Paris
"Are workers equal in front of employers' concentration? We show, using instrumental variable estimations for France between 2000 and 2019, that employers' concentration has a negative heterogenous effect on wage, with the lowest earners being the most vulnerable. This increased wage inequality could reflect some efficiency gains if concentration allows employers to impose a more demanding selection process, improving sorting i.e. workers selection, thus generating both inequality and higher productivity. We find, exploring within-firm and between-firm inequality, that it is not the case. Employers' concentration instead generates wage inequality by undercutting relatively more the bargaining power of the lowest earners."
"Are workers equal in front of employers' concentration? We show, using instrumental variable estimations for France between 2000 and 2019, that employers' concentration has a negative heterogenous effect on wage, with the lowest earners being the most vulnerable. This increased wage inequality could reflect some efficiency gains if concentration allows employers to impose a more demanding selection process, improving sorting i.e. workers ...
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