Documents tax system 107 results

"La proposition gouvernementale d'instaurer une surtaxe temporaire sur la partie des revenus d'activité excédant 1 million d'euros par an a donné lieu à des débats sur le caractère plus ou moins « excessif » de cette mesure. Ce débat s'appuie souvent sur la comparaison des taux d'imposition par niveau de revenu. On montre que cette approche comporte des limites. Pour les surmonter, on développe une méthode qui permet de comparer l'effort contributif des différentes catégories de ménages. Les résultats montrent que l'effort contributif diminue tout au long de l'échelle des revenus : il est le plus faible pour les très hauts revenus. La surtaxe temporaire envisagée par le gouvernement pour ces très hauts revenus aurait porté le taux d'effort contributif des personnes concernées au même niveau que l'effort contributif du contribuable médian, ce qui aurait permis de donner corps au principe d'égalité de tous devant l'impôt."

"This annual flagship publication provides details of taxes paid on wages in OECD countries. It covers: personal income taxes and employee contributions paid by employees, social security contributions and payroll taxes paid by employers, and cash benefits received by in-work families. It illustrates how these taxes and benefits are calculated in each member country and examines how they have an impact on household incomes. The results also enable quantitative cross-country comparisons of labour cost levels and the overall tax and benefit position of single persons and families on different levels of earnings.

The publication shows the amounts of taxes and social security contributions levied and cash benefits received for eight different family types, which vary by a combination of household composition and household type. It also presents: the resulting average and marginal tax rates (that is, the tax burden); the average tax rates (showing the part of gross wage earnings or total labour costs taken in tax and social security contributions, both before and after cash benefits); and the marginal tax rates (showing the part of a small increase of gross earnings or total labour costs that is paid in these levies)."

"This paper investigates the political coalitions giving rise to diverse types of interactions between revenue systems and welfare states. It has been widely acknowledged that coordinated economies with larger public sectors have somewhat regressive tax systems, with a heavy reliance on the taxation of consumption and wages over capital and property. Liberal economies, alternatively, have had more progressive tax systems but smaller welfare states. I suggest that the divergence in the mechanisms for representing employers—through industrial relations and party systems—helps to explain how different models of taxing and spending develop over the course of the twentieth century. Industrial coordination encourages higher levels of tax consent among employers, by simultaneously expanding employers' support for social programmes and giving employers the leverage to restrict taxation of capital and to push consumption taxes. The paper evaluates the role of employers and industrial coordination in the architecture of tax regimes in Denmark and the USA in the early 1900s and 1960s."