Documents Pérotin, Virginie 9 results

"We present new comparable data on the incidence of performance pay schemes in Europe and the USA. We find that the percentage of employees exposed to incentive pay schemes ranges from around 10-15 percent in some European countries to over 40 percent in Scandinavian countries and the US. Individual pay and profit/gain sharing schemes are widely diffused, whereas share ownership schemes are much less common, particularly in Europe. We document a number of empirical regularities. Incentive pay is less common in countries with a higher share of small firms. Higher product and labour market regulation are associated with lower use of incentive pay. Capital market development is a necessary requirement for a wider diffusion of incentive pay, particularly sharing and ownership schemes. When we control for a large set of individual characteristics and company attributes, we find that the probability that a worker is covered by an incentive scheme is higher in large firms and in high-skilled occupations, while it is much lower for females."

"This paper provides evidence on the effect of employee representation on working time flexibility in private-sector European establishments. A 2002 European Union directive granted information, consultation and representation rights to employees on a range of key business, employment and work organization issues beyond a certain firm size. We exploit the quasi-experimental variation in employee representation introduced by the implementation of the Directive in four countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Poland and the UK) with no previous legislation on the subject. The empirical analysis is based on repeated cross-section establishment-level data from the last three rounds of the European Company Survey. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the Directive had a positive and significant effect on both employee representation and the utilisation of flexible working-time arrangements for eligible establishments. The greater use of flexible working-time schemes is driven by establishments in which no local wage-negotiations take place and those with a high proportion of female workers. Our results are consistent with the idea that employee representation provides an endogenous rule-enforcement mechanism in second-best scenarios in which incomplete contracting problems are pervasive and third-party arbitration is unfeasible. Quite paradoxically, the relaxation of shareholders' property rights and the limits imposed on managerial discretion as a result of the operation of employee representation seem necessary to achieve certain valuable forms of organizational flexibility in market economies."

"Using two new data sets from France, the authors present the first study of the comparative productivity of labor-managed and conventional firms involving large representative samples of firms in a range of industries including services. Their study offers new stylized facts on labor-managed firms, and disentangles incentive effects from those of differences in input demand behavior on factor elasticities. Contrary to received wisdom, labor-managed firms are not smaller than conventional firms; they grow as fast or faster in all industries. The two groups of firms organize production differently. Labor-managed firms are as productive as conventional firms, or more productive, in all industries, and use their inputs efficiently; but in several industries conventional firms would produce more with their current input levels if they organized production like labor-managed firms. On average overall, firms would produce more using the labor-managed firms' industry-specific technologies. Labor-managed firms do not produce at inefficiently low scales."

"Though generally more widespread than might have been expected, equal opportunities policies and practices are less common among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than among larger firms, especially when the policies are not mandatory, as in the United Kingdom or for the smallest firms in Australia. The authors' investigation does not suggest that more coercive legislation forces enterprises to adopt practices that negatively affect their performance. On the contrary, equal opportunities policies are associated with higher productivity in all groups except British SMEs. The positive effect is strongest among the enterprises subject to the most stringent regulatory requirements."