Documents Mukherjee, Arijit 3 results

"We show the effects of trade cost reduction in the presence of a domestic firm's strategic output allocation between formal in-house production and subcontracting to the informal sector. Considering a one-way trade, we show that trade cost reduction increases the in-house unionised wage, in-house employment, union utility, the formal–informal wage gap and consumer surplus, it reduces informal production and the profit of the domestic firm, and it creates an ambiguous effect on welfare. Whether trade cost reduction increases the income gap between the domestic producer and the labour union is ambiguous, and depends on the trade cost and the cost of subcontracting. Considering a two-way trade with symmetric segmented markets, we show that a symmetric trade cost reduction reduces the domestic unionised wage, domestic in-house employment, union utility, it increases informal production, consumer surplus and it creates ambiguous effects of the profits."

"In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both decentralized and centralized bargaining. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty only licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing). We discuss the implications of positive opportunity costs of the licensees."

"It is often argued that if the substitutability between workers is sufficiently high, labour is better off under a centralised labour union than under decentralised unions. We show that this may not be the case in an open economy with foreign direct investment as the incentive for outward FDI is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. If the number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is higher than under decentralised unions, their wage rates charged by the labour union and the union utility may be higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, and the comparison may depend on the competitiveness of the industry. We also show that there are situations where both the domestic industry and the labour unions prefer decentralised unions over a centralised union."