Documents information 100 results

"This paper advocates a trans–nationalisation of employee information and consultation procedures in enterprises operating on a worldwide level. After outlining the specific need for trans–national employee information and consultation, the paper provides an overview of the relevant provisions of international law (i.e. the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises Social Policy and the ILO provisions), but also of the existing trans–national private regulation (e.g. International Framework Agreements with trans–national enterprises) and how they cope with this regulatory need. The main argument is that international law should explicitly recognize the setting up of trans–national employee information and consultation procedures in worldwide enterprises to strengthen the efforts recently undertaken by global union federations in various International Framework Agreements."

"This paper addresses the existing provisions in the European Social Charter (ESC) relating to employee involvement in private enterprises, namely the right to information and consultation and the right to workers' participation. After providing an overview of the Charter's historical development, its relationship with the European Union law and the infl uence on the domestic law of the Member States of the Council of Europe are discussed. There then follows a brief description of the enforcement mechanisms for social rights under the ESC: the reporting system and the collective complaint. The subsequent part illustrates the development of the right to information and consultation in the different versions of the Charter, also considering collective redundancy procedures. This paper concludes by examining the rights to workers? participation included in the Social Charter."

"In this article, I suggest that different types of capitalism specialize in communicating different types of information. Strongly coordinated capitalism communicates insider information but suppresses public information, and vice versa for weakly coordinated economies. Selectively targeted insider information credibly signals intention for long-term cooperation, while indiscriminately revealed public information credibly reveals intention for opportunism. Since the same hidden knowledge cannot be revealed both indiscriminately and selectively, coordinated capitalism forces the two types of information to crowd each other out. Using the external financing of R&D as an example, I test this theory in informational environments typical for different types of capitalism (mature technologies for some and cutting-edge for others). When investors rely on public information (Initial Public Offerings), strongly coordinated capitalism exhibits severe symptoms of poor information; when investors rely on insider information (venture capital and banking), symptoms of poor information shift to weakly coordinated economies."