Documents penal sanction 99 results

"Does the imposition of legal sanctions deter crime? Are criminal sanctions so structured that they maximize whatever deterrent effect they may have? Professor Chambliss reviews some of the empirical data bearing on these questions. He concludes from this evidence that the legal system may be operating inefficaciously: It punishes most severely those persons and crimes that are least deterrable, and it punishes least severely those persons and crimes that are most deterrable "

"Objectives The objective of this study was to determine the strength of evidence on the effectiveness of two policy levers—the experience rating of workers' compensation insurance and the enforcement of occupational health and safety regulation—in creating incentives for firms to focus on health and safety issues. Methods An extensive systematic literature review was undertaken in an effort to capture both published and grey literature studies on the topic. Studies that met specific subject-matter and methods criteria underwent a quality assessment. A qualitative approach to evidence synthesis, known as “best-evidence” synthesis, was used. This method ranks the strength of evidence on a particular topic on the basis of the number, quality, and consistency of studies on the topic.Results There was moderate evidence that the degree of experience rating reduces injuries, limited to mixed evidence that inspections offer general and specific deterrence and that citations and penalties aid general deterrence, and strong evidence that actual citations and penalties reduce injuries.Conclusions Although experience rating is a key policy lever of those providing workers' compensation insurance, there is much to be learned about its merits. Few studies have concerned the topic, and most have used crude proxy measures or exploited natural experiments. There have been many more studies on the merits of regulation enforcement, even though here too measures were often crude. Nonetheless, this synthesis indicates that general deterrence is less effective in reducing injury incidence and severity, whereas specific deterrence with regard to citations and penalties does indeed have an impact."

"Au cours des dernières décennies, la plupart des sociétés se sont faites plus répressives, leurs lois plus sévères, leurs juges plus inflexibles, et ceci sans lien direct avec l'évolution de la délinquance et de la criminalité. Dans ce livre, qui met en œuvre une approche à la fois généalogique et ethnographique, Didier Fassin s'efforce de saisir les enjeux de ce moment punitif en repartant des fondements mêmes du châtiment.
Qu'est-ce que punir ? Pourquoi punit-on ? Qui punit-on ? À travers ces trois questions, il engage un dialogue critique avec la philosophie morale et la théorie juridique. Puisant ses illustrations dans des contextes historiques et nationaux variés, il montre notamment que la réponse au crime n'a pas toujours été associée à l'infliction d'une souffrance, que le châtiment ne procède pas seulement des logiques rationnelles servant à le légitimer et que l'alourdissement des peines a souvent pour résultat de les différencier socialement, et donc d'accroître les inégalités.
À rebours du populisme pénal triomphant, cette enquête propose une salutaire révision des présupposés qui nourrissent la passion de punir et invite à repenser la place du châtiment dans le monde contemporain."