Documents Pain, Nigel 33 results

"This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which raising public investment can sustainably lift growth without deteriorating public finances. To do so, it relies on a range of simulations using three different macro-structural models. According to the simulations, OECD governments could finance a ½ percentage point of GDP investment-led stimulus for three to four years on average in OECD countries without raising the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium term, provided projects are sound. After one year, the average output gains for the large advanced economies of such a stimulus amount to 0.4-0.6%. However, the gains are particularly uncertain for Japan. Reprioritising spending in later years would lead to average long-term output gains of between 0.5 to 2% in the large advanced economies. Those gains depend on the assumptions made on the rate of return. Hysteresis reinforces the case for an investment-led stimulus. Output gains will also be higher if the stimulus is combined with structural reforms and if countries act collectively."

"Membership of the European Union has contributed to the economic prosperity of the United Kingdom. Uncertainty about the outcome of the referendum has already started to weaken growth in the United Kingdom. A UK exit (Brexit) would be a major negative shock to the UK economy, with economic fallout in the rest of the OECD, particularly other European countries. In some respects, Brexit would be akin to a tax on GDP, imposing a persistent and rising cost on the economy that would not be incurred if the UK remained in the EU. The shock would be transmitted through several channels that would change depending on the time horizon. In the near term, the UK economy would be hit by tighter financial conditions and weaker confidence and, after formal exit from the European Union, higher trade barriers and an early impact of restrictions on labour mobility. By 2020, GDP would be over 3% smaller than otherwise (with continued EU membership), equivalent to a cost per household of GBP 2200 (in today's prices). In the longer term, structural impacts would take hold through the channels of capital, immigration and lower technical progress. In particular, labour productivity would be held back by a drop in foreign direct investment and a smaller pool of skills. The extent of foregone GDP would increase over time. By 2030, in a central scenario GDP would be over 5% lower than otherwise – with the cost of Brexit equivalent to GBP 3200 per household (in today's prices). The effects would be larger in a more pessimistic scenario and remain negative even in the optimistic scenario. Brexit would also hold back GDP in other European economies, particularly in the near term resulting from heightened uncertainty would create about the future of Europe. In contrast, continued UK membership in the European Union and further reforms of the Single Market would enhance living standards on both sides of the Channel."

"The downturn in fixed investment among advanced economies from the onset of the global crisis was unusually severe, widespread and long-lasting relative to comparable episodes in the past. As a result, investment gaps are large in many countries, not only in relation to past norms but also relative to projected future steady-state levels, with a gap of 2 percentage points of GDP or more in several countries. A significant proportion of this investment shortfall is attributable to soft demand conditions (the accelerator effect) but financial factors and heightened uncertainty have also played a role. In addition to continued support to demand from macroeconomic policies, the recovery in investment could be boosted by tackling longer-term policy issues that bear on investment decisions indirectly, by reducing financial fragmentation in the euro area and by undertaking growth-friendly structural reforms."

"This paper assesses the OECD's projections for GDP growth and inflation during the global financial crisis and recovery, focussing on lessons that can be learned. The projections repeatedly over-estimated growth, failing to anticipate the extent of the slowdown and later the weak pace of the recovery – errors made by many other forecasters. At the same time, inflation was stronger than expected on average. Analysis of the growth errors shows that the OECD projections in the crisis years were larger in countries with more international trade openness and greater presence of foreign banks. In the recovery, there is little evidence that an underestimate of the impact of fiscal consolidation contributed significantly to forecast errors. Instead, the repeated conditioning assumption that the euro area crisis would stabilise or ease played an important role, with growth weaker than projected in European countries where bond spreads were higher than had been assumed. But placing these errors in a historical context illustrates that the errors were not without precedent: similar-sized errors were made in the first oil price shock of the 1970s. In response to the challenges encountered in forecasting in recent years and the lessons learnt, the OECD and other international organisations have sought to improve their forecasting techniques and procedures, to improve their ability to monitor near-term developments and to better account for international linkages and financial market developments."