Documents Rapoport, Hillel 6 results

"The worldwide race to attract talents is getting tougher. The US has been leading the race, with its ability to attract PhD candidates and graduates not only from emerging countries, but also from the European Union. However, a growing number of countries have adopted immigration policies specifically aimed at selecting and attracting skilled workers. This book describes the global competition to attract talents. It focuses in particular on two phenomena: the brain gain and brain drain associated with high-skilled migration.

Part I provides an overview of immigration policies designed to draw in skilled workers. It describes the economic gains associated with skilled immigration in the destination countries and the main determinants of the inflows of skilled immigrants (such as wage premia on education and R&D spending). It also discusses why skill-selective immigration policies do not find more support in receiving countries and shows that interest groups are actively engaged in affecting policies towards skilled migrants. Part II examines the consequences of brain drain for the sending countries. It reviews the channels through which skilled emigration can affect the source countries and looks at remittances, return migration, diaspora externalities, and network effects that may compensate the sending countries for their loss of human capital. Contrary to traditional wisdom, the results indicate that most developing countries experience a net gain from skilled emigration."

"Depuis de nombreuses années, l'immigration fait, dans les pays développés, l'objet de vifs débats. L'adoption à l'automne 2007, en France, du projet de loi Hortefeux visant à encadrer l'immigration en a été une nouvelle illustration. La question de l'immigration sélective, voie dans laquelle se sont engagés désormais bon nombre de pays du Nord, y a été notamment au centre des discussions, car elle est aujourd'hui devenue fondamentale pour l'Europe. Peut-elle en effet résoudre certains des problèmes économiques structurels majeurs auxquels les pays européens sont confrontés - comme le financement de ses systèmes sociaux ou l'exode de cerveaux européens vers l'Amérique du Nord - en favorisant l'accueil sur leur sol de migrants qualifiés ?"

"We investigate the welfare implications of two pre-crisis immigration waves (1991–2000 and 2001–2010) and of the post-crisis wave (2011–2015) for OECD native citizens. To do so, we develop a general equilibrium model that accounts for the main channels of transmission of immigration shocks – the employment and wage effects, the fiscal effect, and the market size effect – and for the interactions between them. We parameterize our model for 20 selected OECD member states. We find that the three waves induce positive effects on the real income of natives, however the size of these gains varies considerably across countries and across skill groups. In relative terms, the post-crisis wave induces smaller welfare gains compared to the previous ones. This is due to the changing origin mix of immigrants, which translates into lower levels of human capital and smaller fiscal gains. However, differences across cohorts explain a tiny fraction of the highly persistent, cross-country heterogeneity in the economic benefits from immigration."

"We examine the relationship between immigration and preferences for redistribution in Europe using a newly assembled data set of immigrant stocks for 140 regions in 16 Western European countries. Exploiting within-country variations in the share of immigrants at the regional level, we find that native respondents display lower support for redistribution when the share of immigrants in their residence region is higher. This negative association is driven by regions of countries with relatively large Welfare States and by respondents at the center or at the right of the political spectrum. The effects are also stronger when immigrants originate from Middle-Eastern or Eastern European countries, are less skilled than natives, and experience more residential segregation. These results are unlikely to be driven by immigrants' endogenous location choices, that is, by welfare magnet effects or by immigrants' sorting into regions with better economic opportunities. They are also robust to instrumenting immigration with a standard shiftshare approach or to controlling for regional growth prospects."

"We analyze the long-run evolution of populism and explore the role of globalization in shaping such evolution. We use an imbalanced panel of 628 national elections in 55 countries over 60 years. A rst novelty is our reliance on both standard (e.g., the "volume margin", or vote share of populist parties) and new (e.g., the "mean margin", a continuous vote-weighted average of populism scores of all parties) measures of the extent of populism. We show that levels of populism in the world have strongly fluctuated since the 1960s, peaking after each major economic crisis and reaching an all-time high – especially for right-wing populism in Europe – after the great recession of 2007-10. The second novelty is that when we investigate the "global" determinants of populism, we look at trade and immigration jointly and consider their size as well as their skill-structure. Using OLS, PPML and IV regressions, our results consistently suggest that populism responds to globalization shocks in a way which is closely linked to the skill structure of these shocks. Imports of low-skill labor intensive goods increase both total and right-wing populism at the volume and mean margins, and more so in times of de-industrialization and of internet expansion. Low-skill immigration, on the other hand, tends to induce a transfer of votes from left-wing to right-wing populist parties, apparently without aecting the total. Finally, imports of high-skill labor intensive goods, as well as high-skill immigration, tend to reduce the volume of populism."