Documents interest dispute 11 results

"Recent revelations have raised concerns on how conflicts of interest may involve even leading scientists and prestigious institutions and lead to bias in reporting and assessing scientific evidence. These have highlighted the need for action to safeguard scientific integrity and public health. The Italian Epidemiology Association has declared that the "biased and deliberately tailored use of the scientific evidence" by scientists with a conflict of interest serves to delay needed measures to prevent harm to public health from a polluting Italian steel plant's continuing chemical emissions. In France, unresolved concerns over conflict of interest forced the Centre for Research in Epidemiology and Public Health to cancel its imminent appointment of a prominent scientist as its Director. These negative events demonstrate the necessity for scientific institutions and journals to implement rigorous measures regarding conflict of interest and the safeguarding of scientific integrity and public health."

"In September 2012 Professor Gilles-Eric Séralini, a researcher at the University of Caen in France, published his team's findings that a Monsanto genetically-modified (GM) maize and Roundup herbicide caused increased rates of organ damage, tumours and mortality in rats fed over a 2-year period.1 The study was significant because it followed the rats over a long-term period, with the first tumours only appearing after 4–7?months. In contrast, the safety studies carried out by GM seed companies in support of EU authorisations typically last for a maximum of 90?days.2–4 In other words, these studies are incapable of seeing long-term effects such as those found in Séralini's study."

"Negli ultimi decenni, l'influenza della grande industria sull'epidemiologia si è rafforzata e si è diffusa, soprattutto nei settori con maggiori contenziosi come la farmacoepidemiologia e l'epidemiologia occupazionale. Per ogni epidemiologo indipendente che studia gli effetti collaterali dei farmaci e quelli avversi delle sostanze di uso industriale, vi sono molti altri epidemiologi assunti dall'industria per attaccare la ricerca e derubricarla a «scienza spazzatura». Talora, si è arrivati a tentare di bloccare la pubblicazione dei risultati di studi epidemiologici. In alcune circostanze gli accademici hanno accettato finanziamenti industriali di cui non si è dato atto nelle pubblicazioni, indicando soltanto le istituzioni accademiche di appartenenza dei consulenti dell'industria. Questo comportamento è una grave minaccia per l'integrità dell'epidemiologia e per la sua sopravvivenza come disciplina scientifica. Il problema non è facilmente risolvibile. Comunque, in risposta a comportamenti non etici di molti consulenti finanziati dall'industria, da vent'anni a questa parte si è sviluppata una ricca discussione sull'etica in epidemiologia. Associazioni di professionisti, come la International Epidemiological Association, possono avere un ruolo importante nel sostenere gli epidemiologi e nell'incoraggiarli ad affermare, in alternativa alla produzione di semplici liste di cose «da non fare», alcuni principi positivi di come la scienza dovrebbe funzionare, e come dovrebbe essere applicata per prendere decisioni in salute pubblica."

"The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is in desperate need of reform. Its weaknesses have allowed chemical companies to exploit the act by thwarting the EPA's attempts to finalize health assessments and delaying regulation of chemicals -- sometimes for decades. The chemical industry's roadblocks often follow predictable patterns:

- Attack early drafts of health assessments
- Force new reviews
- Hold workshops populated with industry-funded panelists
- Introduce new industry-funded studies when assessments are close to final
- Force more reviews
- Enlist elected officials to assist with political interference
- Attack new assessment drafts

Using these tactics, the chemical industry has effectively prevented the EPA from achieving its mission to protect human health.

This report details how the U.S. legal system and TSCA itself have helped the chemical industry to be effective in its efforts to delay regulations. Congress needs to reform TSCA to make it a more effective regulatory tool. The chemical industry should not be able to endlessly postpone regulatory decisions while profiting from unregulated chemical sales until all scientific controversies and uncertainties, large and small, have been eliminated. With good public policy, the EPA should be empowered to make the best decisions it can on a timely basis using existing information, and apply new science to update its evaluations as it becomes available."

"This article examines the history of human exposure to silica, the second most common element on earth, to explore the problem of categorizing substances for regulatory purposes and the role interest groups play in developing policy. The regulatory history of silica teaches three important lessons: First, the most compelling account of the cycle of action and inaction on the part of regulators is the one based on interest groups. Second, knowledge about hazards is endogenous - it arises in response to outside events, to regulations, and to interest groups. Accepting particular states of knowledge as definitive is thus a mistake, as is failing to consider the incentives for knowledge production created by regulatory measures. Third, the rise of the trial bar as an interest group means that the problems of silica exposure and similar occupational hazards cannot simply be left to the legal system to resolve through individual tort actions. We suggest that by understanding market forces, regulators can harness the energy of interest groups to create better solutions to addressing the problems of silica exposure, as well as other workplace health and safety issues."

