Documents offshore oil extraction 21 results

"Despite concern about the harmful effects of substances contained in various plastic consumer products, little attention has focused on the more heavily exposed women working in the plastics industry. Through a review of the toxicology, industrial hygiene, and epidemiology literatures in conjunction with qualitative research, this article explores occupational exposures in producing plastics and health risks to workers, particularly women, who make up a large part of the workforce. The review demonstrates that workers are exposed to chemicals that have been identified as mammary carcinogens and endocrine disrupting chemicals, and that the work environment is heavily contaminated with dust and fumes. Consequently, plastics workers have a body burden that far exceeds that found in the general public. The nature of these exposures in the plastics industry places women at disproportionate risk, underlining the importance of gender. Measures for eliminating these exposures and the need for regulatory action are discussed."

"Dans la production mondiale d'hydrocarbures, la part de l'offshore ne cesse de progresser. La France dispose d un potentiel pétrolier à développer grâce à ses onze millions de kilomètres carrés d'espaces maritimes répartis sur toutes les mers du globe. Elle a aussi à l'égard de leurs richesses environnementales une responsabilité de premier clan. Le CESE, qui s est déjà impliqué par le passé dans le débat sur la prévention et la gestion des accidents majeurs, s'est saisi de la problématique des risques encourus du fait de l'activité offshore.

L'avis analyse comment s'effectue la prise en compte des risques environnementaux par les différents acteurs et propose des perspectives d'évolution pour assurer une meilleure sécurisation de ces activités, grâce à des évolutions de la réglementation, à une meilleure organisation des activités de régulation et de contrôle, et à une meilleure application du principe de participation du public."

"The catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last spring and summer has triggered a frantic search for more effective regulatory methods that would prevent such disasters. The new Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) is under pressure to adopt the British "safety case" system, which requires the preparation of a facility-specific safety plan that is typically several hundred pages long. This regulatory scheme is described as a "goal oriented" approach that inculcates a "safety culture" within companies that operate offshore in the British portion of the North Sea because it overcomes a "box-ticking" mentality and constitutes "bottom up" implementation of safety measures. Safety cases are strictly confidential: only company officials, regulators and, in limited circumstances, worker representatives, are allowed to see the entire plan. This paper argues that the safety case approach should not come to America because this confidentiality and the risk levels tolerated by the British system conflict with the both the spirit and the letter of American law.
British regulations allow the plans to be no more protective than preventing one in 1,000 worker deaths and require operators to spend no more than $1.5 million per life saved. These standards are far more lax than comparable American legal requirements. The use of quantitative risk assessment and cost benefit analysis within the plans means that they must be prepared by technical experts far removed from an oil rig, suggesting that safety cases are not "bottom up" vehicles for ensuring best operational practice. The U.S. now fields only 55-60 inspectors to cover 3,500 facilities in the Gulf. To be even minimally effective, a safety case regime would require increasing available overseers by orders of magnitude, a prospect that is unlikely given the political climate in Washington. Lastly, a British study of conditions in the North Sea suggest alarming neglect of the physical infrastructure that ensures safety, further undermining claims that the safety case system is as effective as its advocates claim."

"The operators of Alaska's Alyeska pipeline have often claimed an outstanding record in preventing accidents and environmental damage. This article highlights that, contrary to these claims, Alyeska's operations have brought with them a life-threatening gamble with Alaska's fragile environment. The authors document how the operators of Alyeska have misled the public about the company's real safety record, while at the same time preventing employees from speaking out. As the oil companies consolidate globally, territorial entities such as Alaska can literally assume the character of an oil province. "

"Based on an examination of safety and industrial relations since the Ocean Ranger disaster, the article argues that government and industry changes have not fully addressed the problems that emerged from the investigation. Although the establishment of a single regulatory agency in the province is an improvement, some jurisdictional ambiguity remains and occupational health and safety regulations are still in draft form after their introduction more than ten years ago. Unionization is seen as an important step toward a safe workplace offshore, particularly in view of some current concerns: working schedules, training, evacuation, and search-and-rescue helicopters. "

"There are indications that the Norwegian oil province has experienced a decrease in incidents since the introduction of its external control system, which gives industry an important role in setting and maintaining safety standards. This article argues that much of the veneration of the Norwegian model is based on a misreading of the Norwegian offshore health and safety system. The author suggests that improvements in offshore safety in Norway were not caused by the adoption of the internal control system alone, but rather by a number of factors which included the introduction of the stringent Norwegian Work Environment Act, which gives union representatives the right to stop work when they feel safety is jeopardized, as well as the maintenance of strong offshore unions with a comprehensive network of trade union-appointed safety representatives. "

"In 1998, the explosion of the Piper Alpha platform claimed 167 lives, making it the world's worst offshore oil disaster. Following this disaster, the U.K. offshore regulatory regime underwent a fundamental reconstruction which was based on the principles of self-regulation and goal-setting. This article argues that there has been no clearly discernable pattern of improvement in terms of offshore incidents since the post-Piper Alpha reforms. The authors attribute this lack of improvement to three principal factors, namely, the lack of effective workforce participation and representation in safety matters, the oil industry's strategic use of “veto points” and, lastly, the failure of the new regulator to police offshore safety and to adequately deter rogue operators."

"The tension is noted between trade union activism and involvement in employee participation schemes. It is shown why, in the United Kingdom's offshore oil and gas industry, a participation scheme--the safety representative system--may be expected to promote union activism in an industry which has resisted union encroachment. It is explained why and how safety representatives have, nevertheless, tended to deny unions a role in the system by reference to the conditions in which representatives acquire their definition of their function. This leads to a categorization of safety representative motivation and role performance and a clarification of how those definitions which associate the representative with management functions rather than union activism receive institutional support. "