Documents Zwick, Thomas 16 results

"Using linked employer–employee panel data for Germany, we investigate whether firms implement real wage reductions in a selective manner. In line with insider–outsider and several strands of efficiency wage theory, we find strong evidence for selective wage cuts with high-productivity workers being spared even when controlling for permanent differences in firms' wage policies. In contrast to some recent contributions stressing fairness considerations, we also find that wage cuts increase wage dispersion among peers rather than narrowing it. Notably, the same selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to firms covered by collective agreements or having a works council."

"This paper analyses the risk of unemployment, unemployment duration and the risk of longterm unemployment immediately after apprenticeship graduation. Unemployed apprenticeship graduates constitute a large share of unemployed youth in Germany but unemployment incidence within this group is unequally distributed. Our paper extends previous research in three dimensions. It shows that individual productivity assessment of the trainig firm, initial selection into high reputation trainig firms and occupations, and adverse selection of employer moving graduates are correlated with unemployment after apprenticeship graduation."

"In this study, we investigate the relation between five specific human resource measures for old employees (SMOE) and the relative productivity of old employees. Despite the fact that the share of old employees increases in most developed countries and many establishments apply specific measures for old employees, this is the first large scale study on this topic. We find that the relative productivity contributions of old workers are significantly higher in establishments that provide either specific equipment of work places or age-specific jobs for old workers. In establishments that apply mixed-age working teams the relative productivity contributions of old and of young employees are significantly higher than in establishments without this measure. Working time reductions and specific training for old employees are not associated with higher relative productivity of these employees. Our results suggest that the application of SMOE can contribute to the explanation for two recent findings, the only modest decline of the relative productivity contributions of old workers and the high variance for estimates of age-productivity profiles."

"Weshalb bezahlen Arbeitgeber Löhne, die mit der Betriebszugehörigkeit steigen? Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie betont, dass Arbeitgeber ihre Beschäftigten an sich binden und motivieren wollen, indem sie ihnen einen relativ niedrigen Einstiegslohn sowie im Laufe der Betriebszugehörigkeit stärker steigende Löhne bezahlen, als dies deren steigende Produktivität rechtfertigen würde. Dieser Beitrag versucht die empirische Relevanz der Prinzipal- Agent-Theorie zu testen und geht hierbei insbesondere auf die Rolle von Betriebsräten und Gewerkschaften ein. Er bestätigt die theoretischen Vorhersagen, die positive Einflussmöglichkeiten beider Institutionen nahelegen. "

"This paper finds soubstantial effects of ICT investments on productivity for a large and representative German establishment panel data set. In contrast to the bulk of the literature also establisment without ICT capital are included and lagged effects of ICT investments are analysed. In addition, a broad range of establishments and employee characteristics are taken account of in order to avoid omitted variable bias. It is shown that taking into account unobserved heterogeneity of the establishments and endogeneity of ICT investments increases the estimated lagged productivity impact of ICT investments."

"Mit dem 'Ersten Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt' ('Hartz I') wurde ab 01.01.2003 eine Entgeltsicherung für Arbeitnehmer ab 50 Jahren eingeführt: Wer zur Beendigung oder Vermeidung von Arbeitslosigkeit eine Arbeit annimmt, die schlechter bezahlt wird als die letzte Arbeit, erhält einen Teil der Entgeltdifferenz von der Bundesagentur für Arbeit für den Zeitraum erstattet, in dem sonst Arbeitslosengeld I gezahlt worden wäre, wenn der Verdienstrückgang mindestens 50 Euro und der Restanspruch auf Arbeitslosengeld I mindestens 180 Tage beträgt. Die Entgeltsicherung ist Teil einer aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktpolitik für Ältere, weil ein Anreiz zur raschen Aufnahme einer Beschäftigung trotz Lohneinbußen besteht. Der Aufsatz beruht auf einer Evaluation der Entgeltsicherung und behandelt die bisher vorliegenden Erfahrungen mit der Entgeltsicherung. Insbesondere werden die Inanspruchnahme der Entgeltsicherung dargestellt sowie die Auswirkungen auf die Wiederbeschäftigungschancen Älterer untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Entgeltsicherung nur relativ selten genutzt wurde. Auch deshalb fällt der Nachweis, dass die Existenz der Entgeltsicherung die Wiederbeschäftigungschancen Älterer verbessert hat, negativ aus. Wesentliche Ursachen für die geringe Nutzung und ausbleibende Wirkung der Entgeltsicherung sind ihre geringe Bekanntheit, die unter anderem auf den zurückhaltenden Einsatz durch die Vermittler zurückzuführen ist, unklare und widersprüchliche Förderbestimmungen sowie die Tatsache, dass die Entgeltsicherung bestehende Akzeptanzprobleme für die Aufnahme der neuen Beschäftigung bei potenziellen Nutzer/innen mehrheitlich nur teilweise beseitigt. Jedoch scheint die Anreizwirkung bei starken Verdienstrückgängen höher zu sein als bei schwachen Einkommenseinbußen."

"The German dual apprenticeship system has come under pressure in recent years because enterprises have not been willing to provide a sufficient number of apprenticeship positions. An argument that is frequently put forward is that the gap could be closed if more firms were willing to incur net costs during the training period. This paper investigates on the basis of representative data whether German enterprises do indeed incur net costs on average during the apprenticeship period, i.e. whether the impact of an increase in the share of apprentices on contemporary profits is negative. The paper uses the representative linked employer-employee panel data of the IAB (LIAB) and takes into account possible endogeneity of training intensity and unobserved heterogeneity in the profit estimation by employing panel system GMM methods. An increase in the share of apprentices has no effect on profits. This can be interpreted as a first indication that most establishments in Germany do not invest more in apprentices than their productivity effects during the apprenticeship period."

"Using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for 2001, the authors found that German works councils are in general associated with higher earnings, even after accounting for establishment- and worker heterogeneity. Works council wage premia exceed those of collective bargaining and are higher, in fact, where both institutions are present in the workplace. The authors also found evidence indicating that works councils benefit women relative to men and appear to favor foreign, east-German, and service-sector workers as well. Separate evidence from quantile regressions suggests that the conjunction of works council presence and collective bargaining is important to the narrowing process. In smaller plants even the presence of a works council markup depends on the coexistence of the works council entity with the machinery of collective bargaining."