"Il en est du commerce international comme du progrès technique : de faiblesperformances en matière de croissance et d'emploi, quand elles surviennent, luisont facilement attribuées. Cet article rappelle que l'ouverture au commerce international,comme le progrès technique, crée l'opportunité de mieux allouer lesressources et de créer des richesses supplémentaires. La réalisation de cette opportunitédépend néanmoins largement des conditions qui président à la transition ainsiengagée. Ce serait une erreur de considérer que les avantages de l'ouverture aucommerce international peuvent automatiquement être obtenus sans heurts niconflits.La théorie du commerce international enseigne qu'il peut exister un conflit derépartition qui fait que les gains à l'échange ne profitent pas à tous dans un mêmepays. Des inégalités se forment et des catégories sociales entières enregistrent despertes qu'il est difficile de compenser. Par ailleurs, des conflits peuvent aussi seproduire entre nations. Si un progrès technique différencié met en cause l'avantagecomparatif précédemment détenu par l'un des partenaires, ce que gagne l'un,l'autre le perd, alors même que le revenu mondial augmente.Toutefois, les écarts de performance évoluent sans cesse. Les spécialisationsinduites par des hétérogénéités en termes de coût de production ou de transportet d'externalités créent inévitablement des différentiels de croissance qui font quecertains pays progressent plus vite que d'autres. Ces différentiels entretiennent unrapport ambigu avec le degré d'ouverture à l'échange international. La raison enest claire. Les conditions de l'ouverture comptent davantage que l'ouverture ellemême.Aussi est-il essentiel de connaître les conditions dans lesquelles nations etfirmes s'adaptent à un changement intervenu dans le degré d'ouverture aucommerce international."

"Asbestos litigation has given rise to over 50,000,000 claims against 8400 former producers, distributors, installers and sellers of asbestos-containing products. To date, 850,000 claimants have sought compensation, costing businesses and insurance companies over $70 billion and resulting in more than 70 bankruptcies. Over 100,000 deaths are attributable to asbestos exposure with an additional 40,000 deaths anticipated over the next 30 years. Despite the significance of the ethical issues generated by the processes of acquiring, pressing and settling the most massive litigation in history, the legal literature is substantially devoid of any such discussion. One possible reason for this paucity of coverage is that rules of ethics are rarely applied to asbestos litigation despite clear and systematic violations of those rules. In practice, it is as if each state supreme court had appended to its rules of ethics, the following exclusion: These rules shall not apply to asbestos litigation.

In this article, I undertake to discuss some of the ethical issues raised by asbestos litigation from the perspective of both plaintiffs and defendants' counsel. For example, despite the fact that the large majority of asbestos claimants have been recruited by paid agents receiving substantial sums from attorneys - in excess of $50 million - rules prohibiting such solicitation are virtually never invoked. Similarly unenforced are rules requiring that fees and expenses be reasonable.

Undoubtedly, the most complex ethical issues in asbestos litigation involve conflicts of interest. In addition to discussion of these issues, I also discuss conflicts of interest issues unique to asbestos-related bankruptcies including pre-packaged bankruptcy filings and the selection and role of the futures representative. This discussion is informed by an overview of asbestos-related bankruptcies from a law-in-action perspective, including discussion of the ethical issues generated by the unprecedented control that a small number of law firms exercise over the creation of asbestos bankruptcy trusts and the procedures for making claims against the trusts.

Conflicts of interest also abound on the defense side, especially because many defense firms represent multiple defendants with conflicting interests. These conflicts are exacerbated by recent state tort reform legislation which grants defendants the opportunity to seek to allocate substantial responsibility for any injury to other entities including other solvent corporations - even those not named as defendants in that litigation - and to trusts created in the wake of asbestos-related bankruptcies for payment of claims. This effectively requires defense counsel to switch roles and put on plaintiffs' cases against other possible responsible parties. Nonetheless, few defense firms appear to be aggressively pursuing their clients' interests in this regard. I consider a variety of the ethical issues thus generated. Other relevant tort reforms discussed that impact on conflicts of interest include those substantially limiting joint liability for noneconomic damages.

Even if Congress enacts legislation presently under consideration to create an administrative alternative that would eliminate substantially all asbestos litigation, what has thus far transpired will stand as a stark reminder of the failure of the bar and the courts to have applied rules of ethics to the most massive litigation ever."

"Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Einführung der Europäischen Arbeitsbehörde sowie der Reform der Entsenderichtlinie und analysiert diese Maßnahmen in Hinblick auf ihre Wirksamkeit in der Bekämpfung von Sozialdumping. In der EU ansässige Firmen haben das Recht, grenzübergreifend Dienstleistungen anzubieten und zur Ausführung der Tätigkeiten eigene Arbeitnehmer/-innen zu entsenden. Diese Freiheiten werden seit vielen Jahren intensiv, aber nicht immer nur zum Vorteil der betroffenen Arbeitnehmer/-innen angewandt und wurden seitdem durch eine Vielzahl von Richtlinien und Verordnungen ausgelegt und erweitert. Die Spannungsfelder und Interessenkonflikte, die sich zwischen den Akteuren/-innen auftun und wie diese innerhalb einer ständig wachsenden Europäischen Union verhandelt werden und werden sollten, ist ein weiterer Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags."