Documents centralization 34 results

"This paper studies the effects of product market integration on wage bargaining institutions. By considering an international Cournot–Nash oligopoly with unionised home firms and non-unionised foreign firms producing substitute goods, the paper shows that the relative size of the home and foreign markets matters for the effects of a bilateral reduction in trade barriers. If the home market size is relatively larger than the foreign market size, a reduction in trade barriers, by lowering the sharable surplus for home firms and unions in the global market, gives unions incentives to choose more decentralised wage bargaining institutions. This industry-level mechanism, however, works in the opposite direction when the foreign market size is sufficiently large, including the “reciprocal dumping” symmetric market size model. In this case, cutting trade barriers raises the global sharable surplus and encourages domestic wage-setters to choose more centralised institutions."

"This paper studies the effects of managerial delegation in a duopoly game under alternative unionization structures. Introducing managerial delegation in a framework with centralized unionization leads to incentives for sales, lower profits and higher consumer surplus as well as overall welfare. In contrast, delegating output decisions to managers in the presence of decentralized unionization produces opposite results unless unions are strongly employment-oriented. Moreover, managerial delegation makes unionization structure neutral in relation to consumer surplus and overall efficiency. Finally, the timing of moves in the three-stage game proves to be important for obtaining the above qualitative results under decentralized unionization."

"In a framework of a unionized oligopoly, this paper reconsiders the impact of the bargaining structure on union wages. In particular, two dimensions along which centralization may occur, namely the professional and firm line, are integrated into one modelling framework. It will be shown that, when taking into account different centralization dimensions, wage outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot simply be ranked according to the degree of bargaining centralization. The argument will be that negotiated wages rather depend on the technical relationship between different groups of labour and goods as well as upon the dimension along which centralization takes place."

"The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare-maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage-bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum."

"This paper contributes to the literature on current account imbalances. Econometric analysis of the paper finds evidence that wage centralization, in a cross-section of industrialized economies, significantly improve current accounts through reducing budget deficits. To explain this empirical finding, the paper provides a political economy framework in which the government follows preferences of N-sector workers (majority rule). An increase in public and so, current account deficits by issuing external public debt leads to real appreciation of the currency. As between-sector mobility is constrained by friction in the labor market, wages in N-sector rises. The opposite happens if the government improves the two balances by rising its saving. Thus, N-sector workers relatively support (oppose) more a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Centralization of wage bargaining moderates the benefit and costs from such twin-deficit policies by reducing the responsiveness of sectoral wage with respect to sectoral prices. Thus, the more centralized is the wage determination, the less N-sector workers support (oppose) a rise (reform) in the two deficits. Correspondingly, more centralized wage bargaining reduces the government's political incentive (cost) to deteriorate (reform) the external balance through the fiscal balance."

"Does the European Union need closer fiscal integration, and in particular a stronger fiscal centre, to become more resilient to economic shocks? This book looks at the experience of 13 federal states to help inform the heated debate on this issue. It analyses in detail their practices in devolving responsibilities from the subnational to the central level, compares them to those of the European Union, and draws lessons for a possible future fiscal union in Europe.

More specifically, this book tries to answer three sets of questions: What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features and functions of the central budget? What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels? What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred? These policy questions are critical in many federations, and central to the current discussions about future paths for the European Union.

This book brings to the table new, practical insights through a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the EU fiscal framework with that of federal states. It also departs from the decentralization perspective that has been prominent in the literature by focusing on the role of the centre (which responsibilities are centralized at the federal level and how they are handled, rather than which functions belong to the local level). Such an approach is particularly relevant for the European Union, where a fiscal union would imply granting new powers to the centre."

"Based on quantitative indicators for fifteen advanced countries between 1974 and 2005, and case studies of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Ireland, this article analyzes the trajectory of institutional change in the industrial relations systems of advanced capitalist societies, with a focus on Western Europe. In contrast to current comparative political economy scholarship, which emphasizes the resilience of national institutions to common challenges and trends, it argues that despite a surface resilience of distinct national sets, all countries have been transformed in a neoliberal direction. Neoliberal transformation manifests itself not just as institutional deregulation but also as institutional conversion, as the functions associated with existing institutional forms change in a convergent direction. A key example is the institution of centralized bargaining, once the linchpin of an alternative, redistributive and egalitarian, model of negotiated capitalism, which has been reshaped in the past twenty years to fit the common imperative of liberalization."

"En ces temps de crise économique, on parle beaucoup des banques centrales. Indépendantes ou non des Etats, émettrices de monnaie, « prêteurs en dernier ressort »... Quel est vraiment leur rôle et en quoi leur fonctionnement est-il révélateur de celui de nos sociétés ? Institutions logées entre pouvoir politique et pouvoir financier, les banques centrales expriment dans leurs actions sur la monnaie le rapport de forces entre ces deux pouvoirs. Et ce rapport de forces, expliqué dans le livre, reflète lui-même un certain « état du monde »."