Documents Naastepad, C.W.M. 6 results

"Economists and the governments they advise have based their macroeconomic policies on the idea of a natural rate of unemployment. Government policy that pushes the rate below this point - about 6 per cent - is apt to trigger an accelerating rate of inflation that is hard to reverse, or so the argument goes. In this book, Storm and Naastepad make a strong case that this concept is flawed: that a stable non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), independent of macroeconomic policy, does not exist. Consequently, government decisions based on the NAIRU are not only misguided but have huge and avoidable social costs, namely, high unemployment and sustained inequality. Skillfully merging theoretical and empirical analysis, Storm and Naastepad show how the NAIRU's neglect of labor's impact on technological change and productivity growth eclipses the many positive contributions that labor and its regulation make to economic performance. When these positive effects are taken into account, the authors contend, a more humane policy becomes feasible, one that would enhance productivity and technological progress while maintaining profits, thus creating conditions for low unemployment and wider equality."

"Owing to its strong dependence on exports, Germany was among the economies hit hardest by the financial crisis. But unlike almost all other countries, Germany emerged from the crisis quickly and stronger than before. What lies behind this success story, if at all it is one? The commonplace – neoliberal – answer is that Germany's success is the hard-won reward for strict economic management, combining fiscal conservatism and structural reforms of welfare and the labour market. The latter, by reducing labour costs, fostered competitiveness, boosted growth, and increased employment. “Progressive” economists arguing that Germany beggared its Eurozone neighbours by squeezing workers' wages, share a similar view. However, this particular explanation of Germany's resilience is wrong and unhelpful. Germany's export success cannot be explained in terms of its (labour) cost competitiveness, but is caused by strong non-price competitiveness. This, in turn, is due – much more than is normally recognized – by the remaining distinctly non-neoliberal dimensions of Germany's economic model (including a Keynesian crisis response). German and European policymakers preaching austerity and structural labour-market changes as the model for other Eurozone countries, misunderstand Germany's rebound from crisis, with serious costs to Eurozone populations."

"The dominant view, both on the mainstream right and on the left, holds that the Eurozone crisis is a crisis of labour-cost competitiveness—with trade imbalances (and hence foreign indebtedness) being driven by divergences in relative unit labour costs (RULCs) between surplus and deficit countries. To re-balance Eurozone growth, the mainstream solution is a deflationary policy of ‘internal devaluation' (i.e. cutting the wage share by as much as 30%) in the deficit countries. The ‘progressive' view holds that the surplus countries should adjust by raising their wage shares. We argue that both sides of this debate are wrong and unhelpful. Europe's trade imbalances are determined by domestic and world demand—whilst RULC divergences play only a negligible role. Eurozone growth can only be revived when Eurozone demand growth is restored, not by lowering wages here and/or raising them there. The current deflationary adjustment forced on the wage-led economies of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is self-destructive: it is a ‘confidence killer', not only deepening the free fall of southern European incomes but also damaging their productive base and productivity growth. The outlook is depressing—further increases in already high unemployment rates, inequality measures and poverty rates inconceivable in prosperous Europe just a few years ago—and arguably dystopian."

"Deregulierung von Arbeitsmärkten und Lohnzurückhaltung haben signifikant niedrigere Wachstumsraten der Arbeitsproduktivität zur Folge. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert theoretische Argumente, warum "starre" Arbeitsmärkte für Innovationen nützlich sein können. Empirische Studien fundieren diese Argumente. Das Argument, dass größere Fluktuationen im Personalbestand schädlich sind für Innovationen und Lernprozesse, gilt vor allem für Betriebe mit einem "routinemäßigen" Innovationsmodell. Diese Betriebe sind stark abhängig von historisch akkumulierter Kenntnis, wovon viel personengebunden und schlecht dokumentiert ist ("tacit knowledge"). "Garage Business"-Betriebe wie etwa in Sillicon Valley brauchen mehr allgemein verfügbare Kenntnisse und haben damit viel weniger Probleme mit häufigerem Personalwechsel. Es ist interessant festzustellen, dass sich das Wachstum des Bruttoinlandsprodukts zwischen angelsächsischen Ländern (mit flexiblen Arbeitsmärkten) und korporatistischen Ländern (mit relativ rigiden Arbeitsmärkten) nur geringfügig unterscheidet. Außerdem gibt es Anlass, die Behauptung zu bezweifeln, dass "flexible" Länder niedrigere Arbeitslosenzahlen hätten."