Documents Bruegel, Brussels 171 results

"GDP contractions are typically associated with within-country income inequality increases. While official income inequality data for 2020 will not be available for about two years, the already available employment data for 2020 shows that the difference between highly-educated and low-educated people in terms of job losses is correlated with the economic shock from the COVID-19 pandemic, suggesting that the depth of the economic recession is related to the increase in within-country income inequality in 2020. Scenarios based on historical patterns of recessions and within-country income inequality increases suggest relatively small increases in global income inequality in 2020.

Factors mitigating global inequality increases in 2020 include larger GDP per-capita declines in richer advanced countries than in poorer emerging and developing countries, and the positive GDP growth of China, which suggests that within-country inequality in the world's most populous country might have not changed much in 2020. In contrast, it is quite likely there was a significant increase in European Union income inequality in 2020, partly reversing the decline during the previous decades."

"In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future.

In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU.

First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly.

Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue.

Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage.

Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability."

"Societies and economies are experiencing deep and intertwined structural changes that may unsettle the perceptions European citizens have of their economic and employment security. Such labour-market perceptions are likely in turn to alter people's political positions. For instance, those worried by labour-market competition may prefer greater social protection to compensate for the accrued risk, or might prefer more closed economies where external borders provide protection (or the illusion of protection). We test these expectations with a conjoint experiment in 13 European countries on European-level social policy, studying how citizens' demands align with parties' political supply. Results broadly corroborate our expectations on the moderating effects of different types of concerns about perceived sources of labour-market competition on the features of preferred European-level social policy."

"The liberal economic order of market-based economic activity, free-as-possible trade and rules-based internationalism is under pressure. Calls for more protectionism arise in particular from a perception of the gains being concentrated in too few hands, with income inequality on the rise. But seen from a global perspective, income inequality has reduced markedly, especially because of economic reform in China and India. This essay argues that global welfare gains should be safeguarded and built on, not undermined by a blinkered perception of liberalism's malign impact on economic inequality."

"Pandemic-related supply disruptions, the energy crisis provoked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and economic coercion by China have put economic security high on the European Union policy agenda. The question is how exactly the EU should ‘de-risk' its external economic relationships without foregoing the benefits of trade. The standard answer is that it should identify product-level trade dependencies, mainly on the import side, and reduce them, mainly through diversification of suppliers, while otherwise maintaining maximum trade integration.

This Policy Brief argues that this answer falls short. First, product-level dependencies cannot be identified reliably even with sophisticated analysis and data. As a result, both ‘missed dependencies' and ‘false positives' are inevitable. Second, external shocks and coercion could be propagated through exports, productive assets held abroad and financial channels as much as through imports.

The analysis has five main implications

Import de-risking should focus on a few product categories for which the costs of supply interruptions would be unquestionably large. This reduces false positives.
De-risking and/or buffers to deal with exports and financial coercion require more attention.
De-risking must be complemented by raising resilience against all shocks, whatever theirorigin. This requires a deeper and broader European single market.
De-risking and resilience must be complemented by deterrence.
A sufficiently high probability of chronic trade conflict – or one very large conflict – mayjustify reducing overall integration with a large trading partner, on both the export andimport sides.
EU economic security policies have been right to emphasise the reduction of import dependence on chips and critical raw materials, and the creation of a powerful legal instrument to deter coercion (the Anti-Coercion Instrument). In most other respects, there is room for improvement."

"This paper discusses employers' experience of working fully remotely during the pandemic, and their approaches to returning to the office following the pandemic. We chose to focus on the point of view of the employer since it is relatively less explored; much more is available and written on the views and opinions of employees about remote work and return to office.

To understand the employer's perspective, we reviewed existing research evidence, and carried out eleven structured interviews with corporate leaders about their experiences with remote, in-office and hybrid work.

Our literature review suggests that remote work does not have negative effects on performance. Similarly, the small sample of employers we interviewed experienced very strong company and employee performance while operating their businesses fully remotely. All employers we interviewed are implementing a hybrid return-to-office policy, although the specifics of the policies are different for each company. No employer was returning to full in-office work.

We focused our literature review and interviews on the impact of remote work on employee collaboration, firm culture and manager control, which we call ‘the 3 Cs'. We found that leaders maintain a belief that employee collaboration is negatively impacted by remote work, but the evidence to support this assumption is mixed. Firm culture is often cited by employers as an important rationale for bringing employees back to the office, but the research evidence and our interviewees suggest that the notion of culture is vague and the idea that better culture is supported by in-office work is not supported by any data. Finally, the shift to remote work caused corporate leaders and front-line managers to worry about effectively managing employees they couldn't see every day. We found that companies did not widely begin implementing employee monitoring systems in lieu of onsite management. Our interviews suggest that much learning remains to transition managers and leaders to effectively managing remote or hybrid employees and teams."

"This book, assesses what must be done to implement industrial policy in a way that will achieve overarching goals while minimising distortions.
Industrial policy has for a long time raised difficult questions for policymakers to unpick. What justifications are there for government intervention in market mechanisms, and how and to what extent should governments intervene? What are the pros and cons of picking ‘winners' for support? These questions have made a powerful return in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical uncertainty, and because of the pressing need to move to net-zero emission economies. In addition, the European Union is reviving its industrial policy in the context of support given to companies in the United States under the US Inflation Reduction Act. This volume, produced with financial support from the European Climate Foundation, assesses what must be done to implement industrial policy in a way that will achieve overarching goals while minimising distortions."

"In March 2023, the European Commission published a legislative proposal for an EU response to the US Inflation Reduction Act: the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). It is an unconvincing policy proposal, both for what is in it and for what is not in it.

The proposal has five problematic aspects. First, it takes a top-down approach, in which specific technologies are selected for preferential treatment. Preferable would be a technology-neutral approach open to all current and future technologies that help tackle the net-zero challenge. Second, its blanket 40 percent self-sufficiency benchmark for EU domestic cleantech manufacturing by 2030 sends a protectionist signal, is poorly defined and does not reflect the differences in EU capacity in the cleantech sector. Third, it relies on the acceleration of permitting procedures as the main policy instrument, although this is not the main obstacle to cleantech investment in the EU. Fourth, it proposes more strategic use of public procurement. While this is an objective to be supported, the specific proposals are likely to be ineffective because of the way they are designed. Fifth and not least, the NZIA would lack a governance structure that would ensure effective implementation.

In addition, the NZIA does not tackle three critical issues. It does not address investment obstacles related to failures of the single market. It does not tackle the coordination problem at the core of developing an EU green industrial policy. Finally, it does not develop an EU-level funding strategy, but rather relies on state aid, with the related risk of fragmentation.

The European Parliament and EU countries in the Council of the EU should reboot the proposal and refocus its objectives, sharpening its limited instruments, improving its governance, and adding financial incentives to ensure implementation. In parallel, the EU should develop a broader green industrial policy strategy that leverages the single market in a credible manner, building a solid new governance framework and a new EU-level funding approach."

"Foundation models (FMs) are the origin of breakthrough innovations in generative artificial intelligence (AI) applications, such as ChatGPT. Only responsible developments in competitive markets can help ensure that FMs deliver their full benefits at minimum risk.

FM developers require language models (LMs), data and computing power to generate natural language output, such as texts, from language input. Thus, the FM value chain is composed of three main elements: LMs, data and computing resources.

These markets are currently competitive, with multiple providers and degrees of openness thanks to several closed- and open-source models, open-source and proprietary data, and vigorous competition between firms at the computing-resources level, despite high degrees of concentration in some of these markets. These market characteristics ensure that FM developers face low or surmountable entry barriers.

Still, potential competition issues are likely to arise in the future. Dominant firms could leverage their dominant positions, refuse to give access to their LMs, scrape data, refuse to grant access to data, impose undue barriers to switching and lock their users into their ecosystems. Firms could also use LMs to achieve an anticompetitive agreement through algorithmic collusion.

Competition authorities should focus their efforts on short-term risks. They should also remain vigilant in terms of ensuring the competitive process between open- and closed-source models works and that open-source developers and public authorities do not impose undue restrictions to mitigate the risks of open-source models, which would deter their development in a way that would favour closed-source models.
Finally, at this development stage, studies are lacking. Researchers and competition authorities should investigate the impact of fms on content providers and the digital advertising industry, the role of FMs in digital ecosystems, and cooperation mechanisms between competent authorities across regulatory fields and countries."