



European Foundation
for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions

Humanize Work and Increase Profitability?

Direct participation in
organisational change
viewed by the social
partners in Europe



Loughlinstown House,
Shankill, Co. Dublin, Ireland

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by
Ida Regalia

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Foreword

The 1990s have seen a strong revival of the debate on work organisation, optimal use of human resources and direct participation of employees. The MIT-study on "lean production" suggested that the competitive advantage of Japanese car manufacturers was mainly based on their superior work organisation and strong involvement of employees in all key areas of activity of a company: design, planning, effective quality management and permanent improvement programmes combined with a lifetime employment guarantee, were key features of "lean production" in Japan.

The reaction in Europe was almost immediate. The Social Partners and governments in most European countries started a national debate; on the European level the European Commission and some sectoral trade unions organised conferences and workshops. The debate was further advanced, as Europe was slipping at the beginning of the 1990s into its worst post war recession, demonstrating the need for structural adjustment.

However, many questions remain still unanswered. What is the diffusion of different forms of direct participation in Europe? How do the European experiments on direct participation e.g. in France (group d'expression), Sweden (Volvo experiments on group work) and Germany (Humanisierung der Arbeitslebens) compare with the Japanese approach? What are the interrelations between increased competitiveness based on new forms of work organisation and the quality of working life? Do these new developments only represent a new rationalisation strategy with negative impact on employment? To what extent does direct participation diminish the influence of employee representatives and trade unions on the Company level?

In order to fill this information and discussion gap the European Foundation initiated the **EPOC** project (**E**mployee direct **P**articipation in **O**rganisational **C**hange). The objective is to provide information and stimulate debate between the Social Partners and the European Union institutions. Within this informal consultation, the possibilities for this topic to be included in the agenda of the "European Social Dialogue" could be explored and the extent the European Commission might support progress in organisational change of European business in programmes of vocational training. The final aim of the Foundation would be to assist the different parties in developing forms of organisational change which would enhance competitiveness, working conditions and the appropriate participation of employees.

The objective of this study is to describe and analyse the perception of direct participation in organisational change by representatives of organisations of social partners in Europe. Nearly 200 interviews have been conducted in the 15 countries of European Union. The investigation throws some light on the ways in which both sides of industry in Europe approach an uncertain and controversial topic beyond the easy rhetoric of common sense.

Dr. Hubert Krieger

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions

Summary

1 Reasons for a study

1.1 Since the mid-1980s, in the international debate on the new tendencies of industrial relations in workplaces in the advanced democracies, the importance of, or the need for, some kind of worker direct participation in the organisation of work have largely become a kind of “new conventional wisdom” (Osterman, 1994). Even though the exact meaning of this “participation” remains substantially undetermined, and its real effects largely unexplored, its virtues are very often seen as a matter of course.

1.2 The specific study within the European Foundation’s EPOC project, the results of which are presented and discussed here, is intended to go deeper into the understanding and the diffusion of this “conventional wisdom”. Our target group is not academics, nor the special community of managerial consultants, but the social partners’ organisations at the national or central level in a very large sample of European countries.

1.3 There were three reasons for targeting this group. First, from a methodological point of view, since an extensive research programme on the operation of direct participation practices in workplaces was also being organised within the EPOC project, an overview of the positions of the social partners on the topic appeared useful in helping both to plan the fieldwork and interpret the results. The second was a more substantive reason, grounded on the specific features of what came to be called the “European model of industrial relations”, characterised by a pluralist labour-inclusive framework, whose pillars are the acceptance and mutual recognition of strong social partners - employers’ organisations and trade unions - and the fundamental role played by centralised or co-ordinated collective bargaining as a means of regulating wages and terms of employment, in most cases supplemented by the crucial role played by the ‘third’ actor, i.e. the state. Despite the numerous variations to the “model”, it goes substantially uncontested that, compared to the United States and Japan, the organisations of labour as well as those of capital enjoyed significant influence in Europe at least up to the late 1970s, both in the industrial and the political arena, so that we can assume that the positions of the social partners on the new participative programmes will, at least to some extent, be an important element in explaining their success or failure. The third reason is linked to the fact that DP might become an issue for collective bargaining and social dialogue at the national or European level: in this perspective, the study would help by providing information and stimulating the debate.

2 Research problems and methodology

2.1 On principle, as defined within the EPOC project (Geary and Sisson, 1994), DP can be looked upon as a positive-sum game, from which each player should gain valuable benefits. However, because of its challenging co-operative nature, which requires it to be founded on reciprocity and mutual trust to demonstrate its positive potential, DP strategies and methods are to be expected to be subject to differing assessments and reactions by the actors of industrial relations

2.2 If it seems uncontested that DP and related developments represent a key competitive strategy for maintaining European competitiveness in world markets, are these new tendencies interpreted as providing an opportunity as well for the humanisation and democratisation of work? Still on the significance of DP, are these programmes considered as a mere responsibility of individual employers, and of their employees, not requiring therefore the elaboration of official positions and/or of normative framework by the social partners? Or are they rather seen as a topic of more general relevance, which needs to be dealt with, and eventually regulated as well, in one way or another according to some explicit criteria? With regard to the experience and effects of DP, what is the relevance attributed to the issue? What is its perceived impact upon the economic performance of enterprises, as well as upon working conditions and worker quality of life? And what influence does it have upon workplace industrial relations and existing patterns of representative participation? Finally, did the social partners take/are they taking initiatives regarding the new programmes? And what are their points of view about the future?

2.3 The empirical study, carried out to answer these questions, covers the 15 countries of the European Union, and was conducted between the autumn of 1993 and the summer of 1994 by a network of industrial relations specialists co-ordinated by the writer. For all countries detailed reports were written on the basis of in-depth interviews with social partner representatives and analysis of documents, according to a standard methodology which, because of the specifically *soft* nature of the utilised data, allowed room for checks and comments to the proposed interpretations on the part of the interviewees themselves. Also the synoptic tables, prepared subsequently by the writer (see Annexes) to facilitate a comparison affected as little as possible by personal impressions, were submitted to checks and observations.

2.2 The organisations selected as the 'social partners' were in each country the peak federations (or confederations) of both sides of industry, as well as the national employers' organisations and the trade unions in the metal industry and in the banking sector, exemplifying manufacturing and services respectively.

2.3 Three main topics were covered by the investigation: the social partners' definition and understanding of DP, their assessment of the diffusion and impact of existing experiences, and their expectations for the future. Thus, the study

regards the opinions and attitudes of the central organisations of both sides of industry. In no way should it be considered as a description of real developments in workplaces. This sets precisely both the limits and the strength of the investigation.

3 Understanding DP

3.1 According to our overview, the idea of what DP is - or can be - is by no means consolidated, but is rather a matter of different interpretations. When asked to illustrate freely, with their own words, what was understood by DP by their organisations, somewhat surprisingly, not all the respondents appeared to have a clear understanding of the topic; and some had a rather unconventional view of it. For example, while the immediate answer of the representatives of some employers' organisations was that the topic was not a concern of the central organisations, but a matter for the individual employers, and that therefore they had no elaborated opinions on it, the spontaneous reaction of others was to equate direct and indirect or representative participation.

3.2 In most cases, terms other than 'direct participation' were proposed as more appropriate, such as *participative management*, *co-determination*, *direct co-operation*, *employee activation*, *employee involvement*, *ways of influencing one's own work*, indicating that the expression 'direct participation' is not highly familiar in the industrial relations culture of many European countries. However, more important than terminology was the underlying difference between an understanding of DP either as a way of having employees *more or less occasionally involved* in the objectives of production and/or in the implementation of change, or as a more formalised opportunity afforded to them to *influence systematically* their working conditions.

3.3 The organisations in the banking sector were as a rule less informed, as well as less interested, in the topic than those in metalworking. This difference is linked to differences in real experience, as well as to the widespread opinion that DP was less suited to the financial sector than to manufacturing. The reasons given, however, were contradictory.

3.4 As to the trade unions, they appeared to be on the whole a little more informed and to have more elaborated opinions on the issue than their employers' counterparts. This reflects differences in the scope of the interests represented respectively by the latter and by the former. The responsibility of the employers' organisations covers in fact the 'collective' interests of members, while DP and related issues were seen as these members' individual affairs. Therefore, it was no coincidence that the overwhelming majority of these organisations did not recognise any official position on DP, although most of them do not lack of initiatives, policy statements and 'informal' positions on the subject. In the case of the unions, which are less affected by differences between collective and

individual interests of their members, formal, official positions have been recorded in a larger number of cases and in most others the issue appeared to have been strongly debated and the object of more or less formalised recommendations, initiatives and investigations.

3.5 Quite surprisingly, however, in many cases the spontaneous understanding of DP from the organisations of labour was extraordinarily similar to their employers' organisation counterparts, thus revealing the growth of a shared industrial relations culture, and sometimes an increasing co-operative climate between the partners.

3.6 Most typical of the approach of the unions was rather their propensity to distinguish between what DP actually is and what it could be. As a rule the trade union representatives emphasised the contrast between the *practice* of DP as a managerial-driven employee involvement and the *possibility* that DP might provide opportunities for employees to influence their own work, sometimes described as *real* DP.

3.7 As to the reaction to the working definition of DP developed at the time by the research group within the EPOC project and which emphasised somewhat the initiative of management, as expected it was the representatives of the employers' organisations who tended to be more in tune with the proposed definition. The majority of the union and a large proportion of the employer representatives agreed indeed only partially; and a few clearly disagreed. The agreements/disagreements were not necessarily grounded however on the expected reasons. For example, on the side of the trade unions it was also emphasised that the definition did not give sufficient weight to the influence and initiative of employees themselves: which is rather unusual given traditional trade union approaches to individuals. On the side of the employers' organisations there were unexpected criticisms of what was seen as an overly "managerialist" approach. DP, it was also argued, had to be integrated with a greater emphasis to be given to representative participation or to the initiative of the employees themselves.

3.8 As to the objectives of DP, our overview confirmed only partially the common view that employers will mainly stress economic goals and the unions social ones. Although the employers' organisation representatives were as a rule interested in the economic performance of firms, and their trade union counterparts were in the first place interested in the well being of workers, our data indicate that the former did not necessarily focus their attention solely on economic objectives, but that they often emphasised social values as well, such as increasing employees' commitment and motivation, and improving and humanising working conditions. Conversely, in many cases the unions did not limit their positive expectations of DP to the amelioration of working conditions, but also mentioned openly the achievement of economic objectives.

3.9 With regard to the general orientations towards DP, the employers' organisations shared, as expected, a positive, although largely informal, attitude

towards these programmes. However, a more cautious or sceptical approach emerged also, unexpectedly, in some cases. Even more surprising, in the majority of cases the trade unions revealed a more positive orientation towards DP than one would have anticipated, although subordinated to the fulfillment of specific preconditions.

3.10 There were also cases where the attitudes of trade unions were much less positive, when not wholly negative. Even the most clear-cut positions, however, with time appeared to have left some room to pragmatic accommodation, where the issue of the regulation of DP and of the preconditions for its successful implementation were perceived as the crucial question.

4 The issue of regulation

4.1 More than the idea of DP, it was its regulation which was perceived as the most controversial issue. The existing, or envisaged, solutions differed considerably. The smoothest situations were in those countries where a normative framework to encourage co-operative relationships between social partners at different levels (although rarely with explicit reference to DP) was already in place as a result of legislation, and - even more - of centralised negotiation. In these cases, the employers' organisations tended to focus predominantly on their claim that substantial autonomy was recognised to the companies within the limits of the already existing general framework; whereas the trade unions stressed the necessity of a systematic decentralised negotiation/co-determination of the conditions of implementation of DP programmes. Where a general normative framework was not available, the contrast between the social partners tended to focus on the opportunity of creating it as well.

5 The diffusion

5.1 Our respondents did not have a clear perception of the quantitative diffusion of DP within their domain. This depended fundamentally on the characteristics of practices and programmes, the introduction of which tended to take place in a piece-meal fashion, without co-ordination from the national organisations, even when it was the result of negotiations involving trade unions or works councils.

5.2 At any rate, DP was generally assumed to be more widespread in manufacturing than in services and among blue-collar rather than white-collar employees. It was held to be especially prominent in the car industry, in large plants, and in particular in those belonging to foreign-owned multinational companies. But there were also those who emphasised that DP was widely

diffused in banking to win the motivation of staff, and, for similar reasons, among small and medium-sized enterprises. Generally speaking, the employers' organisation representatives tended to share a more optimistic view of the diffusion of DP than their trade union counterparts.

5.3 The perceived differences in the diffusion of DP in manufacturing and services may correspond to differences in what is considered to constitute DP: if any kind of employee involvement and motivation is seen as DP, it is likely that DP would be most widespread in the service sector, where the commitment of employees is structurally required in the client relationship. While the opposite might be true if a more narrow meaning of DP is adopted. A similar argument can also apply to the different opinions about diffusion in large and small companies.

5.4 In any event, in most cases the social partners were rather hesitant in attaching much importance to DP. This was not only the case in countries where it is likely that the diffusion of DP was very limited, but also in others where there is a long tradition of co-operative personnel management. On the basis of the tentative figures cited by the respondents, even in the most favourable situations, such as in metalworking, the diffusion of modern DP practices probably does not exceed a quite limited proportion of enterprises. Nonetheless, only a minority of respondents believed that the topic was of little importance, at least in principle and as an experience which might anticipate more general future trends.

6 The impact of DP

6.1 Because of the limited practical experience of DP by the respondents, opinions about its effects were probably often grounded more on expectations than on facts. With regard to the economic impact of DP, a little surprisingly, there appeared to be a widely held view that DP was not productive as such, but that it enhanced productivity and efficiency of enterprises by linking increased internal communications and employee involvement to quality and economic improvement. Whereas the trade union representatives tended to show a more straightforward positive appreciation on the issue, their employers' organisation counterparts stressed that it was not easy to measure directly the effects of DP in terms of economic performance. Some even openly observed that the relationship was by no means certain, and that because of this uncertainty it was not necessarily the case that DP, which in the short run is costly, would be introduced.

6.2 As to the impact of DP on working conditions and quality of working life, the assessment of the trade union representatives was much more critical than that of their employers' organisation counterparts. While the latter often emphasised the beneficial effects of increased autonomy, communication, job satisfaction, the former disclosed a much more controversial view of the matter.

On the one hand, the positive outcome of increased autonomy, more interesting, enriched and challenging work, paid more satisfactorily, within a better environment and improved ergonomic conditions, was indeed stressed. On the other, a long list of negative effects was also quoted: i.e. the segmentation of the workforce between those who are positively affected by DP programmes and those who are marginalised because of their inability to participate in them; the deterioration of working conditions resulting from increased stress, work intensification and social pressure, greater risks of accidents, as well as insufficient change in traditional supervision; the increasing individualism and the decreasing solidarity, the loss of free time and the dangers of self-exploitation.

6.3 Most trade union respondents therefore insisted on the need for a new specification of the terms of employment, to reflect the changed circumstances. They, together with some employers' organisation representatives, also argued that among the conditions for the successful implementation of DP were the need for specific training, to be offered both to managerial and supervising staff and to employees involved, for new pay systems based on qualification and results, and the revision of traditional career paths.

6.4 Surprisingly, the crucial and controversial issue of the impact of *direct* on *indirect* or *representative* participation, and on consolidated industrial relations practices in workplaces, appeared finally to be viewed by our respondents with a rather relaxed, and sometimes co-operative, attitude. This is not to deny the existence of deep differences and contrasting views. In most cases, however, it seemed that the view of DP as a threat to trade unionism, widespread in the 1980s, had been replaced by a more pragmatic approach, where the relatively slow diffusion of DP was seen as offering opportunities for negotiation or co-determination, and sometimes for developing new representative strategies involving closer contacts with employees in a period of extensive change.

6.5 More generally, it seemed that in most cases the trade union role was not endangered by DP where the workforce was reasonably well organised. Only in a limited number of cases was management reported to have taken advantage of change to withdraw recognition from trade unions or employee representatives.

6.6 In many cases, moreover, the introduction of DP appears to have taken place with the approval (informally given or formally negotiated) of the works councils or of the trade unions. At least in these cases, therefore, the issue of the relationship between direct and indirect participation became a question of distinguishing their respective roles. The employers' organisations representatives also appeared to be particularly interested in this topic. Whether the elaboration of functional distinctions would lead to an aseptyc separation of spheres of influence or to some kind of new interaction remained however an entirely open matter.

7 Activities and future prospects

7.1 Not all the considered organisations had engaged/were going to engage in specific activities on DP and related issues. Hardly any initiative was recorded in the banking sector. Elsewhere, it was very likely that some kind of initiatives had taken place, or were on the agenda. However, the economic recession of the early 1990s was often seen as a hindering factor within this perspective.

7.2 There were however many differences, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, as well as in the importance assigned to these activities. The initiatives might indeed range from the organisation of discussions, seminars and the like, and/or the provision of training, advice, audit services for members, to the elaboration of political resolutions, of proposals for changing existing regulation on the matter, and finally to the engagement in programmes for the diffusion of DP.

7.3 DP-related initiatives where both sides (especially at the central/national level) were brought together and/or in which they were jointly involved, were, in contrast, few and limited in scope. Cases were however mentioned within the countries characterised by more co-operative industrial relations climates.

7.4 As to the long-term expectations about DP, a little surprisingly also in the light of previous observation, in the end the overview disclosed an uneven picture, revealing widespread feelings of uncertainty, sometimes combined with some scepticism.

8 Conclusions

8.1 In conclusion, the investigation only partially confirmed expectations based on assumptions commonly accepted in current managerial literature and industrial relations debate. On the one hand it has disclosed less clear-cut and confrontational attitudes and orientations between the social partners than expected, as a result of learning processes. On the other hand, it has shown that the opinions of the social partners in Europe on the possible virtues of DP are heterogeneous, complex, and by no means simplistic, and inspired by commonplace. While less problematic views might sometimes prevail where the new participative programmes had not yet been extensively introduced, nobody concealed existing difficulties and uncertainties where some experience had been accumulated.

8.2 That the future appears uncertain is stating the obvious. In this case however the finding that the social partners are uncertain is meaningful, because it goes against the common-sense and conventional expectations of a rethorical declaration of faith in the intrinsic virtues of participation.

8.3 Our overview has on the contrary demonstrated that the central actors of industrial relations in Europe have developed a critical, and differentiated, view

of DP: it is not simply seen as a set of programmes and practices, which may prove to be an easy way of obtaining economic and/or social benefits in the short term. Rather it is considered as something with considerable potential, which requires investment, attention, time, cultural change, and also a measure of co-operation, or at least interaction, between the social partners together with a normative framework, if it is to bear fruit in the long term.

8.4 This does not mean, of course, that all the organisations involved would be interested in this kind of long-term uncertain investment.

1 Introduction

Since the late 1980s, the importance of, and the need for, some kind of employee direct participation, or of employee involvement in the organisation of work have largely become a kind of “new conventional wisdom” (Osterman, 1994) in international debates on the new tendencies of industrial relations in workplaces in the advanced democracies. At least within academic and enlightened managerial debate, scarcely anyone would contest the general validity of the assumption of the positive value *per se* of increased worker participation in the operation of modern, more flexible, enterprises. Even though the exact meaning of this “participation” remains substantially implicit and undetermined, and its real effects largely unexplored, its virtues are very often seen as a matter of course.

Within the larger framework of a major investigation into the nature and extent of ‘Direct Participation in Organisational Change’ - the EPOC project - initiated by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions¹, the specific study, the results of which are presented and discussed here, intends to go deeper into the understanding and the diffusion of this “conventional wisdom” (Osterman, 1994). Our target group is not academics, nor the special community of managerial consultants², but the social partners’ organisations in the fifteen countries of the European Union. In other words, we do not elaborate upon the findings and points of view of scholars and more or less interested observers, but upon the attitudes and opinions of the principal industrial relations actors at the national or central level throughout Europe.

There are three reasons for targeting this group. The first is methodological. Since an extensive, empirically-based, research programme on the operation of direct participation practices in workplaces is being organised within the EPOC project, an overview of the positions of the social partners on the topic is likely to be useful in helping both to plan the fieldwork and interpret the results. From this perspective, the study is a preliminary phase of the broader project.

The second is a more substantive reason linked to the characterisation of what has traditionally been labelled the “European model of industrial relations” (Streeck, 1991). As has been emphasised by many industrial relations specialists, the democracies of Europe have long been characterised by a pluralist system of labour-inclusive industrial relations. The pillars of this system are the acceptance and mutual recognition of strong social partners - employers’ organisations and trade unions - and the fundamental role played by centralised or co-ordinated collective bargaining as a means of regulating wages and terms of employment,

¹For a presentation of EPOC and of the conceptualisation adopted, see Geary and Sisson (1994).

²For a discussion of opinions and approaches of different academic communities on the emergence and the impact of new forms of work organisation, see Bonazzi (1993).

to which in most cases the crucial role played by the third partner, i.e. the state (as legislator, policy-maker and employer) needs be added.

There are of course many variations of this model, perhaps as many as the number of the European countries themselves. Despite their differences, there is a broad convergence of view that up until the late 1970s, in comparison with those of the United States and Japan, European labour organisations, as well as those of capital, enjoyed significant influence, in both industrial and political arenas (Streeck, 1991; Ferner and Hyman, 1992a). However, as a consequence of this, it is not unfair to assume that, in the subsequent period of decentralisation and transformation of industrial relations in the 1980s and 1990s, the positions and the orientations of the social partners on the topic are, at least to some extent, an important element in explaining the success or failure of DP programmes and practices.

In other words, it is precisely due to the peculiar characters of industrial and labour relations in Europe that undertaking an investigation of the positions of the social partners on a matter such as employee direct participation, which in practical terms is obviously relevant in workplaces, makes sense, and is not merely a matter of curiosity.

The third reason is linked to the previous one and reflects the nature of the topic itself, which - at least in Europe - might well be or become an issue for collective bargaining and social dialogue at the national or European level. According to this perspective, the study might help by stimulating the debate and providing it with information.

In any event, the hope is that the investigation throws some light on the ways in which both sides of industry in Europe approached an uncertain and controversial topic beyond the easy rhetoric of common sense. With this we do not mean that we are looking for unusual, sensational or necessarily unexpected findings. What we do mean is that the positions of the social partners are discussed on the basis of a systematic and extensive empirical investigation, organised in fifteen European countries with the aid of a common methodology for this purpose.

Before proceeding with the findings, we shall now briefly turn to the main questions addressed by the research and to the methodology adopted.

2 Research Problems and Methodology

2.1 Direct Participation: the EPOC Definition

As has been extensively argued in the publication introducing the EPOC project and setting out the conceptualisation of the investigation into direct participation (Geary and Sisson, 1994), there is no doubt that union demands for greater employee say and participation in the organisation of their work as well as worker commitment and interest in productive goals have had a long history in Europe. Occasionally, management also took an interest in experimenting with ways of actively involving workers and allowing them assume greater responsibility in the daily organisation of work. Within an environment where the productivistic culture typical of craft and skilled workers flourished, there were experiments inspired by the social-technical systems theory. The debate and programmes for improvement in the quality of working life in Sweden and the *Humanisierung der Arbeit* initiative in Germany in particular, are but a few, better known, examples of a much richer story³.

Thus, the *new* ideas and practices which came to prominence throughout the industrialised world in the 1980s and early 1990s, under labels such as ‘Total Quality Management’, ‘lean production’, ‘flexible organisation’ and so on (Geary and Sisson, 1994), did not meet with an entirely unprepared, let alone hostile, social terrain in Europe. What, however, was new in those ideas and practices was their disclosure of an unprecedentedly widespread managerial interest in promoting and/or supporting forms of work organisation requiring to a greater extent, in a more systematic way than ever before, a form of employee direct participation or involvement in the organisation of work, in order to enhance business performance.

It is with reference to these more recent developments that, within the EPOC project, direct participation (DP) has been defined as ‘opportunities which management provide, or initiatives to which they lend their support, at workplace level for consultation with and/or delegation of responsibilities and authority for decision-making to their subordinates either as individuals or as groups of employees relating to their immediate work task, work organisation and/or working conditions’ (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 2).

According to the adopted definition, DP then does not constitute a one-dimensional, compact, homogeneous phenomenon. It is rather a set of various provided ‘opportunities’ and/or supported ‘initiatives’ in the daily organisation of work and in the social relationships between employees and management,

³ For an extensive discussion of these and other attempts and programmes, see the Literature Study by Fröhlich and Pekruhl (1995) within the EPOC project. See also Latniak (1995).

wherein the main analytical distinction - independently of the many, different labels used in textbooks and found in the managerial literature on the topic - is between their being of either a 'consultative' or of a 'delegative' nature.

Consultative participation means that 'employees are encouraged, and enabled, either as individuals or members of a group, to make their views known', within a context where 'the management, however, retain the right to accept or reject employees' opinions as well as reserving the right to take action' (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 3). Examples of such participation may be quality circles, the French *groupes d'expression*, suggestion campaigns, and other forms of direct employee consultation programmes.

Delegative participation means 'that responsibility for what has traditionally been an area of management decision-making is placed largely in employees' hands: participation is designed into peoples' jobs', where 'the distinctive feature' is that 'employees are entrusted to plan, conceive and execute the daily organisation of work' (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 3). Examples of such participation are semi-autonomous work groups, team working, as well as individual task enlargement programmes.

2.2 DP as a Positive-Sum Game?

On principle, as previously defined, DP can be looked upon as an opportunity for both sides of industry, i.e. as a positive-sum game, from which each player should gain valuable benefits. We do not mean by this that the differences in the parties' interests would be cancelled; but that each should find reasons for looking favourably upon DP on his/her own ground.

By adopting DP programmes, management might for instance benefit by:

i. *increased* continuous bottom-up *information*, which is a valuable resource for managing complex systems and highly vulnerable processes, as in case of flexible firms, producing customised, diversified, high quality goods;

ii. *decentralisation of responsibilities*, which is a fundamental resource for promoting those worker initiatives and adaptive abilities increasingly needed where productive strategies are dependent on continuous re-adaptation, diversification, modification of routines according to circumstances; to which the supplementary advantage of reducing costs of supervision needs to be added.

For their part, being involved in DP programmes, workers might benefit by:

i. seeing they are *systematically consulted* and their *opinion taken into consideration*, which means that they will to some extent influence their working conditions;

ii. being allowed *spaces for autonomy and self-management* in the organisation of their daily work, which offers them the possibility of exerting some control over it;

iii. enjoying as a result a better work environment and social climate, and occasionally achieving new skills and responsibilities.

As for the trade unions, they should welcome the introduction of programmes which can be largely seen as *positive responses to their traditional demands* for greater employee say and participation in the organisation of work, and which are expected to have positive effects on working conditions.

At the same time, however, the shift to DP practices is very likely to appear highly costly and risky for each of the industrial relations actors. For management, as consultative participation might prove too expensive and time consuming, with the additional disadvantage of being challenging to consolidated managerial routines; as, by definition, delegative participation requires changes in the boundaries between managerial prerogatives and worker autonomy - and therefore in the deployment of power within organisations - this makes its introduction by no means obvious. For workers, as they would very likely regard consultative practices with suspicion as through such practices they would be requested to disclose their practical, 'hidden' knowledge (Bonazzi, 1993), without certainties to or guarantees about its use. Furthermore they might resist the assumption of partial and/or insufficiently defined responsibilities even more, as it may simply increase their stress with no clear advantages. For trade unions, as they might suspect that the introduction of DP programmes by management is targeted at weakening and/or bypassing their more general, and solidaristically-based, representative role.

Paradoxically, therefore, while in order to be really effective DP programmes would require a highly transparent decision-making process and a positive orientation to sharing responsibilities on the part of management, and an active, trustful and to some extent confident involvement and commitment to the goals of production on the part of the employees and of their organisations, the parties might well be induced *de facto* to introduce them opportunistically or half-heartedly, on the one hand, and to react to them with animosity or distrustful indifference, on the other.

2.3 General Assumptions and Open Questions

In conclusion, although little is known about the real developments of DP practices in Europe compared to Japan or the United States, there is no doubt that the topic is one of the most controversial in the debate on the future of industrial relations, and, even more so, on the conditions of economic success, in European countries.

In fact, because of its challenging co-operative nature, which requires a foundation in a form of reciprocity and mutual trust to demonstrate effectively its positive potential, we would expect DP strategies and methods to be subject to differing assessment and reactions by the actors of industrial relations; not only

between the different interest organisations (i.e. the employers' associations and the trade unions), but also within them. The definition and the understanding of DP are very likely to differ considerably according to various circumstances, such as industrial relations' tradition and institutions, industrial culture, or specific economic interests. Conversely, because of the very same uncertain, controversial, trust-based nature of DP, it might be expected that the attitudes and approaches that the social partners have developed towards it, influence, at least to some extent, the ways DP programmes are introduced in the European countries and their possible success.

The attitudes and opinions of the social partners on DP in Europe are not, therefore, of merely secondary importance. Within this perspective, the fact that DP and related developments represent a key competitive strategy for maintaining European competitiveness in world markets seems uncontested; but the fundamental question is whether these developments have been/are being interpreted as providing an opportunity as well for the humanisation and democratisation of work, or as being an essentially ideological project masquing greater management control and work intensification (Geary and Sisson, 1994: IX).

To this main question others can be added. Concerning *the general understanding* of DP, it might be argued whether the social partners tend to interpret it as a mere responsibility of individual employers (and of their employees), which therefore does not require the development of official positions by the representative organisations of both sides, or rather as a topic of more general relevance, leading to the elaboration of a formalised strategy (and, if so, which?). Moreover, it might be ascertained whether the issue is seen as a matter to be regulated in one way or another according to some explicit criteria (and, if so, how?), or as a terrain to be left open to specific initiatives according to circumstances. Finally it should be understood whether the topic has been/is on the top of the policy agenda or not, and if so with which consequences.

On these questions it is generally assumed that the employers' organisations will normally share a more positive and less problematic attitude than their counterparts, focusing mainly on economic objectives, and showing a more confident expectation of the virtues of an organisational and managerial approach which bears positive fruits for all parties involved, and does not, therefore, require formal discussion nor extensive regulation. Whereas the trade unions are in general supposed to have a much more problematic and confrontational orientation, being particularly concerned with the contrasting social effects of DP; they should therefore be expected to require that clearer positions be elaborated by the social partner organisations and the whole matter be subject to adequate regulation with the involvement of employee organisations. However, many further specifications might be expected according to the differing institutions and culture of industrial relations in the different countries.

Other possible questions regard the opinions of the social partners on the *experience and effects of DP*. Here their points of view on the diffusion and introduction of the programmes should be ascertained. How widespread is DP, according to their knowledge? What is then the effective relevance of the issue? On whose initiative was DP introduced? And which factors facilitated/hindered such introduction? What kind of relationship was observed between the recent economic recession and the diffusion of DP? Even more important and crucial, perhaps, is their assessment of the impact of DP: here the opinions about the effects of DP upon the economic performance of enterprises, as well as upon working conditions and worker quality of life, and its influence upon industrial relations within the workplace and existing patterns of representative participation need to be investigated.

On these questions the employers' organisations are generally expected to give a more optimistic view of existing practices and experiences, at least as far as they do not see an adversarial industrial relations culture hindering the success of new developments. Similarly, they are expected to share a positive interpretation of both the economic and social impact of the new programmes, while minimising any possible effect on the existing pattern of industrial relations. In contrast the trade unions are expected to hold a more severe opinion about the diffusion and impact of DP in general, especially as far as the social effects are concerned; and to fear that their role will be marginalised by its success, unless they can benefit by institutionalised supports for their recognition and by co-determination. They are also expected to favour delegative rather than consultative forms of DP. One might wonder however to what extent such general hypotheses do not require revision in the light of real experience, and as a result of a learning process; and whether it were not more realistic to hypothesise some sort of gap between positions of principle and behaviour based on facts.

Still other questions, finally, are related to the social partners' *activities* on the topic and their opinions and *points of view of the future*. Did they take/are they taking initiatives regarding the new participative programmes? If so, which ones? Do they see the topic as an important, strategic issue for future labour relations and/or modernisation of production?

Whereas on the first point it might be expected that the amount of the organisations' initiative will depend on the importance allocated to DP on the policy agenda, on the second set of questions it is generally assumed that both partners will conclude that the topic is going to become increasingly important in the future, independently of their support for it. The "conventional wisdom" we referred to in the first chapter goes exactly in this direction. But will this necessarily be the case when the positions of the interest organisations, which are characterised by long-term, strategic thinking, are taken into consideration?

2.4 The Adopted Methodology

To answer these questions and describe and comment upon the positions of the social partners on direct participation in Europe, an empirical investigation was initiated in 1993, on the basis of detailed country case-studies, which were conducted between the autumn of 1993 and the summer of 1994 by a network of industrial relations specialists co-ordinated by the writer⁴.

The countries covered by the empirical study are the then twelve member states of the European Union and the three countries, Austria, Finland and Sweden which later joined on 1st January 1995. The representative organisations selected in each country as the significant 'social partners' were the peak federations (or confederations) of both sides of industry, as well as the national employers' organisations and trade unions in two industries, namely metalworking and banking. Thus, our sample focuses both on the more general - and encompassing - level of the industrial relations representative system, and on two specific sectors, exemplifying manufacturing and services respectively (see tab. 2.1).

Tab. 2.1 - Social Partner Organisations Selected for the Study, and No. of Interviews.

Country	Peak organisations				Metal Sector				Banking (services)									
	Empl.	Org.	No	Unions	No	Empl.	Org.	No	Unions	No	Empl.	Org.	No	Unions	No			
Austria	Austr. Fed. Economic Chambers		1	ÖGB		1	BWK, Fed. Austr. Industrial ists		2	GMBE, GPA		4	Associat. of Austr. Saving Banks		1	GPA		2
Belgium	VBO/FEB, NCMV		2	ACV/CSC ABVV/FGTB		3	Fabrimetal		2	CCMB (Acv/Csc) CMB (Abvv/Fgtb)		5	BVB/ABV		1	LBC/CNE (Acv/Csc) BBTK/SETCa (Abvv/Fgtb)		4
Denmark	DA		2	LO		2	DI		2	Dan. Metal Worker Union		2	FA		2	Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector		2
Finland	LTK, TT		3	SAK, STTK, AKAVA		4	FIMET		1	Met. Work Union, STL, TL		5	Bank Empl. Associat ion		2	Finnish Bank Employees' Union		2

⁴ Authors of the country reports, which are being published by the European Foundation (see the first section of *References* below, and Regalia and Gill, 1995), are J. Flecker (Austria), M. Albertijn (Belgium), R. Lund (Denmark), A. Hassel and O. Jacobi (Germany), T. Alasoini and T. Mikola-Lahnalampi (Finland), R. Tchobanian (France), J. Geary, C. Rees and K. Sisson (UK), T. Vervelacis (Greece), K. O'Kelly (Ireland), M. Carrieri (Italy), G. Als (Luxembourg), P. van der Meché, B. van Beers, M. van der Veen and W.L. Buitelaar (the Netherlands), M.L. Cristóvam (Portugal), F. Miguélez and C. Llorens Serrano (Spain) and R. Tollhagen (Sweden).

(tab. 2.1 continued)

France	CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	4	CFDT, CGT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	6	UIMM	1	FTM-Cgt, FGMM-Cfdt, FO-Métaux, CFTC-Métaux	4	(Associat. Française de Banque)*	+	Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFDT	4
Germany	BDA	2	DGB	1	Gesamt metall	2	IG Metall	3	Banking Empl. Assoc.	2	HBV, DAG	3
Great Britain	CBI	2	TUC	2	EEF	1	AEEU, TGWU, MSFU	4	(Manag. of large clear. bank)**	1	BIFU	1
Greece	SEV	2	GSEE	2	EES	1	POEM	2	EET	+	OTOE	2
Ireland	IBEC	1	ICTU	1	(Manag. of large corpor.)**	1	AEEU	1	Manag. of large banking groups)**	2	IBOA	1
Italy	Confindustria	2	CGIL, CISL, UIL	6	Feder-meccanica	1	FIOM-Cgil, FIM-Cisl, UILM-Uil	4	Assicredito	2	FISAC-Cgil, FIBA-Cisl	4
Luxembourg	Fed. I.L., G.I.S.L.	1	LCGB, OGBL	1	Fed. I.L., G.I.S.L.	1	LCGB, OGBL	1	ABBL	1	ALEBA	1
Netherlands***	AWV, NCW	2	FNV, CNV, MHP	3	FME	1	Industribo nd FNV, IVB CNV	2	WVHB	1	Diestenbond FNV	1
Portugal	CIP	1	CGTP, UGT	2	AIM	1	CGTP	1	(CCP)*	1	Banking Union	1
Spain	CEOE	1	CC.OO., UGT	4	Union Patr. Metal.	2	Fed. Met. de CC.OO., Fed. Sider. de UGT	6	AEB	2	FEBA-CCOO, FEBASO-UGT	4
Sweden	SAF	3	LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	7	VI	2	Metall. CF	3	BAO	2	(TCO)*	1

TOTAL

Interviews 29 45 21 47 20 33

NB. As a rule, members from boards were contacted, to whom experts might be added. For further information, see the country reports.

* For contingent reasons, access to the appropriate organisations was not possible. Interviews were held with representatives of the organisations in brackets.

** Industry level organisations not available.

*** Also consultants and representatives from public institutions were interviewed.

+ Informal contacts only.

Before going further, a few words on our definition of the 'positions' of the social partners (i.e. of the organised actors of industrial relations) are necessary. Analytically, we can in fact distinguish between two definitions of the term: the *formal*, more or less 'official', *positions* of the interest organisations on the subject, as enunciated by outstanding representatives of these organisations, and/or illustrated by documents produced by them; and their *factual positions*, as *de facto* expressed in their daily interactions with the other side, especially in workplaces.

Obviously, the two aspects are interrelated, and to some extent they will overlap. But it is not necessarily so. One of our general hypotheses is indeed that in many European countries more or less broad gaps between formal, or official, and factual positions should be expected. DP practices are in fact rather distant from the traditional pluralist (and 'fordist') industrial relations approach. Therefore, as previously observed, they might well be regarded with unease and even suspicion by the social partners in terms of principle; while in practice in certain conditions their implementation might prove positive and convenient, thus being supported by the same actors through some kind of pragmatic mutual accommodation.

Both aspects are certainly of the greatest interest. In this study, however, we restricted our observation to the former and formal one; since by definition, the latter, i.e. the social partners' factual positions, can be properly understood only through empirical investigations on actual industrial and labour relations patterns and practices in workplaces, to be conducted with an *ad hoc* methodology of questionnaire surveys and/or detailed case studies.

In conclusion, the data which form the basis of this overview are represented by opinions, points of view, attitudes, approaches, strategies. It seems to us however that this delimitation of the field under consideration does not result in a reduction of the relevance of our findings: after all, the activities and real influence of representative organisations are heavily dependent on ideas, projects for the future and (subjective) visions of reality.

Turning back to the methodology adopted, in each case detailed country reports were written on the basis of in-depth interviews with social partner representatives⁵, according to a common interview outline (see Annexes), and of analysis of documents of the considered organisations (such as political programmes, congressural theses, articles, research reports) and available studies. Three main topics were thus covered - the social partners' definition and understanding of DP, their assessment of the diffusion and impact of existing experience, and their expectations for the future.

Because of the specific *soft* kind of data being collected (i.e. opinions and attitudes, rather than factual information), early drafts of the reports were submitted by the authors to the interviewees, whose comments and reactions were subsequently integrated into the final version of the country reports⁶. Such reports constitute the original basis of empirical information for the comparative analysis presented in the next chapters.

⁵The respondents were selected by asking the political leaders of the selected organisations at the national/central level either to give an interview or to indicate their substitute. In addition, experts from the same organisations were contacted, to control the information and fill gaps.

⁶This accounts for some delay in the delivering of the final versions, which in some cases were not ready before June or July 1994. Although time-consuming, the process increased the reliability of collected information.

Before going into the direct comparison and interpretation of the results, a preliminary phase of (limited) standardisation of the collected data was necessary, to make it possible to handle a very large amount of detailed, but differentiated and uneven, information. Despite many standardisation efforts⁷, the country reports retained at the end a strong individually distinctive character, which conveys the feelings and the 'flavour' of the different cultures and traditions, making them unusually rich and interesting in their own right for a reader; but which did not allow for a straightforward comparison of the results.

Therefore a number of detailed synoptic tables were prepared by the writer (see Annexes), where the relevant information selected from the country reports was set out systematically to facilitate the comparison, thus allowing the subsequent analysis to be grounded as little as possible on individual impressions and personal suggestions. Such synoptic tables have been submitted to the country authors, who contributed with further comments and observations. Finally, our data underwent a double check: from the interviewees in each country, as regards the country reports, and from the country reports' authors, as regards the synoptic tables.

It is expected all the same that the following analysis will be subject to debate and differing interpretations. However, this is welcome, in so far as it contributes to a better understanding of a controversial issue.

⁷ Two meetings of all the researchers - at the beginning of field work and at an advanced stage, when first drafts were ready - were held to co-ordinate efforts, and a common outline for the final presentation of results was prepared.

3 Defining and Understanding Direct Participation

The starting point of the investigation into the position of the social partners could be none other than the definition of the topic itself. Undoubtedly, the concept of employee direct participation is by no means self-evident. It is most likely, on the contrary, that not only do the social partners, i.e. the employers' organisations and the trade unions, view DP from different perspectives, but that the concept of DP is subject to differing interpretations by individual representatives and organisations on each side of industry.

As a matter of fact, every element of the expression 'employee direct participation' could be questioned: which kind of 'participation' are we referring to? Who are the employees who should 'participate', and in what? Why is this 'participation' defined as 'direct'? Of course, the term will appear sufficiently clear, however, if it becomes commonly used, either because the social partners may have already elaborated their, more or less formalised, understanding of it, or because DP may have become a widespread practice in workplaces, well known by the central organisations⁸.

Thus, starting from the definition and the understanding of DP is not just a device to begin a discussion by setting out clearly the terms to be taken into consideration, but is, rather, a first way to check the level of information and of interest in the issue on the part of the social partners in Europe.

In this chapter we shall firstly discuss the ways in which the expression 'direct participation' is understood by the social partners and the ideas they developed about the topic either in a formal or informal fashion; secondly, the reactions aroused by the definition of DP elaborated within the scientific co-ordinating group of the European Foundation; thirdly, the aims attributed to DP according to the representatives of the selected organisations.

As expected, when asked to freely illustrate, in their own words, what was meant by their organisations by DP, not necessarily all the respondents appeared to have a clear understanding of the topic. Moreover, some had a rather unconventional view of it in view of the most widespread managerial literature. On the whole, the picture which emerged was complex and even contradictory, at least at a first glance. However, let us now go into some details, beginning with the employers' organisations.

