Documents Cardullo, Gabriele 5 results

"This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition."

"In this study, we explore the fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies in the Italian labour market over the last 20 years. Relying on the available sources of data for unfilled job openings, we find that even in Italy, similarly to other developed countries, there is a clean evidence of the unemployment volatility puzzle. In other words, we empirically assess that the tightness indicator is significantly more volatile than productivity over the whole period. In addition, on the theoretical ground, we show that a matching model with segmented labour markets and on-the-job search has the potential to provide a rationale for this pattern."

"In this paper we present a search and matching model in which firms invest in sunk capital equipment. By comparing two wage setting scenarios, we show that a two-tier bargaining scheme, where a fraction of the salary is negotiated at firm level, raises the amount of investment per worker in the economy compared to a one-tier bargaining scheme, in which earnings are entirely negotiated at sectoral level. The model's main result is consistent with the positive correlation between investment per worker and the presence of a two-tier bargaining agreement that we find in a representative sample of Italian firms."

"Despite the strong push from European and national institutions for a more decentralized wage bargaining structure, in some countries company or establishment-level negotiations struggle to take place. This paper offers an interpretation for that based on workers' optimal choices in a strategic framework. We construct an equilibrium matching model that explains under which conditions it is best for workers to negotiate their entire wage at sectoral level (one-tier bargaining) or to let a fraction of their salary to be negotiated at company level (two-tier bargaining). Workers' strategies do not simply depend on their own characteristics or on those of their firm, but also on the decisions of all the other employees of the sector. Three alternative Nash equilibria may occur: one-tier bargaining for all workers; two-tier bargaining for all workers; two-tier bargaining for the most productive workers and one-tier bargaining for the others. The prevalence of a specific equilibrium over others hinges on some critical factors, notably the elasticity of the matching function and the properties of the productivity distribution."