Documents EU Council 23 results

"How have the main institutions and decision-making processes of the EU responded to the arrival of new member states? This book assesses the actual state of the EU institutions in the years after the 2004 enlargement, examining each of the main institutional actors as well as trends in legislative output, implementing measures and non-legislative approaches. The contributors outline the key changes as well as patterns of continuity in the institutional politics of the EU. The analysis finds that breakdown has been avoided by a combination of assimilation of the new member states and adaptation of the system, without any fundamental transformation of the institutions. Nonetheless, they conclude that it is not just ‘business as usual'. The streamlining and formalization of procedures, together with increased informal practices, has implications for transparency and accountability. Widening has not prevented deepening of European integration, but it has deepened normative concerns about the democratic legitimacy of that process which will remain very much on the agenda of the enlarged EU. This nuanced approach to the complexities of studying institutional politics and change contains important new and original data."

"Although many have studied European Union (EU) decision-making in order to evaluate where the locus of power is, most studies have relied on the formal decision-making rules in the first pillar to theorize the workings of the EU. This assumption is somewhat problematic given that the informal norms of consensus are the primary mode of decision-making (81 per cent of decisions are made by consensus). This article examines the institution of consensus in the EU. It argues that the informal norm of consensus renders implausible the fundamental assumption of the rational institutionalist literature, challenging the validity of its claims. Finally, the costs and benefits to the EU's perceived legitimacy are examined with the argument that the putative benefits of consensual decision-making do not obtain in the EU and that the institution of consensus - the lack of voting and thus accountability - actually contributes to the perception of a democratic deficit in the Council."

"The literature on legislative decision-making and bargaining in the EU has reached a common conclusion that the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council) are on an equal footing in the main legislative procedure, the co-decision procedure. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case. First, our analysis of the formal rules reveals that the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. This change has important implications for the internal dynamics of the Parliament and its institutional powers vis-à-vis the Council. Testing these analytical considerations of the formal decision rules against voting data on all co-decision legislation adopted in the two institutions between 1999 and 2004, our empirical findings show that: first, from 1999 to 2004 coalition formation in the Council fell predominantly along the traditional left–right political dimensions when negotiating co-decision proposals. Second, when disagreement over legislation is recorded in the Council, a strong divide can also be found in the Parliament. Third, when the Parliament is divided along party political lines, it is less likely to be able to meet the absolute majority requirement for amending the proposal adopted by the Council. Lastly, Parliament amendments are most likely to be adopted when a decision by voting is requested by a party group associated with the main ideological contingency in the Council."