Documents Parteka, Aleksandra 7 results

"We propose a “hardware–software” framework that offers a new perspective on the mechanisms of long-run economic growth. Based on first principles, it assumes that output is generated through purposefully initiated physical action. Production needs energy and information, provided by respective factors: hardware (“brawn”), including physical labor, physical capital and compute, and software (“brains”), encompassing human cognitive work and digital software, in particular artificial intelligence (AI). Hardware and software are essential and complementary in production, whereas their constituent components are mutually substitutable. The framework generalizes the neoclassical model with capital and labor, models with capital–skill complementarity and skill-biased technical change, and selected unified growth theories. We provide an empirical quantification of hardware and software in the U.S., 1968–2019, documenting a rising share of physical capital in hardware (mechanization) and digital software in software (automation); as a whole software has been growing systematically faster than hardware. Accumulation of human capital and digital software were the key contributors to U.S. economic growth. Looking into the future through the lens of the hardware–software framework, we expect full automation of production by transformative AI and an order-of-magnitude acceleration of economic growth."

"Using a rich dataset on over 110,000 workers from nine European countries and the USA we study the wage response to industry dependence on foreign value added. We estimate a Mincerian wage model augmented with an input-output interindustry linkages measure accounting for task heterogeneity across workers. Low and mediumeducated workers and those performing routine tasks experience (little) wage decline due to major dependency of their industries on foreign inputs. Workers from former EU15 are more in danger of unfavourable wage effects than workers from new EU member states. American workers employed in service industries are more exposed than manufacturing workers."

"This paper assesses the impact of international outsourcing/offshoring practices on the process of wage equalization across manufacturing sectors in a sample of EU27 economies (1995-2009). We discriminate between heterogeneous wage effects on different skill categories of workers (low, medium and high skill). The main focus is on the labour market outcomes of vertical integration, so we augment a model of conditional wage convergence through the inclusion of sector-specific broad and narrow outsourcing/offshoring indices based on input-output data (World Input Output Database, April 2012 release). Two-way relations between trade and wages are addressed through the use of a gravity-based sector-level instrument. We find no evidence supporting unconditional skill-specific wage convergence in EU sectors. In a conditional setting, (slow) wage convergence takes place, but international outsourcing plays a negligible role in wage equalization. Moreover, even though regression results indicate that offshoring reduces the wage growth of domestic medium- and low-skilled workers, we show that this negative effect is economically small."

"By using very rich individual-level data on workers from 28 European countries, we provide the first so extensive cross-country assessment of wage response to global production links within global value chains (GVCs) in the period 2005–2014. Unlike the other studies, we (i) address the importance of backward links in globally integrated production structures (capturing imports of goods and services required in any stage of the production of the final product); (ii) measure the occupational task profile of workers with new country-specific indices of routinisation; (iii) compare the impact of global production links on wages between workers from Western, Central–Eastern, and Southern Europe employed in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors; and (iv) account for direct and indirect dependence on GVC imports from developing and high-income countries. We consider the potential endogeneity problems. Our results suggest that global import intensity of production exhibits negative pressure on wages in Europe. This effect mainly concerns workers from Western Europe employed in manufacturing and is driven by production links with non-high-income countries. Our counterfactual estimates suggest that the effect for all of Europe is small, but the pressure of GVC imports on wages in Western Europe is not economically negligible, in particular when inputs are from less developed countries including China."

"This paper's analysis of working conditions in Europe compares several aspects of job quality and wages, rather than relying on earnings as a sole indicator of workers' well-being.

We use a micro-level database of workers from 22 European countries to assess how global value chains (GVCs) and advanced digital production (ADP) technologies affect working conditions. We show that the estimated link between GVC involvement and working conditions is conditional on the technological content of the job: the two aspects should not be analysed separately. The exact effect varies across types of technological exposures and particular aspects of job quality. In occupations of high software and robot exposure, job quality tends to deteriorate as GVC involvement increases. This effect is largely negligible for monetary wages. However, we argue that wages for low software, robot and AI-exposed occupations decrease with GVC intensity."

"This paper uses a sample of over 9 million workers from 22 European countries to study the intertwined relationship between digital technology, cross-border production links and working conditions. We compare the social consequences of technological change exhibited by three types of innovation: computerisation (software), automation (robots) and artificial intelligence (AI). To fully quantify work-related wellbeing, we propose a new methodology that amends the information on remuneration by reference to such non-monetary factors as the work environment (physical and social), career development prospects, or work intensity. First, we show that employee wellbeing is related to the type of technological exposure. Employees in occupations with a high degree of software or robot exposure face worse working conditions – contrary to highly AI exposed occupations. Thus, we find that AI technologies differ from previous waves of technological progress - also in relation to workers' wellbeing. Additionally, we show that the relationship between digital technology and working conditions weakly depends on participation in global production chains."