Documents Schubert, Claudia 5 results

"Collective bargaining, meaning the self-determined and independent negotiation of collective agreements, is subject to multifarious limitations imposed by EU law. In the light of recent developments, this contribution asks which role the sovereignty of collective bargaining plays in the framework of the European economic order and how it relates to EU laws. The decisive questions are: To which extent is collective bargaining protected in Europe and to which extent may the EU limit collective bargaining? The issue concerns nothing less than the scope and limits of the power of collective bargaining."

"Unternehmen und Konzerne, die sich für eine Matrixorganisation entschieden haben, sind in der Praxis inzwischen weit verbreitet. Neben individualarbeitsrechtlichen werden zahlreiche betriebsverfassungsrechtliche Fragestellungen aufgeworfen.

Das vorliegende Werk untersucht schwerpunktmäßig einzelne dieser betriebsverfassungsrechtlichen Problembereiche. Behandelt werden beispielsweise die Tauglichkeit des tradierten Betriebsbegriffs, die Optionen, die § 3 BetrVG zur Anpassung der betriebsverfassungsrechtlichen Organisation bietet und wie das Potential der Norm ausgeweitet werden könnte. Weiter werden auch Fragen der Betriebszugehörigkeit und der bestehenden Beteiligungsrechte dargestellt. In der Broschüre werden damit ausführlich gerade auch die in der Betriebspraxis wichtigen Fragen diskutiert und konkrete Lösungen vorgeschlagen. Abgeschlossen wird das Buch mit einem Regelungsvorschlag für eine Konzernbetriebsvereinbarung."

"The adoption of the SE and the implementation of the employee participation in the member states took place against the background of their national tradition of employee participation. The statutory provisions for the SE thus take on specific characteristics that already applied to company co-determination in the public limited-liability company. Using the examples Germany, Austria, Sweden and France, the conflicts with the Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 (SE-Regulation) and the Directive 2001/86 (SE-Directive) will be identified that arise under the continuation of specific national provisions and the implementation of the SE in the one-tier model."

" Algorithms are the key instrument for the economy-on-demand using platforms for its clients, workers and self-employed. An effective legal enforcement must not be limited to the control of the outcome of the algorithm but should also focus on the algorithm itself. This article assesses the present capacities of computer science to control and certify rule-based and data-centric (machine learning) algorithms. It discusses the legal instruments for the control of algorithms and their enforcement and institutional pre-conditions. It favours a digital agency that concentrates expertise and bureaucracy for the certification and official calibration of algorithms and promotes an international approach to the regulation of legal standards."

" Not only in Germany but in many European states the level of coverage by collective agreements is declining. Since collective bargaining autonomy is based on the principle of voluntary membership, one of its weaknesses lies in the declining degree of organisation on both the employers' and the employees' side. In the long term, weak unions cannot ensure fair working conditions. As a result, collective bargaining agreements lose their inherent warranty of correctness. In the legal policy discussion, this has led to calls for the legislator. In response, in 2014 the German legislature passed the ‘Act to Strengthen the Autonomy of Collective Bargaining' (Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz) to lower the requirements for the extension of collective agreements and to introduce a national minimum wage. As this has not led to significant improvements, there are further-reaching proposals for the statutory extension of collective agreements. The extension of collective bargaining agreements to non-members does not strengthen the social partnership on the employee side. However, it is a legitimate means to avoid a race to the bottom in competing for the lowest social standard; extensions help in creating common labour standards as long as a sufficient margin is maintained for the social partners to negotiate sector-specific regulations and to shape working conditions. A legal system, which is based on rights of freedom and does not consider the freedom of association to be a solely goal-orientated right, offers limited options to strengthen the social partners through legislation. Extensions become increasingly difficult to justify, the higher the existing level of legal protection. Especially in countries with minimum wage legislation and a large amount of employee protection legislation the justification requirements increase. However, at least in Germany, to date the judiciary has not sufficiently considered these aspects. Even though international laws leave substantial freedoms to the states, all legal systems that are based on a strong and vital social partnership should be interested in obtaining and protecting the plurality of collective bargaining agreements. They should only lay down limits, where there are tendencies of eroding solidarity among workforces due to the parallel existence of several collective bargaining agreements. The associations themselves possess limited resources for extending their member base. Still, the more the individual can gain from association membership, the more likely employees and employers are to join their respective associations. Therefore, the state should demonstrate restraint regarding the regulation of labour conditions. However, such restraint will prove difficult for welfare states. Their governments will most likely opt to eliminate deficiencies through legislation, even at the price of further weakening collective bargaining autonomy. Compared to extensions, legal provisions have the disadvantage of being too general and less flexible because of the much slower adaptation process. Therefore, the main argument in favour of extensions is that they facilitate the differentiation of mandatory working conditions. To ensure their legitimation, a number of design options can be considered. Regarding this, neither European nor international law impose high requirements but existing differences between national legal systems demand custom-fit solutions."