Documents Stähler, Nicolai 3 results

"In the theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection reduces job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal."

"In the theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection reduces job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal."

"Employers who use temporary agency staff in contrast to regular staff are not affected by employment protection regulations when terminating a job. Therefore, services provided by temporary work agencies may be seen as a substitute for regular employment. In this paper, we analyse the effects of employment protection on the size of the temporary work agency sector in a model of equilibrium unemployment. We find that higher firing costs may even reduce temporary work agency employment if agencies themselves are subject to employment protection, a consideration that distinguishes our results from those for fixed-term employment arrangements."