Documents company law 246 results

"Policy recommendations
The European Commission is soon expected to propose a European
company law framework designed specifically for ‘innovative' companies.
The evidence shows that the Achilles heel of a ‘28th company law regime'
is its inevitable impact in areas beyond company law, for example on
labour law, taxation, insolvency and social security.
A new company law framework for ‘innovative' companies must ensure:
• precise, enforceable eligibility criteria to prevent abuses;
• anti-abuse rules that block 'letterbox' setups and the exploitation of
known loopholes;
• dynamic worker participation safeguards that cannot be frozen or
evaded;
• guardrails for any Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) to protect
wages and revenues;
• a registration process that preserves real scrutiny over speed: a onestop digital portal can be built while maintaining necessary checks
and in a realistic verification timeframe using existing instruments.
Fostering innovation in the EU is possible without eroding workers' rights
or regulatory integrity if the relevant measures reflect lessons derived
from existing instruments, develop new instruments and ensure robust
cross-border enforcement."

"Corporate boards play a central role in corporate governance and are thus regulated in the corporate law and corporate governance codes of all industrialized countries. Yet while there is a common core of rules on the boards considerable differences remain. These differences depend partly on shareholder structure, partly on historical, political and social developments and especially employee representation on the board. More recently, in particular with the rise of the international corporate governance code movement, there is a clear tendency towards convergence, at least in terms of the formal provisions of the codes.

This book analyses the corporate boards, their regulation in law and codes and their actual functioning in ten European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). It offers the most up to date practical and analytical information on boards in Europe by leading company law experts. The issues addressed include: board structure, composition and functioning (one tier v. two tier, independent directors, expertise and diversity, separating the chair and the CEO functions, information streams, committees, voting and employee representation); enforcement by liability rules (in particular conflicts of interest), incentive structures (remuneration) and shareholder activism."

"Cet article examine les évolutions récentes relatives à l'implication des travailleurs dans la société européenne (SE) et analyse dans cette perspective l'impact de la SE sur les relations professionnelles européennes. L'article démontre que la SE a effectivement apporté certaines innovations et un nouvel élan à la fois au niveau national et européen : elle pourrait donc être plus performante que ce que pourrait laisser supposer sa réputation médiocre. C'est d'autant plus vrai si l'on tient compte des droits nouveaux (quoique limités) octroyés par la législation sur la SE et du contexte de son introduction : la SE n'a jamais été conçue en premier lieu comme un instrument de politique sociale, mais comme un moyen de favoriser la mobilité transfrontalière des entreprises à l'intérieur du marché intérieur de l'UE."

"This article provides an analysis of why regulatory competition in corporate law has operated, for the most part, successfully in the United States, and critiques the position of commentators who are sceptical of the significance and extent of state competition. The article begins by setting out the context in which regulatory competition has been most recently criticized, the US Congress's response to corporate accounting scandals in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, and by briefly noting how the problematic features of that legislative response underscore the benefits of regulatory competition. It then evaluates recent criticisms of regulatory competition that focus on the role of the federal government, or the incentives of states other than the leading incorporation state, Delaware, and conclude that US corporate law is not the product of state competition. The article contends that these permutations on the state competition debate do not provide a satisfactory positive explanation of the behaviour or the influence of the states and federal government. The minimum policy implication of the analysis is that it would be imprudent for policy-makers to overlook the competitive regulatory experience in US corporate law when assessing the approach to take to company and securities law."