"This article examines populists' relationship with non-state actors in international environmental agreements (IEAs). We ask whether populist governments favor transnational non-state actors' access to these institutions. Using data on the design of IEAs since the 1970s, evidence is reported suggesting that populists seek to institutionalize non-state actors' access to IEAs. To explain this relationship, we argue that populist governments likely want to reduce and undermine the influence of established elites, also in international institutions. To this end, they may want to institutionalize access of their own constituents within IEAs. The empirical implication of this claim is that institutionalized access of non-state actors in IEAs is more likely when populist governments are involved. The empirical results provide strong and robust support for our argument, and these findings contribute to our knowledge in a number of areas of environmental politics and political science in general."

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