"In this article, I suggest that different types of capitalism specialize in communicating different types of information. Strongly coordinated capitalism communicates insider information but suppresses public information, and vice versa for weakly coordinated economies. Selectively targeted insider information credibly signals intention for long-term cooperation, while indiscriminately revealed public information credibly reveals intention for opportunism. Since the same hidden knowledge cannot be revealed both indiscriminately and selectively, coordinated capitalism forces the two types of information to crowd each other out. Using the external financing of R&D as an example, I test this theory in informational environments typical for different types of capitalism (mature technologies for some and cutting-edge for others). When investors rely on public information (Initial Public Offerings), strongly coordinated capitalism exhibits severe symptoms of poor information; when investors rely on insider information (venture capital and banking), symptoms of poor information shift to weakly coordinated economies."

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