⁸We wish to stress once again that our investigation regards opinions and attitudes of the central organisations of both sides of industry. It is not an investigation into real practices in workplaces, which can well differ from the views shared by the interest organisations on the central scenario of industrial relations. In no way are our findings to be considered as a description of industrial relations in workplaces, although they can help understand them.

3.1 Understanding DP: the Employers' Organisations

Since modern DP practices are usually seen as dependent on the initiative of management (Geary and Sisson, 1994), and DP related issues are rather widely debated in managerial literature, one might have expected that the employers' organisations had a fairly clear view of DP and of its implications. This assumption is however confirmed by our findings only to a limited extent.

We can distinguish here between three principal situations: those where the representatives of the employers' organisations reacted by saying that DP was not a concern of the central organisations, but a matter for the individual employers, and that therefore they had no elaborated opinions on it; those wherein the respondents tended to misunderstand the topic in one way or another; and finally those where the spontaneous reaction showed an appropriate understanding of the issue according to our approach, although often using a different terminology, and sometimes resulting in unexpected problems (see tab. 3.1 below)⁹.

The first kind of reaction, revealing a sort of 'soft reticence', was found in Belgium (but with the notable exception of the federation representing the Belgian SMEs and, to a lesser extent, of the federation of metal industry), in the central organisations in Luxembourg, and in the banking sector in France. However, we could add here those few organisations which politely refused to give interviews on the ground of their being not sufficiently informed and/or directly involved in the topic¹⁰.

To better understand this position, reference can be made, for instance, to reasons given by the Belgian interviewees: in the first place, as can be read in the country report, they remarked that "organising direct participation is a typical responsibility of individual employers. Companies should decide whether or not they need or want DP. They might even see direct participation as a competitive weapon, offering them an edge over other companies who do not implement direct participation. *A sectorial approach would be at odds with this view*" (Albertijn, 1994: 6; italics mine). Moreover, since they defend the collective interests of their members, they "typically concentrate on the *legal context* of personnel matters, not on their *content*. For example, the employers' federations target the broadening of legal systems of labour flexibility, rather than specifying how this flexibility should be organised" (Albertijn, 1994: *ibid.*). Thus, one reason for the observed reticence reflects the classical dilemma in the logic of representing the employers' interests, which has to meet with the challenge of

⁹ On this and all following topics, full standardised documentation is provided with the Synoptic Tables in the Annexes.

¹⁰ Some representatives from employers' organisations in Spain who declined the invitation to be interviewed, for instance, explained that DP is a matter for the strategic choices of the individual companies, the information on which was kept highly confidential.

coping with their diversity and autonomy, while providing ways for organising them collectively (Streeck, 1989; Sisson, 1991). This holds true in general. However, within contexts where the trade unions moreover, as will be shown, hold quite different approaches to the topic, a strategy of understatement may well appear to be the most convenient. By no means, however, was this to be interpreted as a sign of opposition to DP.

Tab. 3.1 - Definitions and Interpretations of DP: The Employers' Organisations

Country	First Understanding of the Term 'DP'	Reaction to Proposed Definition
Austria	DP is primarily <i>financial particip.</i> DP=participative management, co-determin	Agreement on given definit. But more emphasis on represent. participation needed
Belgium	<i>Not a concern</i> of central organisations Clear and positive understanding (NCMV)	(No opinion given)
Denmark	Banking: Participation is priorily <i>represent. particip.</i> DP=direct co-operation, worker activation	More emphasis on represent. participation needed.
Finland	Participation is priorily <i>represent. particip.</i> DP=ways of influencing one's own work, co-determination	Agreement on given definit. (in banking) In general: approach too managerialist More emphasis on represent. participation needed
France	Clear understanding of DP = means for associating workers in the organ. of work Banking: <i>not a concern</i> of central organisations	Agreement on given definit. CJD (SMEs): More emphasis to represent. participation needed
Germany	DP = involvement of workers in the processes of work organisation	Approach too managerialist (metalworking)
Great Britain	DP: better 'employee involvement'	Approach too managerialist
Greece	Participation is primarily <i>represent. particip.</i>	(More emphasis on represent. participation needed)
Ireland	DP = employee involvement	Agreement on given definit.
Italy	Participation is priorily <i>represent. particip.</i> DP= worker direct involvement Banking: DP is primarily <i>financial particip.</i>	More emphasis on represent. participation needed.
Luxembourg	<i>Not a concern</i> of central organisations	(No opinion given)
Netherlands	DP = employee involvement	Agreement on given definit.
Portugal	DP = employee involvement	Employer prerogatives need to be safeguarded
Spain	<i>Not a concern</i> of central organisations	Agreement on given definit. However, employer prerogatives need to be safeguarded
Sweden	Clear understanding of DP, seen however as old-fashioned. To be replaced by a bottom-up approach	Agreement on given definit. (in metalworking) In general: approach too managerialist

Secondly, other employers' organisations spontaneously reacted, as previously shown, providing definitions of DP which are unconventional, or at least out of tune with the "common wisdom" referred to in the Introduction. Cases here included the employers' organisations in Greece and Finland, the peak organisation (Confindustria) in Italy and the Confederation of Employers of the Finance Sector in Denmark, on the one hand; and the employers' organisations in Austria and the Association in the financial sector in Italy, on the other hand.

In the former case group, the representatives of the employers' organisations tended in the first instance to equate direct participation with indirect or representative participation. Or, rather, to understand 'participation' mainly and primarily as participation through employee representatives.

With regard to the organisations in Greece, more so than on real practice in workplaces, the argument seemed to be grounded on an increased social attention on the need for more participation induced by the legislation to modernise the industrial relations system of the 1980s in the country; in other words, it was an outcome of initiatives taken at the political level.

In the case of Finnish employers' organisations, as well as of the above-mentioned Italian and Danish ones, the word 'participation' automatically evoked among the social partners the idea, or, better, the value, of 'participative management', based on the disclosure of information to, and involvement of, employee representatives, i.e. of representative democracy. A respondent from the Confederation of Employers of the Finance Sector in Denmark observed in fact that DP "is a concept which does not fit in with the daily life of the finance sector - an argument to which we shall return - and I do not think it fits in with Danish traditions in the labour market taken as a whole" (Lund, 1994: 9). In Finland - a similar argument would apply to the Italian case as well¹¹ - the term 'direct participation' appears to be a "rather imprecise concept to both employers and trade unions [...]. Here, the idea of 'participation' largely suggests representative systems of participation (or indirect participation) and especially the Co-operation within Companies Act, which is of key importance in Finnish working life when everyday work-related matters are discussed" (Mikola-Lahnalampi and Alasoini 1994: 5).

The employers' organisations within the latter sub-group, i.e. those from Austria and the employers' organisation for banking in Italy, tended to conceive direct participation mainly as 'financial participation'. As explained in the country report on Austria, "direct participation, or direct involvement of employees, is not a familiar term in Austria [...]. The word 'participation' is used in connection with financial interests in business enterprises; so employee involvement is understood to mean the acquiring, by employees, of part

¹¹ In the Italian case, however, there is no legislative framework governing industrial relations in workplaces comparable to the Finnish Cooperation within Companies Act (see chap. 4).

ownership of their companies, possibly in the form of employee shares” (Flecker 1994). In the Italian financial sector ‘direct participation’ is used as an equivalent term of remuneration linked to the achievement of results (such as productivity bonuses, and the like), which is supposed to “promote greater identification with one’s job [...], improving the direct relationship between company and client” (Carrieri, 1995: 9).

A first conclusion that can be drawn so far is that the term ‘direct participation’ is not highly familiar in the industrial relations culture of many European countries. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, in most cases, terms other than ‘direct participation’ were proposed by the respondents as more appropriate to refer properly to the phenomenon discussed here. A list would include such terms as *participative management* or *co-determination* (Austria)¹²; *direct co-operation*, or *employee activation* (Denmark, the latter definition being used in the metalworking sector); *participative approach* (Luxembourg); *employee involvement* (Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK)¹³; and again *ways of influencing one’s own work* or *co-determination* (Finland).

This does not mean that there were no countries in which the term was immediately and properly understood. Perhaps the clearest example of this is France, where the term DP has been used by the employers’ organisations since the early 1970s (becoming typical of the industrial relations culture in the 1980s). The same held for other countries.

However, perhaps more importantly than all terminological nuances, which may depend on the specific tradition and culture of industrial relations of each country, was the underlying difference between the idea of DP as a way of having employees *more or less occasionally involved* in the objectives of production and/or in the implementation of change, and of DP as a more formalised opportunity recognised by them as *systematically influencing* their working conditions. Or, in other words, between DP as a top-down initiative (i.e. from management to employees), dependent on circumstances, and DP as an interactive process (if not actually a bottom-up one, as claimed in Sweden) with more structure and permanency. While the first view was in general the most widespread, the second was typical of employers’ organisations in Scandinavian countries, and, although to a lesser degree, in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Italy.

Note that this distinction was not necessarily reflected however by the specific terminology adopted by the organisations’ representatives. CBI in the UK, for instance, preferred the term *employee involvement*, because the idea of ‘participation’ was seen as implying “a more formal structure and a recognised process, at least insofar as the term was used by others” (Geary, Rees and

¹² However, also “Humanly-compatible organisation of work”, according to a definition elaborated in 1980 by the Industrialists’ Federation.

¹³ Also in the Joint Declaration signed by ICTU and FIE (now IBEC) in Ireland in 1991 the suggested term is employee ‘involvement’, and not ‘participation’ (see chap 4).

Sisson, 1994: 7): ‘involvement’ then viewed as a more informal, less demanding practice. However, the same term *employee involvement* was used by the Dutch organisations in other ways, and with differences between them. In fact, for the peak confederation NCW and the Association in metalworking (FME) the meaning of the term “varied between worker consultation and participation in decision-making” (similarly, we might add, to the broad approach adopted within the EPOC project); while for the other Dutch peak confederation, AWV, it was only possible to speak of employee involvement “when employees actually did participate in decision-making” (Der Meché *et al.*, 1994: 6).

The clearest messages with regard to the chosen terminology are perhaps those of the employers’ organisations from the countries characterised by the so-called ‘Scandinavian’ or ‘Nordic model’ of industrial relations (Kjellberg, 1992: 88-92). The central and the metalworking Danish organisations, for instance, explicitly stressed that the term direct *co-operation* was to be preferred, because it made clear that the involvement of employees was to be found in a decision-making process within an interactive relationship.

We have so far spoken of the first definitions and/or reactions given by the representatives of the employers’ organisations without much distinction other than the countries’ they belong to. Now we examine whether further elements on this same topic can be found by distinguishing the orientations of the considered organisations according to their position (central/sectorial) within the representative system as well as to the sector they belong to.

Our findings offer a rather variegated picture from this point of view¹⁴, confirming the wide heterogeneity of the different countries’ industrial relations systems¹⁵. We can however firstly observe that the widest differences are found when comparing the spontaneous reactions of the representatives in the financial sector with the others’; and that secondly the employers’ organisations in metalworking appear to be on the whole rather in line with their central organisations, albeit somewhat more pragmatically oriented and more informed (or less reticent).

Starting from the latter observation, it is significant, for instance, that the employers’ organisation in metalworking in Belgium, Fabrimetal, while not developing a position on direct participation (exactly as the central organisation), showed instead *de facto* a great and active interest in it, especially at the regional level. Similar patterns were not the exception, but rather the rule elsewhere too. This tended to confirm the expected differences in the positions of the organisations according to the differences in their roles. Thus, as we shall see also later, the responsibility for defining the general approach, i.e. the strategy, appeared as a task of the peak organisation, while the sectorial organisations in

¹⁴ See tabb. 1a, 2a, 3a in the Annexes.

¹⁵ A more interpretative analysis should distinguish, for instance, between those systems where the central organisations play the most influential role, and those where the strategical initiative lies more on the sectorial organisations.

manufacturing were left more room for action, being therefore more informed with real experience.

As far as the former point is concerned, the representatives of the employers' organisations in banking tended to distinguish themselves in a negative way, i.e. by being more reticent, less informed, as well as less interested, in the topic than the others. This difference is linked not only to perceived differences in real experience (as we shall see in chapter 5), but to the widespread opinion that DP was less suited to the financial sector than to manufacturing.

The reasons given, however, are contradictory. According to some respondents, this happened because traditionally social and working relations in banking tended to be already based on patterns of employee involvement and initiative. Representatives from the Banking Employers' Association in Finland, for instance, thought that what was meant by DP in the research "was already effective in daily working routines, and even exceeded in some places, in that *individual bank employees could agree with their employers on, say, individual arrangements of their annual working time*" (Mikola-Lahnalammi and Alasoini, 1994: 6, italics mine)¹⁶. For others, on the contrary, DP would be less appropriate within banking, because of the rigid prescriptions of tasks which characterise banking activities and/or because of the recent tendencies towards the rationalisation of work in the sector, which hampered the diffusion of participative practices (as explained by respondents in Sweden and in Denmark).

3.2 Understanding DP: the Trade Unions

Turning now to the organisations of labour, generally speaking, the trade unions appeared to be on the whole a little more informed and to have more elaborated opinions on the issue than the employers' organisations. They were less reticent: with only one exception¹⁷, their representatives rather eagerly accepted to disclose the positions of the organisations they belonged to, and in most cases were able to support their opinions with examples.

Most likely, this difference reflects the differences in the scope of the role of trade unions with respect to that of the employers' organisations. In the latter case, as observed in the previous section, and as many of the employers' organisation respondents explained, the representatives' responsibility

¹⁶ It has to be added to this that a similar idea is associated with the particular labour relations in small and medium-sized enterprises, as it is strongly emphasised by the Belgian organisation of Flemish SMEs. In this case, *DP is seen as inherently built into work* through the continuous direct interaction between employer and employees and the spontaneous employee commitment. It does not require therefore to be formally organised, or regulated.

¹⁷ An exception was the Swedish trade union in banking at branch level (Sbmf). The interview was refused because of the banking crisis in Sweden at the time.

covers the ‘collective’ interests of members, while DP and related issues were seen as these members’ individual affairs. Therefore, it was no coincidence that the overwhelming majority of employers’ organisations - the only exception in a total of the 48 considered being the French CNPF, the Federation of Austrian Industrialists¹⁸ and (historically) the Dutch organisation in metalworking - did not recognise any official position on DP, although most of them have publications, policy statements and ‘informal’ positions on the subject.

In contrast, in the case of the unions, which have traditionally offered more extensive support to their individually weaker members, DP and related topics were to be seen as part of these members’ ‘collective’ interests (although new and eccentric in nature) and not simply set aside as their mere personal affairs. Accordingly, formal, official positions have been recorded at least in the cases of all Belgian and French organisations, of the British TGWU, of the Greek confederation (although with reference to representative rather than direct participation, as we shall soon see) and of one of the Dutch confederations. Moreover, in many other cases the issue appeared to have been strongly debated and the object of more or less formalised recommendations, initiatives and investigations.

In a quite large number of cases, however, the spontaneous understanding of DP from the labour organisations was extraordinarily similar to their employers’ organisation counterparts. This was the case, especially if the peak organisations are considered, in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Greece, and partially in Italy, Sweden, Germany (see tab. 3.2).

Thus, both sides of industry: in Austria viewed DP in the first instance as financial participation, while defining DP, as considered in the EPOC project, as ‘participative management’ or ‘co-determination’; in Denmark called DP ‘direct co-operation’; in Greece misunderstood DP equating it with representative participation; in Finland proposed “ways of influencing one’s own work” as a better definition; in Ireland shared the same positive view; in Italy considered ‘participation’ mainly as representative participation, therefore calling DP ‘worker direct involvement’; in Sweden were critical of a term which sounded old-fashioned, and which had to be replaced by another which might emphasise a bottom-up (rather than top-down) process; and in Germany shared similar, though not identical, visions of DP as the involvement of workers in the processes of work organisation.

¹⁸ It is interesting to note that this employers’ organisation is allowed more political initiative because, unlike the statutory employers’ organisation in Austria (i.e. the Economic Chamber), it bears no collective bargaining responsibilities.

Tab. 3.2 - Definitions and Interpretations of DP: The Trade Unions

Country	First Understanding of the Term 'DP'	Reaction to Proposed Definition
Austria	DP is primarily <i>financial particip.</i> DP=participative management, co-determin	More emphasis to be given to employee autonomy
Belgium	DP = <i>werkoverleg</i> , employee involvement (ACV/CSC) DP = a replacement of representative democracy (ABVV/FGTB)	More emphasis to be given to represent. participation
Denmark	DP = direct co-operation	More emphasis to be given to represent. participation
Finland	DP = ways of influencing one's own work	More emphasis to be given to employee autonomy
France	Means to democratise enterprises (CFDT, CFTC, CGC) Possibility for workers to participate in issues of their interest, but open to risk of class collaboration (CGT) False social utopia (CGT-FO)	More emphasis to be given to represent. participation
Germany	DP = involvement of workers in the processes of work organisation	Agreement (banking) More emphasis to be given (metal.) to repres. particip.
Great Britain	DP = HRM practices currently promoted by management	More emphasis to be given to employee autonomy and delegation of responsibilities
Greece	Participation is primarily <i>represent. particip.</i>	More emphasis to be given (metal.) to repres. particip.
Ireland	DP = employee involvement	Agreement (banking and metalw.)
Italy	Participation is primarily <i>represent. particip.</i> DP= worker direct involvement	More emphasis to be given to represent. participation
Luxembourg	In principle, uncertain orientation	Agreement (banking)
Netherlands	Possibility for workers to improve quality of work	Agreement (FNV, and IVB-CNV) More emphasis to be given (CNV) to represent. partic.
Portugal	Participation is <i>representative particip.</i>	More emphasis to be given (metal.) to repres. particip.
Spain	DP mostly perceived as <i>represent. particip.</i>	More emphasis to be given to represent. participation
Sweden	Clear understanding of DP, but seen as old-fashioned. To be replaced by a bottom-up approach	Agreement (academic engineers) More emphasis to be given (banking) to repres. partic. More emphasis to be given to employee autonomy

The reasons for this striking coincidence of views between employer and worker organisations within the same country seemed however to be different. In some countries, most likely this resulted from a consolidated tradition of co-operative industrial relations (as in the Scandinavian countries, as well as in Austria and Germany), or from the increasingly more co-operative climate between the social partners which had been developing since the mid-1980s (as in Italy). In others, this might rather be the outcome of a still limited real experience of DP, which could facilitate the elaboration of similar expectations for the future (as it was likely in Greece and Ireland). As we shall see, this rather unexpectedly widespread shared approach by the social partners when looking at the idea of DP at a very general level did not, however, prevent the trade unions from developing different views from their respective counterparts' when considering the implementation and the effects of DP.

More general, typical of the spontaneous approach of the unions, was the tendency to conceive direct participation mainly as some kind of *employee participation in decision-making*, and/or as *a way for workers to influence the organisation and quality of their work*, where, rather obviously, the emphasis was put on the initiative and autonomy of the employees. In other words, DP was seen as an active 'process' (rather than as a quite passive 'involvement'), which moreover had to be linked to the channels of collective representation.

It is important to note that the first aspect of this approach (i.e. DP as an active process to be influential) received particular emphasis by the trade unions in the countries where the labour movement enjoyed longer tradition and recognition; while the second (i.e. the link with collective representation) attracted more the attention of the weaker, and less consolidated organisations of Greece, Portugal, and, to a lesser extent, Spain, which tended to equate direct with representative participation, as has been shown. In any case, the crucial importance of the links between the two forms of 'participation' was, as will be shown, the central topic for all the labour organisations. Finally, whether the understanding of DP appeared more positive or critical depended on the extent to which both these requirements (participation as an active say in decision-making, and direct participation as positively linked to representative participation) were seen as fulfilled.

A few words need to be added, finally, on the differences observed within the union side. Similar to what has been said with regard to the employers' organisations, a distinction can be made in this case between the more 'political' approach of the confederations (or of the central/peak organisations) and the more 'pragmatic' orientation of the sectorial federations (or trade unions) within manufacturing, which often turned out to be more favourably oriented to DP than the former. Examples were the smoother position of the metalworking union CMB in Belgium with respect to the confederation ABVV/FGTB to which it is affiliated; the more elaborated positions of the British trade unions AEEU,

TGWU, MSF in comparison to that of the TUC; of the Spanish Sider-UGT in comparison to that of UGT.

The trade unions in banking tended on the contrary to disclose a larger variety of positions with respect to those of the central organisations they were affiliated to. According to circumstances, such positions might be more inspired by considerations of principle as in Germany, where both the HBV and the DAG saw DP as “an increase in the level of individual co-determination, suitable to mature and responsible citizens who do not want to have their decisions made for them, but who are able and prepared to take on responsibility” (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 35); or else they might be more critical and/or sceptical, as in the case of the banking organisations in Belgium and in Ireland; less informed and/or interested, because of a contingent period of continuous change where DP practices had not the priority, or because of the limited interest shown by their members (as in the UK, in Portugal, in the Netherlands); more strictly reliant on the requirement of representative participation (as in Denmark). At least in this services sector, therefore, even on the union side the co-ordinating ability of the central organisations appeared to be less stringent than in manufacturing¹⁹, thus leaving more room to autonomy and to diversified approaches.

3.3 Commenting the EPOC Definition

After their free illustration of what their organisations meant by DP, the representatives of the social partners were invited to discuss the working definition of DP developed by the research group as part of the EPOC project.

According to the conceptualisation under discussion in autumn 1993, when the interview guideline was prepared (see Annexes), DP was defined as:

“those management incentivated mechanisms and practices in workplaces through which employees are granted more control over their immediate work situation and/or are invited to participate in decisions which relate to the organisation of work at the point of production”, that is as “a process of delegating responsibility to and/or of consulting employees by the management, in which the workers are directly involved (i.e. not through representatives), either individually or gathered in groups”²⁰

¹⁹This seems to be indeed a characteristic feature of unionism, and more generally of industrial relations, in the services sector with respect to manufacturing (Regalia, 1990). Also in this case, however, a more detailed interpretation would need to take into consideration the specific characteristics of the representative systems, distinguishing between the systems where the central organisations play the most influential role, and those where the strategic initiative lies more extensively on the sectorial organisations.

²⁰ The slightly different definition which was finally agreed upon is the following: “Opportunities which management provide, or initiatives to which they lend their support, at workplace level, for consultation with and/or delegation of responsibilities and authority for decision-making to their subordinates either as individuals or as groups of employees, relating

The given definition emphasised the role of management in introducing DP in a rather straightforward fashion. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the representatives of the employers' organisations who, as expected, were more likely to feel in tune with the proposed statement than those of the trade unions (see again tabb. 3.1 and 3.2 second column). In fact, the peak employer organisations fully agreed with it in 5 countries out of 15²¹ (i.e. in Austria, Spain, Ireland, France, the Netherlands); as did the national organisations in banking in 4 (Austria, Spain, Ireland, Finland), and in metalworking in 6 (Austria, Spain, Ireland, France, Netherlands, Sweden). While in the case of the trade unions only 1 confederation (i.e. FNV, one of the Dutch), the organisations in banking in 3 countries (in Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg) and 3 organisations in metalworking (the Irish, the Dutch IVB affiliated to CNV, the Swedish CF which organises academic engineers) said they completely agreed with the given definition²².

These same data revealed, however, that not only the majority of the union but a large proportion of the employer representatives agreed only partially; and a few clearly disagreed. What is even more interesting, the agreements/disagreements were not necessarily grounded on the reasons that one might have expected.

One would have indeed expected not only that the employers' representatives were to be on the whole quite favourably oriented to the proposed definition, but also that concern might eventually arise among them about the ideas of "granting the employees more *control* over their immediate work situation" and of "*delegating* responsibilities". While, with regards to the trade unions' representatives, one would have anticipated their resistance because of their role having not being explicitly taken into consideration in the definition²³.

Most respondents on the side of the trade unions effectively pointed out that the definition did not give sufficient importance to the role of representative participation (see tab. 3.2). Cases included the confederations in Denmark, Spain, France, Italy and one in the Netherlands (the CNV); the organisations in banking in Greece and Sweden; and those in metalworking in Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, and Finland. A representative from the Dutch confederation CNV observed, for instance, that "an employer deciding the structure of his organisation on his own is an anachronism"²⁴. According to the Danish country study, the union representatives emphasised that "the Danish

to the immediate work task, work organisation and/or working conditions". (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 2).

²¹ Since the data are highly qualitative in character, however, it is not correct to draw straightforward quantitative conclusions by these and other figures.

²² See tabb. 1a, 2a, 3a in the Annexes.

²³ Within the EPOC approach, the role of the unions was in fact especially emphasised with regards to the regulation of DP, as we shall see.

²⁴ Statement not reported in the country study.

style of management implied that management more often than not would contact the shop stewards before taking up any initiative regarding direct participation” (Lund, 1994: 10). Many interviewees from the French confederations, even if with different emphasis, reacted by saying that a combination of DP and indirect participation was necessary because, although the delegation of responsibility to the employees might be positive, at the same time it could be conducive to self-exploitation, thus requiring the intervention of a representative body (Tchobanian, 1994). Representatives of the German IG Metall said they agree only partially, since the proposed definition ruled out “real” participation, which is not only introduced by management, but can be introduced through negotiation (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993). A list of similar remarks could be added, emphasising, according to circumstances, *existing practices* of, or *future strategies* for, explicit combinations of direct and indirect (or representative) participation, as well as considerations of principle.

It was however emphasised in other cases (notably by Austrian, Swedish and Finnish trade unions)²⁵ that the *definition did not give sufficient weight to the influence, initiative and interests of the employees themselves*: which is rather unusual given traditional trade union approaches to individuals. The Finnish organisations’ representatives, for instance, “thought that employee initiative should be encouraged in every possible way. [...] They were ready to expand the opportunities for employee influence included in the definition beyond the individual’s everyday work to financial and economic matters” (Mikola-Lahnamäki and Alasoini, 1994: 6). The Swedish trade unions tended to interpret the proposed definition as too conditioned by a Tayloristic background, where the issues of ‘control’ and ‘decision-making’ were crucial, while the topics of ‘autonomy’ and ‘bottom-up’ influence on work organisation should be given greater emphasis. Still others, finally, raised objection to what was interpreted as an excessive emphasis on managerial initiative.

However, unexpected differences emerged also on the side of the employers’ organisations. Only in a few cases (e.g. in Spain, and in Portugal) did the respondents object more or less openly to the definition on the grounds of the need to safeguard more explicitly the employer prerogatives by setting limits to the devolution of responsibility to the employees.

In others, there were criticisms, rather unexpectedly, of what was seen as a too “managerialist” approach, which did not allow adequate scope for employee initiative, as was the case of the CBI and of the engineering employers’ organisation in the UK, of the SAF in Sweden and of the employers’ organisations in Finland; but also, to a lesser degree, of the German metalworking organisation Gesamtmetall. In the extremely clear words of the British EEF respondent, “the problem with defining direct participation as purely

²⁵ It is perhaps not by chance that the request for a greater emphasis on the responsibility to be allowed the employees rather than on the role of representation is found in some of the countries where the trade unions enjoy a very strong following and widespread recognition.

management led is that it only tells half of the story. Certainly it is management which creates the space for direct participation, but the follow up is important, and this appears to be missing from the definition, making it incomplete. Defining direct participation as the ceding of control by management to workers implies a benign “big brother”, when in fact changes are often bottom-up, or at least at some point in the process the emphasis changes from employees being invited or allowed to participate to employees taking the initiative themselves.” (Geary, Rees and Sisson, 1994: 11).

However, criticism by the representatives of employers’ organisations did not concern only the interpretation of the roles of management and employees respectively. DP, it was further argued, had to be integrated with an increased emphasis given to representative participation, as was stressed by the Danish confederation DA and the French CJD (an employers’ organisation which represents SMEs in particular and which has been promoting DP since the 1970s): to which cases where direct participation was *de facto* seen as matched with representative participation (i.e. the Austrian, the Finnish, the Italian) might be added. In Denmark, in fact, as previously mentioned with regard to the positions of the trade unions, the employers’ representatives referred to a Danish style of management implying systematic contacts with shop stewards when taking initiative regarding DP: this did not necessarily mean, however, “that management surrendered their right to take an initiative independently” (Lund, 1994: 10). In the case of the French CJD, it was observed that the present situation requires a strong model of social dialogue, based on better integration between direct and indirect participation, where the distinctions between the two become blurred.

3.4 Aims of DP in the View of the Social Partners

So far we have explored the first reactions of the social partner representatives with respect to the term ‘direct participation’ itself and to the working definition developed by the research group within the EPOC project. Our findings have shown that the topic is largely perceived as part of a quite uncertain terrain, whose boundaries are not neatly traced. Let us now go deeper into the substance of the problem, trying to understand what are the objectives and the content of DP in the views of our respondents and therefore what are their attitudes towards it.

It is a common view, with regards to the former question, that in introducing and/or accepting DP practices, employers will mainly stress economic goals, while the unions will primarily emphasise social ones. To say it with greater accuracy, on the basis of the conceptualisation elaborated within the EPOC project, the employers’ reasons for introducing DP “are likely to include: the need to respond to increased competition, cost rationalisation, a demand for

greater flexibility, a requirement to adapt to the introduction of new technology, customisation of production and the reform of managerial behaviour”, while “*the need to respond to a shift in employees’ expectations of work is likely to be less important*” (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 27. Italics mine). Whereas trade unions “are likely to want to enlarge jobs, reduce work fatigue and boredom, secure more responsibility and discretion for employees and increased training” (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 11). On the other hand, as far as the latter question is concerned, it is expected that the employer associations will on the whole be quite favourably oriented towards DP and that the unions on the contrary will be unfavourably disposed and will try to resist its introduction, unless “guaranteed and backed by legislation” (Geary and Sisson, 1994: 27).

Our overview however confirmed these assumptions only partially. This is not to deny of course, starting from the first point, that the employers’ organisation representatives, reflecting their members’ interests, were as a rule interested in the economic performance of firms, and that their trade union counterparts were in the first place interested in the well being of workers. However, our data disclose a more complex and intriguing scenario.

With regard to the employers’ organisation representatives, in fact, they did not necessarily focus their attention solely on economic objectives; rather systematically they emphasised social values as well - at least because an active employee commitment was considered essential to increase efficiency²⁶ (see tab. 3.3).

In a very few cases, only strictly economic motives were cited, the clearest example being perhaps that of the Belgian confederation VBO/FEB, and of the affiliated organisations in banking and metalworking (BVB/ABB and Fabrimetal), which referred to increasing productivity, and achieving/improving quality as the main objectives for introducing DP. In nearly all cases, however, other ‘softer’ objectives, such as increasing employees’ commitment and motivation, promoting social cohesion, improving and humanising working conditions, and the like, were seen as a necessary complement to their expectations for economic improvement.

Distinctions might even be traced between the employers’ organisations whose representatives put greater emphasis on social (and/or psychological) than on economic goals, and those who kept more strictly to the traditional motives of increasing productivity, efficiency, flexibility, although “softened” by social considerations. However, the exercise might be of little use, since different nuances in the answers are most likely to be linked to differences in culture, in language, in the personality of the respondents. What is most interesting from our perspective is rather that both objectives (the amelioration of economic performance *and* of social environment) are perceived *as being pursued*, at least to some extent, *together by making use of DP programmes*. “To humanise work

²⁶ See tabb. 1b, 2b, 3b in the Annexes.

while increasing profitability”, as it was put by a representative of the German organisation in metalworking, Gesamtmetall, could well synthesise a more widespread understanding.

Tab. 3.3 - Objectives of DP and Attitudes Towards It: The Employers’ Organisations

Country	Objectives of DP	Attitudes towards DP
Austria	Humanise work & increase efficiency Late 70s-early 80s: contrast collectivistic approaches to industr. democracy	Positive attit.: DP important for economic effectiveness of companies
Belgium	Increase productivity & quality (VBO/FEB) Increase employee motivation & efficiency (NCMV)	Rather positive attit. (VBO/FEB) Positive attit. (NCMV)
Denmark	Increase employee commitment to productive goals	Positive attit.: DP as a method for involving workers
Finland	Encourage employee initiative	Positive attit.
France	Promote social cohesion & ameliorate economic performance	Positive attit.: DP as a factor of cohesion and consensus
Germany	Humanise work & increase profitability	Positive attit.: DP as an effective means of personnel management
Great Britain	Increase employee commitment & achieve business success	Positive attit.: DP as a factor for business success through employee involvement
Greece	Improve work conditions & modernise production	Quite cautious attit.
Ireland	Improve quality of working life & increase competitiveness	Positive attit.: DP important for the competitiveness of economy
Italy	Increase employee commitment & meet challenge of competitiveness Early 80s: reduce union power	Positive attit.: DP as a factor for business success through employee involvement
Luxembourg	Improve motivation & productivity	Positive attit.
Netherlands	Improve quality of work & quality of production	Positive attit.
Portugal	Increase employee commitment & contribute to competitiveness	Quite cautious attit.: limits to worker autonomy have to be set
Spain	Increase employee motivation & commit	Quite cautious attit.: limits to worker autonomy have to be set
Sweden	Give voice to individual demands & humanise work, overcoming limits of IP	Rather critical attit.: DP as an outdated attempt to involve employees individually

We have not to forget, of course, that these answers came from representatives of employers’ organisations, i.e. of political and not economic

organisations (such as the enterprises). However, this does not reduce the importance of this perceived changed possibility for management with respect to the past: a change which makes it possible to meet with the increasing need of having employees better integrated into the company objectives, as emphasised, for instance, by an employers' representative in Germany. The relevance of these findings is reinforced by the observation that this is not the only possible option. Other paths might be followed in principle, and other aims were in fact pursued, as indicated by those respondents, namely from the employers' confederation and organisation in metalworking in Italy, and from the Federation of Austrian Industrialists, who emphasised that in the 1970s and early 1980s a major objective had been the need to bring into being "a credible corporate alternative to the exclusively 'collectivist approaches to industrial democracy'" (Flecker, 1994: 17-8), and to reduce the power of the unions (Carrieri, 1994). In the views of our respondents, these appeared, however, as stories of the past.

Turning now to the other side, symmetrically to their counterparts, in many cases the trade union representatives did not limit their positive expectations of DP to the amelioration of working conditions, but openly mentioned the achievement of economic objectives (see tab. 3.4). This does not mean that the goal of ameliorating employee working conditions was not considered by the unions as their primary concern in the introduction of DP. As a matter of fact, all union respondents mentioned this objective, which was conceptualised either as an increase in worker influence and self-regulation (or self-determination) in the organisation of work, or as an improvement in the quality of working life, or both; even though not all of them (especially within the financial sector) did believe that such an objective could be achieved really.

However, union representatives from a number of peak organisations (such as ACV/CSC in Belgium, Comisiones Obreras in Spain, ICTU in Ireland, GSEE in Greece, Cgil, Cisl and Uil in Italy, SALF in Sweden), and more extensively from those in metalworking, explicitly mentioned economic objectives as a positive complement to the social ones. In the UK, for instance, the engineering organisation AEEU's representative spoke of DP rather pragmatically as a "prerequisite for maintaining competitiveness of British enterprises and securing members employment", while the TGWU's respondent mentioned the "efficiency advantages" which should derive from it (Geary, Rees and Sisson, 1994:10). In Sweden, the aim of increasing quality in highly flexible knowledge-based production was emphasised by the trade union representative in metalworking.

These observations lead us to the other question we raised at the beginning of this paragraph, i.e. the social partners' general attitudes towards DP, which, as we said, were expected to be more favourable on the part of the employer associations and less positive, when not openly critical and unfavourable, on the part of the trade unions.

Tab. 3.4 - Objectives of DP and Attitudes Towards It: The Trade Unions

Country	Objectives of DP	Attitudes towards DP
Austria	Increase worker influence on working conditions	Rather positive attit.: DP corresponds to worker needs To be distinguished real from false DP
Belgium	Increase worker influence on working conditions & improve quality of work. life (ACV/CSC) Improve productivity through consensus-promoting strategy (ABVV/FGTB)*	Rather positive attit.: ACV/CSC. However, to be distinguished real from false DP Negative attit.: DP as a new conservative ideology (ABVV/FGTB). Recently more pragmatic approach
Denmark	Increase worker influence on working conditions & improve quality of work. life	Rather positive attit.: DP as a way for workers influencing working conditions
Finland	Positive orientation. However, concern that only economic objectives be pursued in time of crisis*	Uncertain attit.
France	Increase citizenship rights on work (CFDT) Transform employees into partners (CFTC) Make employees participate in decisions concerning their work (possible positive objective - CGT) Integrate capital and labour (refused objective - FO)*	Rather positive attit.: CFDT, CFTC, CGC. However, to be distinguished real from false DP Rather negative attit.: CGT Very negative attit.: CGT-FO: DP as product of an illusory participationist ideology Recently more pragmatic approach (CGT)
Germany	Promote worker self-regulation in the organisation of work	Rather positive attit.: DP allows self-regulation and self-determination. However, to be distinguished real from false DP (IG Metall)
Great Britain	Increase economic performance & improve quality of working life	Rather positive attit.: DP is about people, rather than about money
Greece	Increase economic performance & improve quality of working life	Uncertain attit.
Ireland	Increase economic performance & improve quality of working life	Rather positive attit.
Italy	Increase economic performance & improve quality of working life	Rather positive attit.: DP as a way of meeting challenge of flexibility, while being beneficial to workers. However, to be distinguished real from false DP (Cgil)
Luxembourg	Improve working conditions	Rather positive attit.
Netherlands	Improve quality of work	Rather positive attit.
Portugal	Increase communication (UGT) Promote worker identification (CGTP)*	Rather positive attit. (UGT) Uncertain/sceptical attit. (CGTP)
Spain	Increase competitiveness & productivity * Increase economic performance & improve quality of working life (possible positive outcome - CCOO)	Rather positive attit (UGT) More uncertain attit. (CCOO) To be distinguished real from false DP
Sweden	Humanise work Increase economic performance & improve quality of working life (SALF)	More disenchanted attit.

NB * Negative/refused views or positions.

On the ground of the views expressed so far, the employers' organisations shared effectively, as anticipated, a positive, although largely informal and unofficial, attitude towards these programmes (see tab. 3.3, second column). The reasons which were cited by the central organisations to support their positive orientation included: the importance of DP for the economic effectiveness of companies (BWK in Austria) and the competitiveness of the economy (IBEC, Ireland); its being an effective means of personnel management (BDA in Germany), a method for involving workers (DA in Denmark), a factor for worker cohesion and consensus (CNPF, France), and a factor for business success and quality achievement through employee involvement and commitment (CBI in the UK, Confindustria in Italy). Similar orientations were found among the employers' organisations in manufacturing. Whereas within the finance sector, emphasis was put especially on the contribution of direct participation in motivating employees.

However, a more cautious or sceptical approach emerged, especially where the real experience in the field was limited (as in the cases of Spain, Portugal, Greece; and sometimes within the financial sector), or, on the contrary, where (as in Sweden) a long previous experience appeared to have come to a deadlock. The employers' representatives in Portugal, for instance, expressed a cautiously favourable attitude towards DP, on the condition, however, that limits to worker autonomy be set. Similarly, in Spain the need to safeguard employer prerogatives and to restrict the direct involvement of employees to consultative practices, and limitedly to the sole sphere of production, was emphasised. In Sweden, - with the notable exception of the employers' organisation in metalworking, the representative of which expressed an unreservedly favourable and positive approach towards DP, rather unexpectedly in the light of the long socio-technical tradition - a critical and sceptical orientation indeed appeared to characterise the views of the central employers' organisation (as well as that of the organisation in the financial sector), which tended to consider DP as an outdated, overly rigid and not really effective attempt to involve the employees individually and achieve more humane working conditions, so that more radical decentralised systems of increased devolution of responsibilities and initiative towards employees were envisaged (Tollhagen, 1994: 4-7)²⁷.

Turning to the other side, perhaps even more surprisingly, in the majority of cases the trade unions revealed a more positive orientation towards DP than one would have expected (see tab. 3.4, second column). According to our interviewees, their rather favourable attitudes were developed because such practices "correspond to worker needs" (Austria), are a way "to promote self-regulation and self-determination in the organisation of work" or "to have a real influence in the organisation of work and in the development of human being" (Germany, Denmark); they allow the parties "to meet the challenge of flexibility

²⁷ See also Lundgren (1994).

while being beneficial to workers” (Italy) as well as “to overcome the lack of citizenship within enterprises” (France); or, as was put by a British respondent, because in the end “DP is about people, rather than about money” (Great Britain). Other similar comments could be added.

As expected, there were cases however in which the attitudes of the trade unions were much less positive, when not wholly negative: the clearest positions within this perspective were those of the Belgian ABVV/FGTB, and of the French CGT and even more of CGT-FO, which emphasised the dangers of a “participationist ideology” that might prove to be pure illusion, as it tended to conceal the structurally unequal balance of power between the parties and the impossibility therefore for workers to have a significant influence on decisions. Even these most clear-cut positions, however, as well as others similar to them (found for instance in Spain, in Portugal, or within the financial sector), with time appeared to have left some room to pragmatic accommodation, where the issue of the regulation of DP and of the definition of the preconditions for its successful implementation had become the crucial question.

What was most typical of the approach of the unions was rather their propensity to distinguish, when defining DP, between what DP actually is and what it could be. As a rule then - turning to a distinction raised before - the trade union representatives emphasised the contrast between the *practice* of DP as managerial-driven, top-down, employee involvement, sometimes described as *false* DP, and the *possibility* that DP might provide opportunities for employees to influence their own work and working conditions, sometimes described as *real* DP.

Although rather generalised (as more or less clearly emerged from answers by representatives of ÖGB in Austria, UGT and Comisiones Obreras in Spain, IG Metall in Germany, Cgil in Italy, and of most trade unions in the banking sector among which a sceptical view of the real possibility of implementing DP in their sector prevailed), this tendency appeared to be more evident where the trade unions had accumulated experience on DP, especially if they had entertained previously high expectations of it. Thus, the Christian democratic confederation ACV/CSC in Belgium, which has maintained a basically favourable position on *werkoverleg* (employee involvement)²⁸ over the last 25 years, and which had somewhat updated its official view on DP in 1990, after having experimented with the new developments in the field of DP in the 1980s, reacted by saying that by DP they mean ‘*real* employee involvement’, i.e. direct

²⁸ *Werkoverleg* stands for the consultation of workers on matters concerning their work. *Werkoverleg* implies the formal consultation of all employees of a division or production unit. The foremost discussed topic is the organisation of work, but it can include topics of general interest. The expression dates from the 1960s and implies less a reference to a changing work organisation than does the modern concept of “semi-autonomous work group”. (Albertijn, 1994: 8) Here it is translated as “employee involvement”, since the notion implies a less formal and of a less far-reaching nature.

participation which brings benefits for both employer and employees (Albertijn, 1994: 8). Similarly the French confederation CFDT, whose official position had always been in favour of DP, reacted by stressing that the implementation of DP is often a false participation²⁹; not very dissimilar from the position of another major French confederation, the CGT, which had always been strongly critical of any kind of ‘collaboration’ between social parties.

In other words, in the words of an author of one country reports, on the side of trade unions “a dual tension was expressed both in comments made and in the written programmes, namely humanisation versus rationalisation and greater productivity on the one hand, participation by individual employees versus collective representation on the other” (Flecker, 1994: 18). It is unnecessary to stress that this dual tension is structurally based, and therefore on principle unresolvable. However, the employees’ organisations tended to share a positive expectation of the possibility of keeping such a tension under control, provided that DP programmes were properly regulated.

This leads us to a most critical issue, which was especially emphasised by the trade union representatives, and which we shall discuss in the next chapter: the issue of the regulation of DP.

²⁹ Similar positions are shared by the French CFTC and CGC.

4 The Issue of Regulation

We can synthesise our debate so far by observing that, unlike the prevailing mood in the 1980s, it is not the idea of DP which appears to be most controversial in Europe in the mid-1990s, at least as far as the social partner central organisations are considered. It is rather the way of regulating the introduction and actual implementation of participative programmes.

To use the language of the adopted conceptualisation, what is most critical in the view of the social partners is not the ‘why’ or the ‘which’; it is rather the ‘how’ of DP (Geary and Sisson, 1994: X): how is it introduced and implemented, with which rules and within which normative framework, with which participation of trade union and/or employee representatives. From this perspective, a general hypothesis would see the trade unions asking for formalised/statutory regulation regarding the introduction and operations of programmes of employee direct participation, and the employers’ organisations opposing it on the ground of managerial rights of disposition and prerogatives, according to the long tradition of disputes surrounding the topic of worker control.

However since differences might arise with regard to the characteristics of the normative framework upon which the social partners developed their attitudes, the positions of our interviewees on the topic can be better understood if set within the broader context of each country’s industrial relations system. This is done with particular reference to any general framework regulating “co-operation” between the parties and “participation” rights and practices.

This chapter, which focuses on the *regulation of DP as an issue* more or less clearly emphasised as such by the parties (the ways in which DP, according to their views, is introduced and handled in practice will be discussed in chapter 6), starts therefore with a brief overview of the industrial relations institutional patterns relevant for our discussion. Subsequently, the positions of the social partners on the topic will be illustrated.

4.1 Existing Patterns for Regulating Workplace Participation

If we consider the different institutional arrangements upon which the partners developed their positions, a preliminary rough distinction can be raised between those industrial relation systems where some *general*³⁰ *normative framework to encourage co-operative relationships* between social partners *in workplaces* was established - although generally not with explicit regard to direct but more likely to representative participation - and those where it was not. A

³⁰ We are interested here in the normative arrangements of a general kind, i.e. which apply to a given country. However, of course, specific normative frameworks can be elaborated within the single companies, as an outcome of a specific corporate culture.

further distinction regards the source of the existing framework regulation at the central level, which can be a result of legislation, or of centralised negotiation, as well as of both.

Combining these dimensions, we obtain four patterns of regulation of workplace participation, as shown in Figure 4.1.

FIG. 4.1 - Patterns of Regulation of Workplace Participation, According to their Normative Basis

		<i>Legislation</i>	
		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>Centralised Negotiation/Agreements</i>	<i>yes</i>	<p><i>Mixed Regulation</i></p> <p>(Belgium, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden)</p>	<p><i>Joint Central. Regulation</i></p> <p>(Denmark Ireland)</p>
	<i>no</i>	<p><i>Statutory Regulation</i></p> <p>(Austria, Germany, Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain)</p>	<p><i>Voluntarism</i></p> <p>(Great Britain)</p>

With *statutory regulation* we refer to the situations where the normative framework to encourage co-operative relationships between social partners in workplaces (i.e. to promote representative/direct workplace participation) is substantially grounded on institutions provided for by legislation. This is the case, for example, in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, as well as Spain and Greece. Under the label of *centralised joint regulation* we refer to the situations in which the existing normative framework is mainly based on accords negotiated, or on agreements/understandings signed centrally, by the social partners: Denmark in the first place, and recently, and in a far more informal fashion, Ireland, can be placed here. The cases wherein specific combinations of legislation and centralised negotiation gave origin to their current normative framework for workplace participation, and which are therefore characterised by patterns of *mixed regulation*, are those of Sweden, Finland, and

Belgium, to which those of Italy and Portugal can be added. Finally, an orientation inspired by a substantial *voluntarism* in the relationships between the industrial relations actors, preventing the interference of both legislative measures and centrally negotiated arrangements, characterises the case of Great Britain.

It has to be stressed that this classification is very approximate, as it attempts to make distinctions within a field where differences often are not clear-cut, but are rather blurred³¹. Even more importantly, it focuses on the institutional/general framework introduced to help - at least indirectly - the diffusion and the consolidation of some kind of participative, and/or co-operative practices between the partners in workplaces; while it is by no means intended to describe the industrial relations institutional systems of the considered countries. All the same, it can be useful for our discussion.

Let us start with statutory regulation, and firstly from the countries where the existence of a legal framework for 'participation' in workplaces dates back further (see tab. 4.2, first column). In Austrian workplaces, we find a well consolidated system of statutory works councils regulated under the Labour Constitution Act of 1973. *The individual rights* of employees are protected under the same law. The law focuses however on collective rights of participation and co-determination *through the works council*; while the development and support of individual rights, on which there had been a lively debate at the time when the legislation was enacted, was left to a standardised codifying of labour law, which has however not yet taken place (Flecker, 1994: 14; Cerny, 1988).

Not dissimilarly, in Germany the Works Council Constitution Act focuses on the rights and functioning of works councils and co-determination, i.e. on *representative forms of participation*, while it provides for *limited participation rights for employees*, concerning, mainly, rights to information and complaint (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 27; Jacobi et al. 1992).

Also within the highly institutionalised system of industrial relations in the Netherlands, characterised by the operation of tripartite bodies where the social partners co-operate with government representatives, the operation of *works councils*, which the firms have a legal obligation to establish, is the *main institution for 'participation'* at workplace level: according to circumstances, their advice and/or approval must be set on a wide range of matters, including aspects related to work organisation (Van der Meché *et al.*, 1994: 1).

³¹ For further details, see the country reports. Consult also the volume edited by Ferner and Hyman (1992).

Tab. 4.2 - Regulation of Workplace Participation: Normative Framework and Social Partner Positions

Country	Normative Framework	Social Partner Positions
Austria	Highly formalised statutory regulation of IR (and of works councils in workplaces). Individual employee rights protected under Labour Constitution Act (1973), which focuses however on collective rights of co-determination.	<i>Employers:</i> early 70s, in favour of legally supported individ. co-determination rights. Currently, no demands for further regulation. <i>Union:</i> Introduction of DP requires the involvement of WC (GMBE). DP should be negotiated (GPA)
Belgium	Productivity Agreement (1954) and Collect. Labour Agreem. 39 (1983) - on technolog. innovation. Statutory <i>works councils</i> and Safety, Health & Improvement of the Workplace bipartite committees SD/DS (workplace trade union delegation) with negotiating rights over personnel matters	<i>Employers:</i> in general abstentionism. NCMV: DP must not be regulated <i>Union:</i> ACV/CSC: unions should be consulted in introduct. and have veto right ABVV/FGTB: Introduction has to be negotiated
Denmark	<i>Main Agreement</i> (periodically revised), setting rules for collective bargaining and co-operation at enterprise level (both through RP and DP). <i>Co-operation Agreement</i> (1983), includes rules for the establishment of bipartite co-operation committees and day-to-day co-operation.	<i>Employers & Unions:</i> both sides stress that participative system works as a result of collective bargaining
Finland	Co-operation within Companies Act (1979, amended 1989) aimed at <i>promoting worker particip.</i> and strengthening position of <i>shop stewards</i> , whose negotiating rights were extended to issues of managerial prerogative. General agreements of 1981 and 1986 between the central labour market organis. going into detail in implementing the procedures under the act.	<i>Employers:</i> early 70s, in favour of stronger legal emphasis on individual DP. Currently, in favour of leaving the implementation of DP to be decided at workplace level <i>Union:</i> DP should be preferably handled via IP. General rules should be jointly agreed on.
France	Statutorily regulated IR. Multiplicity of representat. institutions at company level. Auroux laws (1982) defined a <i>procedural framework for the regulation of DP</i> (with regards to <i>groupes d'expression</i>).	<i>Employers:</i> within existing legal framework (with regards to <i>groupes d'expression</i>), more autonomy for individual enterprises claimed for. <i>Union:</i> DP as 'negotiated modernisation'. Collective rules regulating individual employee behaviour required. Direct and represent. democracy must be combined.
Germany	Statutorily regulated collective bargaining and <i>works councils</i> . Works Constitution Act focuses on rights and functioning of WC and co-determin.; only limited participation rights for employees.	<i>Employers:</i> DP has to be left to the initiative of management and has not to be formally regulated (through written agreements). <i>Union:</i> while remaining independent of traditional forms of represent., DP must be the subject of co-determin. by the WC in a works agreement.
Great Britain	No general normative framework	<i>Employers:</i> voluntarist approach claimed for. Strong opposition to external regulation in the area. <i>Union:</i> DP has to be adopted in co-operation with employee representatives

Greece	<p>Legally supported IR. A 1982 Act established union rights in workplaces; legislation of 1985 and 1988 introduced health & saf. committees and <i>works councils</i> in the private sector.</p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> DP as a management tool (the use of which can be negotiated at enterprise level), not as an issue to be included in bargaining at the federal level. <i>Union:</i> implementation has to be negotiated among the actors involved</p>
Ireland	<p>Failure of initiative to introduce works councils; legally supported worker director system and sub-board consultat. arrangements in state companies. <i>Joint Declaration between social partners (1991), setting framework for employee involvement.</i> PCW - Programme for Competitiveness and Work (the 1994 National Agreement between the government and the social partners), underlining the importance of the Joint declaration.</p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> voluntarist approach. <i>Union:</i> the opportunity of being consulted when introducing DP emphasised.</p>
Italy	<p>Tradition of conflictual, voluntarist IR, partially modified by legislation of 1970 (Workers' Statute), which provided for <i>works council-like organ. in workplaces.</i> Since late 70s collect. agreem. on informat rights & Protocollo IRI (1984) de facto set procedures for co-operative interaction (IP & DP). <i>Tripartite central agreement (1993) openly introduced the issue of participation as a new field for IR in workplaces</i></p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> early 80s, in favour of unilateral regulation. Currently, in favour of joint regulation mechanism (at workplace level). <i>Union:</i> DP must be the subject of collective regulation. Formal set of rules needed</p>
Luxembourg	<p>Law of 1974 established <i>joint works committees</i>, having co-determination rights over many issues, including employee appraisal, definition of criteria for evaluation of employee suggestions</p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> a matter to be left to individual employers, where implementation will be subject to WC rights of co-determin. <i>Union:</i> essential that DP fits into system of representative particip.</p>
Netherlands	<p>Highly formalised statutory regulation of IR, and of <i>works councils</i> in workplaces. WC's advice/approval must be set on many matters, including aspects related to work organisation</p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> DP is not a matter for negotiation between the social partners (it is a matter for WC) <i>Union:</i> essential that a prominent role on the topic is guaranteed to WC.</p>
Portugal	<p>Highly legalistic, rigid framework of IR regulation. In the 80s policy of social concertation, culminating in the <i>Economic and Social Agreement (1990)</i>, introducing <i>information rights in workplaces</i> on many issues, including HRM</p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> in favour of legislation on labour flexibility, which might facilitate a development of DP. <i>Union:</i> DP should develop within the framework of Economic and Social Agreem. and be regulated with union representatives</p>
Spain	<p>Statutory regulation of IR. Workers' Statute (1980) formalized worker participation through <i>workers' committees and delegates</i></p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> in general, it is not an issue for the organisations. It is a matter that would have to be negotiated (regional organisation in Catalun.) <i>Union:</i> DP has to be negotiated and workers' committees have to be involved</p>
Sweden	<p>Within a tradition of self-regulation, in the 70s growth of state intervention: laws on <i>union workplace repres. (1974)</i>, on <i>co-determination (1976)</i>, a framework law requiring collect. agreem to be implemented 1982: <i>Agreem. on Efficiency & Participat.</i></p>	<p><i>Employers:</i> (within the framework of 1982 agreement) more individual co-determin. claimed. <i>Union:</i> DP has to be set up alongside representative particip.</p>

Somewhat different are the cases of Luxembourg and especially of France, where a relatively more recent legislation on 'participative' practices within companies provided the representative workplace organisations with more specific competencies in the field of DP. The so-called *modèle luxembourgeois* is characterised by a *high degree of legislative intervention to incentivate co-operation between the two sides of industry*, although DP remains in principle a topic for managerial initiative. Of particular interest for our subject is the legislation of 1974 on *cogestion*, which introduced a legal obligation to establish joint works committees (*comités mixtes d'entreprise*). Such councils are competent in a number of matters, including the establishment of general worker appraisal criteria and the award of payments to workers who have come up with suggestions (the most diffuse form of DP being traditionally in this case the resort to suggestions campaigns) (Als, 1994: 2).

The case of France is characterised by a deep change induced by the legislation of 1982 ('lois Auroux') in an industrial relations system traditionally depicted as highly adversarial and ideologically oriented, based on a centralised system of collective bargaining, a strong initiative on the part of the state and a weak organisation of employees in workplaces, notwithstanding the complex system of worker representation (Goetschy and Rozenblatt, 1992). Under the new legislation, a right for 'employee direct expression' was introduced and an obligation for negotiating its implementation³² in workplaces was also established, thus favouring the decentralisation of collective bargaining, and *defining a procedural framework for the regulation of DP*, at least as far as 'expression groups' are concerned (Tchobanian, 1994: 7-9). The law provided in fact that *Groupes d'expression* could be initiated in all companies with more than 200 employees. Each group should consist of about 15 employees from single offices, shops or assembly lines. They are allowed 4-5 meetings of two hours per year, where management is required to answer questions asked by the groups on topics related to working conditions, work organisation and quality of work (since 1986) (Chouraqui-Tchobanian, 1991: 151-57).

The list of this first group of countries, where a general normative framework related to 'participation' in workplaces has been mainly introduced by law, can be finally completed with the cases of Spain and of Greece, where quite recently the industrial relations systems have been objects, after the recovery of democracy, of frequent legislative intervention. In Spain, where the institutional framework was laid with the enactment of the Workers' Statute of 1980, legislation included measures for the protection of worker rights and the establishment of workers' committees (*comités de empresa*), the effectiveness of which appears however to be rather unsatisfactory (Miguélez and Llorens, 1994).

³² At the same time obligations of negotiating on wages and working hours in workplaces were established.

In Greece, worker participation in decisions in workplaces was unknown until the early 1980s. The situation radically changed after the adoption during the 1980s of a series of laws recognising various aspects of union and worker participation rights: protection of trade union activities in workplaces in 1982; participation mechanisms in the “socialised” public sector of the economy in 1983; health and safety committees in 1985; and a general statutory framework for works councils in 1988 (Vervelacis, 1994: 11-4). However, the implementation of this ambitious legislation is still seriously lagging behind.

Let us turn now to the other group of countries, where some kind of general normative framework to promote co-operation within companies has been centrally negotiated by the social partners, although such a framework is generally supported, more or less directly, by legislation. Cases of “mixed regulation” (i.e. of some combination of central agreements and legislation) variously included Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Italy, and - partially - Portugal; while the Danish and - to a lesser extent - the Irish experiences furnished examples of patterns of centralised regulation substantially achieved through the initiative of the sole social partners (see fig. 4.1).

The normative framework in Belgium is indeed characterised by a peculiar mix of statutory and bi/trilaterally negotiated regulation. At workplace level statutory works councils and Safety, Health and Improvement of the Workplace bipartite committees combine with the operation of workplace trade union delegations, which enjoy negotiating rights over personnel matters, thus revealing a well rooted and strong union presence (Vilrocx and Van Leemput, 1992). Moreover, at least formally, an important role in workplace industrial relations was played by the Productivity Agreement of 1954 and more recently by the Collective Labour Agreement 39 of 1983, dealing with the broad topic of technological innovation for the first time. The implementation of such an important agreement proved however to have been rather poor (Albertijn, 1994).

In Finland the normative framework concerning the participation of employees in matters affecting their everyday work and working conditions is primarily grounded on the fundamental Co-operation in Companies Act of 1979 (amended in 1989), covering establishments employing 30 persons or more, supplemented by general agreements between the social partners in 1981 and 1986. The Act “gives employees influence in decisions affecting their work. Its object is to pave the way for improvements in working conditions, company development and co-operation between different groups of employees. The Act stipulates that the employer must consult his/her employees on any decisions he/she proposes to make that will have the effect of changing their work or working conditions, and negotiate with them on possible alternatives to such decisions. However, the final decision rests with management. Management and employee representatives must agree on shop rules and training for co-operation

before these can be implemented”³³ (Mikola-Lahnammi and Alasoini, 1994: 3). As to the general agreements, they go into more detail with respect to the procedures established by the Act and to the timing of the information to be given to employees. Note that the original emphasis of the Act was on the individual rights of employees to participate in decisions affecting their work (i.e. on DP), but that in practice it has also resulted in an expansion of the negotiation rights of shop stewards, whose competences have been extended to issues of managerial prerogatives (see also Lilja, 1992). In the end, it can be said that in this case employees are given rights to influence change affecting their work not so much directly as through their representatives³⁴.

In Sweden since the mid-1960s, a long tradition of self-regulation and bipartite co-operation between the social partners (similar to the Danish situation, illustrated immediately below) has undergone fundamental change and has been supplemented in the 1970s by a number of legislative interventions in the field of labour and industrial relations, culminating with the Co-determination Act of 1977³⁵. The Act however took the form of a framework law, which required a collective agreement to be reached between the social partners before implementation (Tollhagen, 1994; Kjellberg, 1992). In 1982 the much needed central Agreement on Efficiency and Participation was finally signed. With this agreement the parties recognised the opportunity of co-operation for the development of new and more efficient forms of work organisation where the employees would be given more responsibilities, for the introduction of new technology and for the improvement of economic performance of enterprises. The Agreement indeed stated (par 3, Item 3): “...Decentralisation and delegation are of decisive importance. The employees should be given the opportunity to take part in the planning of their own work. Discussion and consideration with superiors and colleagues about their common tasks and opportunities for delegation within clearly delineated areas are important aspects of this. Responsibility and decision-making can be delegated within an organisational unit and within well defined sections to groups of employees who organise their work together themselves” (quoted in Tollhagen, 1994: 3).

³³ In 1989 the Act was amended to provide that in certain cases a company’s workforce has to be consulted in the event of a merger or buy-out. Cooperation under the Act covers the effects on employment of other changes, such as those due to dismissals, lay-offs, transfers to part-time jobs, retraining and relocation (Mikola-Lahnammi and Alasoini, 1994: 3).

³⁴ Whether the main impact of the legislation has been the increase of direct or of representative participation seems to be however the object of differing interpretations in Finland. In any case, the Finnish experience differs from those of the other Scandinavian countries (see below) for the more important role played by the direct intervention of the law in the considered field (Kjellberg, 1992: 88-92; Lilja, 1992).

³⁵ In the 1970s the public Work Environment Fund Programmes were also launched to promote industrial democracy and participation (Latniak-Löwe, 1995).

The case of Denmark, in contrast, is exclusively based on the principle of collective agreements. In this country - as illustrated in the country report - "since the second world war the DA and LO have agreed on rules for co-operation at enterprise level, where both sides strive to ensure industrial peace; these agreements on co-operation between the two parties involving an industrial court system [...] have been codified into a Main Agreement. This Main Agreement has been revised on several occasions, in 1960, 1973, 1987, and most recently in 1993. These revisions maintained management's right to manage. In the revised agreement of 1st January 1993 [...] a clause makes it explicit that the management of Danish enterprises must be carried out in co-operation with the employees and their representatives which, in relation to this study, means direct participation of the employees in one form or another as well as representative (or indirect) participation. The content of the Main Agreement is further developed in the Co-operation Agreement", by which the social partners "recognise that they have common interests, that they are interested in the development of new technology and wish to *further co-operation involving the direct participation of employees*. [...] Supplementary to direct participation the Co-operation Agreement includes rules for the establishment of *co-operation committees* in enterprises employing 35 persons or more." (Lund, 1994: 3-5, italics mine).

The normative framework in the remaining three cases is far less developed. Italy for a long time was characterised by a tradition of conflictual, voluntarist, informal and poorly institutionalised industrial relations, only partially modified by the labour legislation of 1970 (the Workers' Statute), which favoured both the recognition of some worker individual rights and of the role of the trade unions, disclosing opportunities for the establishment of legally supported works council-like representative organisations in workplaces (Ferner and Hyman, 1992b; Terry, 1993; Regalia, 1995). Since the late 1970s, however, a centralised negotiation of information rights within national collective agreements at the industry level, followed in 1984 by an encompassing accord on new rules in the field of industrial relations within the state-owned manufacturing sector (the so-called 'Protocollo IRI'), opened the path and started setting procedures for greater *de facto* co-operative interaction between the parties, by which forms of representative and/or direct participation negotiated with the unions tended to be fostered (Regalia and Regini, 1995). Finally, the tripartite centralised agreement of July 1993, focused on cost of labour and reform of the system of collective bargaining, as well as on employee representation in workplaces, and explicitly introduced the issue of 'participation' as a new terrain for decentralised industrial relations (Carrieri, 1994).

In Ireland, since its entry into the European Union, there has been considerable interest in the trend in other European countries towards greater workplace communications and consultation of employees. After the failure of an initiative to introduce works councils in the early 1970s, legislation was enacted

to introduce, and subsequently extend, a worker director system and sub-board consultative arrangements in state companies; whereas the government was reluctant to impose participation on the private sector. Finally, the employer and the trade union central organisations published a *Joint Declaration* encompassing the most acceptable approach for the private sector in 1991 and *setting out an agreed framework for employee involvement*, which relied heavily on the voluntarist nature of Irish industrial relations. The objectives of the Joint Declaration were supported by all parties to the 1994 National agreement (PCW), as they recognised ‘the importance of employee involvement in facilitating higher levels of productivity and competitiveness at firm level [...] the effective development of the enterprise, increased job satisfaction, closer identification of employees with the organisation and a safe and healthy work environment’ (O’Kelly, 1994: 13-5).

In Portugal, the transition process from the former corporatist industrial relations order (which in its final phase had tried to introduce participative practices in workplaces) to a pluralist and democratic system of interest representation, led to the development of an industrial relations system characterised by highly adversarial relationships between unions and employers (Lacomblez, 1992) and by the crucial role played by the state and by legislation in the regulation of collective bargaining and the introduction of a system of workers’ commissions in workplaces. In the 1980s a policy of social concertation, leading to agreements between the government and the social partners, although with the notable exception of the major union confederation CGTP, seemed to mark a shift towards a more co-operative pattern of industrial relations (Barreto, 1992). Against this background a national tripartite Economic and Social Agreement was signed in 1990, by which information rights in workplaces on a number of issues, including HRM, were introduced. This framework agreement, which was followed by others on vocational training and on health and security committees in the early 1990s, to which also CGTP joined, is indeed considered as the fundamental normative reference for any discussion and practice related to employee participation (Cristóvam, 1994: 13-17), although its practical implementation is largely unsatisfactory.

The case of the UK, finally, is characterised by the lack of any general normative framework on the topic of workplace direct/indirect participation, in accordance with the voluntarist character of British industrial relations (Geary, Rees and Sisson, 1994).

4.2 The social partner position on regulation

With the notable exception of the UK, the European countries considered here are characterised, as we have seen, by the existence of specific normative frameworks for the incentivisation and regulation of co-operative relationships

between the two sides of industry at the workplace level. In all cases such a framework, independently of its base (see Fig. 4.1 again), relies almost exclusively on the operation of representative channels (be they the works councils or the shop stewards). We can then conclude that in most European countries, unlike the US, and despite the many national variations, existing normative frameworks disclose a picture where *participation is substantially envisaged as 'participation through representation'* (Rogers and Streeck, 1994).

On the other hand, we have seen that, *with a few exceptions, such a normative framework does not* however strictly *apply to* the more recent DP programmes, whose practices (or some of them, as in the French case if the *groupes d'expression* are excluded) tend to fall out of the field of competences already recognised by the representative systems. This is precisely one of the reasons why the issue of the regulation of DP has been largely perceived as a crucial topic and as a terrain open to confrontation.

Generally speaking, with regard to the regulation of the new participative programmes the employers' organisation representatives tended to emphasise the need for a substantial autonomy to be granted to their affiliates, within the boundaries set by the previously existing general framework (if any). The trade unions, on the other hand, stressed the need for a systematic decentralised negotiation/co-determination of the conditions of implementation of DP programmes (see tab. 4.2).

If we go into further detail, however, some further differentiations emerged. According to the central employers' organisations in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, partially Luxembourg³⁶ and Spain, no supplementary regulation was needed: formalised rules had been previously set by existing legislation on works councils and co-determination, which applies to a rather well defined range of issues to be dealt with through representative participation. DP, on the other hand, as strongly emphasised by a representative of the German BDA, has to be subject to management's power of disposition and not to be regulated through written agreements³⁷; because DP - as stressed by the Belgian employers' representatives - is a matter for individual employers (VBO/FEB), which, according to the NCMV (representing Flemish SMEs), does not require formally organisation.

For their part, in these same countries the trade union representatives argued that DP needed to be formally channelled through representative participation,

³⁶ The orientations of the central organisations in Luxembourg, which reflect positions on principle, are similar to those of the other mentioned countries. The organisations of both sides in metalworking and banking, on the contrary, held a different positive position, since part of DP programmes, namely suggestion schemes and quality circles, are jointly regulated (Als, 1994).

³⁷ The German organisation for metalworking stressed even more strongly that all participation programmes have their limit in management authority and that the extension of co-determination rights for the works council has to be resisted.

i.e. through works councils, whose attributed competences had to be extended or interpreted in a more extensive way. As stated most clearly by a representative of the German confederation DGB, DP ought to be the subject of co-determination by the works council in a works agreement, while remaining independent of traditional forms of representation³⁸ (see also Müller-Jentsch and Sperling, 1995).

In France, the social partners' positions on the topic were very similar to those observed in Germany or in the Netherlands. The employers' representatives claimed that their members should be granted substantial autonomy in workplaces, safe for the procedural framework introduced by the law with regard to expression groups. Whereas in opposition to this the union interviewees presented their view of DP as a "process of *negotiated modernisation*" (CFDT, CFTC, CGC), which, to be successful, required extensive joint regulation; or a new field to be pragmatically supported/controlled through union representation and activity (CGT) (Tchobanian, 1994: 17).

The current orientation of central employers' organisations in Austria was also near to the employer positions mentioned above. It needs to be recorded however that in the early 1970s, when the Labour Relations Act was under discussion, the Austrian employer associations were in favour of legally supported individual co-determination rights (in contrast to collective ones); whereas the unions opposed this proposal, viewing it as openly anti-representative participation. As a matter of fact, the unions have since then been developing a rather lukewarm orientation towards DP, which in their view can not be considered as co-determination, as it may be granted, or withdrawn, quite unilaterally by management. Like the labour organisations in other countries, therefore, they claimed to be involved more or less formally in the introduction of DP.

Similarly, in Finland, during the 1970s, when the legislation affecting DP, namely the Co-operation within Companies Act, was under discussion, the central organisations of the employers would have liked to stress direct participation by individual employees in the substance and application of the Act more than was actually stipulated. In practice, the employee participation called for by the Co-operation Act mainly takes place - as we have already seen - through representatives, i.e. shop stewards and representatives of employees.

³⁸ In IG Metall's "Collective Bargaining Reform 2000" trade union objectives include an "extension of co-determination for works councils and the involvement of those directly affected in all issues regarding workplace layout, work organisation and technology", "setting up committees with equal representation to deal with issues of developing work systems as well as grouping, further training, work time organisation, performance conditions and staffing" (i.e. with issues related to DP), "realisation of rights to complain for works councils and the employees affected", "extending opportunities for workers effectively to have their interests and ideas considered" (Jacobi and Hassel, 1994: 8-9).

Subsequent factual developments, which led to successful ways of using DP to ensure employee commitment to companies' financial targets, have however shown that the system worked quite satisfactorily for both parties (Mikola-Lahnammi and Alasoini, 1994: 10). This smoother result was further facilitated by the broader range of competences (which included issues of managerial prerogatives) to which the shop stewards were entitled by the law with respect to the cases so far discussed.

In Portugal, not dissimilar to the claims developed years ago in Austria and Finland, the employers' representatives expressed their preference for the introduction of new legislation which, within the framework established by the Economic and Social Agreement of 1990, might facilitate more flexible work rules, as well as DP programmes; the trade unions, on the contrary, emphasised the opportunity to keep to the existing framework and to introduce DP through collective bargaining.

On the other hand, no, or limited, emphasis on the need to delimit the scope of a general normative framework came - only with the partial exception of Sweden - from the employer representatives in the countries where the most relevant existing framework had been introduced through a centralised agreement, i.e. in Denmark, Italy, Ireland.

In Sweden, in fact, the employers' organisation representatives seemed rather anxious to distance themselves from the practices which developed according to the Agreement on Efficiency and Participation of 1982, and claimed that more individual co-determination be utilised (Lundgreen, 1994); against which the trade union respondents argued that DP be kept alongside representative participation. On the contrary, in Denmark the current situation, in which shop stewards and the employee representatives in the co-operation committees are involved in the procedures through which DP programmes are implemented, was considered satisfactory for both parties. In Italy, the employers' organisation representatives appeared to see currently as a rather obvious (and perhaps satisfactory) matter of fact that DP were implemented through *ad hoc* agreements, i.e. through joint regulation mechanism, at company level (according to the spirit of the general agreement of 1993)³⁹. For their part, however, the trade unions stressed the opportunity of setting more stringent and formalised rules on the topic (Carrieri, 1994). Not dissimilarly in Ireland the unions emphasised the opportunity of being consulted when introducing the new participative programmes.

Finally, in the UK, where a general normative framework was not available, the contrast between the social partners tended to focus on the opportunity of setting it as well: the clearest position against any move in this direction was the British CBI's, which perhaps reflected a more general climate of government and

³⁹ It was not so, though, in the early 1980s, when the employer organisations were rather in favour of unilateral regulation.

employer opposition to so-called corporatism. It was for instance emphasised in CBI's *Statement of Principles on Employee Involvement* that "It is the responsibility of management to generate effective employee involvement through the systems and techniques at their disposal" (Geary, Rees and Sisson, 1994: 9); while the unions stressed their concern to ensure that DP was adopted in co-operation with employee representatives.

4.3 Which kind of regulation?

Which conclusions can be drawn from our findings so far? Certainly many. However in order to select the most important for the purpose of our debate, it seems that we can concentrate on a couple of observations.

In the first instance, the position of the trade unions on the topic appears to be rather clear and needs no further emphasis: the introduction and the operation of DP have to be jointly and explicitly regulated through the channels of representative participation in order to be supported by the unions and be really effective. As long as it is so (as in the case of Denmark), the trade unions see no objections in openly supporting the new managerial programmes. Note that, contrary to expectations, currently in no case do the unions openly declare an interest in legislating DP (although it is very likely that some organisations might welcome it⁴⁰).

What about the employers' organisations? Our findings seem to indicate that it would be misleading to assume that the employers' organisations in Europe simply see DP as a private matter for their members and as a channel completely independent to traditional industrial relations; and that therefore they maintained, as expected, a position contrary to the perspective of a regulation of DP.

We have seen that under specific circumstances the employer organisations would be, or had been, even favourable to legislation supporting the 'individual co-determination rights' of employees. More generally, they often did not oppose, and sometimes they even supported, the negotiation of DP. Thus, it seems possible to argue that by saying that DP is a responsibility of the individual employer, they are not opposing the definition of a normative framework. They may rather suggest that a centralised, rigid, uniform regulation would not fit in with the kind of practices and programmes which are useful and effective as long as they are sufficiently flexible and capable of being adapted to circumstances.

⁴⁰ Since the late 1980s in Germany, for instance, a broad majority within the trade unions advocates extending co-determination rights in association with direct participation. This view has also found its way into the proposals for "Collective Bargaining Reform 2000", the objective of which is to reorganise the area of collective bargaining agreements (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 17). At least at the time of the investigation, such an objective was apparently not pursued through formal requests of change in legislation, though.

In other words, our findings reveal that the debate is not so much whether a regulation of DP should be established or not; it is rather which kind of regulation can be conveniently adopted in order that DP may be sufficiently efficient from an economic perspective and sufficiently acceptable from a social point of view.

5 Diffusion and Relevance of DP

In this and in the next chapter we shall discuss the social partners' appraisal of the practical experience of DP in their countries. Therefore the broad topics of the diffusion and relevance of participative programmes, as well as of the effects they had, will be considered from different perspectives. The reader should bear in mind, however, that the following discussion is based upon the respondents' interpretation and representations of reality more than upon factual information. Through receiving in any case some information on facts from unusual points of view, an understanding of the social partners' position on our topic will therefore become clearer.

5.1 Diffusion of DP: A Quantitative Appraisal

Our respondents did not have a very clear perception of the quantitative diffusion of DP within their domain⁴¹. With very few and partial exceptions, quantitative data were not put forward by the social partner representatives, even where official surveys on industrial relations in workplaces existed which were promoted more or less directly by government, as in France and the UK.

One partial exception is represented by the Danish central organisations: on the union side, LO referred to a recent investigation carried out by the Danish Technological Institute and Roskilde University for the LO. According to this investigation, based upon information provided by consultants in a number of industries, job rotation, job development and group organisation were found "in most industries resulting in increased competence and responsibility on the part of employees. There was an increasing trend for decisions relating to job planning to be delegated to the employees" (Lund, 1994: 10). On the other side, DA representatives argued that, in spite of a widespread strong emphasis on quality improvements, quality circle-like discussions were not spread in more than 1-2% of firms.

Within the banking sector, no social partner organisation knew of any figures on DP, or tried to give its own estimates. Some more information appeared to be available in the metalworking industry. In Austria, the employers' representatives in this sector estimated that half the total number of firms were engaged in some form of employee direct participation, although the diffusion of semi-autonomous work groups did not exceed 3-5% of firms. Tentative figures were given by the employer organisations' representatives in Luxembourg, who estimated in 10% of the large and medium-sized enterprises those using some form of DP, especially under the form of suggestions programmes. In Germany, the union representatives from IG Metall, quoting from an empirical research, spoke of

⁴¹ See tabb. 4a, 5a, 6a in the Annexes.

16% of workers in the car industry working in groups, which however does not necessarily mean - it was emphasised - that they were involved in direct participation programmes. In the Netherlands, the union representatives from the Industriebond FNV estimated that 5% of the companies in the industrial sector had previously introduced autonomous work groups and that 30% were expected to do so in the future; figures which were confirmed by the other union. In Finland, according to union surveys, in metalworking one quarter of members reported working in some kind of group work.

Most likely, this limited information on the diffusion of DP depended on the characteristics themselves of the new practices and programmes, the introduction of which tended to take place in a rather piece-meal fashion, without much co-ordination from the national organisations, even when it was the result of negotiations involving the trade unions or the works councils. In any event, the lack of precise information favoured the development of more subjective interpretations, sometimes leading to contrasting appraisals between the social partners within the same countries. In these cases, as might be expected, it was the employers' representatives that shared the more optimistic view of the diffusion of the new programmes.

Thus, in Germany, DP appeared to be more widespread in the employer representatives' view than in the unions'. Similarly, in France DP programmes were expanding according to the employers' representatives (although expression rights, quality circles and communication policies were considered as rather stagnating), whereas the same programmes were seen as declining and losing support from the employees by the trade union representatives. In Austria, the Association of Austrian Saving Banks considered DP as rather widespread, since "banks, as service enterprises, depend on the motivation of their staff, so the only way they can be managed is by endeavouring to win the commitment of their individual employees." On the contrary, according to the union view the banks had made hardly any move in the area of work organisation; and most examples quoted as DP (such as meetings, organisational improvement processes, corporate models, job enhancement) were not to be seen in the strictest sense as such (Flecker, 1994: 28-29). The expected more optimistic orientation of the employers' organisations was also confirmed finally by those respondents who thought that in any case DP was likely to be more widespread than known, as in the Netherlands.

In other cases however, the opinions of the social partners were roughly the same. Cases included: Belgium and Portugal, where both sides emphasised the limited and the marginal importance respectively of DP practices in their countries (with the exception though of the metalworking industry in the former, where DP was unanimously considered as widely spread); Italy, where on the contrary a slow but steady increase in DP was stressed by both sides; Finland, where the partners shared the opinion that DP was perhaps less widespread than

in other European countries, while IP was very well established⁴². Similar positions were shared by the Swedish organisations in banking and in metalworking: as regards the former sector, both sides emphasised the diffusion of informal practices of direct participation or of employee involvement of an individual kind, while as far as the latter was concerned, DP was said to be widespread where there was high co-operation between the partners .

According to the picture, which emerged - though not very clearly - from the different and incomplete assessments, distinctions might be finally raised between the countries where DP appeared to be still marginal or limitedly diffused (Greece, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Spain and Finland), the countries where DP was considered a new emergent reality (the UK, Italy, Ireland), those where DP was rather stably and widely spread, although - as emphasised by representatives of DA in Denmark and of Gesamtmetall in Germany - not necessarily as much as the employers' organisations might have wished (Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria), and finally those where - traditional/orthodox - DP practices were considered, at least by the peak organisations, to be declining in respect to the past (Belgium⁴³ and Sweden). In these last two countries, companies were said to be moving in other directions: either focusing more directly on issues related to production, flexibility, wage differentiation, high quality in Belgium: or trying to introduce systems of "total employee autonomy", where the term 'participation' was no longer considered appropriate, in Sweden (Tollhagen 1994; Lundgren 1994).

However, let us move now our attention from this very general level of the discourse to more qualitative assessments about significant *differences within countries*. In the opinions of the respondents, DP, as expected and confirmed by research data (Milward et al., 1992), was generally assumed to be more widespread in manufacturing than in services and among blue-collar rather than white-collar employees. It was held to be especially prominent in the car industry, in large plants, and in particular in those belonging to foreign-owned multinational companies.

Emphasis on the wider diffusion of DP in manufacturing, and especially in metalworking, rather than in services was recorded for instance in Germany (by the union central organisation DGB and by both social partners in banking), in Belgium (by both social partners in metalworking), in Luxembourg (by employers' organisations Fed.I.L. and G.I.S.L.), in the UK and in Finland (by the social partners in banking), in Italy⁴⁴. Conversely, most respondents of both sides in banking observed that successful experimentations of DP were extremely

⁴² This sounds however rather puzzling, since - as previously recorded - according to union surveys 25% of members in metalworking reported working in some kind of group work.

⁴³ With the exception however of NCMV's position regarding SMEs.

⁴⁴ In Italy examples included companies within pharmaceutical, food processing, chemical industries as well.

limited in their sector. Sometimes it was not even known whether there were actually any bank currently working with DP techniques.

The importance of the large dimension of companies and/or of their belonging to foreign-owned multinational companies to explain differences in the diffusion of DP was particularly emphasised by the social partners in countries where a structure of indigenous small and medium-sized companies is prominent (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, but also Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy). The propensity of foreign-owned multinationals to use DP was sometimes explained by their interest in complying with ISO-norms regarding quality (and therefore the forms of DP which were then mentioned as typical were those more directly linked to the achievement of high quality standards, as we shall see in a while). As to the importance of the large dimension, references were made to both their better financial capacity and longer strategic vision: as it was put by a representative of the Dutch union CNV, “larger companies are more DP oriented than smaller, because they have more expertise on this issue and therefore see the advantages of DP more clearly; another reason is that smaller companies find changes in work organisation too expensive” (Van der Meché et al., 1994: 15).

There were those, however, who emphasised that DP was rather widely diffused in banking, and more generally in the services sector. This was the case, for instance, of the organisation of Saving Banks in Austria, whose opinion about the importance of motivating staff in service enterprises has been previously mentioned. Similarly, according to the representative from the Portuguese central employers’ organisation in the services sector (which does not however represent financial enterprises), at least in Portugal DP was likely to be particularly widespread within large service enterprises. Within this perspective, the view expressed by a representative of the German peak employers’ organisation, BDA, is of particular interest. The interviewee maintained that DP as a delegation of responsibility is traditionally more connected with white collar workers; and that the same origins of DP might be drawn from the concepts of co-operative personnel management, developed for white-collar sectors in the 1960s.

Finally, there were those who emphasised that DP was particularly diffused among small and medium-sized enterprises. The most outstanding example is represented by NCMV, the organisation of Flemish SMEs in Belgium, whose representative stressed the increasing importance of DP in their sector, because - it was argued - SMEs “need a safe and well organised environment”. Whereas others observed that smaller firms require a style of management where little space is left for embarking on complicated DP programmes.

Other data are needed to understand whether such differences in opinion correspond to differences in reality or not. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that the perceived differences in the diffusion of DP in manufacturing and services may correspond, at least to some extent, to differences in what is considered to be DP: if any kind of - even informal and unintentional - employee

involvement and motivation is defined as DP, it is likely, in fact, that DP would be most widespread in the service sector, where the commitment of employees is structurally required in the client relationship (Regalia, 1990). While the opposite would be true if the meaning of DP is restricted to quite formalised and explicit opportunities which management provide for consultation with and/or delegation of responsibilities to their subordinates relating to their immediate work task and/or working conditions. It is revealing that in banking the forms of DP which are mentioned are: *ad hoc* project groups (Austria), 'time-autonomous groups' (Germany), consultation and communications (UK), work groups for staff only (Portugal), incentive schemes linked to quality objectives (Italy), semi-autonomous individual work (Sweden, Finland), not all of which can be fully understood as DP.

A similar argument can be applied to the different opinions on diffusion in large and small companies. Not very differently, finally, the more optimistic assessment of the diffusion of DP of the employers' organisation representatives in comparison to their trade union counterparts in many cases appears to be dependent on the looser interpretation⁴⁵ of participative practices of the former in comparison to that of the latter.

