Documents Schwellnuss, Cyrille 7 results

"Over the past two decades, aggregate labour productivity growth in most OECD countries has decoupled from real median compensation growth, implying that raising productivity is no longer sufficient to raise real wages for the typical worker. This paper provides a quantitative description of decoupling in OECD countries over the past two decades, with the results suggesting that it is explained by declines in both labour shares and the ratio of median to average wages (a partial measure of wage inequality). Labour shares have declined in about two thirds of the OECD countries covered by the analysis. However, the contribution of labour shares to decoupling is smaller if sectors are excluded for which labour shares are driven by changes in commodity and asset prices or for which labour shares are driven by imputation choices (primary, housing and non-market sectors). The ratio of median to average wages has declined in all but two of the OECD countries covered by the analysis and appears to reflect disproportionate wage growth at the very top of the wage distribution rather than stagnating median wages. The causes for these developments will be analysed in follow-up research."

"This paper compares the short-term forecasting performance of state-of-the-art large-scale dynamic factor models (DFMs) and the small-scale bridge models routinely used at the OECD. Pseudo-real time out-of-sample forecasts for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States during and after the Great Recession (2008-2014) suggest that large-scale DFMs are not systematically more accurate than small-scale bridge models, especially at short forecast horizons. Moreover, DFM parameters appear to be highly unstable during the Great Recession (2008-2009), making forecast revisions between successive vintages difficult to explain as revisions cannot be fully attributed to news on specific groups of indicators. The implication for OECD forecasting practice is that there would be no gain from switching from the current small-scale bridge models to large-scale DFMs."

"Global trade growth over the past few years has appeared extraordinarily weak, even in relation to weak global GDP growth. This paper shows that the apparent breakdown in the relationship between global trade and global GDP growth is largely explained by two factors: an inappropriate measurement of global GDP and extraordinary demand weakness in the euro area. As a measure of demand for traded goods, global GDP at market exchange rates is more appropriate than the conventional purchasing power parity-based measure. Moreover, extraordinary demand weakness in the euro area – which is a particularly trade intensive region – has had a substantial negative effect on intra-euro area trade flows, which are commonly counted towards global trade. When global GDP is measured at market exchange rates and intra-euro area flows are removed from the measure of global trade, econometric estimations suggest that over the past 15 years the long-term elasticity of global trade to GDP has been similar to that of the 1990s. Indeed, the overwhelming part of post-crisis trade weakness can be attributed to weak global demand rather than structural changes, according to the econometric estimations in this paper and supporting evidence on changes in global investment, international production fragmentation and protectionism."

"After peaking in the first half of 2008, international imbalances declined sharply during the global crisis of 2008-09, in part reflecting cyclical factors such as large contractions in domestic demand on the back of bursting housing bubbles in a number of deficit countries, as well as large declines in cross-border capital flows, interest rates and commodity prices. This paper suggests that business and housing cycles alone account for around half of the decline in international imbalances, with real exchange rate and fiscal adjustments explaining only around one fifth. A range of stylised scenarios for the major trading areas that extends the short-term projections in OECD Economic Outlook No. 93 of May 2013 to 2020 suggests that in the absence of policy adjustments beyond 2014 international imbalances could rebound as output gaps gradually close and housing markets normalise, though to levels below the pre-crisis peak. Ambitious fiscal adjustment in countries with the largest remaining fiscal imbalances and selected structural reforms could offset the cyclical rebound in international imbalances and prevent diverging net asset positions in most areas. Moreover, ambitious fiscal and structural policy adjustments would provide some margin in case upside risks to international imbalances -- such as renewed housing booms that could be triggered by a rebound in cross-border capital flows or higher oil prices -- materialise."

"Over the past two decades, real median wage growth in many OECD countries has decoupled from labour productivity growth, partly reflecting declines in labour income shares. This paper analyses the drivers of labour share developments using a combination of industry- and firm-level data. Technological change in the investment goods-producing sector and greater global value chain participation have compressed labour shares, but the effect of technological change has been significantly less pronounced for high-skilled workers. Countries with falling labour shares have witnessed both a decline at the technological frontier and a reallocation of market shares toward “superstar” firms with low labour shares (“winner-takes-most” dynamics). The decline at the technological frontier mainly reflects the entry of firms with low labour shares into the frontier rather than a decline of labour shares in incumbent frontier firms, suggesting that thus far this process is mainly explained by technological dynamism rather than anti-competitive forces."

"Widespread supply disruptions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian Federation's large-scale aggression against Ukraine have raised concerns among policy makers that globalised value chains expose domestic production to shocks from abroad. This paper uses new indicators of global value chain dependencies and exogenous pandemic shocks to econometrically estimate the effects of supply disruptions abroad on domestic output. The results suggest that the adverse effects of supply disruptions are particularly large when concentration of supplying countries and supplying firms is high. Counterfactual simulations of the econometric model suggest that diversification of suppliers would have sizeable benefits in terms of shielding domestic production against country-specific supply shocks, with partial onshoring of production having only small additional benefits. Technological innovation that reduces foreign dependencies, such as the substitution of renewable energies for fossil fuels, can have similar benefits as diversification."