Monopsony power, pay structure, and training
Muehlemann, Samuel ; Ryan, Paul ; Wolter, Stefan C.
2013
66
5
Oct.
1097-1114
training ; wage differential ; wage structure
Wages and wage payment systems
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/
English
Bibliogr.
"Although interest in monopsonistic influences on labor market outcomes has revived in recent years, only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on this topic. In this article, the authors analyze the effect of monopsony power on pay structure, using a direct measure of labor market thinness. The authors find evidence of monopsony power, as firms facing fewer local competitors offer lower wages to skilled labor and trainees, but not to unskilled labor. The findings have important implications for the economic theory of training, as most recent models assume monopsonistic pay-setting for skilled labor, but not for trainees."
Paper
The ETUI is co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the ETUI.