To conclude the discussion, it can be added to this that in most cases, when trying to

appraise the diffusion of DP, the social partners were rather hesitant in attaching much importance to it. This was not only the case in countries where it is likely that the diffusion of DP was very limited; but also in others where there is a long tradition of co-operative personnel management. According to one of the Danish employers' organisations, for instance, "DP in its proper form is not very widespread". Similarly, a representative of IG Metall in Germany suggested that "the debate is more extensive than practice". As we have seen, on the basis of the estimated figures cited by the respondents, even in the most favourable situations, such as in the metalworking industry, the diffusion of modern DP practices probably does not exceed 10-15% of enterprises. Significantly, in each country the cases of success quoted by the representatives of both sides⁴⁶ were not usually more than a half dozen. Nonetheless, only a minority of respondents believed that the topic was of little importance, at least in principle and as an experience which might anticipate a more general future trend.

⁴⁵ "Not any form of teamworking should be seen as DP", was for instance the comment from one trade union representative, thus indirectly suggesting that there might be a broader approach.

⁴⁶ See tabb. 4d, 5d, 6d in the Annexes.

5.2 Diffusion of DP: The Most Widespread Forms

We have so far discussed the social partners' opinions on the diffusion of DP without making many distinctions between the different forms that such new developments may take. Although the topic received only limited attention by our respondents, we shall try now to go more into detail⁴⁷.

From this point of view, the banking sector and the metalworking industry clearly disclosed quite a different picture. Let us start with the former.

5.2.1 Banking

We have previously observed that not all the programmes and practices which were described as examples of DP by the representatives of the social partners in the financial sector could straightforwardly be considered as such - at least according to a quite stringent definition of direct participation. Conversely, many interviewees emphasised that most of the modern forms of DP did not seem suitable to the kind of work which is performed in banks, and to an organisation of work which is often depicted as traditional and centralised.

Semi-autonomous work groups cannot be transferred to banks for legal reasons, was a point argued by a representative of the employer Austrian organisation in the financial sector. Similarly, a representative from the Finnish union observed that teamwork had a limited diffusion in banks, since it does not fit well with the activities in the sector. Limited cases of teamwork (in Greece) or of work groups (in Portugal) were however cited; but in both situations these were experiments involving only staff and supervisors. Similar to these limited and temporary forms of DP was the one cited by the trade unions in the sector in Austria, i.e. the 'thematically-centred project work' (forms of project organisation introduced for innovation purposes "in preparation for management decision-making") (Flecker, 1994: 28).

At least in the Scandinavian countries, however, it was stressed that the employees in the financial sector were particularly capable of individual semi-autonomous work, because of their versatile and diverse skill (Finland), or because they were forced to this by the reorganisation of the sector which was meant to reduce hierarchies and increase efficiency (Sweden). Sometimes a tendency to devise specific ways of involving the employees within the structural/legal limits, to which the activities in banking had to conform, was observed. Thus, in Germany the most typical form of DP (recently introduced through a sectorial collective agreement) was represented by the "time-autonomous work groups", where employees are delegated responsibility limited to the organisation of working hours. In Luxembourg a specific version of TQM, called 'concerto' had been established to underline the co-operative effort of all

⁴⁷ See tabb. 4a, 5a, 6a; and 1b, 2b, 3b in the Annexes.

participants. In Italy specific incentive schemes linked to quality objectives were considered functional and more suitable substitutes of other, more 'classic', DP programmes.

In conclusion, where attempts were made to implement some form of DP in the sector, the emphasis was mainly on two-way communications programmes, limited forms of individually-based delegation of responsibility (task enlargement, job enrichment), temporary problem solving groups (mainly for staff and middle management), specific ways of involving employees through incentivisation or restricted delegation of responsibility on a group basis.

However, as it was put by a representative from the Danish trade union in banking, giving voice to a widespread position among the organisations of labour, *DP should mean autonomous/semi-autonomous work groups and quality circles*, which are not found in banking. It is precisely on these forms of DP that the debate was concentrated as far as metalworking was concerned.

5.2.2 Metalworking

With regard to metalworking, our findings largely confirmed on the one hand the expected trade union preference for teamworking and autonomous work groups, as forms better embodying the union idea of DP. Although critical appraisals emerged, as we shall see, positive expectations about these ways of delegative participation appeared to be the most diffused. Even the currently rather critical position of Swedish trade unions seemed to be positively oriented towards these forms of DP. Significantly there were those, such as the Belgian trade union CMB/CMB, which strongly emphasised their identification with these strategies: "*teamwork, c'est nous!*".

Our data revealed on the other hand a more diversified approach on the side of the employers' organisations. From this perspective, analytically five different positions could be individuated, which roughly corresponded to different stages in an ideal process for the development of DP programmes.

A first position reflected the claim that DP methods were to remain completely informal and not organised to be effective (as requested by the Belgian employers' representative of SMEs). The second (typical of the employer organisations in less industrialised countries) relied upon the net preference for communication programmes, suggestion schemes and, more generally, on *ad hoc* and occasional ways of consulting/informing the employees. A third position focused on less volatile and more formalised forms of consultative participation (as in the cases of expression groups in France, of QC and the like). The fourth (typical of most Central European countries) focused on the delegation of responsibilities to the employees in the organisation of their work, and therefore had as its main concern the topics of teamworking and autonomous/semiautonomous work groups. The last approach (represented by

the programmes of TQM and the like) sought a more integrated, systematic and permanent involvement of the employees at every level.

The appraisal of the existing situation by the social partners revealed however a gap between expectations and reality, especially as far as the more demanding forms of systematic consultative and delegative participation were concerned. Even in the most favourable cases semi-autonomous work groups and teamworking were not considered widespread, at least not as much as wished (as previously mentioned with regards to Germany). As to QC, while in the less industrialised countries it was said to have not yet been introduced, it was considered nearly out of fashion in the others, where it was being replaced by more sophisticated projects of total quality management.

It was especially the more 'soft', informal and flexible practices of information, systematic two-ways communication, suggestion schemes, regular consultation, individual contributions to continuous improvement, sometimes organised within strategic frameworks, which were emphasised as actually expanding, although with many differences according to each country. In many cases - and especially where the experience of DP was less developed - it was however expected that 'harder' forms of teamworking and work groups were a necessary achievement in the future.

5.3 The Introduction of DP

With regard to the ways in which DP practices and programmes were introduced, it was largely accepted that recently the initiative lay fundamentally with management. This is not to deny that in many cases (e.g. in the UK, in Germany, in France, in Italy, in Finland) the initiatives and pressures coming, even primarily, from the trade unions in the 1960s and 1970s were mentioned, thus confirming the idea that DP has had a long history in Europe, and that its actors are to be found on both sides of industry (Geary and Sisson, 1994). The great majority of the social partners' representatives agreed however on the fact that for about the last ten-fifteen years the initiative came from management. In countries where in the past the employers' organisations had played an active role in the introduction of DP, like France or Germany, it was emphasised that the companies themselves were by now taking the initiative, sometimes relying on advice from consultants.

While largely agreeing with this interpretation, the unions' representatives often added that this recent prominent role of managerial initiative was linked to the fact that since the mid-1980s DP had been introduced primarily to improve the productivity and financial performance of companies. It had been different earlier, during the 1970s or early 1980s (with regard to Finland), when, in a more flourishing economic situation, pressures came from employees to improve the quality of their work (Mikola-Lahnammi and Alasoini, 1994).

At any rate, cases where the unions and/or the employee representatives had even recently retained a positive influence in promoting DP practices were mentioned. Examples came from the Netherlands, where it was claimed that in the metalworking industry sometimes the works councils themselves requested that autonomous work groups be introduced to improve the company performance (Van der Meché et al., 1994); and from Ireland, where it is reported that in some cases the introduction of teamworking had been proposed by the unions and that management agreed to a trial period (O’Kelly, 1994). Among the trade union representatives there was a widespread consciousness that the labour organisations played no secondary role in the development and implementation of DP programmes: as observed by German trade unionists in banking, for instance, “while the responsibility for impetus, ideas and initiative is upon management, putting this into practice in the company requires the involvement of the works councils” (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 42)⁴⁸

This leads us to the discussion of the factors which, according to the social partners, would facilitate, or hinder, a successful introduction of DP. The views that the interviewees held on the topic were rather articulated and the relevant elements they mentioned were numerous. We can divide them into structural, social,⁴⁹ economic, organisational, information-related, industrial relations-related factors.

1 - *Structural* factors are those relying on the ‘hard’ characteristics of the company, or of the industry it belongs to in the given moment, such as the kind of activities performed (e.g. services, and banking in particular vs. manufacturing, and metalworking), the size of the company (large/small), its ownership (private/state owned/ foreign multinational).

2 - *Social* factors are those deriving from societal change and social characters and attitudes of employees linked to it, such as their capability and interest /or not in assuming responsibilities.

3 - *Economic* factors are those arising from the general economic context (expansion vs. recession), the characteristics of the market (highly competitive/protected), the company performance and investment capability.

4 - *Organisational* factors are those linked to the behaviour of the different groups within the company (e.g., management, supervisors, white- and blue-collars in manufacturing), and to the functioning, the change, the needs of the organisation.

⁴⁸ A special case is the Danish, where semi-autonomous groups were introduced in early 1970s after a joint visit of representatives of both partners to the US; and where a new joint visit to Japan followed in the early 1980s to study the experience of QC, which were finally found to be inferior to the previously provided for project groups within the Danish Agreement on Cooperation. Also the Danish version of TQM was designed by the employers’ association in cooperation with the unions (Lund, 1994).

⁴⁹ See tabb. 4b, 5b, 5b in the Annexes.

5 - *Information-related* factors are those linked to the exposure/or not to relevant information about DP (such as the dissemination of information by consultants, the contact with successful DP-companies).

6 - *Industrial relations-related* factors are those linked to existing culture, institutions, behaviour of industrial relations actors (e.g. adversarial vs co-operative culture, legal/ negotiated constraints or incentives, reactions/interactions between partners, mutual trust/distrust).

Starting with the factors which were considered positive for the introduction of DP, on the basis of this classification we can observe that:

i. only a few organisations mentioned *structural* factors (see fig. 5.1); among these especially the requirements of service enterprises, and the client relationship (with regards to white-collars), or the larger size of enterprises were cited.

ii. even fewer were those who referred to *social* factors, such as the new employee demands regarding their work, the needs of the workers to determine their work;

iii. *economic* factors received on the contrary much greater attention from both partners, especially from the employer side. Such factors can be grouped around three main foci: the increased competition in international markets, and the new imperatives deriving from it, such as the need to conform to quality standards and apply for ISO certification, to increase efficiency for survival, or to emulate foreign (Japanese, American) investors (with respect to just-in-time philosophy), etc.; the economic recession/crisis, since it intensifies pressures to become more competitive and/or facilitates the development of co-operative attitudes; and lastly the periods, on the contrary, of economic expansion, when plenty of money is available for investments, including organisational and technological innovation;

iv. *organisational* factors were very extensively cited by both partners. Among the most frequent items, were on the one side the implications of 'technical and organisational change requiring staff motivation', or of 'an organisational structure capable of reacting flexibly to customer needs', which were often linked by both sides to specifications such as 'a favourable culture of companies', ready to give 'detailed information to employees', a 'cultural change of the employers', a 'highly prepared and motivated management'. On the other side, especially, but not exclusively, the unions mentioned innovations in the organisation/remuneration of work, such as 'flattened qualification systems', 'systematic job rotation', 'adequate incentive systems (bonuses) linked to the new programmes', 'systematic training programmes', as well as job security;

Fig. 5.1 - Factors Facilitating the Introduction of DP According to the Social Partners: Distribution per Countries

	<i>Employers' Organisations</i>	<i>Trade Unions</i>
<i>Structural</i>	Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark	Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark
<i>Social</i>	Austria, Germany	Austria, Germany
<i>Economic</i>	UK, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxemb., Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden	Austria, Germany, Italy, Belgium
<i>Organisation.</i>	Austria, Luxemb., Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Denmark	Austria, Finland, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Luxemb., Ireland
<i>Information-related</i>	Austria, Germany, Luxemb., Ireland, Denmark, Portugal	Austria, Denmark
<i>Industr.relat.-related</i>	Luxemb., Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Finland	Spain, Belgium, Luxemb., Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Finland

v. *information-related* factors were frequently cited, especially on the part of the employers' organisations, revealing on the one side the relevance of processes of learning from others (such as foreign successful companies), as well as of the role played by consultants; and disclosing on the other side the high importance attributed to keeping the employees continuously informed;

vi. finally the facilitating role played by *industrial relations-related* factors was mentioned fairly frequently, especially within the organisations from the Scandinavian countries. Such factors included aspects such as a 'co-operative' culture, grounded on 'mutual trust', an 'early consultation and involvement' of the union or of the works councils, the 'approval and participation in the system' of the workplace representative organisations, the establishment of 'formalised ways of co-operation between the social partners' (e.g. the 'co-operation committees'), the definition of 'collective agreements on successful DP practices', and the 'co-operation between social partners and institutions about training'. It can be observed that any reference to institutional facilities established at the central/national level was absolutely marginal, even on the part of the trade union representatives, confirming that rather obviously the topic is clearly considered as pertaining to workplace social and industrial relations.

Turning now to the factors which were perceived as hindering the successful introduction of DP, we find the following picture:

i. *structural* factors continuously received rather limited attention (see fig. 5.2). Particularly cited among these were some structural characteristics of the labour market (such as the scarcity of qualified workers), or of the economy (when characterised by the overwhelming presence of SMEs), or of the activities performed in the financial sector (which required uniformity and therefore hampered local initiatives; or which, conversely, required intense communication and therefore made the development of explicit DP programmes unnecessary);

ii. no importance was given to *social* factors (with the exception of those who emphasised a general ‘fear of change’, ie. a traditional attitude);

iii. a rather limited emphasis was put on *economic* constraints, especially in comparison to the importance that these kind of factors had received as facilitating inputs. From this perspective practically all comments focused on the implications of the economic crisis: which according to the one side ‘may induce management to short-minded industrial relations strategies’ (as emphasised by an employer representative), ‘requires quick decisions’, ‘leads to harsh cost policies’; whereas according to the other side, it leads to ‘staff reduction and job insecurity’, has ‘negative effects on worker confidence’, ‘demotivates the unions in taking initiatives’ on participative topics, or else, because of financial restraint, ‘prevents more extensive training’;

iv. *organisational* factors received on the contrary the greatest attention. They mainly focused on three issues: inadequate organisational culture (‘low trust environment’, ‘hierarchical structure’, ‘persistence of taylorist culture’, ‘authoritarian and traditional culture, not prepared to delegate responsibilities and reduce direct control of work’, etc.); management and middle management lack of preparation and resistance to change (‘resistance of older employers’, ‘managers’ fears of losing authority’, ‘reluctance of management to change and share power’ ‘lack of education, training, skill development among middle management’, ‘lack of credibility in introducing change on the part of management’, etc.); and the lack of preparation and resistance to change on the part of the employees (‘excessive demands on unprepared workers’, ‘inadequate qualification of workforce’, ‘employee demotivation due to worsened status’, ‘worker hostility’, etc.). However, mention was also made of other aspects, such as ‘more cost-oriented than quality-oriented managerial strategy’, ‘low technological innovation’, ‘limited implementation of DP’;

v. the *information-related* factors were absolutely marginal;

vi. finally, the *industrial relations-related* constraints were considered as much more important. Also in this case three main groups of negative elements can be distinguished: firstly, negative factors linked to characters of the environment or of the functioning of the system (such as a ‘traditional system of IR’, an excessive ‘predominance of collective bargaining’, a ‘conflictual IR climate’, the ‘traditional antagonistic culture’, a ‘national culture enhancing the collective role of unionism’, an ‘excessive union influence supported by legislation’, etc); secondly, negative factors linked to aspects of managerial

behaviour (the ‘absence of consultation with workers affected’, the ‘employer unwillingness to negotiate the implementation of DP’, etc); thirdly, negative implications of the behaviour of the employees and their organisations (the ‘employee pressure on union officials to deliver short term results’, an ‘initial resistance of the trade unions’, a ‘limited understanding of the trade unions’ due to their ‘ideological commitment’, a ‘too literal and strict observance of legislation and collective agreements’, etc.).

Fig. 5.2 - Factors Hindering the Introduction of DP According to the Social Partners: Distribution per Countries

	<i>Employers' Organisations</i>	<i>Trade Unions</i>
<i>Structural</i>	Denmark, Portugal, Germany, Italy	Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Netherlands
<i>Social</i>	Luxemb.	
<i>Economic</i>	Germany, France, Luxemb.	France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Denmark
<i>Organisat.</i>	Germany, Italy, Luxemb., Austria, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Finland	Germany, Luxemb., Netherlands Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Greece, France, Finland, Italy, UK
<i>Information-related</i>		Spain
<i>Ind. relat.-related</i>	Spain, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Finland, Germany,	Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Germany

A comparison of these two sets of factors shows that the facilitating factors were seen as being largely of an external kind and variously diversified: in other words, pressure and help for change were perceived as being multiple, and coming from outside the workplaces. Whereas the hindering ones were described rather as arising from within the companies and polarised much more around the contrasting interests and behaviour of the parties.

This explains why in many cases the social partners could share similar positions with respect to the former set of factors, which seemed to be grounded

on much more ‘objective’ terrain, whereas far more contrasting and conflictual interpretations arose around the latter, which appeared to be largely rooted in the differentiation of their interests.

5.4 The importance of DP on the policy agenda

Let us conclude our review of the ways in which the social partners described and interpreted the diffusion of practices and programmes of employee direct participation with a brief discussion of the importance attributed to the topic on their respective policy agendas.

According to current rhetoric, on principle, increasing attention to such programmes as well as rising expectations - or, conversely, concern - about them, should be expected. However, it can be expected that the social partners’ attitudes will be influenced by their assessment of experience so far accumulated.

First of all, our findings⁵⁰ indicate that a distinction needs to be made between the increasing/decreasing importance of the topic for the organisation the respondent belongs to, and the increasing/decreasing importance attributed to the topic by the respondent in practice. The first dimension regards the political importance of direct participation. The second its envisaged relevance. Many respondents did not answer at both levels, i.e. on both dimensions, but on one only (see tab. 5.3).

The large majority of social partners’ representatives chose the second rather than the first level of their discourse, i.e. *gave more emphasis to assessment of reality* rather than to considerations of principle. Exceptions included, on the side of the trade unions, the positions expressed by the two central organisations in Belgium, the representatives of which both stressed the greater importance of the topic for their organisations with respect to the past: ACV/CSC stressing its willingness to defend *real employee involvement*, which was not spontaneously granted by management, and ABVV/FGTB claiming for negotiation and union involvement in the introduction of DP, to counter-balance the disproportionate power of employers. Both organisations admitted however that they were feeding a debate on a topic of which the practical importance was limited.

In this case the increasing interest on the side of the unions was matched by the decreasing importance attributed to the topic by the employers’ organisations, particularly if the central organisation (VBO/FEB) and the federation in banking are considered⁵¹. Not very dissimilarly, in Germany too DP seemed to have recently received greater attention in principle, although mixed with some

⁵⁰ See tabb. 1c, 2c, 3c in the Annexes.

⁵¹ The employers’ organisation in metalworking was however more interested, thus confirming the greater *de facto* importance of DP in this sector. To this the great interest of the organisation of Flemish SMEs (NCMV) has to be added.

scepticism, among the trade unions than among the employer organisations. In other cases, i.e. in Denmark, in Ireland, and to a much lesser extent in Spain and in Portugal, both sides appeared to be increasingly interested in the topic: in Denmark this was seen as an effect of the DA-LO agreement of 1986 (see chapter 4), by which the initiatives of all the organisations had been further incentivated, and the debate, both within and between the parties, intensified. In Ireland too the increasing importance of the topic for the organisations of both sides can be interpreted as a consequence of the FIE-ICTU Joint Declaration of 1991, although in this case the debate grew much more within than between the social partner organisations. In the two Iberian countries, a very timid but growing attention to a topic, which remained however a minor issue on the policy agenda of both sides, was perhaps the signal of a desire to modernise their industrial relation systems.

Tab. 5.3 - Importance and Relevance of DP for the Social Partners

Country	Employers' Organisations	Trade Unions
Austria	Rather low importance & relevance of an issue previously satisfactorily dealt with	Rather low importance & relevance of an issue previously satisfactorily dealt with
Belgium	Decreasing importance of DP (VBO/FEB) Steady practical relevance (metal) Fundamental importance of informal DP (NCMV)	Higher <i>political</i> importance of the topic with respect to the past, though limited practical relevance
Denmark	Increasing importance & relevance of DP	Increasing importance & relevance of DP
Finland	Rather low importance & relevance of an issue previously satisfactorily dealt with	Rather low importance & relevance of an issue previously satisfactorily dealt with
France	Decreasing interest for a topic previously sufficiently dealt with	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP
Germany	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP (banking, metal)	High importance of DP
Great Britain	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP
Greece	Low importance & relevance of the topic	Low importance & relevance of the topic
Ireland	Increasing importance of DP	Increasing importance of DP
Italy	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP
Luxembourg	Rather low importance & relevance of an issue previously satisfactorily dealt with	Rather low importance & relevance of an issue previously satisfactorily dealt with
Netherlands	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP	Increasing <i>de facto</i> relevance of DP
Portugal	Low importance, but increasing interest	Low importance, but increasing interest
Spain	Low importance, but increasing interest	Low importance, but increasing interest
Sweden	Decreasing importance & relevance of DP	Decreasing importance & relevance of DP

Other situations were characterised by a rather low importance attributed to the topic by the partners, both in political and practical terms. Cases included Greece, where the issue appeared to have not yet been taken very seriously; and, at the opposite extreme, Sweden, where the issue was considered as somewhat old-fashioned. In an intermediate position, the examples of Austria, Finland, Luxembourg gave the impression that the topic had been previously sufficiently dealt with, and quite satisfactorily regulated, in the past to deserve much fresher attention. To this final position the French employers' central organisations, which, following a very early and prolonged active interest for the topic in the past, were turning their attention to broader projects of integrated HRM, could be added.

In the other countries a pragmatic, vigilant interest appeared to be widespread, especially on the side of the unions. A special emphasis was put in these cases on the *increasing importance of DP in reality*. As argued by trade union representatives from the TUC in the UK, for instance, direct communication and direct participation programmes were becoming so common as not to be worth arguing about: the initiatives were to be supported as long as they contributed to the union goals of improvement in the quality of working life. Quite similar positions were found among both sides in Italy and in the Netherlands; and, with different emphasis, among the employers' organisation in the metal and in the financial sectors in Germany.

Finally, most French unions and the French employers' organisation in metalworking shared similar positions. Particularly with regard to the unions, this was the outcome of a dual, opposite movement: on the one hand, a process of disillusionment and disenchantment on the part of those organisations which in the past had entertained higher expectations of DP (and particularly of the potential of expression groups), and on the other hand, a more pragmatic orientation not to loose contact with reality on the part of those organisations which had previously been more opposed to DP on principle.

In conclusion, our findings do not seem to simply confirm easy expectations of a generalised increasing interest for the topic, either on the side of the employers' organisations or on that of the trade unions. They have rather presented a differentiated scenario, where the logic of the positions of the actors appears to be grounded more on complex factors than on mere rhetorical arguments, or fashion. In the next section we shall delve deeper into the opinion of practical experience, i.e. of the impact of direct participation programmes in European countries.

6 The Impact of DP

Certainly, the social partners' assessment of the effects of DP is even more important and politically crucial than their views about the diffusion of the new participative programmes. As will be shown, however, their opinions about the impact of DP often seemed more grounded on expectations than on facts: perhaps because of the limited experience of successful DP in practice, or else because of their limited information about a kind of innovation which, as previously observed, is generally conceived as typical of workplace social and industrial relations, as well as being characterised by the rather piece-meal fashion of its introduction.

The chapter will consider in turn, the *economic* effects, i.e. the impact on the efficiency and performance of companies, the *social and organisational* effects, i.e. the impact on working conditions and worker quality of life as well as on human resource development within companies; and the *industrial relations* effects, i.e. the impact on, and the relationship with, representative participation and the role of the trade unions.

6.1 The Impact of DP: the Economic Effects

Given the almost generalised acceptance of modern practices of DP having been initiated by management, and primarily to improve the economic performance of their companies (see paragraph 5.3 above), it might have been expected that the opinions on the economic impact of DP would have on the whole been straightforwardly positive. On the topic there appeared however to be a widely held view that *DP was not productive as such*, but that *it enhanced productivity and efficiency of enterprises in a more indirect way*.

According to our findings⁵², the majority of the social partner representatives argue in fact that the introduction of DP practices had positive effects on the economic performance of enterprises. Significantly, a representative from the employers' organisation in banking in Austria stressed that "business results would be poorer if this way of maintaining employee relations did not exist" (Flecker, 1994). The reason for this, as explained by some of the French employer representatives, lay in the fact that current differences in economic performances are no longer dependent on machinery (which is largely the same everywhere), but on management and human factors: thus, programmes which are successful in enhancing an active worker involvement have positive effects on companies' performance. However there were those who had no clear opinion on the topic or held different views on it. Moreover, many of those who

⁵² See tabb. 4b, 5b, 6b in the Annexes.

expressed positive appraisals, at the same time emphasised that such positive influence was however conditional on the existence of specific conditions.

Positive appraisals were expressed by at least some of the social partners (either employer organisations or trade unions, as well as both) in eleven countries out of fifteen (see tab. 6.1) with regard to the metalworking industry (i.e. in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK), in eight as far as the peak organisations are concerned (i.e. in Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands), and in seven considering the banking sector (Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland). This does not however mean that in the remaining countries critical views of the relationship between DP and economic performance prevailed. In most cases, no opinion was expressed by any of the social partners, who sometimes even admitted very openly that they held no clear view on the issue (as was the case in Greece generally, as well as in Belgium with regard to the main employer confederation and in the Netherlands with respect to most social partner organisations in banking and in metalworking).

Doubts about the positive economic virtues of DP per se were, rather unexpectedly, raised by the central employers' organisations in countries like Spain, Ireland, Portugal, where the diffusion of DP was still rather limited, although increasing. In these cases tendencies were observed either to minimise the real/potential importance and impact of these programmes, seen more as a minor consequence of other change driven by management, rather than as instrument for change in itself (as in Spain); or to emphasise the limited scope of practices such as teamworking, which had not to be seen as "a panacea for ills", working in every circumstances (as in Ireland); or finally to conclude that, since there is little certainty about the positive economic effects of these practices, DP had not necessarily to be introduced: after all quality is expensive - it was argued by an employer representative in Portugal - and not all consumers will claim it.

Somewhat surprisingly, fewer trade union representatives than employers' seemed to hold a critical or sceptical expectation of the positive impact of DP on the economic performance of companies (see tab. 6.1 again). Most likely this reflected a widespread opinion that - as plainly summarised by a French trade union representative - *since companies use it, DP has to be economically effective*. An exception is represented by the more hesitant and cautious assessment of representatives from the German IG Metall, who stressed that increases in profitability observed in companies adopting DP programmes (and especially work groups) do not necessarily have to be interpreted as effects of these programmes; they can be linked to other factors, such as the lower age of the workers, as well; and that moreover, according to existing studies, only 15% of the growth potential regards the production area, while the rest appears to be linked instead to planning, subcontracting, marketing, with little or no relationship to the new managerial and organisational practices.

Tab. 6.1 - The Impact of DP: Economic Effects

Country	Employers' Organisations	Trade unions
Austria	C: - B: positive effects M: positive effects	C: - B: - M: positive effects
Belgium	C: no position (VBO/FEB), positive effects (NCMV) B: - M: positive effects	C: positive effects, at certain conditions B: - M: positive effects (CCMB). At cert. cond.
Denmark	C: positive effects. At cert. condit. B: - M: positive effects. At cert. conditions	C: positive effects. At cert. conditions B: - M: positive effects. At cert. conditions
Finland	C: positive effects. At cert. conditions B: positive effects. At certain conditions M: positive effects. At cert. conditions	C: positive effects. At cert. conditions B: positive effects. At certain conditions M: positive effects. At cert. conditions
France	C: positive effects. B: - M: -	C: positive, but limited effects B: - M: -
Germany	C: positive effects B: positive effects M: positive effects	C: positive effects, at certain conditions B: positive effects M: positively oriented, but uncertain
Great Britain	C: - B: - M: positive effects	C: - B: - M: -
Greece	C: no position B: - M: no position	C: no position B: no position M: no position
Ireland	C: positive limited effects. B: positive effects M: positive effects	C: uncertain position B: - M: positive effects
Italy	C: positive effects. B: positive effects M: positive effects	C: positive effects B: positive effects M: positive effects
Luxembourg	C: - B: positive effects (but recent experience) M: positive effects	C: - B: positive effects M: positive effects
Netherlands	C: no clear opinion B: no clear opinion M: no clear opinion	C: positive effects (CNV) B: no clear opinion M: positive effects (Ind FNV)
Portugal	C: uncertain position B: - M: no inf.	C: - B: - M: no inf.
Spain	C: positive effects minimised B: - M: -	C: positive effects (for companies) B: positive effects M: positive effects (for the companies)
Sweden	C: - B: - M: -	C: - B: - M: -

NB C = central organisations; B = organisations in banking; M = organisations in metalw.

Even more interesting is the fact that a significant proportion of those who held a positive view of the economic impact of DP felt it necessary to emphasise that such virtues were in any event uncertain, difficult to appreciate and/or did depend on the fulfillment of specific preconditions (see tab. 6.1). Note that such

positions were not necessarily more typical of the trade unions, as might have been expected. It was effectively so as far as the peak organisations, and to a lesser extent those in the banking sector, were considered⁵³; but it turned out to be the opposite with respect to metalworking. To put it differently, the trade union representatives tended to be more sceptical when the opinions were grounded more on positions of principle (as quite typical of the peak organisations) and/or on expectations for future developments (as is characteristic of organisations with less consolidated experience in the field like banking); whereas it tended to be the contrary - and the employer organisations showed therefore greater concern and uncertainty - when the assessment was more likely to be grounded on experience (i.e. in the case of metalworking).

The preconditions for DP to be economically effective spontaneously stressed by the respondents included, on the side of the employers, the need for adequate training (Denmark), for continuous management support for the programmes (Finland), and high job satisfaction on the part of the employees⁵⁴ (Austria). Whereas, on the side of the unions, arguments put forward were that DP might have positive economic effects only when employers are taking a thorough approach while introducing it (Belgium); that DP will only lead to long-term improvements in productivity (and not simply to short-term advantages due to facilitated reduction of costs) if it is used as a way of democratising the organisation of work in the long run (Germany); that the positive impact of DP on productivity and quality will depend on the provision of adequate training by companies (Denmark); and that the economic effectiveness of DP will not be limited to the short-term only if the employers overcome their too narrow view of the potential of employee participation (France).

In any event, no respondent seemed to think it possible to *measure the effects of DP directly* in terms of efficiency and economic performance⁵⁵. Such economic advantages "cannot be counted in pounds and pences", it was observed by an employer representative in Austria (Flecker, 1994: 31). The economic impact of the participative practices was rather considered of an indirect kind. Sometimes the link between DP and economic performance was

⁵³ As far as the peak organisations were concerned, trade union representatives from 5 countries and employers' organisation representatives from 2 (out of a total of 8 countries where the partners recognised that DP had positive economic effects) expressed such an ambivalent or cautious appraisal; as regards the banking sector, the same applied to 2 trade union and 1 employers' organisation representatives (out of a total of 6 countries); while as far as the metalworking industry is concerned, this applied to 5 employers' organisations and 3 trade unions (out of 10 cases).

⁵⁴ This depends on the fact, it was said, that "output is high when job satisfaction is high. And DP can lead to job satisfaction" (Flecker, 1994: 34-5).

⁵⁵ A partial exception is however the position of the trade union representatives in Luxembourg, who observed that the large amount of bonuses distributed to workers was to be considered as a measure of such impact, since such bonuses are related to increases in profitability.

seen as mediated⁵⁶ by technology and technical equipment. As clearly argued by an employers' organisation representative in Belgium, "companies need lean and just-in time production to be competitive: to make these techniques work they need DP. DP is then as the oil that makes the machine function smoothly. However, as such, the oil does not generate a better economic performance. That is the result of better machinery" (Albertijn, 1994: 12). A similar position was shared by employers' organisations in Spain. There were those who argued that the economic impact of DP was positive because the introduction of such programmes (and particularly of teamworking) led to a reduction of the workforce, therefore making productivity increase, as emphasised by a representative of the manager and staff union MHP in the Netherlands. And similarly, that the positive effects of DP depended on the opportunity it provided to reduce additional work and overtime, as stressed by both partners in the banking sector in Germany.

For most respondents however the positive economic effects of DP depended on its ability to link increased internal communications and employee involvement to innovation, quality and economic improvement. Which had the additional advantage of helping overcome anxieties and prejudice towards change. This leads us to our next topic, which focuses on the social impact of DP and its effects on working conditions and quality of working life.

6.2 The Impact of DP: Social Effects

We have seen in the previous paragraph that the trade union representatives tended on the whole to show a more straightforward positive appreciation of the economic impact of DP than their employers' organisation counterparts. Conversely, if we shift now to the impact of DP on working conditions and quality of working life, the assessment of the former was much more critical than that of the latter⁵⁷.

In fact, the employers' organisation representatives shared a quite positive view of the issue. With very few exceptions⁵⁸, all the respondents tended to emphasise the beneficial effects of DP on working conditions and quality of working life, which were expected to descend from a number of DP-related

⁵⁶ The position of the French central employers' organisation, previously cited, was clearly very different. It emphasised on the contrary that it was no longer the machinery which could make the difference.

⁵⁷ See tabb. 4c, 5c, 6c, in the Annexes.

⁵⁸ Focusing our attention on the respondents from the central employers' organisations, 8 were unreservedly positive, 4 very positive although emphasising some critical issues, 3 were either reticent or uninformed. The same figures for their union counterparts accounted for 2 unreservedly positive, 1 positive but critical, 2 quite strongly critical, 5 controversial or ambivalent, 1 reticent reactions.

changes. Such changes included a safer working environment (NCMV representing the Flemish SMEs in Belgium); more demanding and more performance-oriented systems, increased responsibility, more diversified/less monotonous tasks leading to higher work satisfaction (BDA in Germany, Confindustria and Assicredito in Italy, all employers' organisations in Finland); a better remuneration complementing change in working environment (DA in Denmark); a more democratic organisation aiming at utilising a wider range of employee skills (IBEC in Ireland); an enhanced two-way communication combined to better working conditions due to technological change (French employers' organisations, CBI in the UK, Fabrimetal in Belgium); an increased information which should facilitate the positive integration of the workers within the company (CIP in Portugal); the combination of high productivity and high job satisfaction (SAF in Sweden); and finally the possibility of linking together private interests and professional requirements (Banking Employer Association in Germany).

We might distinguish therefore between cases where the main emphasis was on the material amelioration of working conditions and environment, cases where the emphasis was more on communication, information, the greater possibility of having a say in one's own job, and cases where the emphasis lay fundamentally on new social values as enhanced responsibility and increased autonomy in the performance of one's own task or of the group's one belongs to. In all cases it was expected that better motivation and a higher job satisfaction would be the positive social outcome.

A few more critical considerations were added, however. There were those indeed who emphasised that the new systems were more demanding than the old ones, requiring "a commitment to change and an ability to live with some confusion" (O'Kelly, 1994: 30), as well as an ability to assume responsibilities, which were not to be considered as a matter of course. Although in some cases this was seen as a problem "only for those who do not really want to work or are not able to accept responsibility" (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 62), it was stressed in others that DP could improve the quality of working life only if associated with widespread training, increased competences as well as better pay (Van der Meché et al., 1994: 22-3).

For their part the trade union representatives disclosed⁵⁹ a much more controversial view of the matter. With only two exceptions⁵⁹, most employee organisations maintained that DP had an ambivalent impact on working conditions and quality of working life. While still others expressed a thoroughly critical and problematical appreciation of the issue.

On the one hand, many trade union representatives emphasised in fact the positive outcome of DP, leading to increased autonomy, to more interesting,

⁵⁹ See for instance the trade union representatives from Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Sweden.

enriched and challenging work, paid more satisfactorily, favouring social contacts, within a better, safer, less hierarchical environment and improved ergonomic conditions (as emphasised by interviewees from Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland). At the opposite end, an even larger majority⁶⁰ of respondents quoted a long list of negative effects.

Such negative effects included social consequences as well as consequences affecting working conditions. Among the former, special emphasis was put on the segmentation of the workforce between those who are positively affected by DP programmes and those who are marginalised because of their inability to participate in them (as a consequence of structural reasons as well as of health or aptitude). Others, moreover, strongly stressed the deterioration of social fundamental values, resulting from the increasing individualism and the decreasing solidarity favoured by DP practices. With respect to the latter effects (i.e. the negative consequences on working conditions), criticism was raised on the deterioration of working conditions resulting from increased stress, work intensification and social pressure; on the greater risks of accidents, therefore, as well as on insufficient change in the traditional supervision; on the loss of free time (especially in regard of quality circles) and on the dangers of self-exploitation.

DP programmes appeared to be indeed a problem for lower performance workers (it was stressed by DGB in Germany), since such practices are likely to act as a selective factor, which will contribute to the division between those - a minority - who work in more complex, challenging and gratifying environments and those - the majority - who, for any reason, are excluded from them (it was emphasised by representatives from the French, the Portuguese and the Italian⁶¹ unions). Why should workers be enthusiastic about the rhetoric of commitment culture (it was the sceptical comment from a TUC representative in the UK), when the new schemes were most likely imposed on often over-stretched, underpaid workers? In the view of the Dutch trade unions, it should be kept in mind that not every productive process might be realistically reorganised in ways where increased DP corresponded to more job satisfaction; and that, moreover, DP might lead *at the same time* to more interesting work and to increased stress, and might produce divisions not simply between more favoured participants and non-participants, but between those who saw their task enriched and those who had theirs *impoverished*. Still, although co-operation and the achievement of a

⁶⁰ In fact, there were trade union representatives who focused only, or mainly, on the negative consequences of the DP programmes, as in the case of most British organisations, or of the central organisation in the UK.

⁶¹ In the case of the Italian respondents it was emphasised, however, that while only a minority of those affected by DP would benefit from less stress and from more satisfying work, more workers would enjoy less physical effort and better ergonomic conditions in any case (see also Bonazzi, 1993).

positive social climate were emphasised with DP, programmes such as the 'search for excellence' led on the contrary, according to representatives of the trade unions in Portugal, to an individualisation of social relationships, which were negative for the efficiency of the companies in the long run.

Most trade union respondents therefore insisted on the need for a revision and a new specification of the terms of employment, to reflect the changed circumstances, as well as on the need for a new definition of the role of works councils and of the trade unions themselves. We shall now briefly deal with the first topic, while the second will be developed in a subsequent paragraph.

6. 3 The Impact of DP: Organisational Effects

Turning now to the impact of DP on human resource development and training, and more generally to the organisational change needed for DP to be effective, similar to what has been illustrated in the previous paragraph, the appreciation of the trade union representatives on the topic tended to be much more critical than their employers' organisation counterparts⁶². The main difference from the arguments discussed so far concerned however the much more prescriptive and normative orientation of the respondents on this issue with respect to the other.

Such a prescriptive orientation, by which the respondents tended to give their opinion more on the ground of their views and expectations about the ways the performance of the organisations might be improved rather than of real experience, characterised the positions not only, as expected, of the trade union representatives, but also of the employers' organisations. As a matter of fact - it was argued by representatives of the latter in Germany - DP presupposes a minimum of *social competences* on the part of the employees in order to be able to work in a group: but while this can be taken for granted within some contexts, as in the banking sector, it *has to be created* in others.

A full agenda from the point of view of management for this new organisational need was neatly set down by representatives of the employers' organisations in France: within a broader perspective of human resource development, efforts had to be made, firstly, to invest in specific training, secondly, to make better use of all existing/enhanced competences, and thirdly, to devise new roles for those crucial positions within the organisations whose traditional role was to be highly affected by change and which most likely were in the condition of facilitating/resisting it, as in case of the middle management. Similarly, the employers' organisation representatives in Finland focused their attention on human resource development and training, which were to be seen not simply as an effect but rather as a prerequisite for the successful introduction

⁶² See tabb. 4c, 5c, 6c in the Annexes.

of DP schemes and innovation. Moreover, even within a context of traditionally limited attention to the training of their employees on the part of the employers as in the UK, representatives from the employers' organisation in metalworking in this country acknowledged that training was becoming essential for introducing cellular manufacturing and team working: so that it could no longer be considered an optional extra. Similar views were held by the employers' representatives in other countries, as in Portugal, in Belgium, in the Netherlands, in Austria, in Luxembourg.

Thus, it is because it was seen by the employers' organisations as a basic requirement and as a prerequisite for any successful change, that the topic of adequate training, to be offered both to managerial and supervising staff and to all employees involved, appeared to be a most crucial issue for both sides. At least in some countries, like Germany, Portugal and the UK, the partners held however contrasting opinions about the characters that such training should assume. While the employers' organisation representatives seemed more interested in focusing their attention on the need for rather - and increasingly more - specific, decentralised, specialised and dedicated programmes to be implemented in order to increase the efficiency of the organisations according to circumstances, their trade union counterparts were clearly in favour of more general, longer, un-specific and much more widespread initiatives, to be offered not only to the core workers, immediately involved in the DP programmes, but also to the others, i.e. to the more peripheral ones. Thus, more than as an instrument for short-term re-adaptation and change, training was seen by the trade union representatives as a means of counterbalancing in a broader perspective the spontaneous tendency of DP-related transformations to produce those segmentation and unfair divisions of the workforce which were considered, as shown in the previous paragraph, as the worst social effects of current organisational change. Many trade union respondents appeared to be rather pessimistic, however, about the real possibility that such an approach, by which in their opinion virtuous effects were to be expected for the improved efficiency of the enterprises as well as for the amelioration of the employees' terms of employment, might be successful.

Similarly, rather sceptical views sometimes emerged with respect to the other conditions considered fundamental by the trade unions for the successful implementation of DP: namely the recognition of higher qualifications to DP-involved employees and the revision of traditional career paths within the organisations, as well as the elaboration of new pay systems. In any event, according to the opinions of trade union representatives from many countries, including Germany, Finland, Italy, these topics were becoming, or had already become (as in Denmark), the terrain for new initiatives in the field of collective bargaining and industrial relations, where old rules and practices had to be revised.

It is worth emphasising finally that the need for such a new specification of the terms of employment, particularly emphasised by trade union representatives, was not necessarily to be interpreted as a mere request for improved conditions (higher qualifications, better pay, etc). At least as far as the Italian trade union representatives were concerned, instead the need for a thorough joint revision of the traditional career and qualification systems set by collective agreements was stressed, to make a real development of human resources at workplace level easier.

6.4 The Impact of DP: Effects on Representative Participation and Industrial Relations

In the light of our discussion of the social partners' assessment of economic, social and organisational effects of DP, it is rather surprising that the crucial and controversial issue of the impact of *direct* participation on *indirect* or *representative* participation, and, more generally, on consolidated industrial relations practices in workplaces, appeared finally to be viewed by our respondents with a somewhat relaxed, and sometimes co-operative, attitude⁶³

This is not to deny the existence of deep differences and contrasting views. ABVV/FGTB, one of the trade union confederations in Belgium, for instance, was very clear in considering DP as "an anti-union strategy, the new version of the old idea that workers do not need a union". Similar positions were shared by other unions: the French CGT-FO, which represented one of the most outstanding examples in this group, considered DP as "a weapon against unionism"; in Spain, especially within Comisiones Obreras, the idea that DP was to be seen as a strong challenge to representative participation, whose functions were likely to be weakened, was widespread; in Portugal, it was emphasised that DP would heavily interfere with both collective bargaining and trade union activities and rights.

In most cases, however, it seemed that the view of DP as a threat to trade unionism, which was widespread in the 1980s, had been replaced by a more pragmatic approach based on the expected possibility of their rather peaceful coexistence, or even regulated combination. The explicit idea that DP was to be seen more as complementing, rather than being alternative, to representative participation was widespread, for instance, among the employee organisations in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK with regard to companies where unions were recognised.

In fact, according to the opinions of both social partners, in practice the trade union role was rarely endangered by DP when the workforce was reasonably

⁶³ See tabb. 4c, 5c, 6c in the Annexes.

well organised. Only in a limited number of cases (in the UK and in Belgium, for instance, very marginally in Germany within the banking sector and in Italy in the early 1980s) management took advantage of change to withdraw recognition from trade unions or from other employee representatives. In France in the 1970s - in the view of a representative of the peak employers' organisation - there were companies which wanted to marginalise the trade unions; but it became clear that DP was not a substitute for social dialogue; and subsequently the perceived problem was rather union organisational weakness (Tchobanian, 1994: 37-8).

In many cases, on the contrary, the partners were quite ready to explain how direct and indirect participation had distinct, and non contrasting, roles. In Austria, for instance, it was stressed on the employer side that the two participative channels were assigned different sets of competences: direct participation was to be applicable for anything which could be individually organised (e.g. the immediate workplace), whereas indirect participation (i.e. co-determination) was to intervene either where interests of others were touched upon or where collective interests of the workforce were involved. While there were those on the union side who emphasised that works councils (i.e. representative participation) exercised a supportive function by dealing with problems arising between employees and foremen on introducing DP schemes (Flecker, 1994: 34).

According to a representative of the Belgian employers' organisation VBO/FEB, direct and indirect participation had little in common, since the former originated on the shop floor to deal with practical and technical problems, while the latter, involving contact between the parties, evolved around other subjects. Similarly, the Christian trade union confederation ACV/CSC emphasised that DP stood for more communication, and that therefore it would help in finding solutions to minor problems (Albertijn, 1994: 14 ff.). In the view of the employers' organisation NCW in the Netherlands, there was no conflict between the two ways of participation, since representative participation dealt with the allocation of power and earnings, while direct participation was concerned with production. On the other side, a representative of the Dutch Dienstendbond FNV stated that the representative form of participation, i.e. the works council, had to look after the long term interests of companies, while DP might encourage short term interests, and that therefore the works council had to protect the companies from the short term interests of their employees gathered in groups: thus reversing a rather consolidated contrary view of the matter (Van der Meché et al. 1994: 13). According to a representative of the employers' organisation in metalworking in Portugal, there was no relationship between the new practices and collective bargaining, since the former was related to innovation within individual enterprises (Cristóvam, 1994: 32-3).

Certainly, not all the distinctions which were raised would be agreed upon by the organisations of the other side. Yet, they are indicative of attempts to find

reasons and ways to account for and to settle a controversial matter. Significantly, with the only notable exception of Portugal, the partners, and especially the trade unions, in only a few cases indicated explicitly undesired change which was taking place as a consequence of DP and/or matters on which there had been open conflict between the two ways of tackling issues. According to a respondent of the peak trade union organisation in Austria - who observed that as a consequence of DP the works councils were assuming a "moderatorship role" - contradictions between direct and representative participation arose only where the flexibility of the individual workplace-oriented negotiation of isolated questions might come into conflict with standard collective agreements (Flecker, 1994: 41). Problems for the trade unions might arise, in the view of a representative of the Belgian employers, since there were some topics which were matters for both direct and indirect participation; although the ways the two channels approached matters were wholly different (Albertijn, 1994: 14). According to a representative from the Irish trade union confederation, as a consequence of successful operation of DP, 90% of the issues traditionally dealt with through collective bargaining were expected to shift into the participative arena - which was not considered a negative development (O'Kelly, 1994: 31).

By contrast, in Portugal, particularly within the metalworking industry, the two sides appeared much more inspired by conflictual attitudes and understanding. On the employer side it was in fact maintained that DP would reduce the scope of sectorial collective bargaining, bringing new issues for a decentralised negotiation, so that the unions were increasingly requested to re-adapt their practices to be able to negotiate the new topics (such as programmes of work rationalisation and human resource development). While on the part of the trade unions, as previously observed, it was rather strongly emphasised that DP would heavily interfere with both collective bargaining and trade union activities and rights. On the first issue it was argued that under DP arrangements, which were significantly widespread within multinational foreign-owned companies that were not respecting the host country's industrial relations tradition, the constitutional principle of "equal pay for equal job" was being infringed; that informal direct understandings with individual workers were being established; that arbitrary wage differentiations within teams were being adopted. With regard to the second issue, emphasis was put on the negative impact of the new forms of organisation of work on representative participation, since teamworking interfered with the trade union activities at the workplace level, and the information and communication programmes were limiting the representative rights of the trade unions (Cristóvam, 1994).

At least according to our findings, this case represented quite an exception. Similarly, only in a few situations the employers' organisations (e.g. Gesamtmetall in Germany) thought it necessary to emphasise, as far as the regulation of DP in workplaces was concerned, that DP was part of personnel management and staff planning: in other words a corporate right which in

principle was not to be questioned, or limited through a collective bargaining process which would impose rigid solutions on a topic which instead required flexible ones⁶⁴.

There were numerous cases on the contrary (e.g. in the Scandinavian countries⁶⁵, in Austria, in Germany itself, in Luxembourg, in France with respect to the *expression groups*, and even in Belgium, and in Italy since the mid-1980s) where the introduction of DP appeared to have taken place with the approval (either informally given or formally negotiated) of the works councils or of the trade unions. As it was put by a Belgian employer representative in metalworking, “a good understanding with trade unions is crucial to the success of any participation scheme. A company cannot introduce DP without the support of its unions” (Albertijn, 1994: 14). Similarly, according to the opinion of a German employer representative in banking, “with the works council on board, it will be easier to implement. Direct participation would not be introduced against the wishes of the works councils, as this would put a severe strain on implementation”⁶⁶ (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 48-9).

Thus, in many cases the relatively slow diffusion of DP was seen by trade union representatives as offering opportunities, on the one hand, for distinguishing competences and prerogatives of the new participative practices with respect to established representative channels, possibly through negotiation or co-determination, as we have seen, and, on the other, to develop a new more efficient representative strategy involving closer relationships with employees in a period of great change.

From this point of view, the comments of a representative from the German IG Metall, were particularly enlightening. The interviewee observed that both the works councils and the middle management tended to be disturbed by some of the developments in DP, which often seem to threaten their mediatory position by allowing employees direct access to central management; but that experience proved that DP could have positive effects on union representation when works councils were strong, whereas it could have negative effects when they were weak. The trade union was therefore trying to reinforce the position of employee representative bodies by offering training to equip their members to handle

⁶⁴ Other cases were found in Austria (banking sector) and in Spain (banking and metalworking).

⁶⁵ In Denmark and in Finland the introduction of DP usually took place through the cooperation procedures.

⁶⁶ In fact, according to their trade union counterpart, DP was in practice being introduced through works agreements from an opening clause established in the sectorial collective agreement. It has to be emphasised that this applied however to banking, where the typical form of DP was that of time-autonomous work groups. In other industries it was likely that the situation differed, since the peak employers' organisation, as well as most of its associated federations opposed the introduction of DP through works agreements. But see also Müller-Jentsch and Sperling (1995).

change. As a consequence of the new trade union efforts, the majority of the rank-and-file and trade union officials were now in favour, for instance, of direct elections of work group spokespersons, rather than insisting they be under the control of the works councillors; under this arrangement, the respective roles were clearer: the spokespersons were entitled to represent their group and not the union, while the union had to be attractive by itself and not to maintain its position through compulsory measures. Successful examples of companies where team working had been practised with a positive combination of representative and direct participation were given (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 25-6).

That, in the end, it was necessary for the unions themselves to undergo substantial change to meet the new developments, and/or that a reform of traditional industrial relations practices in workplaces to reflect the changed circumstances had to take place, recurred in many other cases, although generally much less explicitly.

In conclusion, a rather unexpected positive influence either of indirect upon direct or, viceversa, of direct upon indirect participation practices, and even of both, was sometimes observed. As we have seen, representative participation was supposed by many respondents - and not only from the union side - to exercise supportive functions in the implementation of DP: by helping reduce resistance to change, by dealing with problems arising between employees and foremen, by guaranteeing that all personnel groups would be safeguarded and information to all employees would be more easily passed (Finland). In other words, it was in some cases discovered that the works councils and the trade unions might play a fundamental role in the achievement of the social requisites (smooth communication, trust, equity) the more and more fundamental for the successful establishment of DP. Significantly there were employer representatives who spoke of a *learning process* on the topic.

Conversely, it was found - and not solely from the employer side - that direct participation might have a positive influence on industrial relations, collective bargaining, and the role of works councils and trade unions: by helping to re-define and extend the issues which needed to be dealt with collectively; by favouring an intensification/decentralisation of collective bargaining the unions had not been able to achieve themselves (France); by improving the quality of information available to works councils, thus resulting in "a chance for better quality co-determination" (Austria, see Flecker, 1994: 39). In other words, it was sometimes discovered that DP might turn from being a fundamental threat into an opportunity for the renewal of industrial relations.

At least in these more favourable cases, therefore, the issue of the relationship between direct and indirect participation appeared to become a question of distinguishing their respective roles. On this issue, the employers'organisation representatives, who were less likely to see a contradiction between the two forms of participation, and who in some cases even considered them as equivalent, as we saw at the beginning of our

discussion, seemed to be particularly interested. Whether the elaboration of a functional distinction would lead to an aseptyc separation of spheres of influence or to some kind of new interaction - and not only when introducing the programmes - was however an entirely open matter.

7 Activities and Prospects

In the preceding chapters it has been shown that the opinions of the social partners in Europe on the possible virtues of DP are heterogeneous, complex, and by no means simplistic. The analysis suggested that a less problematic view tended to be more prevalent where the new participative programmes had not yet been extensively introduced; while nobody concealed existing difficulties where some experience had been accumulated. At the same time, however, a sort of 'learning process' was observed, so that, in certain conditions, new and unexpected perspectives seemed to be perceived where these programmes had been experimented with for a longer time.

We shall now complete our overview by taking into consideration and discussing, on the one side, the initiatives and the activities which the social partners did promote or were going to promote, or in which they had been or were being involved, regarding our subject, and, on the other side, their expectations and prospects for the future.

The first topic (focusing upon the initiatives and activities undertaken by the partners) will add elements to the partners' assessment of the importance of the new participative programmes; the second (focusing on their interaction around DP-related issues) will deal with the characters of the different industrial relations systems; the third will lead us to the conclusion of our investigation.

7.1 Past and Present Initiatives on DP

Did the social partners take initiatives in the field of employee direct participation-related issues? Are they going to take any in the near future? These questions are meaningful since, as we know, our respondents are representatives of the trade unions and of the employers' organisations at the central or national level. It was by no means necessary, therefore, that they considered it relevant to be directly involved in a matter whose practical relevance regards workplaces.

According to our findings, not all the organisations considered had in fact engaged in specific activities on the topic⁶⁷. This was most clear with respect to the banking sector, where hardly any initiatives on DP had been taken by the social partners. Reasons for this lack of initiative were provided by social partner representatives in Finland, who explained that the organisations in the financial sector were endowed with a limited staff and could focus only at times on the topic. Moreover, information, training and activities on DP were produced within the banks themselves (i.e. where the new participative practices are immediately relevant). Instructions and applications were provided by the representative

⁶⁷ See tabb. 7a, 8a, 9a in the Annexes.

organisations of both sides, on application of the Co-operation Act⁶⁸ (Mikola-Lahnammi and Alasoini, 1994: 17). However, it is likely that similar considerations could have a more general validity elsewhere. In a few other situations, finally, discussions and the delivery of information about DP within training programmes were simply mentioned.

More than a general tendency, this meagre picture is to be interpreted as a further confirmation of the specific significance of the new participative programmes for the services sector, and for banking in particular. As far as the peak organisations and those in metalworking were concerned, the scenario in fact appeared to be quite different. With only two or three exceptions⁶⁹, in all countries both social partners, or at least one of them, had engaged in some activities regarding DP in the past and most of them had further initiatives on their agenda.

Many differences could however be observed, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. From a quantitative point of view, only in a limited number of cases had the activities undertaken in the past related to DP been numerous (e.g. in France, in Denmark), while in the majority of cases the partners had engaged in quite a few initiatives.

As to the kind of these initiatives, a tentative list ordered according to their relative frequency, from the most to the least recurrent, would include:

i - the organisation of *discussions*, seminars, conferences on DP and related topics (nearly all organisations);

ii - *publication* of articles, papers, books, educational material, booklets on DP, primarily aiming at the information of members (nearly all organisations);

iii - *training* activities and programmes for the organisations affiliated and/or individual members, where DP and related topics had become an important issue (e.g. employers' organisations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland; trade unions in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, France, the Netherlands);

iv - provision of *advice*, audit service, definition of general criteria for the assessment of experiments and proposals, designed for members (e.g. employers' organisations in Austria, the UK, Greece, Finland; trade unions in Austria, Ireland, Finland);

v - *research and study* activities on DP (e.g. employers' organisations in the Netherlands and Sweden; trade unions in Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden);

vi - elaboration of *proposals for changing* the existing regulation on the matter

⁶⁸As previously explained (see chap. 4), the Co-operation Act (1979) is the main framework reference for industrial relations in workplaces in Finland. It contains provisions on DP.

⁶⁹Examples included very different cases: the social partners' organisations in metalworking in Greece and Portugal, where the experience of DP was very limited, as well as the German employer peak organisation, whose representative explained that they did not take any initiative on the subject, since it was not their function.

(e.g. employers' organisations in France; trade unions in Germany, Denmark, Portugal);

vii - elaboration of *political resolutions* (e.g. employers' organisations in the UK; trade unions in Germany, Denmark);

viii - diffusion/*disseminating activities* (e.g. employers' organisations in France, in the UK, Denmark, trade unions in Italy);

ix - elaboration and implementation of comprehensive *programmes for the diffusion* and experimentation of DP (e.g. employers' organisations and trade unions in Denmark).

The past behaviour of the partners differed with regard to the importance assigned to, or the interest shown in, these activities, which were only partially revealed by the amount and the kind of their involvement. Focusing our attention on the positions of the central/ peak organisations, there were cases where the topic had remained on the whole marginal within the overall activities of the organisations (i.e. the employers' organisations in Austria, in Greece, in Belgium with regard to VBO/FEB; and the trade union confederations in Belgium⁷⁰, in Greece, in Portugal); cases where such topics had been losing importance over time (as in Sweden); cases on the contrary where the initiatives regarding DP and related topics had been developing within a context of increasing or steady interest and expectations (as in France, but with exceptions on the trade union side; in the UK, in Italy⁷¹, in the Netherlands, in Finland, and even more so in Denmark and in Germany⁷¹).

Turning to current and prospective activities, our findings seemed to disclose an even greater differentiation in the degree and the kind of initiative of the social partner organisations regarding DP in the various countries, partly due to the different impact of the recession which was affecting the European economy at the time of the investigation⁷². In fact, while many of the social partner organisations were going on along already experimented patterns, a new tendency emerged leading to a clearer polarisation between cases where the topic was quickly losing importance in front of the social consequences of the economic crisis, and cases where it was on the contrary gaining prominence in the concrete activity of the organisations.

Good examples of the observed tendency towards a decreasing initiative of the social partners on DP and related topics were provided by the cases of Spain,

⁷⁰ In this country a pronounced rise in trade union interest in DP had been recorded in the early 1980s, when the worker organisations became alarmed by the diffusion of quality circles, similarly to what was then happening in many other countries in Europe. Soon the topic lost practical importance and the activities regarding it became marginal. As discussed previously, however, the issue is still crucial in the political debate of the confederations, i.e. in terms of principle.

As previously specified, in this country this did not apply though to the peak employer confederation.

⁷² See tabb. 7b, 8b, 9b in the Annexes.

where the issue was clearly considered of secondary importance face to the economic crisis⁷³, of France, where all partners, although with different emphasis, seemed to borrow arguments from the new economic difficulties to lessen their attention to a topic which had been of a high priority in the 1980s, of Sweden, where similarly the economic pressure was a good motive for all organisations to open a debate on possible new directions for radical forms of delegating responsibilities to the employees and increasing efficiency and performance of companies.

At the other extreme, cases of increased attention and activities, at least on the part of one of the partners, were those of Denmark, Belgium, and Ireland. In the first country, after the success of a quite extraordinary joint programme to disseminate the new ideas and show how they could function in practice (i.e. 'The Club of Good Examples' project of 1989-1992), *new joint initiatives* were being undertaken, aiming at both continuing with the disseminating activities, which were given greater permanency, and working out agreed criteria and procedures for the 'strategic development of employee qualifications' (Lund, 1994: 19).

Recently new activities have been promoted by the trade in Belgium unions (especially in the metal sector). On the one hand this has been to *develop an 'internal code'*, where clear rules and principles on DP-related issues had to be set, hopefully to prepare future collective bargaining on the matter (CCMB/CCMB affiliated to the Christian confederation), and on the other to organise *plans to follow-up the impact* of recent training initiative on teamwork (CMB/CMB, affiliated to the socialist confederation) (Albertijn, 1994: 16-7).

In Ireland, a network of enterprises already involved in the implementation of DP, which could serve as good practical examples for others, was being organised (O'Kelly, 1994: 33). This was as a consequence of the increasing commitment of the employers' central organisation to the diffusion of participative programmes.

7.2 Contacts and Agreements Between the Partners

The initiative and the activities of the social partners on DP can be of an interactive nature. In other terms they can be the outcome of behaviour where the existence and the positions of the other side are explicitly taken into consideration and looked after. Therefore, such joint initiatives are particularly meaningful for assessing the general climate of industrial relations within the countries considered, as well as useful for adding further elements to the

⁷³ Similarly, in Portugal the employer association were of the opinion that the topic should receive more attention, but that this would not occur in their country before the late 1990s, when a period of increased economic welfare was anticipated.

understanding of the importance accorded to DP as such by the social partners. For this same reason, however, we should expect that such activities were, and are, less frequent than the initiatives autonomously undertaken by each side⁷⁴.

In fact, no initiatives involving both sides were mentioned in a group of cases, namely Belgium, Spain, Greece, Portugal, where, as has been shown, DP not only saw a limited diffusion, but the relationships between (and sometimes within) the parties were characterised by a rather conflictual orientation, at least with respect to our topic. However, in most other cases the activities where both sides were brought together were few and of limited scope. Few were indeed situations wherein the social partners had jointly developed far-reaching initiatives on the new participative practices.

In Austria, where there is a strong tradition of co-operation between the two sides in advanced training institutions, the topic of DP had been only marginally taken into consideration jointly. In metalworking however a joint working group on a DP-related topic has recently been formed (Flecker, 1994: 48). In Ireland, the most important initiative in the field (at least at the central level) was the previously mentioned FIE-ICTU Joint Declaration (1991), i.e. a fundamental policy statement setting a general framework for the behaviour of the parties within a voluntarist approach (O'Kelly, 1994: 32). In France, within a framework of state sponsored projects, the social partners, although with the notable exception of some trade unions (especially of CGT), entered a campaign of 'negotiated modernisation' in the late 1980s, which led to the signature of many collective agreements in larger companies (Tchobanian, 1994: 39-41). Few cases of joint events regarding DP took place in the UK: however in 1993 a conference on 'Future of manufacturing' was jointly sponsored by the social partners in metalworking (Geary et al., 1994: 18). In Italy, since the mid-1980s quite a number of plant-level collective agreements on different forms of participation have been reached, while informal contacts between the partners on the topic in the workplace, but also at the national, level developed. Finally the previously mentioned tripartite agreement of July 1993 opened a new perspective for the co-operation of the partners in participative issues (Carrieri, 1994: 20). In Sweden, joint initiatives in the field of study and publications about significant experiments of DP (e.g. the Volvo-Kalmar experiment) were mentioned (Tollhagen, 1994: 44).

In Finland, within a centralised legal framework whereby, as mentioned earlier, the general rules for the co-operation between the social partners were set, a recent tendency has been observed allowing for the definition of decentralised collective agreements by which DP-related matters could be jointly dealt with. In metalworking a practice of co-operation between the two sides in the field of training and information about DP was further illustrated: according to our respondents, the employers were making extensive use of the training

⁷⁴ Sometimes publicly sponsored programmes were however launched (Latniak, 1995).

centre of the trade unions, since they had found that employees were more receptive to training arranged by their union (Mikola-Lahnamäki and Alasoini, 1994: 17).

In the Netherlands, in the late 1980s, within a longer tradition of experiments in '*werkoverleg*', the COB-SER experiments with autonomous work groups had been an initiative in which both sides had co-operated. In metalworking, a further joint initiative was the development of common projects for the improvement of quality of work, which led to the instalment of a bipartite commission by the council for the metal industry through which all the social partners of this sector co-operate (Van der Meché et al., 1994: 23-24).

In Germany, although neither joint declarations nor joint conferences or workshops occurred, frequent contacts between the social partners on DP-related issues were reported to take place indirectly via the "social dialogue" within the so-called platform organisations; many direct contacts of an informal nature were moreover cited at the sectorial level, and between experts of both sides who met frequently at conferences. In the banking sector, with an umbrella agreement norms had been set requiring works agreements for the introduction of time autonomous team working (Jacobi and Hassel, 1993: 28-9; 49-50).

In Denmark, within the long tradition of co-operation between the social partners, often referred to in the text, an increased importance of the two peak organisations' joint initiatives in the field of DP has been recorded since the mid-1980s. Since then, both sides have been working to joint programmes, devoted to the promotion of quality and to the experimentation of new forms of management within enterprises. Such programmes included the diffusion of the best results through joint conferences, forums and the like, in which representatives of both sides from successful participative companies could illustrate and discuss their experience. Recently, new joint initiatives (i.e. the establishment of a Joint Council) have been recorded in the banking sector (Lund, 1994: 17-20).

7.3 Prospects for the Future

In conclusion, what were the social partners' long-term expectations about DP? Were all of them looking at the new participative programmes as a necessary development for the future?

From this point of view our overview disclosed an uneven picture once again, although the idea of the increasing importance of the topic was recurrent.

This was not the case, as should be clear by now, of the organisations of both sides in Belgium (with the exception of the employers' organisation NCMV)⁷⁵,

⁷⁵ This organisation, which, as we know, represents the Flemish SMEs, did on the contrary expect DP to be more and more important. Reasons were the complexity of modern

where increased interest in DP was not expected. Nor was it the case in France, where all the social partners organisations - although deeply divided on principle - shared the common view that the issue of DP was going to be less important than in the past. In the UK, the trade union representatives held a rather sceptical opinion that things in general would continue much as they have done. Whereas the parties' representatives did not express a clear opinion of the topic in either Greece or Spain.

In all other cases there were expectations that DP would become more widespread, although these opinions were accompanied by mixed feelings. For instance, the social partners in Portugal saw the expected trend as an irreversible tendency, which was to develop as a matter of course, independently from the wishes of the organisations involved. Whereas the trend was cautiously welcomed by the employer side, and looked at with much more concern by their trade union counterparts.

At the other extreme, in Germany the trade union concern regarded the possibility that DP might be abandoned after the recession, thus revealing a very different, non-evolutionary approach to the matter. Moreover, especially in the banking sector, where DP had a narrow empirical basis, both partners seemed to share a high positive interest in the development of the programmes.

Most other positions were somewhere in the middle. In the Netherlands, for instance, there was widespread opinion among the employers that, notwithstanding the hierarchical Dutch culture and the slow diffusion of DP up to the present, a development of the participative programmes had to be expected, because of the pressure to improve the efficiency and the economic performance of companies. In Ireland it was maintained that DP was there to stay, and that it would become the norm in employee-management relations in ten years time. In Austria, Italy and Luxembourg a further diffusion of DP was somewhat anticipated. In Denmark the strenuous effort of both sides in promoting the participative programmes clearly indicated their positive expectations about their potential. In Sweden opinions varied from the high expectations of those union respondents who maintained that a "complete worker autonomy" was the challenge of the future to the scepticism of those, not only on the employer side, who believed that DP was not going to be any longer an important issue. In Finland the common opinion that DP would become increasingly widespread and consolidated in the future went hand in hand with the observation that there was still a great deal of room for improvement in productivity and efficiency, and that DP might help in ameliorating a depressed economic situation.

On the whole, the final impression received by the observer was that of a peculiar combination of optimistic orientation combined with a high level of uncertainty, and sometimes also with scepticism.

8 Conclusions

Having concluded the presentation and discussion of the social partners' opinions and points of view of the possibilities and reality of the programmes of employee direct participation in Europe, let us firstly observe whether, and to what extent, our main initial assumptions were, or were not, confirmed by the investigation, before mentioning a few final considerations. We shall therefore return to the points raised earlier (see chapter 2), trying to distinguish between expected and unexpected results, to conclude with a more arbitrary selection of relevant findings and the proposition of open problems.

8.1 Expected and unexpected results

Going back again to the issue of the general understanding of DP, we have seen that, *as expected*, the employers' organisations tended to conceive the new participative programmes as the substantial responsibility of individual employers (and of their employees), and therefore as a matter which does not require the development of official positions by the central representative organisations; their propensity not to elaborate specific strategies on the topic points indeed towards this direction. On the whole they tended as well to share a more positive and less problematic attitude than their trade union counterparts, showing a more confident expectation of the virtues of an organisational and managerial approach which was expected to bear positive fruits for all parties involved. *Unexpectedly*, however, not only did they sometimes appear to be not very well acquainted with the term 'direct participation'; but, in addition, not necessarily all of them seemed to have a clear view of direct as differentiated from representative forms of participation. Moreover, when asked to comment on a working definition of DP, which strongly emphasised the role of management in its introduction, many of the employer side respondents surprisingly criticised what was considered either an excessively "managerialist" approach, allowing excessively limited scope for employee initiative, or a partial approach, which was to be supplemented with an increased emphasis to be given to representative participation. Finally, not only economic goals but also social ones were, quite unexpectedly, spontaneously stressed by many employer representatives as reasons for introducing DP, as synthesised by someone under the aim, as it was put, of "humanising work while increasing profitability"⁷⁶.

⁷⁶ At least within the limits of a point of view, this position is an answer to the fundamental question (see chapter 2) whether DP is interpreted as being an essentially ideological project masquing greater management control and work intensification, or as providing an opportunity as well for the humanisation and democratisation of work.

Turning to the other side, on the same topics the trade unions, *as expected*, proved indeed to have a much more problematic orientation towards DP than their employer counterparts, and were particularly concerned with its possible contradictory social effects and negative consequences on collective representation. In most cases, they especially stressed therefore the need for clearer positions to be elaborated by the social partner organisations also at the central level and for the whole matter to be subject to adequate regulation. However, rather *surprisingly*, in a majority of cases the labour organisation representatives revealed a more positive orientation towards the new programmes than one would have expected. Often they even held a view of the potential of DP programmes which was quite similar to their counterparts', sometimes mentioning explicitly economic objectives as a positive complement to those they were quite obviously most interested in, i.e. the social ones. Finally, although claiming on the one hand without any exception that the introduction and operation of DP was to be jointly regulated through the channels of representative participation, contrary to expectations, they did not express on the other hand an open interest in legislating for DP.

With regard to the opinions on the experience and effects of DP, it was the employers' representatives that *as expected* shared the more optimistic view regarding the diffusion of the new programmes, although their appraisal of the existing situation tended to reveal a (negative) gap between expectations and reality. It was still the employers' representatives that, in accordance with expectations, mentioned quite a large number of facilitating factors, mostly of an external kind⁷⁷, accounting for the successful introduction of DP; and that shared a fairly positive interpretation as well of the social and organisational impact of the programmes, while minimising any possible negative effect on the existing patterns of workplace industrial relations. However, they appeared to be *more uncertain than one would have expected* with regard to the economic effects of the programmes. Moreover, even on the employers' side representative participation was unexpectedly sometimes expected to exercise supportive functions in the implementation of DP.

For their part, the trade union representatives did effectively hold, *as expected*, a rather severe opinion about the diffusion and impact of DP, especially as far as its potentially contradictory social and organisational consequences are concerned - a more positive assessment of economic effects being on the contrary widespread. *Unexpectedly*, however, although with relevant exceptions, in most cases they appeared to view the crucial and controversial issue of the impact of direct on indirect or representative participation with a quite relaxed attitude. It was even observed by trade union respondents that under positive circumstances direct participation programmes

⁷⁷ Thus adding to the social acceptability of change.

might have a positive influence on workplace industrial relations, thus turning from a fundamental threat into an opportunity for innovation.

Finally, as far as the social partners' activities on the topic and their opinions and points of view regarding the future were concerned, in many cases our findings disclosed *somewhat surprisingly* contrasting, and even contradictory, patterns of mixed feelings, where rather optimistic, or relieved, interpretations of past and current developments combined with quite cautious and wary anticipation of future trends. Which, at the end, might raise doubts about the degree of awareness and conscious acceptance of the whole matter.

Our initial assumptions, grounded on points of view widespread in the managerial literature, were then neither fully rejected nor fully confirmed. Rather, they were replaced by somewhat more intriguing pictures, where both the different interest organisations' approaches and the logics of direct and indirect participation were to be seen as strictly intertwined rather than neatly distinct. Note that, with respect to this latter relationship, we do not simply mean that the two forms of participation were seen as distinct, but not conflicting, i.e. as peacefully coexisting (as suggested by Gold, 1995: 17); but that they were even interpreted as rather reinforcing each other.

8.2 Common trends and logics of differentiation

A number of general conclusions can be finally drawn from our investigation. Firstly, that the positions of the social partners in the fifteen European countries taken into account appeared to be far less clear-cut and mutually exclusive than assumed in much current industrial relations and managerial literature.

Secondly, that on the contrary such positions were often inspired by principles of mutual acceptance and recognition, although mostly of a pragmatic kind; and that at any rate moves towards less conflictual approach and learning processes with respect to the past were in all cases mentioned.

Thirdly, that employee direct participation was substantially conceived by both sides as complementing rather than as being an alternative to representative participation.

Fourthly, that, at least since the early 1990s, even the highly critical issue of the regulation of DP was not being approached in a rigid, confrontational way, but tended to be dealt with within a more conciliatory approach, wherein the trade union representatives did not insist on formalised, rigid prescriptions, while the employers' did not simply emphasise the fundamental principle of managerial prerogatives and discretionary rights to manage.

Finally, that a considerable amount of uncertainty appeared all the same to characterise the importance attributed by the social partners to DP on their respective policy agendas and their future expectations.

On each of these dimensions our analysis has however shown also a great deal of heterogeneity and differentiation, based on structural diversities, as in the case of metalworking vs. banking sectors, and as in case of large vs. small and medium-sized companies as well; or else grounded on cultural/ideological (i.e. identity linked) cleavages.

It would certainly be appealing to draw a few final conclusions with regard to patterns of differentiation by directly linking them to the main characteristics of the industrial relations systems of the considered countries. Yet, this exercise would prove to bear meagre fruit, since the social partner representatives from organisations operating within similar institutional arrangements did not systematically disclose similar patterns of interpretations and of expectations from the introduction of new participative practices. Even employer or trade union representatives from the same general industrial relations framework, i.e. from the same country, often revealed rather different understanding and assessment of current tendencies.

More generally, our findings cannot be easily matched to a few external ‘determinants’, nor constrained into a lean table on the base of a handful of clear categories. This uneven character of the results, which makes them difficult to manage, may, at least partially, reflect the complex and heterogeneous nature of national industrial relations “systems” themselves, which are so little systematic in character, being, as they are, the outcome of numerous and contrasting processes over time⁷⁸. Moreover, it may depend as well on the fact that the investigation dealt with the opinions of people who were not directly involved in the introduction and implementation of the programmes they were asked to discuss. Uncertainty and lack of first-hand information, and therefore a predominance of imagination over facts, might indeed account for discrepancies and hesitations which were difficult to deal with.

Even more so, however, the unevenness of the results is likely to depend, as expected (see chapter 2), on the challenging co-operative nature of direct participation practices and approach themselves, which require, as emphasised earlier, a foundation in the form of reciprocity and mutual trust to demonstrate effectively their positive potential. Within this perspective, the uncertainties, and even incongruities, of the social partners’ positions are implicitly revealing of the difficulties in shifting from the traditional pluralist and conflictual industrial relations paradigm to a new one capable of fostering the development of those high-trust relationships between the parties required for DP programmes to be effective.

⁷⁸ For an interpretation of industrial relations systems in Europe in terms of growing complexity and increasing heterogeneity, see the comparative Introduction by Ferner and Hyman to their volume (1992a: I-XLIX) on industrial relations in seventeen European countries, bearing the significant subtitle *Industrial Relations in the New Europe: Seventeen Types of Ambiguity*.

8.3 Expectations for the future and open questions

In conclusion, it is the rather high degree of uncertainty and ambivalent feelings for the future of participative programmes, within a general climate that is however depicted as less problematic, and even more co-operative, than expected, which is particularly significant.

Of course, any expectation for the future is grounded on some - not necessarily conscious - interpretation of the past. On the basis of the collected evidence, we might indeed conclude our discussion by saying that expected trends for the future revealed, at the time of the investigation, four main interpretative views. They can be labelled the *rising expectations* view, the *rise and fall* view, the *marginal interest* view, the *mature development* view.

The 'rising expectations' view is typical of cases where DP is still in its infancy and the partners, under external pressure, but facilitated by internal favourable conditions, can expect a future of successful achievements, where the problems and the difficulties deriving from the implementation of the programmes are not yet well perceived. The 'rise and fall' view is on the contrary typical of cases where DP was previously implemented in the past, within the context of high expectations about its virtues, but where not all the necessary conditions for its permanency after the fading away of the first phase of strong interest (or alarm) were present, thus facilitating a sense of failure and disillusion to emerge. The 'marginal interest' view is typical of cases where neither external pressure nor internal change have been sufficiently strong, as yet, to induce a significant revision of previous and consolidated practices, and where therefore innovation will take place occasionally, in a piecemeal fashion. The 'mature development' view is, finally, typical of those cases where DP has been introduced some time ago and is established, and where at the same time favourable conditions existed for a continuous effort on both sides to re-adapt experiences as required, devising the most suitable normative framework to make them sufficiently consolidated.

The exercise of trying to match these interpretative views with our real cases is perhaps not too difficult, although it requires some simplification of the practical experience. Thus, according to the prevailing positions of the social partners in the respective countries, the cases of Finland, Ireland, Italy might go with the rising expectations pattern; those of Belgium, and, to some extent, of France and of Sweden as well, might be matched with the rise and fall one; Greece, Portugal, Spain, and perhaps the UK too⁷⁹, might be grouped under the marginal interest label; while the others, but in its clearest way especially the Danish one, might be considered examples of mature development. However, it

⁷⁹ In fact this case should be placed somewhat in the middle between the first and this third pattern.

is perhaps even more important to stress here again that all these views, although with the partial exception of the last one (i.e. of mature development pattern) in its purest form, were also different ways of approaching uncertainty, sometimes combined with scepticism.

That the future appears uncertain is stating of the obvious. In this case, however, it does make sense to emphasise the feeling of uncertainty about the possible developments of DP shared in the end by all our respondents, independently of differences in terms of their experiences, ideologies, or interests. The conclusion that the social partners are uncertain is meaningful because it goes against the common-sense and conventional expectations of a rhetorical declaration of faith in the intrinsic virtues of participation.

Our overview has demonstrated that on the contrary the central actors of industrial relations in Europe have developed a critical, and differentiated, view of DP. DP is not simply seen as a set of programmes and practices, which may prove to be an easy way to obtain economic and/or social benefits in the short term. Rather it is considered as something with considerable potential, but which requires investments, attention, time, cultural change, and a measure of co-operation, or at least interaction, between the social partners together with a (lean) normative framework, if it is to bear fruit in the long term.

This does not mean, of course, that all the organisations involved would be interested in this kind of long-term uncertain investment. In the end, the questions which remained open regarded precisely the conditions at which such an investment would appear to be convenient. Which brings us back to the question of the conditions at which high trust relationships and reciprocity are likely to develop, and have the chance to become sufficiently consolidated, so as to overcome the limits of mere authority relationships in the regulation of complex and highly vulnerable organisations (Ouchi, 1980).

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ANNEXES

Annex 1

Schedule of Questions

A What is DP and how to consider it

1. DP is subject to different interpretations. What does the organisation mean by DP? Is there an 'official' position/definition?
2. What is the reaction of the organisation to the definition of DP which is currently under discussion within the scientific co-ordinating group of the European Foundation? [to be discussed at end of interview]
3. DP is not a single practice or programme, but may assume different forms. Is there an 'official'/'unofficial' position on the following:
 - a) semi-autonomous work groups and team working;
 - b) quality circles and/or other ways to involve employees in the improvement of quality and production on a voluntary basis (e.g. suggestion campaigns);
 - c) TQM, permanent improvement programmes, and/or other managerial approaches intended to obtain the commitment of all the organisation's members on the goal of production;
 - d) direct employee communication programmes;
 - e) individual task enlargement programmes or similar;
 - f) other forms [to be specified].
4. Is there an internal debate in the organisation on DP in general and on its different forms? What are the different positions? To which logic/concern/interest differentiation do they correspond?
5. Has the importance of DP on the organisation's policy agenda changed in the last 5 years and, if so, why? Or is it the same as it was about 5 years ago?
6. What is the organisation able to say about the positions of the other social partners on DP? Is it aware of any 'official'/'unofficial' positions and internal debates and the interests involved? Are these positions/debates/interests seen to be very different from those of the organisation? Has the importance of DP (and its different forms) on their policy agendas changed in the last 5 years etc. and is it greater/more limited than their own?

B. Assessment

1. What is the judgement about the diffusion of different DP programmes/practices? Who took the initiative to introduce them and why?

2. What factors are thought to facilitate/hinder the introduction (and eventually the success) of different programmes/practices?
3. What is known about the reactions of employees (including first-line and middle managers) and their representatives to the introduction of DP programmes/practices?
4. What are the views on the impact of different DP programmes/practices on the following:
 - a) the economic performance of companies and improving the quality of production;
 - b) the quality of life and working conditions;
 - c) training and human resource development; and
 - d) qualifications and payment levels?
5. What is the organisation's view on the impact of the introduction of the various DP programmes/practices on existing arrangements for indirect involvement/participation, i.e. on representative participation and on traditional patterns of workplace industrial relations?

For example:

- a) have the different forms [which?] of DP restricted the scope of collective bargaining and the range of matters traditionally dealt with by workplace representatives?
 - b) have the different forms of DP [which?] and the practices of indirect (representative) participation been in conflict with each other?
 - c) is it the experience that the different forms of DP (or at least some of them) and the practices of representative participation are strictly interconnected?
 - d) is it the experience that the existing practices of representative participation tend to be prerequisite for the success of DP programmes [examples].
6. After the introduction/experimentation/consolidation of the different forms [which?] of DP, did the initial positions of the other partner(s) change? How? Why?
 7. Did the introduction of DP programmes lead to the establishment of new rules in the field of labour/industrial relations (legislation, collective agreements, informal understandings, etc.)?
 8. Consider cases of 'success' and of 'failure'. For each example: what are the indicators of success/failure? What are the reasons for these outcomes?
 9. Are there established contacts with the other social partners (employers/trade unions) to discuss these matters?

For instance:

- a) informal talks [on which subjects?];
- b) joint conferences, workshops [how many, when, on which subjects; references];
- c) agreements, joint statements [collect documentation].

C. Activities and Perspectives

1. Has the organisation taken initiatives in the past in relation to DP programmes/practices?

For instance:

- a) organising debates, discussions of the different positions; giving information to members;
- b) promoting studies and research activities;
- c) giving explicit support (or organising opposition and resistance) to DP programmes.

2. How is the degree of success/failure of past initiatives judged?

3. What initiatives (or what changes in existing initiatives) has the organisation planned for the 1990s (in terms of informing members, research activities, direct intervention, etc.)?

4. On the grounds of past experience, what does the organisation expect will happen in the field of DP in the 1990s in terms of the following?

- a) the consolidation of DP practices;
- b) the expectations and behaviour of members;
- c) the behaviour of other social partners;
- d) the performance and economic efficiency of companies;
- e) conditions of work, and the employees' skill/responsibility/satisfaction levels.

5. Which positive/negative outcomes does the organisation expect from any extension of DP programmes/practices?

6. Are there other issues/problems the organisation would like to emphasise?

7. Are there any books, publications, papers, articles, etc. (published by the organisation, or by others) which the organisation believes are particularly useful in helping to achieve a deeper understanding of DP and of participative managerial practices?

Annex 2

Synoptic Tables

Table 1a - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Cou ntry	Organisat ion	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/informal position
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,	In the first instance, DP as financial participation. Also: DP as 'co-determination' Better term: "participative management"	Agreement with given def. As a synonymous term: 'functional co-determination' As defined, DP is very important	No official position because DP is not an issue in negotiations with unions. DP is seen as members' internal affair. But it supports firms in introducing DP
	<i>Union:</i> ÖGB	In the first instance, DP as financial participation. Also: DP as 'co-determination' Better term: "participative management"	Partial agreement with given def. Employees' interest has to be stressed As defined, DP is very important	In their programme ÖGB mention both opportunities and dangers of DP. DP is not co- determination as it is granted (and eventually withdrawn) unilaterally by management.
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)	VBO: DP as a matter of individual employers NCMV: DP [in SMEs] as inherently built into work through direct communication (between employer and employee) and employee commitment.		VBO: no official position. DP is a responsibility of individual employers, while the organisation defends collective interests of members. NCMV: DP as an obvious requirement for SMEs; which has not to be formally organised (nor regulated).
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV	ACV: DP used to be positively seen as ' <i>werkoverleg</i> ' (employee involvement), or as a channel for worker expression through a meaningful job. But real recent practices permit only partial involvement: union active control is therefore needed. ABVV: DP as consensus- promoting strategy, aimed to hide the unequal balance of power between employer and employees and the need of representative democracy.		ACV: Official position [May 1990 congress]; in favour of DP as long as it is real employee involvement, which benefits both employer and employees; to achieve this guarantees have to be asked for. ABVV: Official position [November 1990 Congress]; DP condemned together with all new principles which are only meant to improve productivity. Active union involvement, extension of union rights, and a more human-centred approach to work are therefore necessary.
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	DP as the involvement of workers in the processes of work organisation; in certain areas workers should be given the opportunity to organise their workplace themselves.	Critical of the word control	No formal position. But DP is considered very important as a means of personnel management; it is not co- determination and it must be subject to management's power of disposition.

(tab. 1a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/informal position
D	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	DP as an opportunity for workers to exercise greater self-determination and self-regulation.	Critical of the word control	No formal position. But DP is considered very important as a means of influencing working conditions. It must be a subject of co-determination by the works council, while remaining independent of traditional forms of representation.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	DP as 'direct co-operation', i.e. as a method for involving workers.	Partial agreement. Although managerial initiative has to be emphasised, greater importance has to be given to representative participation.	No formal position on DP. But fundamental is the reference to the Main Agreement and the Co-operation Agreement, which set the framework of IR.
	<i>Union:</i> LO	DP as 'direct co-operation', i.e. as a method for workers to influence the organisation and quality of work.	Partial agreement. Less emphasis on managerial initiative, and more on representative participation.	No formal position on DP. But fundamental is the reference to the Main Agreement and the Co-operation Agreement, which set the framework of IR.
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE	DP is clearly distinguished from IP. DP has to be limited to protect managerial prerogatives.	Agreement with given definition. Emphasis on managerial initiative.	No official position: DP is a responsibility of individual firms. Informally, DP is considered as a potential opportunity, which should be debated.
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	In general: DP tends to be seen as IP. (But experts of both unions make clear distinctions between DP and IP). UGT: DP is also understood as a direct relationship between management and employees which takes place in workplaces.	Partial agreement with given definition. Greater importance should be given to IP.	No official/formal position on DP at the national level. Official position emerges at local level. Experts: unilateral imposition of DP and its restriction to consultative practices only have to be avoided.
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPFF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès" (EP)	Clear understanding of the term "DP", which has been used since the early 70s in France. CNPFF and in general: DP as a means for associating workers in the organisation of their work. A factor of cohesion and consensus	CNPFF: agreement with given definition, although a more comprehensive approach to the management of firms (of which DP is only a part) is now considered more important. CJD: partial agreement with given definition, since the present situation requires a better integration between DP and IP. EP: agreement with given definition, which is however seen as somehow problematic in the present situation of change.	CNPFF: Officially strong, formal support to DP until mid-80s. Afterwards, the issue is considered as sufficiently consolidated, and less crucial than others (training, employment). CJD: DP, which was promoted by the organisation since the 70s, is presently less important, as the situation requires a strong model of social dialogue, where the distinction between DP and IP becomes blurred. EP: presently the significance of DP has to be enlarged to meet with the requirements of a more reactive and cellular-like organisation of work.

(tab. 1a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/informal position
F	<p><i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC</p>	<p>FO: DP (as well as financial participation) seen as a false "social utopia", which would pretend to reduce the conflict of interests between capital and labour.</p> <p>CFTC: DP as worker participation in the elaboration of the organisation of work and in the definition of working conditions.</p> <p>CGC: DP as new social relations in workplaces (in opposition to tayloristic approach).</p> <p>CFDT: DP as a means for introducing citizenship rights within the enterprise.</p> <p>CGT: DP is seen more critically as a possibility for workers to participate in issues which are of immediate interests to them, but which is exposed to the risk of class collaboration.</p>	<p>FO: Partial agreement with given definition: DP may endanger worker health, and challenge union recognition.</p> <p>CFTC, CGC: Partial agreement with given definition. The delegation of responsibility may prove positive, but it may lead to self-exploitation; therefore it has to be combined with IP.</p> <p>CFDT: partial agreement with given definition, which is considered too restrictive. A combination of DP with IP is necessary.</p> <p>CGT: partial agreement with given definition: DP should be supported by IP to become positive, but in alternate ways to management strategies.</p>	<p>FO: Official position: DP as a product of a "participationist ideology", which is against the interests of workers and their legitimate instruments for self-defence (i.e. the labour movement and collective bargaining). Although new forms of work organisation require worker participation, such a participation is an illusion since workers cannot influence economic decisions.</p> <p>CFTC: Official position: DP, in conjunction with representative and financial participation, as a positive means to transform employees into partners within the enterprise. More critical the assessment of existing experience.</p> <p>CGC: Official position in favour of partnership within the enterprise, and therefore of DP, the implementation of which is however seen as controversial.</p> <p>CFDT: Official position in favour of DP, within a long tradition of promotion of worker participation (and of <i>autogestion</i> in the 70s). Worker expression rights have been strongly requested and actively supported by the organisation. However, the implementation of DP is often seen as a false participation.</p> <p>CGT: Officially opposed to "collaboration" between social parties, it is in favour of DP as long as it permits real worker participation in issues in which they are interested and in the new modern ways of organising production. Better terms: 'democracy', 'citizenship', 'intervention'.</p>
GB	<p><i>Employer:</i> CBI</p>	<p>'Employee involvement' is a better term than DP. Participation implies a more formal structure and a recognised process, while the aim is to ensure employees to become directly involved in the work process.</p>	<p>Partial agreement with given definition, seen as too limited and 'managerialist'.</p>	<p>No official position. A voluntarist approach is adopted. It is strongly opposed to EC regulation in this area.</p>

(tab. 1a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/informal position
GB	<i>Union:</i> TUC	DP as HRM practices currently promoted by management. To be supported as long as they contribute to union goals of improvement in quality of working life.	In general, partial agreement with given definition. The emphasis in Britain has been on 'consultative' rather than 'delegative' forms of DP.	No formal position on DP. Neither do they consider it desirable to have one. But HRM agenda is seen as more in tune with union thinking than previous short-term financial control model; as it is about people rather than money. Key issue is the relationship between DP and IP.
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	DP is understood as the same as IP.		No formal position: legal introduction of IP is informally looked with some favour (especially with reference to Health and Safety Committees).
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	DP is understood as the same as IP.	No grounded opinion.	Official position(March 1992 Congress): the union is going to promote worker participation through union representatives in any possible way. In theory, interest for forms of DP as QC.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)	Positive understanding of DP.	Agreement with definition	No official definition. IBEC has published booklets on the topic. DP seen as important for the competitiveness of Irish economy.
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	Positive understanding of DP.	Partial agreement with definition - considers it too limited as DP is only part of Employee Involvement	No official definition, ICTU has published booklets on the topic. DP seen as important for the competitiveness of Irish economy.
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	The term 'DP' is not used: better 'worker direct involvement' (especially of a consultative kind: typically QC). While "participation" in general means IP (especially information/consultation rights).		No official position: direct involvement is a matter of individual firms, which has neither to be formalised nor regulated. It is however recognised that its importance and scope have been <i>de facto</i> increasing, together with the importance of IP.

(tab. 1a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/informal position
I	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	The term 'DP' is not used: but 'worker direct involvement'. While "participation" in general means IP; it implies some degree of redistribution of power within enterprises. DP and IP are not to be conceived as the opposite of conflict. CISL: greater emphasis on an associative approach to participation, i.e. on IP; and also on 'financial participation'. CGIL: greater emphasis on employees' participation ('movement approach').		No official position. But DP is looked at favourably, as long as it is linked to IP, and benefits employees while increasing economic performance.
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. I.L., G.I.S.L.	In principle favourable to DP. DP is a matter to be decided on by individual employers.		No official position.
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	In principle unfavourable to DP.		No official position.
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW	In general, DP as 'worker involvement which is initiated by management'. AWV: DP implies participation in decisionmaking. NCW: DP as consultation or participation in decisionmaking.	Agreement with given definition.	No official position: DP is a responsibility of individual employer. AWV: informally they traditionally had and still have a high interest in DP. NCW: from an idealistic to a more pragmatic approach.
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	DP as a possibility for workers to improve quality of work.	FNV: Agreement with given definition. CNV: partial agreement: DP as an initiative of both management and union.	FNV: No official position: the issue is dealt with freely by associated unions. CNV: Formal position: DP as 'the employees' ability to control the organisation of their work'.
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP	DP as worker involvement linked to strategies to improve productivity		No official position on DP. Informally in favour of DP, at the condition of delimiting worker autonomy.
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	General view of participation, rather than DP. CGTP: participation as IP at any possible level. UGT: participation as IP, and achieved through information and consultation rights and collective bargaining.	Not in tune with given definition	No official position on DP. CGTP: presently DP practices are rare and associated to peculiar situations. UGT: in 1990 proposal of a 'Social Contract for Modernisation' (considering also DP), which was soon to be looked at as being far from reality.

(tab. 1a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/informal position
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	DP , which developed from the failure of representative democracy, implies a top-down approach, while a participation growing from bottom upward is looked for.	Disagreement with given definition, as it looks too 'managerialist'.	
	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	LO: DP as a process which should grow from within the working groups, under the assistance of the union. SIF: (for salaried workers) the already 'delegated' responsibility is a prerequisite for workers being able to perform their job. SALF: DP is good as involvement leads to better performances.	LO: Disagreement with given definition: it is 'super-tayloristic'.	No official position. But DP has to be supported by management.
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK	The term 'DP' is not used. Better: "ways of influencing one's own work", "co-determination".	Partial agreement with given definition. The emphasis on management initiative is unnecessary: employees' initiative must be encouraged. Worker influence might be extended to financial and economic matters.	No official position <i>on DP</i> . Important the Co-operation within Companies Act, which sets rules for representative participation.
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA	The term 'DP' is not used. The idea of 'participation' is associated to representation. Better: "ways of influencing one's own work", "co-determination".	Partial agreement with given definition. The emphasis on management initiative is unnecessary: employees' initiative must be encouraged. Worker influence might be extended to financial and economic matters.	No official position <i>on DP</i> . The Co-operation within Companies Act, which sets rules for representative participation is important.

Table 2a. Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks	In the first instance, DP as financial participation. Also: DP as 'co-determination' Better term: "participative management"	Agreement with given def. As a synonymous term: 'functional co-determination'. As defined, DP is very important	No official position. But DP is considered very important to motivate employees.
	<i>Union:</i> GPA	In the first instance, DP as financial participation. Also: DP as 'co-determination' Better term: "participative management"	Partial agreement with given def. Employees' interest has to be stressed As defined, DP is very important	In some publications of mid-80s a critical position is taken (DP as a psychological managerial tool for rationalisation of work).
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB	DP as a matter of the individual employer		No official position: DP is a responsibility of individual employers. The organisation defends the collective interests of members.
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK	LBC: DP used to be seen with favour as positive worker involvement. Recent practices criticised as they are used to improve mainly productivity.		LBC: Official position [1993 Congress]: from a favourable to a rather critical position. BBTK: no official position. DP is not considered of prime importance.
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	DP as "direct integration of individual employee into the company's objectives"; also "everything associated with teamwork".	Partial agreement with given definition: rather than "more control" over work situation it should be said "greater opportunities for co-organisation"	No official position: a greater emphasis on the business management standpoint of profitability and cost reduction.
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	All: "an increase in the level of individual co-determination; suitable to mature and responsible citizens".	Agreement with given definition.	No official position; a greater emphasis on the political aspect of co-determination democracy.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA	DP is seen as IP: in a strict sense DP "does not fit with the daily life of the finance sector and [...] with Danish traditions".	Partial agreement with given definition: the Danish style of management implies previous contacts with shop-stewards.	No formal position on DP (other than the general agreements on co-operation committees).
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector	DP is seen as IP: i.e. worker influence on the organisation of work taking place through representative democracy.	Partial agreement with given definition: management's initiative has to be honest and avoid manipulation.	No formal position on DP (other than the general agreements on co-operation committees).
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB	DP is clearly distinguished from IP. DP has to be limited to worker consultation, and largely confined to the sphere of production.	Agreement with given definition. Managerial initiative has to be safeguarded.	No official position: DP is a responsibility of individual firms.
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO-UGT	In general: DP tends to be seen as IP. (But experts of both unions make clear distinctions between DP and IP). FEBA-CCOO: distinguishes better between IP and DP.	Partial agreement with given definition. Greater importance should be given to IP.	No official/formal position on DP. A debate on DP and its collective regulation should be opened. Experts: unilateral imposition of DP and its restriction to consultative practices only have to be avoided.

(tab. 2a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
F	<i>Employer:</i> AFB			No formal position. DP is a matter of individual enterprises.
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC	[see the positions of peak organisations]	[see the positions of peak organisations]	[see the positions of peak organisations]
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank	Positive orientation on the widest possible involvement of the staff in the implementation of change.	Partial agreement with given definition, seen as too limited and 'managerialist'.	No programmatic approach to DP, which is however seen as very important in the implementation of change.
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU	No accepted definition, since the union presently has to deal with a situation of continuous change and not simply with DP or any other 'technique'. Growing recognition of the importance of HRM, TQM, etc.		No clear-cut position on DP, because of the basic IR structure of the industry (where there is no longer a sector agreement, or an employers organisation), and of the major process of restructuring which is taking place.
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET	According to practice and agreements, DP is understood as the same as IP.		No formal position.
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE	DP is understood as the same as IP.	No grounded opinion. But DP should be linked to IP.	Official position (last Congress): the union is going to promote in any possible way worker participation through union representatives. In theory, favourable to forms of DP as QC.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Managers in large b. groups	DP seen as a way of recognising the contributions of staff, and as a means of motivation and workforce effectiveness.	Agreement with definition	DP is important for the competitiveness of the banks in the Irish economy.
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	Positive attitude to DP. But concern that it might be used as a means to undermine its role.	Agreement with definition	No formal or informal position
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	The term 'DP' is not used: but 'worker direct involvement'. While "participation" in general means IP, and also 'financial participation'.		No official position. It is however largely recognised that the importance of both DP and IP have been <i>de facto</i> increasing.
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	The term 'DP' is not used: but 'worker direct involvement'. While "participation" in general means IP, and also 'financial participation'. It implies some degree of redistribution of power within enterprises. DP and IP are not to be conceived as the opposite of conflict.		No official position. But DP is looked at favourably, as long as it is linked to IP, and benefits employees while increasing economic performance.

(tab. 2a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL	DP is a matter of the individual employer		No official position
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	-	Agreement with proposed definition	No official position. Attitudes differ from bank to bank
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB	DP as 'Worker involvement which is initiated by management'		No official position: DP is an issue of individual enterprises.
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstendbond FNV	DP as a means of improving production and quality of work.		No official position [(especially older) members not necessarily approve it]
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]	DP as a mean of involving workers in innovation.		No official position on DP. Informally in favour of DP, at the condition of delimiting worker autonomy.
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union	Participation is information and consultation, but is also <i>autogestion</i> .		No official position. It is not important in the political agenda, as now there is no social space for DP.
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO	DP as not fully appropriate in banking, where employees are given responsibility, while decisions on working conditions have to be channelled formally.		
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)	TCO: DP as fully autonomous work-groups	TCO: Partial agreement: DP has to grow parallel to IP.	TCO: DP was actively promoted during the 60s for salaried employees.
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.	The term 'DP' is not used. Better: "ways of influencing one's own work", "co-determination".	Agreement with given definition: so defined, DP is already effective in daily routines.	No official position <i>on DP</i> . Important: the Co-operation within Companies Act, which sets rules for representative participation.
	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union	The term 'DP' is not used. The idea of 'participation' is associated to representation. Better: "ways of influencing one's own work", "co-determination".	Disagreement with given definition: so defined DP is utopian, since there is little space for delegation of responsibility; service delivering leaves no room to autonomy.	No official position <i>on DP</i> . Important: the Co-operation within Companies Act, which sets rules for representative participation.

Tab.3a - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrial- ists	In the first instance, DP as financial participation. Also: DP as 'co-determination' Better term: "participative management"	Agreement with given def. As a synonymous term: 'functional co-determination'. As defined, DP is very important	Fed. of Austr. Ind. [it represents mainly large firms, does not negotiate collective agreements]: official position in favour of DP since the 80s. DP as human and effective practices Economic Chamber [negotiating organisation, reluctant to give public statements on work organisation]: no official position
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	In the first instance, DP as financial participation. Also: DP as 'co-determination' Better term: "participative management"	Partial agreement with given def. Employees' interest has to be stressed. As defined, DP is very important	GMBE: no official position. It has a positive attitude towards DP, at the condition that works council and union are involved. GPA: official position is currently being developed. It has a rather sceptical view of DP
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal	DP is not considered a concern of the national federation (Typical activity of regional offices, which on the whole show very high interest in it).		No official position: DP is a responsibility of individual employers. <i>De facto</i> the organisation is highly committed to DP.
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	CCMB: DP used to be seen with favour as positive worker involvement. Recent practices criticised as they are mainly used to improve productivity. CMB: in general, negative view of DP; teamwork however is seen with favour.		CCMB: official position [1992 Congress]: DP as a very important issue, to be positively supported at certain specified conditions CMB: Official position: sets a rigid number of conditions.
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamtmetall	Gesamtmetall: DP (clearly distinguished from co-determination) concerns the informing and involving of workers in all matters regarding their work: "turning the affected into participants".	Partial agreement with given definition: DP is not a 'mechanism': it is a way of utilising employee knowledge and achieving their commitment to innovation, not at their expenses, but delegating responsibility.	Gesamtmet.: A long-time supporter of DP. No official definition, but programmatic publications; DP is seen as very important, particularly in periods of innovation of production.
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	IG Metall: distinction between DP as a managerial instrument and DP as "real" participation.	Partial agreement with given definition: because it rules out "real" participation, which is not introduced only by management, but can be introduced also through negotiation.	No official definition, but programmatic publications. DP should be a way of achieving democracy in everyday work environment strictly linked to co-determination rights.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI	DP as 'direct co-operation', or 'employee activation', i.e. as a method for involving actively workers.	Partial agreement. Although managerial initiative has to be emphasised, greater importance has to be given to representative participation.	No formal position on DP. But fundamental is the reference to the Main Agreement and the Co-operation Agreement, which set the framework of IR.
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	DP as 'direct co-operation', or 'employee activation', i.e. as a way for workers to influence the organisation and quality of work.	Partial agreement. Less emphasis on managerial initiative, and more on representative participation.	No formal position on DP. But fundamental is the reference to the Main Agreement and the Co-operation Agreement, which set the framework of IR.

(tab. 3a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.	DP is clearly distinguished from IP. DP has to be limited to worker consultation, and largely confined to the sphere of production.	Agreement with given definition. Managerial initiative has to be safeguarded.	No official position: DP is a responsibility of individual firms.
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO. Fed. Sider. de UGT	In general: DP tends to be seen as IP. (But experts of both unions make clear distinctions between DP and IP). Sider-UGT: distinguishes better between IP and DP, which is seen rather critically.	Partial agreement with given definition. Greater importance should be given to IP.	No official/formal position on DP. A debate on DP and its collective regulation should be opened. Experts: unilateral imposition of DP and its restriction to consultative practices only have to be avoided.
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM	DP as very important means to increase competitiveness.	Agreement with given definition	No official position, although in the 70s UIMM actively supported the development of DP practices (ERACT). Presently in favour of DP within a broader context of development of HR and TQM.
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM- CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux	[see the positions of peak organisations]	[see also the positions of peak organisations] FTM: disagreement with given definition, as it is heavily dependent on the economic point of view of enterprises.	FGMM: Since the 70s involved in the debate on ERACT and DP. Strongly in favour of 'expression groups' in the 80s. Disappointed by real DP practice, present informal position is to develop collective rules which may help individual choices of employees. FTM: opposition to DP as it is practised: emphasis on a strategy of union support to worker genuine aspirations to intervene into the management of enterprises, to be accomplished increasing dialogue with employees rather than with employers. FO Métaux: Official position: DP is not an issue for union strategy, which is primarily based on collective bargaining. Therefore expression groups were opposed in the 80s; all the same the introduction of DP practices may be negotiated (as any other issue).

(tab. 3a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF	Very close position to that of CBI. DP is considered very important, since worker commitment is essential to achieve business success.	Partial agreement with given definition, seen as too limited and 'managerialist' ("changes are often bottom-up" rather than only top-down).	No official position [see also CBI]. A former rigid top-down approach enshrined in a formal policy statement of 1979 has been abandoned, and now seen as inappropriate. Recently (1992), a revised policy statement stresses the importance of DP.
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSF	AEEU: DP seen as largely compatible with union goals (as it stresses the importance of training, involvement of union and employees, quality - appreciated within a craft tradition - and employment security). MSF: DP seen mostly in terms of 'lean production'.	In general, partial agreement with given definition. The emphasis in Britain has been on 'consultative' rather than 'delegative' forms of DP. TGWU, MSF: in any case 'delegative' DP does not result in the kind of autonomy and discretion often implied.	AEEU: Informally in favour of DP, as long as it is adopted in co-operation with employee representatives. TGWU: Official position of engagement, where employee representatives are encouraged to work with management in introducing DP (1991). MSF: no official position. DP as a challenge/opportunity not yet sufficiently seized by the union.
GR	<i>Employer:</i> ES	DP is understood as the same as IP.	No opinion.	No formal position. In practice DP is irrelevant.
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM	DP is understood as the same as IP.	No grounded opinion. But DP should be linked to IP.	No formal position. In practice DP is irrelevant. In theory, the union is favourable to DP.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of Large American Corporation	Positive attitude in this company. But in small indigenous Irish firms little recognition of the need for employee involvement.	Agreement with definition. However, the new role of managers should be reflected	Formal corporate commitment to DP and other forms of employee involvement
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	Positive attitude to DP, seen as participation of workers in decision-making in workplace issues.	Agreement with definition	
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. IL. G.I.S.L.	In principle favourable to DP. DP is a matter to be decided on by individual employers.		No official position
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	In principle unfavourable to DP.		No official position
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME	DP: from worker consultation to participation in decisionmaking.	Agreement with given definition.	There was an official position in the past. Emphasis is now informally given to programmes that improve the quality of production.
	<i>Unions:</i> Industriebond FNV IVB CNV	Ind. FNV: DP as a means of improving both production and the quality of work. IVB CNV: emphasis mainly on the improvement of quality of work.	Ind. FNV: Partial agreement with given definition: it emphasises worker involvement (consultation without participation in decisionmaking). IVB CNV: agreement with given definition.	Ind FNV: No formal position IVB CNV: same position as peak organisation.

(tab. 3a continued)

Country	Organisation	Definition/Understanding of DP	Agreement with proposed definition	Official/Formal position
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM	DP as a mean of involving workers in innovation.		No official position on DP. Informally in favour of DP, at the condition of delimiting worker autonomy.
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP	Participation in Portugal implies institutionalised representation.	Partial agreement with given definition: more emphasis on IP.	No official position. It is not important in the political agenda, as now there is no social space for DP.
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI	DP as a system in which management takes into consideration workers' opinions.	Agreement with given definition	Informal position: top-down approach.
	<i>Unions:</i> Metal, CF	Metal: DP as a prerequisite of modern production, resulting in increased individual autonomy and improved quality of working life. CF:	Partial agreement with given definition: DP is not to be 'management incentivated'. CF: agreement with given definition	CF: informal top-down approach.
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET	The term 'DP' is not used. Better: "ways of influencing one's own work", "co-determination".	Partial agreement with given definition. Unnecessary the emphasis on management initiative: employees' initiative must be encouraged. Worker influence might be extended to financial and economic matters.	No official position on DP. Important the Co-operation within Companies Act, which sets rules for representative participation.
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL	The term 'DP' is not used. The idea of 'participation' is associated to representation. Better: "ways of influencing one's own work", "co-determination".	Partial agreement with given definition. Unnecessary the emphasis on management initiative: employees' initiative must be encouraged. Worker influence might be extended to financial and economic matters. Links between DP and IP are ignored.	No official position on DP. Important the Co-operation within Companies Act, which sets rules for representative participation.

Table 1b - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,	To settle directly questions related to individual task or working place.	In 70s in favour of stronger individual co-determination rights (in contrast to collective ones), currently no demands for regulation	DP is important for economic effectiveness
	<i>Union:</i> ÖGB	To enhance worker influence on working conditions.	DP seen as granted, or withdrawn, unilaterally by management: it is not co-determination. In legislation union stresses IP rather than DP	DP corresponds with workers' needs, but rationalisation and innovation of firms are more important
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)	VBO: to increase productivity NCMV: to enhance informally worker commitment and therefore productivity.	VBO: it is a matter of individual employers NCMV: DP has not to be formally organised.	VBO: (no position) NCMV: the organisation opposes any formalisation (such as QC, teamwork, autonomous work group, etc.).
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV	ACV: to increase workers' control on their job, ameliorate working conditions, improve productivity. ABVV: DP only meant to improve productivity through consensus-promoting strategy, while it might be an opportunity to improve the quality of working life.	ACV: Implementation of DP should be subject to preliminary consultation of and discussion with the union during working hours. ABVV: DP should be introduced through negotiation, and subject to union control.	ACV: clear implicit preference for broad forms of DP, which offer real say in matters, and are advantageous for workers ABVV: teamwork and employee involvement preferred to QC and TQM.
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	To involve workers in the processes of work organisation	DP is subject to management's power of disposition. It has not to be regulated through written agreements.	
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	To promote worker self-regulation or self-determination in the organisation of work and in the definition of working conditions	DP must be the subject of co-determination by the works council in a works agreement, while remaining independent of traditional forms of representation. It has to be regulated through written agreements	
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	To increase employees' commitment to productive goals	DP within a framework of bargained regulation on managerial right to manage [Main Agreement] and on co-operation at the enterprise level [Co-operation Agreement]	The firms have to decide which forms they want to use: all presented forms could be accepted by the partners
	<i>Union:</i> LO	A mean for workers to have real influence and to ameliorate organisation of work and development of human being	DP within a framework of bargained regulation on managerial right to manage [Main Agreement] and on co-operation at the enterprise level [Co-operation Agreement]	The firms have to decide which forms they want to use: all presented forms could be accepted by the partners

tab. 1b continued

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEO	To involve workers in the organisation of production	DP must be regulated at enterprise level, with limitations	Suggestion schemes, communications programmes
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	In general: For employers it is only a way to increase competitiveness and productivity. CCOO: economic objectives might be combined with enrichment of working life	CCOO: DP through a democratisation of IR (industrial democracy) In general: introduction of DP should be negotiated	Most quoted: QC, work groups (improvement groups, cellular work). The latter are preferred as they are an instrument to improve worker skills and qualification TQM
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	To ameliorate economic performance through the promotion of social cohesion and consensus To associate employees in the organisation of their work	CNPF: Within a framework of legal regulation (for expression groups), more autonomy for the individual enterprises requested.	Participative management, i.e. mainly QC; expression rights
	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	FO: to integrate/associate capital and labour (refused objective) CFTC (and CGC): to transform employees into partners in the enterprise CFDT: to overcome the lack of citizenship within enterprises CGT: positive objective might be the possibility for workers to participate in decisions concerning working conditions and work finalities	CFDT, CFTC, CGC (and not CFDT): the process of DP as negotiated modernisation CGT: IP and union activity should support/control DP	QC, expression rights
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI	Economic objectives prevalent. Employee involvement as a factor for business success.	Voluntarist approach. Strong opposition to EC regulation in the area. "It is the responsibility of management to generate effective employee involvement"	Considered forms: systematic two-way communication; regular consultation; decision-making at the lowest practicable level of authority; individual contributions to continuous improvement; (training, financial participation, harmonisation of terms of employment).
	<i>Union:</i> TUC	DP is "about people" (rather than money). It should have not only economic, but also quality of working life objectives.	DP and IP are not opposed. DP provides an "agenda for a creative union to work with" through the methods of collective bargaining and joint consultation.	
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	In principle, to modernise the organisation of production and improve working conditions		In principle: QC, teamwork, work groups, TQM
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	In principle, to modernise the organisation of production and improve working conditions		In principle: QC, teamwork, work groups, TQM
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)	To increase competitiveness and productivity and improve quality of working life.	No regulations. See FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement in the Private Sector (1991)	QC, improvement schemes, self-managed team working, QWL programmes, TQM

(tab. 1b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
IRL	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	To increase competitiveness and productivity and improve quality of working life.	No regulations. See FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement in the Private Sector (1991)	QC, improvement schemes, self-managed team working, QWL programmes, TQM
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	Early 80s: to limit union power. In the 90s: to obtain productivity and quality goals through worker commitment To meet the challenge of competitiveness	In the early 80s: unilateral regulation by management In the 90s: through <i>ad hoc</i> agreements with unions within enterprises	Early 80s: QC In the 90s: TQM
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	To meet the challenge of competitiveness, benefiting at the same time workers	DP has to be jointly regulated, not only to be supported by unions, but also to be effective A formal set of rules needed	Teamwork QC
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. I.L., G.I.S.L.	To improve motivation and productivity	It is a matter of individual employers	No position: they are not informed about forms
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	To ameliorate working conditions	DP should be channelled through IP	No position: they are not informed about forms
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW	AWV: to improve the quality of production and quality of work (also as a consequence of new social values) NCW: (to give individuals responsibility on their work)	NCW: it is a responsibility of the individual employer	AWK: in the 70s: <i>werkoverleg</i> in the 80s: autonomous work group
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	In general DP to improve the quality of work	CNV: DP should be an initiative of both managers and works council; DP has to be complemented by IP	FNV: general features (=task enlargement and enrichment, delegation of control, participation in decisionmaking) rather than specific forms mentioned CNV: ideal-typical form is <i>werkoverleg</i>
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP	To contribute to competitiveness by involving (skilled) workers in the innovation process.	Within the general framework of the Economic and Social Agreement, a new legislation might facilitate more flexibility in work rules, and also DP. (DP as a private matter of enterprises)	(Polyvalence, adaptability, teamworking)
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	UGT: as an opportunity for increasing communication and information CGTP: fears that DP is simply a means to promote worker identification with productive goals, to eliminate industrial conflict and take the place of union representation	DP has to be regulated within the framework of Economic and Social Agreement, together with union representatives	Communication programmes, TQM, team work [interpreted by CGTP as anti-union practices]
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	In a historical (and old-fashioned) perspective: to give voice to individual demands - overcoming the limits of IP - and to humanise work	A suitable approach should not be top-down	

(tab. 1b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
S	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SALF	LO: to overcome the limits of tayloristic dehumanising organisation of work SALF: to involve everyone actively, improving the organisation of production and increasing the economic performance	A suitable approach should not be top-down, but grow from within the working groups with union assistance	
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK		Within the general framework of Co-operation within Companies Act, practices connected to DP are to be left to individual workplace	Group work; work groups (which may go under different names); and practically all forms of modern management methods as management by results, rationalisation, lean production, JIT, etc
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA	Concern that DP might be used solely to enhance greater productivity and efficiency (in a situation of economic crisis)	Within the general framework of Co-operation within Companies Act, practices connected to DP are to be left to individual workplace, but handled through IP. Preferably general rules for DP procedures should be set jointly through collective bargaining.	

Table 2b. Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks	To motivate employees.		Participatory leadership style important; formal DP programmes not preferred
	<i>Union:</i> GPA	Psychological management tool of rationalisation [mid 80s publications].	(DP should be combined with IP)	Non-permanent forms of DP (project teams, task forces) most widespread
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB	[see VBO]	[see VBO]	[see VBO]
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK	LBC: often used just to improve productivity and break solidarity [but banking section shares a more favourable opinion] . BBTK: [no position]	(see peak organisation)	(see peak organisation)
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	To integrate the individual employee into the company objectives (i.e. DP as part of company staffing policy), increasing profitability and reducing costs.	No further co-determination	Team working is the most important Time-autonomous work groups (introduced on the basis of collective agreements)
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	To broaden industrial democracy, to increase individual co-determination.	DP might/should be initiated also by works councils, or the unions	Team working is the most important; job enrichment. Time-autonomous work groups (introduced on the basis of collective agreements).
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA		Within co-operation committees, meetings between management and personnel circle (= through representative participation).	Project groups, two-way communication, individual task enlargement.
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector	It should be employees' possibility to exert influence; but it does not happen: real employee influence is through IP.	Within co-operation committees, meetings between management and personnel circle (= through representative participation).	DP should mean semi-autonomous groups, QC (but they are not found in the reality).
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB	DP as suggestion schemes. Employer autonomy needs to be safeguarded.	It is a competence of individual enterprise.	QC, individualisation of labour relations.
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO-UGT	--> Individualisation of labour relation.	FEBA-CC: DP should be regulated through IP (i.e. through collective bargaining).	QC and work groups.
F	<i>Employer:</i> AFB	No position: DP is an issue of individual companies.	No position: DP is an issue of individual companies.	Management by objectives.
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC	Perceived employer objective: To increase worker responsibility (without giving real possibility of intervention on work practices).	Greater worker involvement has to be controlled by unions.	QC.

(tab. 2b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank	Employee involvement as a way to implement change, as a competitive factor.	DP is a responsibility of local managers.	References to: communications, consultation.
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU	(a position has not been elaborated).	(a position has not been elaborated).	(HRM, TQM quoted as important).
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET	(According to documentation and practice) in principle, to modernise the organisation of production and improve working conditions.		(According to documentation and practice) in principle: QC, teamwork, work groups, TQM.
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE	In principle, to modernise the organisation of production and improve working conditions.	In principle, DP should be regulated through IP.	In principle: QC, teamwork, work groups, TQM.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Managers of large b. groups	To motivate staff and increase effectiveness.	None in banking sector. However, FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration applies.	All forms of DP found in large bank groups, such as Team Briefing, TQM and a range of information and consultation fora.
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	Accepts need for a participative environment. However, there is concern DP might be used to undermine role of union.	None in banking sector. However, FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration applies.	All forms of DP found in large bank groups.
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	To increase flexibility and quality of work through worker involvement and incentivitation.	Through collective bargaining, which should remove contractual rigidities.	Productivity remuneration schemes (as a typical form in the banking industry).
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	DP as a means for industrial democracy.	DP through IP.	Fisac-Cgil: Productivity remuneration schemes Fiba-Cisl: financial participation.
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL and large bank	To increase quality, productivity -To motivate employees.	Joint committee informed about DP.	Communication/information programmes. QC or Improvement teams: <i>concerto</i> (=TQM).
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	To increase quality, productivity	Should be channelled through IP	Suggestion schemes, direct communication
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB	To give individuals responsibility on their work.	It is a responsibility of the individual employer: there is no need of regulating DP with unions.	Teamwork.
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstend bond FNV	To improve the quality of work (but fears that DP may undermine aspects of collective agreements).	Worker participation has to be secured through agreements.	
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]	To contribute to competitiveness by involving workers in the innovation process.	Within the general framework of the Economic and Social Agreement, a new legislation might facilitate more flexibility in work rules, and also DP. (DP as a private matter of enterprises).	Polyvalence, adaptability, teamworking.

(tab. 2b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
P	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union	DP is not in the logic of HRM in the banking sector.	Representative participation.	HRM.
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO	DP does not fully apply to the sector But: organisational change mentioned, aiming at flattening hierarchies and delegating responsibility to deliver clients better and faster service.		
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)		TCO: DP has to be implemented together with IP.	TCO: fully-autonomous work-groups.
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.		Within the general framework of Co-operation within Companies Act, practices connected to DP are to be left to individual workplace.	Management by results and pay by results.
	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union		Within the general framework of Co-operation within Companies Act, practices connected to DP are to be left to individual workplace, but handled through IP. Preferably general rules for DP procedures should be set jointly through collective bargaining.	Management by results and pay by results. Banking is ideally suited to semi-autonomous work.

Tab.3b - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Cou ntry	Organisat ion	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrial ists	To humanise and increase efficiency of work. In the 70s: to win hegemony over 'collectivist approaches to industrial democracy'.	At least in the 70s, in favour of statutory regulation.	All mentioned forms apply to blue collars. Temporary participation in project teams or task forces most important for white collars.
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue- collars), GPA (white collars)	GMBE: sceptical about possibility of humanising working conditions. GPA: more sceptical.	GMBE: In favour of union and works councils' information and involvement by management. GPA: through works councils and union involvement DP should be combined with institutionalised IP.	Temporary participation in project teams or task forces most important for white collars.
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal	To achieve/improve quality.		QC, TQM.
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	CCMB: Not only to improve productivity, it should also focus on better quality of working life. CMB: Not only to improve productivity: productivity gains following the introduction of DP should lead to reductions in working time.	CCMB: a veto right for the works council requested. Unions should be actively involved in the functioning of DP. CMB: collective agreements (specifying conditions) should precede the introduction of DP.	CCMB: clear implicit preference for broad forms of DP, which offer real say in matters, and are advantageous for workers CMB: teamwork favoured: "teamwork, c'est nous!"
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamt metall	To utilise employees' knowledge and achieve workers' acceptance of new production concepts. To humanise work while increasing profitability.	Opposition to extending co- determination rights for the works council. All participation programmes have their limit in management authority.	Project groups: semi- autonomous work groups, team working. TQM, continuous improvement process.
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	To increase productivity with the co-operation of the workforce. But also fears that DP may result purely in a management instrument to achieve acceptance of structural change (and job losses) by the workforce.	DP should be introduced through negotiations between management and works council by means of a works agreement. Further extension of co- determination for works councils, and the setting up of committees with equal representation to deal with issues related to DP requested.	Lean production (= self- regulating units, flattened hierarchies, team working, etc.) Main form is team working.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI	To increase employees' commitment to productive goals	DP within a framework of bargained regulation on managerial right to manage [Main Agreement] and on co- operation at the enterprise level [Co-operation Agreement].	The firms have to decide which forms they want to use: all presented forms could be accepted by the partners.
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	A means for workers to have real influence and to ameliorate organisation of work and development of human being.	DP within a framework of bargained regulation on managerial right to manage [Main Agreement] and on co- operation at the enterprise level [Co-operation Agreement].	The firms have to decide which forms they want to use: all presented forms could be accepted by the partners.

(tab. 3 b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.	To increase competitiveness through positive worker involvement.	DP has to be regulated autonomously by companies.	Preferred forms TQM, work groups.
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC. OO. Fed. Sider. de UGT	UGMet.: economic objectives might be combined with enrichment of working life.	Introduction of DP (= work groups) should be negotiated. UGMet.: DP through a democratisation of IR (industrial democracy).	QC and work groups (which are looked at more critically than in other industries). TQM.
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM	To increase competitiveness through HRM.		In the 70s: ERACT (= problem-solving groups). In the 90s: TQM.
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM- CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux	FGMM: for employers it is mainly aimed at ameliorating economic performance.	FGMM: regulation through collective bargaining (i.e. direct democracy combined with representative democracy). FO: regulation through negotiation. FTM: negotiation on DP refused because of distrust with management aims.	Expression rights.
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF	To generate employee commitment in order to achieve business success.	Legal regulation rejected. DP is a responsibility of management.	Important forms: communication, team working.
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSF	AEEU: prerequisite for maintaining competitiveness of British enterprises and securing members employment. TGWU: to create efficiency advantages. MSF: management objectives are: promotion of greater efficiency breaking down barriers between manual and non manual employees; performance amelioration through worker active contribution of ideas for improving production; sometimes deliberate strategy to bypass trade unions.	AEEU: DP has to be adopted in co-operation with employee representatives. TGWU: it has to be introduced without threatening trade union representation. MSF: the agenda is being set by management (and union has not yet developed a position).	AEEU: (continuous improvement, quality management). TGWU: quality circles, team working, employee involvement, HRM ("and other euphemisms"). MSF: lean production, and associated techniques (continuous improvement, team working, flexibility, etc.).
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES	In principle, to modernise the organisation of production and improve working conditions.		In principle: QC, teamwork, work groups, TQM.
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM	In principle, to modernise the organisation of production and improve working conditions.	In principle, DP should be regulated through IP.	In principle: QC, teamwork, work groups, TQM.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of Large American Corporation	Contributes to quality, competitiveness and overall performance of company.	No regulation but FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration applies.	All forms of DP utilised in one way or another.
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	Positive effect on performance of enterprise.	No regulation but FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration applies.	All forms of DP found in sector and different mixes in different enterprises.

(tab. 3b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federmecchanica	Early 80s: to limit union power. In the 90s: to obtain productivity and quality goals through worker commitment. To meet the challenge of competitiveness.	In the early 80s: unilateral regulation by management. In the 90s: through <i>ad hoc</i> agreements with unions within enterprises.	Early 80s: QC. In the 90s: TQM.
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM	To meet the challenge of competitiveness, benefiting at the same time workers.	DP has to be jointly regulated, not only to be supported by unions, but also to be effective. A formal set of rules needed.	Teamwork QC.
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. I.L., Steel company	Participative management to assure quality production and worker social cohesion and motivation.	Part of DP programmes is jointly regulated and managed. Worker representatives are always informed (= <i>luxembourgish model</i>).	From suggestion schemes, to QC, TQC, improvement groups. Total Productive Maintenance Moreover: <i>cercles-thèmes</i> , participative management by objectives, statistical process control; direct communication programmes, individual task enlargement.
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL		QC are matter of negotiation; the unions participate in the committee for suggestion schemes. TQM is responsibility of management.	QC, TQM, suggestion schemes.
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME	To improve the quality of production by increasing worker involvement.		Quality management projects.
	<i>Unions:</i> Industrieboord FNV IVB CNV	In general: DP to improve the quality of work. Ind. FNV: to increase worker participation in the decision making process.	IVB CNV: DP should be an initiative of both managers and works council; DP has to be complemented by IP.	Ind. FNV: general features (=task enlargement and enrichment, delegation of control, participation in decisionmaking) rather than specific forms mentioned. IVB CNV: ideal-typical form is <i>werkoverleg</i>
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM	To contribute to competitiveness by involving workers in the innovation process.	Within the general framework of the Economic and Social Agreement, a new legislation might facilitate more flexibility in work rules, and also DP. (DP as a private matter of enterprises).	Polyvalence, adaptability, teamworking.
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP	Fears that DP is simply a means to promote worker identification with productive goals, to eliminate industrial conflict and take the place of union representation.	DP has to be regulated within the framework of Economic and Social Agreement, together with union representatives.	Communication programmes, TQM, team work [interpreted as anti-union practices].
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI (CF)	To take into consideration workers' opinions, enhancing worker commitment and providing companies with a competitive advantage.		

(tab. 3b continued)

Country	Organisation	Objectives of DP	Actual/envisaged regulation of DP	Importance of/preference for different forms of DP
S	<i>Unions:</i> Metall, SIF	Metall: To increase quality in high-knowledge and high-flexibility based production and to improve quality of working life. SIF: to delegate responsibility for workers being able to perform their job.	Metall: DP has to be promoted by trade unions.	
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET		Within the general framework of Co-operation within Companies Act, practices connected to DP are to be left to individual workplace.	QC, JIT, lean production. Semi-autonomous work groups as the development trend of the future.
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL		Within the general framework of Co-operation within Companies Act, practices connected to DP are to be left to individual workplace, but handled through IP. Preferably general rules for DP procedures should be set jointly through collective bargaining.	QC, JIT, lean production. Semi-autonomous work groups as the development trend of the future.

Table 1c - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK (Austrian Federal Economic Chamber)	<i>In the early 70s</i> (when Labour Relations Act was under negotiation), debate on the concept of "functional co-determination": as an alternative to/an enhancement of collective co-determination		Low importance on policy agenda: in the past and presently
	<i>Union:</i> OGB	<i>Early 70s:</i> Christian Democrat union group and People's Party's Wage and Salary Association stressed individual rights of co-determination; Social Democrat union group stressed more works council's rights. <i>Presently:</i> parliamentary groupings' different positions are much more focused on the question of <i>financial participation</i>	Differences in the level of approval and in the reservations expressed or the basic conditions required: · humanisation vs. rationalisation and greater productivity; · individual vs. collective particip.	
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)	VBO: no need to discuss the matter.	Actually the topic is not really discussed between the parties. Participation in steering committees mentioned	Decreasing importance of the topic. (But peculiar position of NCMV)
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV	The national levels of both unions are feeding the discussion on DP, which is seen as a general issue, although its real impact is limited: = DP as a topic for long-term oriented and strategic thinking of national organisations. Very different positions. ACV: since the 1970s in favour of 'werkoverleg', while ABVV sees DP as a consensus-promoting strategy, aiming at hiding the unequal balance of power between the parties. To some extent, however, both unions have modified their positions over time.		Higher importance of the topic for the unions, which with time came to re-adapt their positions: ACV stressing its willingness to defend <i>real employee involvement</i> , which is not spontaneously granted by management, by watching carefully at the implementation of DP, for which more union rights are requested; ABVV claiming for negotiation and an active union involvement in the introduction of DP, to counter-balance the disproportionate power of the employer.
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	BDA: there is a varying degree of openness in relation to DP, with the majority of companies having a positive attitude and wanting to implement it. But also a tendency (specially in period of crisis) to "brutalise" personnel management, taking hard measures in order to reduce costs quickly.	Both sides want DP, but the unions want to bureaucratise and control it.	

(tab. 1c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
D	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	The internal debate is not taking place at the level of DGB, but in the sectoral trade unions. Within IG Metall different positions: a too optimistical assessment on the humanisation potential of lean production was recently corrected. At company level even more scepticism. The debate is only beginning in the banking sector.	Although the employers want DP, they do not want to see companies democratised.	Debate started in mid 80s, peaked about early 90s.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA		Within a situation of widespread consensus, debate on recent LO programme (1991) stressing employee influence on work.	After the DA-LO 1986 agreement, growing importance of joint initiatives, where the role of co-operation committees and DP are combined.
	<i>Union:</i> LO	Elaboration of a proposal, in co-operation with all member unions (1991), by which LO wants to secure that economic and productive development may contribute to a higher participation of employees in the daily decision-making process at workplaces, and at the same time increase individual opportunities for development at work - and in life.	Within a situation of widespread consensus, but with high levels of unemployment, debate on the consequences of DP for long-standing unemployed.	After the DA-LO 1986 agreement, growing importance of joint initiatives, where the role of co-operation committees and DP are combined.
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE	No internal debate: DP is a matter of individual employers.	No debate	Very important for competitiveness and worker involvement
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	Differences within the unions are more grounded on occasional experience than on clear positions. In any case, the main concern regards the weakness of the unions, which may encourage the employers in using DP as a substitute for IP.	No debate, except at the local level (docum.), especially in the car industry	Increasing attention and interest in DP in the last years. DP as a topic connected to industrial democracy.
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	Discussions and differences regarding the best ways of integrating DP into new principles of HR management, specially in time of crisis.		From participative management of the 1980s (mainly focused on QC) to the development of more effective, integrated, consensus-based forms of employee involvement.

(tab. 1c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
F	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	Strong divergences between the unions on the significance of DP: is it a means for increasing democracy and citizenship in workplaces, or an instrument for that dangerous utopia which is class collaboration?		CFDT (and CGC, CFTC): from a favourable and positive position to a more critical and disenchanted appraisal. CGT: although on principle not in favour of DP, greater emphasis is currently given to change in the organisation of work, and therefore also to DP. FO: on principle strongly against DP, whose importance is however declining, as the workers themselves are looking at it with hostility.
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI			Growing importance of employee involvement, which remains however a matter of individual employers.
	<i>Union:</i> TUC	TUC: different strands of opinion amongst unions stressed. Key issue is the relationship between IP and DP.		Direct communication and DP became so common as to be not worth arguing about: initiatives are to be supported where they contribute to union goals of improvement in the QWL.
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	No internal debate: the issue is not yet taken into consideration, although on principle it is looked at with favour.		Currently, only IP and economic participation (i.e. productivity-linked remuneration) are becoming more important.
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	No internal debate: the issue is not yet taken into consideration, although on principle it is looked at with favour.		Currently, only IP and economic participation (i.e. productivity-linked remuneration) are becoming more important.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)	Internal debate on future impact of DP, and on ways to balance productivity and competitiveness with improving the quality of work.	Since the adoption of the FIE/ICTU Joint Declaration (1991), no formal discussions between the social partners. They are however developing a national project (through the IPC) to promote employee involvement, including DP, for the private sector.	It is now an important issue on the national agenda and referred to in the recent National Programme (PCW)
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	Internal debate on the impact of DP on the role of the unions, in particular in the public sector. In the private sector, DP seen as essential for competitiveness.	Ditto	Although participation arrangements have been requested for over 20 years, it is only in the past 5 years that DP has come to the fore on the national agenda.

(tab. 1c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	Internal debate on the best ways for incenting co-operation and participation (as opposed to conflict) in workplaces, which are no longer seen as private matters of the individual employer only. Currently, the options go more to bilateral consultative committees and collective bargaining, within a scenario of 'new IR', rather than to DP.	No need of more formalised regulation of participative practices is seen.	Increasing importance of worker involvement and co-operation as a fundamental resource for management. Limited interest however on DP as such.
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	CGIL: the internal discussion ranges from 'co-determination', to 'humanisation of work' and 'industrial democracy', where the need for both DP and IP is stressed. A minority position hostile to 'participation' is also recorded. CISL: in the internal debate the accent is mainly on the rules and procedures of participation, and in particular of IP. UIL: emphasis on institutionalised industrial democracy, more than on DP.	The need of a more formalised regulation of participation is emphasised.	In general, the topic of participation, and also of DP, has been gaining importance, and will be even more so in the future.
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.I.L., G.I.S.L.	On principle, in favour of DP. But no elaborated position, nor internal discussion.		No explicit position
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	On principle, suspicious toward DP. IP is supported. No internal discussion recorded.		No explicit position
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW	In the past, the discussion was marked by a high dose of idealism. Over time their attitude became more pragmatic.	According to them, unions have a distant position on DP (AWV), or see it as a management matter (NCW).	In the 1970s and 1980s 'werkoverleg' and worker involvement received more attention than today. But both organisations seem to have become more interested in DP over the last two years.
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV			FNV: DP became a more important issue at the end of the 1980s. At the CNV: the importance of DP is growing.

(tab. 1c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP	DP is seen as a matter which has to be dealt with by the companies concerned. In a few cases, however, CIP had to discuss the topic on request of companies which were being pressed by their multinational clients to introduce DP for quality certification reasons.	CIP: The social partners did take officially their positions when negotiating the Economic and Social Agreement. Since the unions did not claim for a debate on DP, they are not interested in the topic. CIP is rather in favour of social (tripartite) concertation on single issues.	Recently the topic gained a little more attention.
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	No internal debate on DP. Recently, CGTP started a first discussion on the topic, on the presentation of a research on the impact of new technologies (which quite astonished the members).	CGTP: DP as a threat for trade unionism, as an alternative to union representation.	No tradition in dealing with issues linked to organisation of work and productivity. Only recently, CGTP started a first debate on the topic.
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	Top-down perspective of DP considered as obsolete, as far as tayloristic work organisation is left behind.		
	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	LO: very suspicious to the approach on DP adopted by the research. TCO: stresses the importance of control on DP by the union. SIF: more confident in its members' ability to influence their jobs, and more ready to discuss a new role of the union SALF: in favour of DP (as defined in the project)	LO: criticism to SAF's move from societal to managerial corporatism	
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK	DP relates to matters which are dealt with in workplaces, unless in case of disputes. The organisations are however involved in monitoring and general discussions on working conditions (in Finland and abroad), where DP is a central topic. No disputes within the organisations on DP	No disputes between the organisations on DP. Joint rationalisation committees established, which regularly take into consideration new working approaches, developing practical guidelines	Worker participation has been subject of discussion since the 1970s, mainly in connection with the enactment of the Co-operation within Companies Act. Currently, new programmes, aiming at promoting worker commitment through productivity-linked incentives, are gaining importance.
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA	DP relates to matters which are dealt with in workplaces, unless in case of disputes. The organisations are however involved in monitoring and general discussions on working conditions (in Finland and abroad), where DP is a central topic. No disputes within the organisations on DP	No disputes between the organisations on DP. Joint rationalisation committees established, which regularly take into consideration new working approaches, developing practical guidelines	Worker participation has been subject of discussion since the 1970s, mainly in connection with the enactment of the Co-operation within Companies Act. Currently, new programmes, aiming at promoting worker commitment through productivity-linked incentives, are gaining importance.

Table 2c - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisation	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks	No internal debate	Currently negotiation of collective agreement on "stress at work"	
	<i>Union:</i> GPA	Differences in the level of approval and in the reservations expressed or the basic conditions required: · humanisation vs. rationalisation and greater productivity; · individual vs. collective particip. Emphasis on "stressful pressure of work"	Union demands DP in improvement of working conditions	Some years ago: discussion of new forms of work organisation in connection with technical development. Recently: innovations in work organisation and associated management strategies are growing important as independent topics
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB			Decreasing interest
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK	In general: the debate is much more at the level of peak organisations. LBC: From a favourable to a critical opinion. BBTK: Shares negative view (as peak organis.)		In general: low experience LBC: from a previously favourable to a much more critical position. BBTK: DP is becoming of minor importance, as management is oriented towards more individualistic approaches.
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	No debates and controversy within the organisation on DP recorded.	They consider contradictory the behaviour of the unions, which on principle want sovereignty over working hours for individual employees, while asking in practice more co-determination rights for works councils.	Increasing importance of the issue
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	DAG: DP and "lean banking" made subject of consultation and discussion. HBV: 2 lines: 1 in favour of team working, the other warning against the erosion of co-determination rights.	Conversely, the unions stress that employers want to introduce team working without the involvement of the unions, and claiming the managerial prerogatives of being the sole decision-maker in case of controversies.	While 5 years ago, DP and team working were a minor issue, now they are a crucial (although controversial) issue.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA	Internal debate is not so much focused on DP as on IP.		After the establishment of Joint Council, more optimistic regarding the possibility for an improved dialogue.
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector	Internal debate is not so much focused on DP as on IP.		Scepticism about the possibility of improving dialogue

(tab. 2c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB	Some internal debate on the most suitable forms of DP, and on the limits to be set to worker participation.	Workers and unions are seen as not yet ready for DP. IR are seen as too principle-oriented and not enough realistic.	A little more interest in DP in the last years, although DP remains a minor issue on the agenda.
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO- UGT	There is an increasing debate on the 'modernisation' of work organisation (to which experts and trade unionists from other countries are invited). But fears that DP may substitute IP.	Claims for a real, 'integral' DP, which needs to be regulated through IP.	Increasing attention and interest in DP in the last years. DP might prove to be an opportunity which the unions risk not to seize.
F	<i>Employer:</i> AFB	(DP is a matter of individual companies)		
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC			In general, the new tendencies in the organisation of work which are observed in the sector are not to be considered as DP practices.
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank			No programmatic approach; but the widest possible involvement of staff in the implementation of change encouraged.
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU	BIFU had a motion before the 1993 TUC on the importance of DP.		Widespread and growing recognition of the importance of developments in HRM, TQM, etc.
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET	(see peak organisation)		(see peak organisation)
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE	(see peak organisation)		(see peak organisation)
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Managers in large b. groups	Debate is over in one bank group. In the second, an ongoing review of DP programmes	None for banking sector	Increased interest and implementation of different forms of DP
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	No debate in union	None	Has not been discussed by union
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	The internal debate is mainly on the needs of increased flexibility and quality, requiring new ways of incenting workers, among which also DP, which have to be openly negotiated by the partners. DP practices as ways to improve also direct relationships between the companies and their clients.	Through collective bargaining also the contractual rigidities have to be removed.	Increasing importance of worker involvement, which has to be incented.
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	Internal debate on the specific forms of participation within the sector (mainly incenting systems [Cgil], and/or financial participation [Cisl]).	For the unions the employers should implement more extensively what are declaring on principle.	Increasing importance of participation in general, and also of DP.

(tab. 2c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL	The debate is about participative management (as a kind of managerial style, which is based on co-operation).		The interest in DP is very recent
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	No internal debate on the topic.		The interest in DP is very recent
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB		Unions would co-determine the organisation structure because they want power.	
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstendb ond FNV	Within the union, opposition to DP from older workers. The union itself does not oppose DP.		The topic seems to be a rather minor point: it received some interest in 1989, which faded away quickly.
P	<i>Employer:</i> CCP	Initial debate on the topic within programmes for sensitising members to quality standards. However, members are not necessarily positively oriented to DP.		Recently the topic gained a little more attention.
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union	The topic is unknown, as it regards matters which are eventually dealt with by worker internal commissions.	Their opinion is, however, that DP is very far from the logic of HRM within the banks.	The topic is unknown, as it regards matters which are eventually dealt with by worker internal commissions.
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO			
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)			
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)
	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)

Table 3c - Definitions and interpretations of DP by the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisation	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
A	<i>Employer:</i> VOI (= Fed. of Austrian Industrialists)	From the idea of "Humanly-compatible organisation of work" (early 80s) to the catchword of "flexibilisation"		The last 10-15 years: always high importance; although Swedish models of work organisation have been replaced by Japanese ideas
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	Differences in the level of approval and in the reservations expressed or the basic conditions required: ... humanisation vs. rationalisation and greater productivity; ... individual vs. collective particip. GMBE: Internal debate ceased after positive experience GPA: increasing programmatic debate, but no conflicting view	GPA: debate on adaptation of salary schemes to task enlargement	Some years ago: discussion of new forms of work organisation in connection with technical development. Recently: innovations in work organisation and associated management strategies are growing important as independent topics
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal	More active and in favour of DP than other VBO organisations		The topic is not losing importance.
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	In general, the official debate is much more at the level of peak organisations; but it is well elaborated (and more pragmatically oriented) in the metal sector. CCMB: more critical position than in the past. CMB: in favour of teamwork more than other ABVV sectoral unions (<i>teamwork, c'est nous!</i>)		CCMB: more critical than in the past. CMB: more pragmatically positively oriented than in the past, under specific conditions.
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamtmetall	Debate on DP overshadowed by the discussion on the expansion of co-determination (IP), although G. was a long-time supporter of DP (see their 1989 publication). Recently, strong influence by MIT study, stressing positive economic effects of DP (Humanisation + profitability)	Opposed to extending co-determination rights for the works council, since co-determination leads to lengthy and bureaucratic procedures. In addition, often the unions proved to be hostile to new technology. (The union as an unsuitable partner with regard to co-determ. in matters of technology and product organisation).	While in the past the workforce was seen as a disruptive factor in the company, which was to be rationalised away, now more positive attitude, leading towards appreciating the knowledge potential of the workforce.
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	Opinions range from rejection to idea that DP is a necessary change. Broad majority asks for greater co-determination rights in association with DP (see union pamphlet). A minority is of the opinion that existing rights are to be better used.	Fundamental difference between partners lies in how the works councils should be dealt with.	Debate is changing as practical experience with DP is gained. From strong reservations to growing interest. The central issue: how DP initiated by management can be combined with worker interests.

(tab. 3c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI	Elaboration of a strategy (1992), where "management is going to be an activity in which more and more employees are going to participate"	Joint initiatives on education and training, and on co-operation.	Since the establishment in 1979 of a joint Technology Committee, increasing importance of employee involvement programmes.
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	(See LO)	Joint initiatives on education and training, and on co-operation.	Since the establishment in 1979 of a joint Technology Committee, increasing importance of employee involvement programmes.
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal	Some internal debate on the most suitable forms of DP, and on the limits to be set to worker participation.	Workers and unions are seen as not yet ready for DP. In practice, however, frequent discussions on the topic.	A little more interest in DP in the last years, although DP remains a minor issue on the agenda.
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO. Fed. Sider. de UGT	There is an increasing debate on the 'modernisation' of work organisation (to which experts and trade unionists from other countries are invited). But fears that DP may substitute IP.	Claims for a real, 'integral' DP, which takes real conditions of work into consideration.	Increasing attention and interest in DP in the last years.
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM			In the past, UIMM promoted DP; currently it adopts a more pragmatic orientation, according to the needs of the companies
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM-CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux	Internal divergences (see peak organisations)		(see peak organisations) In general, from the prominence of positions taken on principle, to the priority of pragmatic orientation, which leads the unions (except CGT) to negotiate aspects of the introduction of DP.
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF	EEF position is very close to that of the CBI.		An essentially top-down traditional approach has been abandoned. Presently the importance of involvement, team working and communication is stressed.
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSFU	AEEU: DP is not regarded as an inevitable threat to trade unionism; on the contrary, it is necessary for maintaining competitiveness and compatible with union tradition. TGWU: 'mixed' and 'pragmatic' position, because of its devolved structure: officially it favours engagement so long as union representation is not threatened. MSF: the union seen as too slow in developing its position on 'lean production'		In general, from a rather suspicious to a more positive approach. MSF: having played a leading role in the development of new business strategies (see the Lucas example), currently it does not seem able develop a clear-cut position.

(tab. 3c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES	(see peak organisation)		(see peak organisation)
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM	(see peak organisation)		(see peak organisation)
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of Large American Corporation	No debate - DP part of management style	None	Now an important issue for both management and unions
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	Yes - a key issue for the unions	None	Now an important issue for both management and unions. The union has taken the lead in promoting the introduction of involvement and DP programmes
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federnmeccanica	The discussion is led more by outstanding companies (Fiat, Zanussi, Olivetti, etc) than by the organisation.	According to Federnmeccanica difficulties in extending DP practices through national concertation are linked to the divisions among the unions, which do not facilitate the development of constructive and reliable relationships between the partners.	Increasing relevance of participation and of DP in the real practices of companies.
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM	FIOM: since 1988 focus on co-determination and QWL, which require also DP. FIM: more recently, high interest in the elaboration of a participative 'system', to be carefully regulated through collective bargaining and the involvement of shop stewards. UILM: from the traditional commitment to institutionalised participation (i.e. German co-determination) to an increasing emphasis on DP.		Increasing interest on DP.
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.I.L., ARBED	The participative system which is adopted is continuously subject to internal debate and verification.		High and positive importance of DP.
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	The participative system is implemented pragmatically, and did not give rise to internal debates or different positions among the unions.		High and positive importance of DP.

(tab. 3c continued)

Country	Organisation	Debate within the organisations	Debate between the social partners	Importance of the policy over time
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME	FME abstains from elaborating opinions on DP		Growing importance of joint research (with unions) of ways to improve QWL
	<i>Unions:</i> Industriebo nd FNV IVB CNV			FNV: DP as a more important issue since the end of the 1980s, as the union has been confronted with all sorts of initiatives on DP in workplaces. IVB CNV: the importance of DP is growing, in connection with experimentation to improve the quality of work .
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM	Initial debate on the topic within programmes for sensitising members on quality standards. Not necessarily, however, members are positively oriented to DP.		Recently the topic gained a little more attention.
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP	(see peak organisations)	CGTP: DP as a threat for trade unionism, as an alternative to union representation. As it is illustrated by cases of DP practices in multinational companies.	(see peak organisations)
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI			
	<i>Unions:</i> Metall, CF	Metal: worker influence should be from below to top, and supported by IP CF: new managerial projects (flow layout) criticised ('chiefs existing in all directions')	Criticism to ABB T-50.	
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)
	<i>Unions:</i> Met.Worker Union, STL, TL	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)	(see peak organisations)

Table 4a - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,	[see tabb. 5a and 6a] No data available	[see tabb. 5a and 6a]	[see tabb. 5a and 6a]
	<i>Union:</i> ÖGB	[see tabb. 5a and 6a] No data available	[see tabb. 5a and 6a]	[see tabb. 5a and 6a]
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)	No data available DP is not in any way seen as being of great importance: companies focus on other issues (production, flexibility, wage differentiation, high quality) NCMV: Increasing importance of DP: because SMEs need safe and well organised environment		
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV	No data available In any way DP is not seen as being of great importance: companies focus on other issues (production, flexibility, wage differentiation, high quality)		
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	No data available. In employers' view it is more widespread than in unions' [broader view of DP: any form of team working seen as DP] DP as delegation of responsibility has more tradition with white-collars	DP origin seen in the concepts of co-operative personnel management, developed for white-collar sector in the 60s	Need of workers to determine their work
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	No data available Stricter vision of DP: only in few cases there is serious interest in participation More widespread in metal sector and production	DP origin. started in industrial production ("humanising of work", then lean production). DP as a way of reducing alienation from work. Recently, restructuring of white-collars areas and services: "lean management", "lean banking"	Pressure of competition as a facilitating factor for change in companies
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	Lack of exact information. DP in its proper form is not very widespread. Emphasis on quality: but only 1-2% of firms have forms of QC NB. Smaller firms have management style where there is little need to embark on programmes of DP.	Management as prime initiators. [but see tables below]	Trends in management philosophy. Policies pursued by governments about technol. development, productivity, need to export. Research results and influence from abroad Co-operation between social partners organiz. and educational institutions; training progr. for engineers and economists System of co-operation committees, shop stewards, DA-LO Co-operation Board Firm size (=larger firms) and technology

(lab. 4a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
DK	<i>Union:</i> LO	Lack of exact information. According to an investigation promoted by LO, job rotation, job development and group organis. found in most industries.	Management as prime initiators. [but see tables below]	[The same as above]
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE	Not much information DP is a strategic issue for companies. But it is not really influential	Managerial introduction. But DP is not the rule, only found in specific situations DP is not an objective per se, it is rather an effect of other managerial change	DP is more easily introduced in new establishments, with no union tradition, or where unions are involved [=unions as disturbing factor, unless they are accommodated with]
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	DP is not much diffused. More frequent in large companies and multinationals [NB existing data show a larger diffusion than indicated of QC, ie. the form the unions appreciate less]	Introduced by management, without much knowledge of implications	More easily introduced either in establishments with no union tradition (and has negative effects on employees); or when it is implemented through negotiation.
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	In general, according to employers DP is expanding (although express rights, QC, communic. policies are not flourishing) [Existing data on sample of companies: 30% expression groups, 33% QC, 70% briefing meetings]	CNPF: after having given the necessary impulse, now DP is spreading on initiative of the companies themselves	
	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	In general, DP is seen as declining and losing support from employees.	DP is introduced in France under not favourable conditions: . cultural limits of employers . excessive State intervention in favour of enterprises, demotivating their initiative in the development of HR	
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI	[Research data: main development is 2-way communic.; 'delegative' part. much less diffused; 2% workplaces have aut. w.g. QC in only 2% of establishments overall. TQM in larger companies. DP is more likely in large, manufacturing, foreign-owned firms]	Practices associated with DP in recent years largely management-led Initially, more diffused in green field sites and Japanese comp. More recently extension to brown field sites	-Competitive pressure
	<i>Union:</i> TUC			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV			
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE			

(tab. 4a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)		Management initiated programmes. In some cases, teamworking proposed by unions, and management agreed to trial period	[from <i>Teams in Action</i> : - need to survive, to be more competitive, to increase productivity, to improve quality, to be world class manufacturer/service provider, to adapt to technol. change, to achieve worker increased flexibility, to de-layer the organis., to benefit from combined HR skills pool. - Factors for successful introd. of DP are linked to survival and competitiveness of enterprise: necessary to provide people with relevant information; necessary commitment of top management and ability to listen and respond to views of the workforce Trust
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU		Management initiated programmes. In some cases, teamworking proposed by unions, and management agreed to trial period	Key factors for success: early consultation and involvement; training of participants and leaders; DP incremental introduction; IR improvement; job security (in particular in the Services Sector); the services of outside facilitator. Trust
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	No data available. In general, DP practices are more widespread than in the past. QC saw their apex in the mid-80s (in the car, chemical, food industries), especially in multinationals. Subsequently replaced by TQM approach		International competition Customer oriented production
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	No data available. In general, DP practices are more widespread than in the past. Especially experiments of team working, job enrichment and flattened hierarchies emphasised	In the 70s union pressures. In recent years the initiative is management's	International competition Under certain conditions, economic crisis, which can facilitate development of co-operation
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. I.L. G.I.S.L.	Estimated that 10% of medium-sized and large manufacturing firms practice DP, especially under the form of suggestion schemes. DP is more systematic within American multinationals. Recently, successful diffusion of QC Unknown whether and to which extent DP is widespread within small firms.	Managerial initiative. Starting from 1979 within the manufacturing sector	The initiative of foreign multinationals The stimulus of structural economic crisis (in the steel industry)

(tab. 4a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
L	<i>Union:</i> LCGB OGBL			
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW	In general, no data on DP. But DP is likely to be more widespread than known. AWV: companies with DP are the exception: still strong separation between functions, and steep hierarchy. Forms of w.o. which are small deviations from dominant model are called 'aut. work groups' All the same DP is spreading. NCW: Semi-aut. w. g. and 'werkoverleg' are receiving great attention by employers	DP is introduced by management. AWV: main reason for introducing DP is higher efficiency. NCW: employers are familiar with the principle of worker involvement, which is economically beneficial. SANT consultant: quality-competitive companies are more inclined to DP (aut. gr.) than cost-competitive ones. STZ consult.: industrial companies started first in experimenting DP	AWV: Often, DP is implemented to eliminate layers of middle management. Techn. innov. as a facilitating factor Need to improve efficiency Need to improve quality Support of top management
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	FNV: cases mentioned of lean production, of quality programmes for women in ind. sector CNV: larger companies are more DP oriented than smaller, because they see more clearly the advantages of DP; and because in the short term the introduction of DP is costly	DP is introduced by management.	Economic reasons as driving forces
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP	Very limited information on DP and its diffusion. DP seems to be practised on a totally voluntary basis, by a minority of companies: within textile and electrical industries, or pharmaceuticals (QC); in general by larger plants and multinationals. DP practices seem to be more diffuse in large service enterprises (TQM). QC are seen as not particularly suitable to European culture. Other quality related practices are more successful.		Information about DP is being diffused by organis. as the Association for Quality, Association of Managers, Institute of SMEs. Limited success, however ISO-norms
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	Limited information on DP and its diffusion. CGTP: DP is not widespread. UGT: No DP since very little technol. innovation	Managerial initiative. Especially by recently established companies and multinationals	
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	Widespread in the past. DP seen as an anachronism when high technology firms pursue a better integration of production, administration and work environment development		

(tab. 4a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
S	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	LO: 20 years' experience. Often "nothing really changed", though. TCO: having gone further than other countries in DP, problems can arise in comparison to other economies (see the Volvo-Renault fusion) SIF: present situation is highly variable: Tayloristic and advanced organis. of work coexist. DP discussion is seen obsolete by members, excepting for declining categories of salaried employees, performing specific, specialised tasks. In general DP is not considered positive. But semi-aut. w.g. and QC are looked upon favour.		Facilitating factors: LO: "firing spirits" TCO: IR tradition of consensus
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK	No clear picture of diffusion: no comprehensive surveys. Often DP practices are just a matter of fashion Teamwork seems the most common, followed by QC, then QM experiments. Job rotation and enrichment, and communication are widespread DP is perhaps less widespread than in other Europ. countries (while IP is well established) DP less diffused because of vocational training system, where training is separate from work	Initiatives come from management, since in recent years DP has been adopted to improve productivity and financial performance	Facilitating factors: -management backing DP and having it jointly accepted as organ. goal -extensive training of entire personnel When DP programmes are successful, agreements must be reached between parties to consolidate experiences and share improved results
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA	No clear picture of diffusion: no comprehensive surveys. Often DP practices are just a matter of fashion Teamwork seems the most common, followed by QC, then QM experiments. Job rotation and enrichment, and communication are widespread DP is perhaps less widespread than in other Europ. countries (while IP is well established) DP less diffused because of vocational training system, where training is separate from work	Initiatives come from management, since in recent years DP has been adopted to improve productivity and financial performance In better economic situation (1980s) pressure came also from employees to improve quality of work	Facilitating factors: -management backing DP and having it jointly accepted as organ. goal -extensive training of entire personnel When DP programmes are successful, agreements must be reached between parties to consolidate experiences and share improved results

Table 5a. Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Cou ntry	Organisati on	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks	No data available Semi-auton. w.g. cannot be transferred to banks for legal reasons. But: DP is widespread because banks as service enterprises depend on the motivation of their staff	DP is a company-management initiative [NB: In banking, by comparison with the metal industry, DP rarely found in the form of explicit programmes]	The special requirements of service enterprises The introduction of innovation-based projects and technical change (which requires staff motivation) New employee demands regarding their work ("It's no longer money that motivates us, it's such 'soft factors' as praise and recognition")
	<i>Union:</i> GPA	No data available Banks have made hardly any real move in the area of DP Thematically-centred project work as principal form of particip NB: other forms as meetings, organisational improvement processes, corporate models, job enhancement are current practice but are not DP, since they not include partic. in decision-making	DP is a company-management initiative Forms of project organisation introduced for innovation purposes, "in preparation for management decision-making".	The introduction of innovation-based projects and technical change (which requires staff motivation)
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB	Only marginal use of DP It is not known whether any bank is currently working with DP techniques. Experiments in the 80s seem to have vanished	Few experiments initiated by single enterprises	-
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK	Only marginal use of DP The experiments in the 80s had been initiated by enthusiastic individuals in a particular situation	Few experiments initiated by single enterprises	Economic difficulties
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	No data available. DP is assumed to be more widespread in industrial sectors (especially in car industry) Employers think it is more widespread than unions But the extent of teamwork differs greatly from bank to bank	Managerial initiative	Intensively competitive situation Changing social values
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	No data available. DP is assumed to be more widespread in industrial sectors (especially in car industry) Unions think it is not very diffuse, also because of their understanding of DP (=individual co-determination), rather than time-autonomous groups	Managerial initiative (with help of consultancy companies) But, if innovation is upon management, implementation requires involvement of WC	Intensively competitive situation Changing social values

(tab. 5a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA			
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector			
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB	DP is a strategy issue for companies, but it is not really influential when planning or taking decisions	DP is not an objective per se. It is rather an effect of other managerial change	Facilitating factor is cultural change of employers
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO-UGT	Not much information	[same as 4a]	[same as 4a]
F	<i>Employer:</i> -			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC	(No real tradition of DP in the banking sector).		
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank	Changes in banking have not involved the development of DP as in engineering [because there is scope to cut costs with new technol.; the control exercised by trade union workplace organis is weak in comparison to engineering. Thus, main instruments: individual performance pay, consultation and communications. Less needed formal DP programmes]	Practices associated with DP in recent years largely management-led	Domestic and international competitive pressure
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET			
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE	Extremely limited experimentation of DP: cases of teamwork (in staff departments), not too successful. The organis. of work is traditional and centralised		
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Manag. of large groups	DP programmes have been introduced in banks	Commitment to open management	
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA			

(tab. 5a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	Less DP experiments in financial sector. Functional substitute here are specific incenting systems linked to quality objectives	Managerial initiative	Customer-oriented service delivery
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	Less DP experiments in financial sector. Functional substitute here are specific incenting systems linked to quality objectives	Managerial initiative	Customer-oriented service delivery
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL	No data available	Managerial initiative Only since the early 90s	Quality requirements Internal and international competition within the sector: concerted effort incented To implement DP necessary: .methodology and training; .management's involvement; .continuous information effort
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	No data available		Training programmes and small size of enterprises are facilitating factors
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB		DP is introduced by management. STZ cons.: DP started to be introduced later in service sector	
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstend bond FNV	Examples given of DP banks. But QC and TQM almost do not occur in the sector	DP is introduced by management.	
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]	(DP seems to be more widespread in the services sector)		
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union	Very limited information. Organis. change is taking place, but without any information of the unions. Work groups have been introduced in a few enterprises, but involving only staff and supervisors		
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO	No documentation on DP available. Bank employees assumed to have high degree of autonomy: since 70s organisat. change to increase efficiency, flattening hierarchies		Need for greater efficiency, for delivering better and faster services
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)	No documentation on DP available. Bank employees assumed to have high degree of autonomy: since 70s organisat. change to increase efficiency, flattening hierarchies		

(tab. 5a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.	No clear picture of diffusion: no comprehensive surveys. Often DP practices are just a matter of fashion Teamworking seems to be less diffuse, as it is better suited to manufacturing. Employees are however capable of semi-auton work, because of their versatile and diverse skill DP is perhaps less widespread than in other Europ. countries (while IP is well established) In banking, employees are trained on the job, but labour market pressure does not incent DP programmes	Initiatives come from management, since in recent years DP has been adopted to improve productivity and financial performance	[See peak organis.]
	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union	No clear picture of diffusion Teamworking seems to be less diffuse, as it is better suited to manufacturing. Employees are however capable of semi-auton work, because of their versatile and diverse skill DP is perhaps less widespread than in other Europ. countries (while IP is well established) In banking, employees are trained on the job, but labour market pressure does not incent DP programmes	Initiatives come from management, since in recent years DP has been adopted to improve productivity and financial performance	[See peak organis.]

Tab.6a – Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrial ists	No data available Estimated that half the total number of firms are engaged in this direction. Semi-auton. w.g. are not very widespread (=3-5% of firms; i.e. 30-40 unionised companies). QC are not very widespread. Individual suggestion scheme prevails More emphasis recently on information and communication programmes (in connection to ISO 9000 certif.) Lean prod. widely discussed: into practice in just a few metal-industry firms In the area of salaried employees wide diffusion of team-oriented and project-style working methods	Initiated by management. QC introduced in the 80s. Further diffusion of lean prod. anticipated	Technical and organisational change, which requires staff motivation The opening up of the East (= greater competition) The economic recession (as it intensifies pressures on firms to become more competitive) The transfer of foreign experience (but pacemaking role of multinational companies denied) New employee demands regarding their work Quality assurance (ISO 9000 certification) Advanced training of managers is seen as a requirement for successful introduction of DP With regards to white-collars: crucial the client relationship
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	No data available Semi-auton. w.g. are not very widespread QC are less widespread than in Germany; more important the traditional company sugg. scheme More emphasis recently on information and communication programmes; but more on a formal than on a substantial level -Lean prod. widely discussed: into practice in just a few metal-industry firms In small firms teamwork is the norm= "flex:ble conditions in which everyone can do everything" In the area of salaried employees wide diffusion of team-oriented and project-style working methods. But it applies to technical field more than to administrative staff	Initiated by management. QC introduced in the 80s: this phase of development soon bypassed (in comparison with Germany) Forms of project organisation introduced for innovation purposes -Foreign-owned companies are more frequent introducers of DP NB. The limited diffusion of DP in Austria is related to the limited diffusion of Tayloristic forms of w.o.: therefore explicit programmes to overcome Tayloristic forms of work are less likely to be found.	Technical and organisational change Situations where "the introduction of complex new technical or organisational systems cannot be prescribed on the drawing board", and "in which success of failure depends on employee co-operation" The economic recession (as it intensifies pressures on firms to become more competitive) The transfer of foreign experience, especially by multinationals (which are favoured by their internal organisation) ISO 9000 certification. {Small firms}
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal	Forms of DP are well spread in the sector, especially in the car industry (and subcontracting companies)	(Management initiated)	The diffusion of DP in the sector is linked to strong international competition in car industry: for which just-in-time, lean product, etc are required Important is also the self-enforcing nature of DP: experiments with DP lead to more involvement

(tab. 6a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
B	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	In general. Forms of DP are well spread in the sector, especially in the car industry CMB: DP is more popular in large multinational companies and in the Flanders (where there are most multinationals) CCMB: many companies start half-hearted experiments which often fail	(Management initiated)	CMB: DP is more likely to flourish in "better" times, when there is plenty of money available
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamtmetall	No data available Forms of part. exist in almost all large companies, but not to the extent the organiz. would wish		Detailed information about company's objectives given to employees Organizat. structure of small units which can react flexibly to customers' needs
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	No real data available The debate is more extensive than practice: 16% of workers in car industry work in groups, but not necessarily this is DP. Only few (2-3) cases where managem. is really looking for a new understanding of work		Competitive pressure Reversal of negative factors (see)
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI		Management as prime initiators. Semi-auton. groups (production groups, improvement groups) introduced in early 1970s after joint visit to the USA. A joint visit to Japan in 1982 revealed that QC were similar to section committees and project groups within the Danish Agreement on Co-operation. (Superiority of improvement g. with respect to QC) 'Employee activated production development' (similar to TQM) designed by empl. associat. in co-operation with the unions	Introduction of ISO 9000 standards [see peak organiz.]
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union		Management as prime initiators.	Demands for technical knowledge
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.	[same as 5a]	[same as 5a]	[same as 5a]
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC. OO. Fed. Sider. de UGT	[same as 4a]	[same as 4a]	Negotiation on DP with a clear, effective commitment to its positive implementation Flattened qualification systems and upgrading to higher levels Systematic job rotation
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM	[see peak organis]	[see peak organis]	[see peak organis]

(tab 6a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
F	Employer: UIMM	[see peak organis]	[see peak organis]	[see peak organis]
	Unions: FTM-CGT, FGMM- CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux	[see peak organis]	[see peak organis]	[see peak organis]
GB	Employer: EEF		Management-led initiative	International competition In the motor component sector, impact of Japanese investors, who obliged companies which wished to secure contracts with them to make radical changes → cellular manufacturing, team working
	Union: AEEU, TGWU, MSF	AEEU: delegative partic. rarer than consultative TGWU, MSF: DP, especially delegative forms, rare in their experience		
GR	Employer: EES			
	Unions: POEM	Insufficient information: union is organised mostly in large, especially state-owned, old- fashioned companies.		
IRL	Employer: Subsidiary of large American Corporation	Forms of DP introduced, and working well; now part of manag style, ongoing development process.		Belief in DP within firm; managers and workers must be committed to DP
	Union: AEEU		Support for the introduction of DP arrangements	Trust A good working relationship between managers and workers
I	Employer: Federmecca nica	[see 4a] From QC to TQM	[see 4a]	[see 4a]
	Unions: FIOM, FIM, UILM	[see 4a] From QC to TQM. Unions stress gap between programmes and implementation	[see 4a]	[see 4a]
L	Employer: Fed.IL G.I.S.L. Arbed	Estimated that 10% of medium- sized and large manufacturing firms practice DP, especially under the form of suggestion schemes. It is more systematic within American multinationals. Recently, diffusion of QC Unknown whether and to which extent DP is widespread within small firms.	Managerial initiative. Starting from 1979 within the manufacturing sector In the steel sector, unions involved in the establishment and implementation of DP (suggestion scheme, QC, TQC, amelioration groups)	The initiative of foreign multinationals The stimulus of structural economic crisis (in the steel industry), because of which an active worker involvement was required. The imperative of quality In the steel company: suggestion schemes is incented by the system of bonuses Union approval and participation in the system

(tab.6a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
L	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, GBL			Works council (comité mixte d'entreprise, introduced by the legislation on co-determination in 1974) has approved and facilitated the introduction of DP
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME	In metal-electr. industry high attention to quality management projects	DP is introduced by management.	
	<i>Unions:</i> Industriebo nd FNV IVB CNV	Data and examples given. Ind.FNV: 5% ind companies work with aut.w.g. (data unclear) IVB CNV agreed	DP is introduced by management. STZ consult.: sometimes WC ask for auton. w.g. (to improve performance) Ind. FNV: companies with aut. w.g. are companies with strong unions	Need for higher efficiency Establishment of ISO norms
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM			
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP	DP companies where the union has been involved are some multinationals in the car industry: seen as cases of conflict.		
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI	DP widespread in sectors where there is high co-operation between partners		Facilitating force: the wish to maintain activities and jobs in Sweden: → efficiency for survival Co-operative culture of partners (which form a group of decision-takers) Favourable culture of companies
	<i>Unions:</i> Metall, CF	DP widespread in sectors where there is high co-operation between partners Well established in daily routines and in work culture Typical of most traditional production plants (as Volvo's was)	DP started already in the 70s with the so-called development councils' efforts (Volvo-Kalmar) Actual experiments as ABB's are too management-incented	Facilitating force: the wish to maintain activities and jobs in Sweden: → efficiency for survival Co-operative culture of partners (which form a group of decision-takers)
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET	No clear picture of diffusion: no comprehensive surveys. Often DP practices are just a matter of fashion DP is perhaps less widespread than in other Europ. countries (while IP is well established)	Initiatives come from management, since in recent years DP has been adopted to improve productivity and financial performance	[See peak organis.]

(tab.6a continued)

Country	Organisation	Diffusion of DP	Introduction of DP	Factors facilitating the introduction of DP
	<p><i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL (union of technical employees)</p>	<p>No clear picture of diffusion. According to union surveys, 1/4 of members reported working in some kind of group work. New trend is however towards singles working on machine or work station. Teamworking is increasing among white-collars DP is perhaps less widespread than in other Europ. countries (while IP is well established)</p>	<p>Initiatives come from management, since in recent years DP has been adopted to improve productivity and financial performance TL: pressures came also from foremen , who often bring new ideas after participation in training In better economic situation (1980s) pressure came also from employees to improve quality of work</p>	<p>[See peak organis.]</p>

Table 4b - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,	[see 5b and 6b]	[see 5b and 6b] Middle management coming under pressure, and threatened by job losses	[see 5b and 6b]
	<i>Union:</i> ÖGB	[see 5b and 6b]	[see 5b and 6b] Middle management under pressure from below as well.	[see 5b and 6b]
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)			NB In general, reticence on effects (since DP is rather marginal) NCMV: DP has positive economic effects since secures worker commitment
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV			NB: unions are not convinced of the merits of DP and find it hard to appreciate effects Effects can be positive, but only when employers use DP in a proper way ABVV: since DP is linked to the struggle for improving internal communications, DP is not productive as such, but facilitates techniques which increase productivity
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	Economic crisis (tendency to "brutalise" personnel manag. to reduce costs quickly, which is not supported by BDA, which is in favour of more strategic co-operative approach) Economic crisis: because it requires quick decisions which cannot be made collectively Middle management as central problem	Central problem is middle management: tempted to form coalitions to help ensure its survival Therefore new functions need to be given to them (from monitoring and work allocation → moderators and co-ordinators)	Companies introduce DP to reduce costs and this is obtained
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	For production: fears that excessive demands on workers could become an obstacle for lack of preparation Middle management as central problem	Central problem is middle management: tempted to form coalitions to help ensure its survival	Companies introduce DP to reduce costs and this is obtained, at least in short term. But long-term improvements in productivity depend on democratiz. work organ. over the long term
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	Lack of education, training, skill development among supervisors and middle management (more training therefore necessary) Inertia in the labour market (see the case of early semi-auton. groups)		NB. No attempt to measure effects of DP in terms of efficiency as such: source of opinions is from regular meetings between both sides, within and outside companies Positive link between employee involvement, productivity and quality. But adequate training necessary

(tab. 4b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
DK	<i>Union:</i> LO	Lack of education, training, skill development among supervisors and middle management The employer's right to direct and distribute work Inertia in the labour market (see the case of early semi-auton. groups)		NB. No attempt to measure effects of DP in terms of efficiency as such: source of opinions is from regular meetings between both sides, within and outside companies Positive link between employee involvement, productivity and quality. But adequate training necessary
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE	Limited understanding of trade unions, Lack of preparation of employees	Union resistance	In general, effects of DP are minimised. DP is seen as a consequence of other change in the management of companies
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	Managerial culture: not prepared to delegate responsibilities and reduce direct control and authority on the organis. of work. Employer unwillingness to negotiate DP implementation Insufficient preparation of employers	Initial resistance of organisations mentioned (distrust, fear...) CCOO: also worker resistance mentioned. Usually however workers do accept passively DP. Works councils are even more positively oriented.	Increase in productivity and quality (effects positive for companies)
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	Economic crisis and unemployment: →negative effects on worker confidence		No direct assessment of effects In general, differences in economic performances are no longer dependent on machinery (which is the same everywhere), but on management and human factor. Thus, active worker involvement has positive effects
	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	FO: worker hostility CGT: the logic of profitability, which limits DP potential, favouring worker disillusion Other unions: the limits in implementation, the contrasts with traditional management practices, the persistence of taylorist culture Unemployment, which demotivates the unions in taking initiatives on this field		No direct assessment of effects Since companies use DP, it is economically effective But this economic effectiveness is limited to the short-term, since employers have a limited view of worker intervention
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI			
	<i>Union:</i> TUC		Employees' acquiescence, not to be confused with consent. Necessary to take into account the political and economic context	
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	Conflictual IR climate		No information
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	Economic recession and unemployment Structural characteristics of economy, where very traditional owner-managed SMEs prevail		No information

(tab. 4b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)	Traditional system of IR and dominance of collective bargaining -Structure of unions leading to too much negative rivalry Pressure on union officials to deliver short term results Reluctance of management to change and share power High age profile of workers in certain Irish firms, making it difficult to introduce change		[From <i>Teams in Action</i> : teamworking as but one of the tools in the pursuit of organis. effectiveness. Nor a panacea for ills, it does not work in every circumstances
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	The opposite to facilitating factors Absence of consultation with workers affected: changes cannot be imposed Hierarchical structure of firms (→necessary new forms of reward systems)	Positive response from unions where consultation of workforce part of process. Suspicious reactions of workers involved or of unions where they have not been consulted Fears that DP fosters discrimination (eg, when women return to work after maternity leave); that DP facilitates contracting-out.	Case by case approach to assessment, measured against criteria: Is DP needed from a competitive point of view? Will manag. consult unions and discuss with them? Is DP a strategy to by-pass/derecognise unions?
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	Resistance of middle management, of older employees Initial resistance of unions Traditional antagonistic culture (especially within Cgil) In SMEs resistance towards too formalised DP programmes		Positive effects on overall performance, productivity, quality
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	Economic crisis and restructuring of companies: redundancies do not facilitate DP		Positive effects on overall performance, productivity, quality
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.I.L., G.I.S.L.	[see 5b and 6b]	[see 5b and 6b]	[see 5b and 6b]
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	[see 5b and 6b]	[see 5b and 6b]	[see 5b and 6b]
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW <i>MHP (Union for managers)</i>	(Middle management)		No clear opinion on the relationship between DP and econ. performance AWV: DP promoted to improve performance [MHP]. Team working improves performance, because less employees are needed
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV			CNV: evidence show that performance is improved

(tab. 4b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP	Structure of economy (SMEs) Low qualification of workers	Resistance of middle management very likely.	It is imagined that DP might improve productivity. But in general, there are many doubts about possible positive economic effects of DP: quality is expensive and not necessarily consumers pretend it
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	Managerial strategy much more cost-oriented than quality-oriented Low technol. innovation Traditional culture of management and corresponding conflictual union culture Unemployment and precarious contracts CGTP: predominance of tayloristic org. of work; Lack of education of middle management National culture which enhances collective role of unionism		
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF			
	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF			
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK	Hindering factors: Oppressive workplace culture Excessively strict and literal observance of legislation (Co-operation Act) or of coll. agreem. Broader problems between employers and employees	Positive role of unions. They have a well-established role in IR (Co-operation Act). Shop st. always present when new practices are planned: their role is usually active and beneficial Supervisors/foremen are group whose work is most threatened and has to change (or disappear): negative attitude towards DP Middle manag. in the ambivalent position of having to support DP, while risking from it.	Positive impact on financial performance, production and quality improvement: precondition is the common and continuous support by management and personnel

(tab. 4b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
SF	Unions: SAK, STTK, AKAVA	Hindering factors: Oppressive workplace culture Excessively strict and literal observance of legislation (Co-operation Act) or of coll. agreem. Broader problems between employers and employees	Positive role of unions. They have a well-established role in IR (Co-operation Act). Shop st. always present when new practices are planned: their role is usually active and beneficial Supervisors/foremen are group whose work is most threatened and has to change (or disappear): negative attitude towards DP Middle manag. in the ambivalent position of having to support DP, while risking from it. STTK: consider their member attitudes as positive; believe that they take initiatives in promoting DP (teams need a leader: what is needed is retraining for supervisory staff)	Positive impact on financial performance, production and quality improvement: precondition is the common and <i>continuous</i> support by management and personnel

Table 5b. Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks			“Business results would be poorer if this way of maintaining employee relations did not exist”
	<i>Union:</i> GPA	The persistence of banking pronounced hierarchical structure		
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB			
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK	The kind of work itself: since it requires intense communication as a rule, it is not necessary to develop explicit DP programmes		
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	Current recession as hindering factor	Dilemma of management personnel Workers’ representatives are better qualified and have greater interest with regard to DP	Positive effects, in particular by reducing additional work and overtime
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	Current recession as hindering factor (although in this period it would be beneficial)	Middle management as a blocking factor; problems depend on: -removal of hierarchic levels; -gap between material qualification and low levels of social competence Among union representatives “scepticism and uncertainty predominant”. Passive acceptance of companies’ initiatives, because of psychological barriers. Fears that companies want to organise workers without unions.	Positive effects, in particular by reducing additional work and overtime Union assessment is more positive than the employers’ (=reduction of overtime, lower absenteeism, higher work satisfaction and motivation). But workloads raised to a critical level
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA		[relative absence of DP]	[relative absence of DP]
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector	The employer’s right to direct and distribute work Reduction in staff since early 90s and job insecurity Need for banks to be increasingly customer conscious; therefore uniformity required which hampers local initiatives	[relative absence of DP]	[relative absence of DP]
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB			
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO-UGT	Low level democracy at company level Low trust context Limited union response because of lack of information from employers.		Increased quality in service delivery Increased innovation

(tab. 5b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
F	<i>Employer:</i> -			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC			
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank			
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU		Employees' acquiescence, not to be confused with consent. Necessary to take into account the political and economic context Impact on managerial culture and practice	
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET			
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE	The hierarchical, bureaucratic and centralised organisation of Greek banks		No information
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Manag. of large groups	Lack of commitment by top management; Low trust; Not allowing people to make decisions; Bad communications	Very positive - Many forms of DP have been introduced	Positive impact on range of staff related issues; Better quality of service
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	Staff alienation Lack of trust Staff are over-worked	No difficulty with DP so long as it is not intended to undermine the union	
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito			Positive effects on overall performance, productivity, quality
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	Gap between the open attitude of employer organis. and real practices in many private banks		Positive effects on overall performance, productivity, quality
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL (and specific banks)	The fear of change The scarcity of means and of time	Unions were informed through works council (joint committee) In any way, DP introduces elements of individual freedom and initiative which the unions have to accommodate with	Too recent experience According to the report "Making quality work" a 2% increase in client satisfaction= 1% increase in investment return
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA		On principle unions are in favour. Differences are on ways of implementation Middle management is more resistant in manufacturing sector than in banks	Positive impact on production since it frees individual energies. If combined with authoritarian managerial style, it requires extra motivation

(tab. 5b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
NL	<i>Employer:</i> WGVB	STZ consult.: middle management		No clear opinion on the relationship between DP and econ. performance
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstend bond FNV	Cultural resistance of middle management The organisation of banking itself (which traditionally requires rigid procedures)	Introduction of aut. w.g. resisted by workers with richest tasks; supported by those who expect their position to improve with multiskilling	No clear opinion
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union	Unilateral and authoritarian style of management Individualisation of labour relations		
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO			
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)			
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.	[see peak organis]	In general, positive role of unions. They have a well-established role in IR (Co-operation Act). [see peak organis] Supervisors/foremen are group whose work is most threatened and has to change (or disappear): negative attitude towards DP Middle manag. in the ambivalent position of having to support DP, while risking from it.	Positive impact on financial performance, production and quality improvement: precondition is the common and <i>continuous</i> support by managem. and personnel
	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union	[see peak organis]	In general, positive role of unions. They have a well-established role in IR (Co-operation Act). In the present banking crisis, shop st. became more critical: DP is implemented on employer terms only. DP as a way of cutting personnel	Positive impact on financial performance, production and quality improvement: precondition is the common and <i>continuous</i> support by managem. and personnel

Tab.6b - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrial ists	Cost-oriented management and cost-reducing programmes (since initially DP would lead to additional costs) Many managers' fears of losing authority in involving employees in decision-making. The culture of middle management	Resistance from middle management The spread of DP is neither encouraged nor restrained by works councils (no firm turned to the association because of internal disputes over work organisation)	In general it is assumed that DP has positive effects. But: The economic advantages "cannot be counted in pounds and pence" "Output is high when job-satisfaction is high. P can lead to job satisfaction" DP is of particular advantage in connection with technological change as a means of dissipating anxiety and prejudice.
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	Culturally entrenched hierarchical structures (especially among firms managed by the proprietors themselves, very limited DP). The culture of middle management	Resistance from middle management; due also to generation gap. (but some advantages for squad leaders) The spread of DP is neither encouraged nor restrained by works councils: resistance arose only in firms where works councils were left uninformed and not involved in the decision-making process	DP has a positive effects on quality
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal			Companies need lean and just-in-time production to be competitive: to make these techniques work they need DP. DP as the oil that makes the machine function smoothly. But as such oil does not generate a better economic performance (that is the result of better machinery)
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB			CCMB: economic effects can be expected, but only when the employer is taking a thorough approach while introducing DP

(tab. 6b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamtmetall	Insecurity of workforce Lack of qualification among workforce Uncertainty of WC.		DP as a clear positive factor in increasing profitability
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	Contradictory behaviour of management Middle management's concern Existing power balance Insecure employment position of workers Lack of qualification Existing collective agreements which have different view of work Economic crisis --> combination of DP and harsh cost policy		More cautious: DP brings about new potential in increasing productivity: but, according to some studies, only 15% of growth potential is in area of production (the rest is linked to planning, subcontracting, marketing...) Increase in profitability in DP companies can be linked to other factors (low age of workers...) Not necessarily a company is more profitable during transformation phases (higher costs in training, technic. and organiz. development): but with time investments will pay off
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI	[see peak organis.]		NB. No attempt to measure effects of DP in terms of efficiency as such: source of opinions is from regular meetings between both sides, within and outside companies Positive link between employee involvement, productivity and quality. But adequate training necessary
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	[see peak organis.]		NB. No attempt to measure effects of DP in terms of efficiency as such: source of opinions is from regular meetings between both sides, within and outside companies Positive link between employee involvement, productivity and quality. But adequate training necessary
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.	Limited understanding of trade unions; excessive union influence supported by legislation Lack of preparation of employees		

(tab. 5b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO, Fed. Sider. de UGT	Union resistance and lack of preparation Managerial culture: not prepared to delegate responsibilities Middle management resistance Lack of preparation among employers Employee demotivation due to worsened status.		Increased competitiveness, productivity, efficiency; Continuous improvement; Cost reduction
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM			
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM-CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux			
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF			Often impact has been "survival, pure and simple"
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSFU	Lack of credibility in introducing change on the part of managem. AEEU: when introducing deleg. forms of DP management often does not realise full benefits	Impact of change on management	
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES			
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM	The organisational, technological, financial backwardness of most enterprises		No information
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of large American Corporation	If DP is not believed in by management and workers	DP is part of management style	DP has contributed to competitiveness and quality of production. Greater investment in training and improvement of skills.
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	Distrust Poor industrial relations Manag. trying to impose change without consultation	Unions now focusing on DP	Positive effects on: - quality of production; - work environment; - improved skills and investment in training
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federnmeccanica	Resistance of middle management, of older employees Initial resistance of unions Traditional antagonistic culture (especially within Cgil) Limited size of most organisations (=DP is more likely to flourish in large firms) In SMEs specific, more informal and "spontaneous" forms of DP		Positive effects on overall performance, productivity, quality
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM	Ambivalent attitudes towards DP of employer organisations Economic crisis and redundancies		Positive effects on overall performance, productivity, quality

(tab. 6b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.IL G.I.S.L. Arbed	Financial limitations which prevent further extension of training Time shortage	Limited resistance from middle management. Initially, waiting position on the part of unions.	Positive impact, although difficult to measure The recognition of ISO 9001 (in Feb. '94) is a result of TQC.
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, GBL	Initial resistance of middle management to suggestion schemes	Positive acceptance, with the initial exception of middle management	Positive and significant impact The large amount of bonuses distributed (which are related to increases in rentability) are a measure of it. The recognition of ISO 9001 (in Feb '94) is a result of TQC
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME			No clear opinion on the relationship between DP and econ. performance
	<i>Unions:</i> Industriebond FNV IVB CNV		WC are in some cases active in asking for DP (especially aut. work g.) Introduction of aut.w.g. resisted by workers who fear not to be able to make necessary change in qualification (=low skilled people); supported by those who expect their position to improve with multiskilling Resistance of staff and middle management when DP may result in job loss or job impoverishment	-IVB CNV: no clear opinion Ind. FNV: DP improves performance
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM			
	<i>Union:</i> Met. CGTP			
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI			
	<i>Unions:</i> Metall, CF			

(tab. 6b continued)

Country	Organisation	Factors hindering the introduction of DP	Initial reactions to DP	Economic Effects
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET	[see peak organis]	Positive role of unions. They have a well-established role in IR (Co-operation Act). Shop st. always present when new practices are planned: their role is usually active and beneficial Supervisors/foremen are group whose work is most threatened and has to change (or disappear): negative attitude towards DP Middle manag. in the ambivalent position of having to support DP, while risking from it.	Positive impact on financial performance, production and quality improvement: precondition is the common and <i>continuous</i> support by managem. and personnel
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL	[see peak organis]	Positive role of unions. They have a well-established role in IR (Co-operation Act). Shop st. always present when new practices are planned: their role is usually active and beneficial When implementing DP programmes sometimes negative reactions of shop st. where teamwork and versatility threaten status and remuneration of more skilled workforce Supervisors/foremen are group whose work is most threatened and has to change (or disappear): negative attitude towards DP Middle manag. in the ambivalent position of having to support DP, while risking from it. TL: consider their member attitudes as positive; believe that they take initiatives in promoting DP (teams need a leader: what is needed is retraining for supervisory staff)	Positive impact on financial performance, production and quality improvement: precondition is the common and <i>continuous</i> support by managem. and personnel

Table 4c - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
A	<p><i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,</p>	<p>DP as an improvement of working conditions</p>		<p>Because of statutory basis of company representation of interests and co-determination, DP is not seen as an alternative to RP (as it would be in a voluntary system) DP and IP are by no means opposite. The role of the works councils (which is <i>protected by the Labour Relations Act</i>) would not be affected by DP DP and IP are assigned different sets of subject-matter: . DP for anything which could be individually organised (e.g. the immediate workplace) . IP (co-determination) where interests of others are touched upon and when interests of workforce <i>per se</i> are touched</p>
	<p><i>Union:</i> ÖGB</p>			<p>No fundamental conflict between DP and IP But change in the role of WC: a "moderatorship role" Contradiction between DP and RP exists only where the flexibility of the individual, workplace-oriented negotiation of isolated questions comes into conflict with standard, collective arrangements.</p>
B	<p><i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)</p>	<p><i>NB In general, reticence on effects (since DP is rather marginal)</i> NCMV: DP contributes to a safer environment</p>	<p><i>NB In general, reticence on effects (since DP is rather marginal)</i> NCMV: DP requires more training (since companies expect more from their employees)</p>	<p><i>NB In general, reticence on effects (since DP is rather marginal)</i> DP and IR have little in common: DP originates in the shop floor to deal with practical and technical problems: contacts between social partners evolve around other subjects. -But concerns of unions regarding DP: fears that DP limits their rights, since some topics are matters for both. But the way the two channels treat matters is wholly different</p>

(tab. 4c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
B	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV	NB: <i>unions are not convinced of the merits of DP and find it hard to appreciate effects</i>	NB: <i>unions are not convinced of the merits of DP and find it hard to appreciate effects</i>	NB: <i>unions are not convinced of the merits of DP and find it hard to appreciate effects</i> ACV: DP stands for more communication: many minor problems will find there a better solution. Unions should be concerned with other matters. Unions should express positive attitude, but keeping enough distance to defend the workers' interests ABVV: DP as a anti-union strategy.
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	Work in particip.-oriented systems is more demanding, and more performance-oriented. But this increases work satisfaction. This is a problem only for those who do not really want to work or are not able to accept responsibility	[DP presupposes a minimum of social competence in order to be able to work in a group. This is taken for granted in the banking sector, while in other areas it has to be created. This is why in banking no relation is seen between DP and qualific.]	DP is not posing serious competition to RP DP should remain an instrument of personnel management
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	DP is a problem for lower performance workers	Qualification is a prerequisite for and result of participation. DP is not compatible with low pay ad low qualific. strategies. Unions hope DP leads to a higher qualificat (but it is quite uncertain it will)	DP is not posing serious competition to RP Despite ambivalent position on DP, positive attitude on relations between DP and RP: it is RP which needs to be reorganised, having become inadequate as Taylorist forms of work organis.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	Link between pay system and new forms of employee involv. -Not enough to change the working environment to enable employees to plan their own work without affecting pay. -Jointly constructed guidelines for payment system based on qualification and results. -NB. The persistence (that both parties see with favour) of framework agreement negotiated at national level, i.e. of indirect partic. which enables employees to be more acquainted with financial context	-DP promotes individual development	DP and IP go together, each supporting the other. -Correct forum for discussing the introduction of DP is the Cooperation committee at enterprise level - Increasing acknowledgement of need for a central body to co-ordinate and monitor DP and pass experiences from one group to another.

(tab. 4c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
DK	<i>Union: LO</i>	Link between pay system and new forms of employee involv. Jointly constructed guidelines for payment system based on qualification and results. Greater part of pay is determined outside the workplace NB. The persistence (that both parties see with favour) of framework agreement negotiated at national level, i.e. of indirect partic. which enables employees to be more acquainted with financial context	Simply focusing on individual jobs through DP is inadequate: to be acknowledged the role played by shop stewards and represent. in workplace.	DP and IP go together, each supporting the other. Correct forum for discussing the introduction of DP is the Co-operation committee at enterprise level Increasing acknowledgement of need for a central body to co-ordinate and monitor DP and pass experiences from one group to another.
E	<i>Employer: CEOE</i>	No specific effects of DP as such mentioned	-No specific effects of DP as such mentioned	No specific effects of DP as such mentioned
	<i>Unions: CC.OO., UGT</i>	Easier integration of workers (in some cases, effect positive for companies, but not for employees) Increase in worker autonomy (positive effect for employees) -Negative effects for employees: increasing individualism, diminishing solidarity, loss of free time (with QC)	-Increases in qualification, in training expected	Negative effect: individualisation of labour relations, in which employees (and unions) are losers because of their weaker position -DP seen as a strong challenge to RP. But it has not to be resisted to, it has to be negotiated -More DP is needed, but it has to go together with industrial democracy, and joint committees, ie with more RP, to be positive
F	<i>Employer: CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"</i>	DP as a motivating factor, which enhances communication Technol. changes --> amelioration of work conditions	A general perspective of HR development More training Better use of competencies New roles for middle management	[Legisl. of 1982 introduced negotiation on expr. groups, but not on other forms which developed largely outside negotiation] No antagonism between DP and RP In the 70s there were companies which wanted to marginalise unions. Now the problem is rather union weakness. DP is not a substitute for social dialogue CJD and EP: elaborated a reform of workplace represent. to reinforce their role [NB State incited "modernisation négociée" ('88) and "Changer le travail" ('91) projects]

(tab. 4c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
I	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	In general, on the basis of a Ministry of Labour's research (1991): deterioration of work conditions and increase of risk . more autonomy but more stress and workload . increasing work dissatisfact. . more accidents (FO) DP as a selective factor, which contributes to the division between those who work in more complex environments and those who are excluded	Positive effects for workers are too limited with respect to enterprises': DP is insufficiently paid for But tendencies towards higher qualification linked to permanent training Necessary a revision of traditional career paths Negative effects from workforce segmentation	FO: DP as a weapon against unionism Other unions: the risk of a direct dialogue between management and employees emphasised. In recent times, such a risk is seen as less strong (because DP has not met with great support from employees) [DP favoured the decentralisation of collective bargaining since express rights were introduced together with the obligation of negotiation at plant level]
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI	DP is a good thing both in theory and practice, as it enhances two-way communication, consultation, and thus motivation and work satisfaction		
	<i>Union:</i> TUC	Scepticism about positive effects for employees (who should be enthusiastic of the rhetoric of commitment culture ...), as new schemes have been imposed on often over-stretched, underpaid workers [Existing research show that participat. forms of w.o. do not replace traditional forms of control: close forms of supervision maintained]		
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	No information		DP is a managerial technique
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	Uncertain assessment of impact	Uncertain assessment of impact	
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)	[From <i>Teams in Action</i> : teamworking demands commitment to change and ability to live with some confusion. Objective is more democratic organis. aiming at utilising a wider range of employee skills	Greater investment in technical, administrative training and in particular in group and interpersonal skills	DP programmes complementary to RP Because of small size of enterprises, DP is more suited to smaller firms Where DP works well, better climate also for coll. barg.
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	Case by case approach to assessment, measured against criteria: Is DP needed from a competitive point of view? Will manag. consult unions and discuss with them? Is DP a strategy to by-pass/derecognise unions?	Where DP has been introduced with proper consultation and involvement then training and HR policies will benefit.	DP programmes complementary to RP Because of small size of enterprises, DP is more suited to smaller firms Successful operation of DP has impact on collect. bargain.: 90% of issues traditionally dealt with through coll. barg. will shift into particip. arena

(tab. 4c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	Cautious assessment: many workers are involved in job enrichment programmes, which are satisfying		
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	Uncertain effects: .only for a minority of employees less stress and more work satisfaction; .for more workers less physical effort and better ergonomic conditions	Traditional careers and qualification systems set in collective agreements should be revised to facilitate HR development	
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.I.L., G.I.S.L.	[see 5c and 6c]	[see 5c and 6c]	[see 5c and 6c]
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	[see 5c and 6c]	[see 5c and 6c]	[see 5c and 6c]
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV , NCW	AWV: DP can improve quality of w.l. if it is associated to more training, larger competencies and responsibilities, increased pay	SANT consultant: if indicated conditions are fulfilled, DP (=w. g.) is a way of getting more opportunities for career developm. and better pay, and for increasing control on the organ. of work lowering stress	NCW: no conflict: RP has to do with allocation of power and earnings; DP has to do with production NCW, AWV: in most cases unions delegate worker influence in DP to WC
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	FNV: ambivalent impact: more interesting work as well as increased stress. -Task enrichment for some and impoverishment for others CNV: not any prod. process can be reorganised in ways where more DP=more satisfaction Conditions for positive outcome: -full information -specification of competencies -assumption of responsibility by managem. Proper use of multi-skilled employees within work g.		CNV: RP is valued higher because of greater potential and legal basis FNV: fears that DP restricts influence of RP; it threatens worker solidarity. Distribution of responsibility has to guarantee worker solidarity CNV: same fears; thus arrangements about the distribution of responsibilities have to be made

(tab. 4c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP	More information should facilitate worker integration New practices should improve quality of work, especially in large plants. DP is less suited in SMEs CCP: more worker active involvement needed, as enterprises have to be profitable	Traditionally, limited attention for HR development and training. Multinationals are faced with problems when trying more modern approaches More training should be organised	No relationship between DP and coll. barg. DP is related to innovation within enterprises. DP will influence collect. bargain. practices: --> decentralis. of negotiation, new issues to be dealt with But centralised social concertation will remain a fundamental opportunity for dialogue and mutual information and knowledge IP is not necessary to establish DP: DP requires better trained and educated workers, more autonomous in relation to their work organis. CIP: Their 'involvement' does not seem to be of interest to the unions CCP: The unions are not interested in dealing with these new issues, which entail the reallocation of power: they don't want to run any risk, and continue in a general quantitative defence of workers
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	UGT: DP risks to be only a fashion. It requires technol. innovation and worker motivation, which are not widespread. DP can produce more worker autonomy and polyvalence. But also marginalisation of weaker employees and qualification losses. CGTP: DP should improve both economic performance and worker welfare, without differentiating between core and peripheral workers -'Search of excellence' leads to individualisation of social relationships: DP positive only if management approach changes		DP will not change structure of coll. bargain. DP will rather bring more issues to be dealt with CGTP: union participation in DP programmes can improve effects for workers: but more effective union intervention needed UGT: DP is positive as long as it enhances worker citizenship rights, but it has to be coordinated with RP. DP has to be more than information and communication rights. It must lead to negotiated change
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	Referring to Volvo-Kalmar plant, both high productivity and high job satisfaction achieved. Possible to perform better both in regard to efficiency and human aspects		

(tab. 4c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development and on training	DP and representative participation
S	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	Referring to Volvo-Kalmar plant, both high productivity and high job satisfaction achieved. Possible to perform better both in regard to efficiency and human aspects		
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK	Diversification of work, greater worker responsibility and job satisfaction; better working climate.	HR development and training not only as effect but also as prerequisite of successful DP. This should lead to sharing results and better pay	DP has not brought any real changes in familiar forms of IP. Introd. of DP usually takes place through the Co-operation procedure DP must never appear to displace or by-pass representat. functions of unions
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA	Diversification of work, greater worker responsibility and job satisfaction; better working climate. DP requires however an extremely active attitude from workers, who are not necessarily prone to it.	-HR development and training not only as effect but also as prerequisite of successful DP. This should lead to sharing results and better pay -In practice no pay improvement recorded	DP has not brought any real changes in familiar forms of IP. Introd. of DP usually takes place through the Co-operation procedure DP and IP are mutually supportive. To be successfully introduced DP needs to be supported by IP (all personnel groups can be safeguarded and information to all employees easily passed) SAK: some danger since employers might give prominence to DP (but no examples of such cases given)

Table 5c. Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks	DP as an improvement of working conditions		DP and IP are by no means opposite. The role of the works councils (which is <i>protected by the Labour Relations Act</i>) would not be affected by DP Existing collect. agreem. contain no reservations regarding the introd. of DP. Therefore no adjustments have been made nor are under discussion.
	<i>Union:</i> GPA		Especially in management training DP is subtly opposed to IP	No fundamental conflict between DP and IP But danger "that firms want a weak representation of interests".
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB			
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK			BBTK: some companies try to use DP to marginalise unions: some employers offer more information to DP channels than to company council. But on a practical level not much overlap exists.
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	Positive impact as private interests and professional requirements can be linked together better	Team-w. has nothing to do with qualification: team.w. is not designed so that as many members as possible can take as many different jobs as possible. On the contrary, trend towards specialisation	No conflict in principle between DP and RP. DP more as complementing than being an alternative to RP DP as a part of personnel management and staff planning = corporate right It is employer policy to discuss everything with WC (DP "will not be introduced against the wishes of WC, as this would put a severe strain on implementation"). There may be isolated cases of companies wanting to use DP to undermine RP
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	Ambivalent effects: on the one hand higher work satisfaction, on the other increased group pressure which not everyone can support	Unions fear that previous training long programme could be replaced by specialised courses All the same, assumption that working in auton.groups brings enrichment of knowledge and shifts to higher qualification levels Upgrading to higher agreed wage categories expected	No conflict in principle between DP and RP. DP more as complementing than being an alternative to RP DP as an extension of co-determination -A company strategy of circumventing WC would be counterproductive: risk higher than a position of Co-operation In practice: DP introduced through works agreement from an opening clause established in collective agreements

(tab. 5c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA			
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector			
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB	No specific effects of DP as such mentioned	No specific effects of DP as such mentioned	Companies don't wish collective bargaining on the topic, since coll. agreements are too rigid, while they need flexible solutions
	<i>Unions:</i> FEB A-CCO FEBASO-UGT	Increased worker motivation Less work monotony.	[same as 4c]	DP as a threat for RP. Unions have to increase their propositive capacity and have more participative structures. More negotiation needed for DP to be really positive.
F	<i>Employer:</i>			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC			
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank		Impact on training: decentralisation of training; specific instead of general training increasing	Examples of companies which took advantages of change to withdraw recognition from TU (eg, chemical and oil comp.). In most cases, where unions recognised, DP and RP together
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU	Great deal of stress associated with cultural change programmes	Downskilling; precariousness of many jobs	Examples of companies which took advantages of change to withdraw recognition from TU (eg, chemical and oil comp.). In most cases, where unions recognised, DP and RP together
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET			
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE			DP can lead to beneficial (economic and social) results only if channelled through RP.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Manag. of large groups	DP has positive impact on work environment and working conditions.	Banks invest substantially in training and staff development	DP programmes complementary to RP
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	No comment	No comment	DP programmes complementary to RP. No RP in banks.

(tab. 5c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito <i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	Positive effects: job enrichment, less monotonous tasks Together with job enrichment, increases in workload and stress	Traditional careers and qualification systems set in collective agreements should be revised to facilitate HR development. More emphasis on merit than on seniority	
L	<i>Employer:</i> Banque Générale	Better employee motivation		Unions are informed about DP through the <i>comité mixte</i> .
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	May lead to better motivation		DP is facilitated by a link with representative participation
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVV	No opinion expressed		A question is whether RP (the WC) can limit the influence of unions in the introduction of DP
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstend ond FNV	Ambivalent impact: more interesting work as well as increased stress. Therefore conditions for use need to be specified		RP (WC) has to look after the company's long term interests, while DP may encourage short term interests. WC has to protect the company from short term interests of groups of employees.
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]			CCP: The unions are not interested in dealing with these new issues, which entail the reallocation of power: they don't want to run any risk, and continue in a general quantitative defence of workers
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union (?)	No experience known. It is assumed that DP might improve worker quality of working life if co-ordinated with collective agreements	Presently, only cases of individualis. and merit-related pay and career recorded.	Formally, in recent years innovative IR issues (internal communication, HR development). Implementation however is very poor. Tendencies towards a complete, individualised, not controlled individual worker "involvement" Agreements needed Heavy pessimism for future of unionism: worker committees and union organisat. might however co-exist within plants
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO			Failure of RP (ie. of Agreement on co-determination of 1979): too slow and does not give individual members participation, but the union.
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)			

(tab. 5c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.	Diversification of work, greater worker responsibility and job satisfaction; better working climate.	HR development and training not only as effect but also as prerequisite of successful DP. This should lead to sharing results and better pay	DP has not brought any real changes in familiar forms of IP. Introd. of DP usually takes place through the Co-operation procedure DP must never appear to displace or by-pass representat. functions of unions
SF	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union	Diversification of work, greater worker responsibility and job satisfaction; better working climate. DP requires however an extremely active attitude from workers, who are not necessarily prone to it.	HR development and training not only as effect but also as prerequisite of successful DP. This should lead to sharing results and better pay In practice no pay improvement recorded	DP has not brought any real changes in familiar forms of IP. Introd. of DP usually takes place through the Co-operation procedure DP and IP are mutually supportive. To be successfully introduced DP needs to be supported by IP (all personnel groups can be safeguarded and information to all employees easily passed)

Tab.6c - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
A	Employer: BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrialists	DP as an improvement of working conditions	Increased effort in training foremen and dept. managers to develop a new approach to the employee. NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of. But on a related topic (qualification and further training) joint working group has been formed. Statutory distinction between waged and salaried employees discussed: new concepts of organisation are leading firms to introduce uniform employment status.	DP and IP are by no means opposite. The role of the works councils (which is <i>protected by the Labour Relations Act</i>) would not be affected by DP. A need for the adaptation of collective agreeem because of DP is pointed out; especially because new forms of work affect pay structure ("Law should be changed to give right to company wage agreement"). NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of.
	Union: GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	GMBE: favourable estimation of consequences. But sufficient qualification of employees has to be politically secured. GPA: <i>positive effects</i> as work becomes more complete and social contacts increased; <i>but</i> , especially in job enhancement and teamwork, productivity related <i>pressure</i> , which leads to the <i>exclusion of those who are incapable</i> of high output for reasons of health, or of aptitude. "Improvements are possible as a spin-off of rationalisation" DP has to be guided by representatives because: 1. the employees initially tend to undo themselves; 2. they lose all motivation once they stumble over the boundaries of self-determination	Increased effort in training foremen and dept. managers to develop a new approach to the employee. GMBE: the very demand for greater skills and aptitudes make it easier to arrange the permanent further training of workers: DP "as a chance to contribute to an upgrading of peoples' worth" NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of. But on a related topic (qualification and further training) joint working group has been formed. Statutory distinction between waged and salaried employees discussed: new concepts of organisation are leading firms to introduce uniform employment status.	Works councils exercise a supportive function by dealing with problems arising between employees and foremen on introducing DP. No fundamental conflict between DP and IP. No longer fears that DP might undermine the role of works councils: DP "won't make good works councils any worse, or bad ones any better". With DP improved the availability of information to the councils: "a chance for better-quality co-determination". . WC may have the opportunity to intervene; . more open atmosphere . trend towards involvement by the WC: management will reach agreement with WC before introducing DP, otherwise it will probably be doomed to failure. GPA: for wage earners, readiness to engage in DP depends on the attitude of WC: for salary earners is different; but salaried workers' council is involved all the same when introducing organisational change (for fears that WC may oppose other matters)

(tab. 6c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal	DP leads to better working conditions: having a say in your job improves your job satisfaction. But this should not lead to higher wages, since you already give them a better life		In the 80s fears of TU that DP was a non-union practice. The contrary was indeed the case. A good understanding with TU crucial to success of any participation scheme. Company cannot introduce DP without support of its unions Attitudes of unions directly linked to amount of information received: → mutual trust. In the long run collaboration can lead to better IR.
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB			CCMB: DP is not a real threat. But warning against incorporating DP techniq. into a broader strategy. CMB: DP as an anti-union strategy: it is the new version of old idea that "workers do not need a union". Represent. democracy needed to counterbalance unequal power.
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamt metall	Unreservedly positive impact on qualification, pay, quality of working life.		Role of WC is overall a positive one. But problems on the matter of works agreements: WC insist in reaching work agreements, within the framework of IG Metall's Coll.Barg. Reform 2000 IG Met. is concerned that WC will be undermined. But this is neither the intention nor the result of DP
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	Ambivalent impact. DP can lead to self-regulated working and therefore to improvement in working life. But it depends on how DP is implemented (eg. if introduced with redundancies, the pressure on individuals will increase) DP has positive impact if it focuses on various abilities of w., and not as a way of selecting the best (= 'Olympic team' principle)	Ambivalent impact on levels of qualification. Ex. from car industry: where groups receive more information, are better qualified, etc. but qualified staff can feel they are being downgraded Sceptical about impact on pay: at Opel teamwork introduced with a 3% increase. But in many cases management refuses to change pay system (=area of conflict with company manag.)	Both WC and middle management are disquieted by DP, since both are mediatory bodies and their position is threatened by direct access Concerns that WC is not sufficiently established and trade union committed. DP can have positive effects on RP where WC are strong and negative where they are weak The potentially conflicting role of group spokespersons in team working and s.s.: but union is counteracting s.s. fears on this

(tab. 6c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI			DP and IP go together, each supporting the other. Correct forum for discussing the introduction of DP is the Co-operation committee at enterprise level; <i>but initiatives might originate also elsewhere</i> Increasing acknowledgement of need for a central body to co-ordinate and monitor DP and pass experiences from one group to another.
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	Positive impact on working conditions, quality of working life and HR development.		DP and IP go together, each supporting the other. Correct forum for discussing the introduction of DP is the Co-operation committee at enterprise level Increasing acknowledgement of need for a central body to co-ordinate and monitor DP and pass experiences from one group to another.
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.	No specific effects of DP as such mentioned	No specific effects of DP as such mentioned	DP as a way to organise work. It's management's responsibility. Therefore it is not a subject for negotiation Only in some large multinationals, where the enterprise committee is strong, DP and RP combined
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO, Fed. Sider. de UGT	More autonomy, more knowledge, more satisfaction; Worker abilities and creativeness emphasised; Better wages; Increased work safety and health Less work fragmentation. <i>But</i> increased pressure, stress, competition Reduced employment and increased worker segmentation Expropriation of worker know-how.	Higher qualification, more training expected	DP as a threat for RP: individualisation/segmentation of IR; union marginalisation. New channels for intervening in the organisation of work and more negotiation needed.
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM			Union weakness (especially in SMEs) as a limitation to representative involvement in DP.
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM-CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux			

(tab. 6c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF		Significant impact on training: which is becoming essential for introducing cellular manufacture and team working (Thus training is no longer an optional extra)	Examples of companies which took advantages of change to withdraw recognition from TU (eg, chemical and oil comp.). In most cases, where unions recognised, DP and RP together
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSFU	AEEU (the most positively oriented): DP contributed to improving quality of w.l. Increase in employees' involvement in work organis. TGWU, MSF: limited autonomy and discretion	AEEU: more training as a positive effect	Examples of companies which took advantages of change to withdraw recognition from TU (eg, chemical and oil comp.). In most cases, where unions recognised, DP and RP together
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES			
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM	Uncertain assessment of impact	Uncertain assessment of impact	DP can lead to beneficial (economic and social) results only if channelled through RP in workplaces.
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of large American Corporation	The workforce are better motivated and there is an improvement in the work environment.	Large investment in training and improvement of skills, multi-skilling part of ongoing improvement programme.	DP programmes complementary to RP
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	DP has positive effect on quality, work environment, skill levels and training.		DP programmes complementary to RP
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federmeccanica			
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM	Flattening hierarchies, polyvalence	Traditional careers and qualification systems set in collective agreements should be revised to facilitate HR development.	
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.IL G.I.S.L. Arbed	Worker satisfaction and motivation as positive results per se	In relation with DP, large investments in training. Participation in QC facilitates skill development. Special training is provided to facilitators in QC DP facilitates job enrichment and a better utilisation of HR	DP does not interfere with RP: it has enhanced mutual understanding DP does not affect scope and coverage of collective bargain. QC are regulated by collective agreement No interference with role of the unions: both suggestion scheme and QC were introduced with the approval of works council. Union representatives participate in the system

(tab. 6c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
L	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	Positive effects (e.g. in the field of security) as outcome of workers' suggestions.	Participation in QC facilitates skill development. Special training is provided to facilitators in QC DP facilitates job enrichment and a better utilisation of HR	DP does not interfere with RP, it has enhanced mutual understanding DP does not affect scope and coverage of collective bargain. QC are regulated by collective agreement No interference with role of the unions: both suggestion scheme and QC were introduced with the approval of works council. Union representatives participate in the system
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME	No opinion expressed		
	<i>Unions:</i> Industriebond FNV IVB CNV	Ambivalent impact: more interesting work as well as increased stress. Therefore conditions for use need to be specified Ind.FNV: effects vary according to the form. From lowest to highest worker influence: traditional forms of 'werkoverleg', job rotation/enrich TQM and QC, aut. w. g.		Ind. FNV: RP is valued higher because of greater potential and legal basis
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM			No relationship between DP and coll. barg. DP is related to innovation within enterprises. DP will reduce scope of sectoral collect. barg. It will bring new issues for decentralised negotiation Unions are required to readapt their practices and to be able to negotiate new issues (ie. rationalisation of work and HR) Less intervention of legislation and of centralised negotiation required Unions are too rigid and workplace organis. are not representative and capable of assuming responsibilities on new issues: likely that workers will themselves negotiate DP related issues in the future DP may work together with effective worker workplace representatives

(tab. 6c continued)

Country	Organisation	Impact on working conditions and worker quality of life	Impact on HR development	DP and representative participation
P	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP	According to experience, effects are not very positive: increasing effort and stress, more accidents, etc. The workers themselves seem to have reacted against new forms of w.o.	Training is insufficient, and oriented exclusively to companies' needs	DP is interfering with coll. bargain. ; constitutional principle "equal pay for equal job" not respected; informal arrangements with workers established; workers are not classified according to coll. agreem.; arbitrary wage differentiation within teams; in DP multinationals country's IR tradition not respected New forms of work organis. are interfering with RP: teamworking affects union activity at the workplace; information and communic. programmes limit union rights to represent workers
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI			
	<i>Unions:</i> Metall, CF			
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET	Diversification of work, greater worker responsibility and job satisfaction; better working climate.	HR development and training not only as effect but also as prerequisite of successful DP. This should lead to sharing results and better pay	DP has not brought any real changes in familiar forms of IP. Introd. of DP usually takes place through the Co-operation procedure DP must never appear to displace or by-pass representat. functions of unions
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL	