consequently, the group disadvantage requirement in indirect belief discrimination ought to be interpreted away under section 3 HRA. Doing so, it is argued, does not give an unfair advantage to beliefs over other aspects of personal identity and complies with the legal injunction against judicial involvement in theological or philosophical disputes. The article concludes by arguing that, in light of the UK case law, imposing a requirement of group disadvantage is likely to pose a more significant barrier to secular philosophical beliefs than to religious ones. In light of an understanding of secularism that requires equal treatment of religious and deeply held secular beliefs, it is imperative that such a barrier be dispensed with."

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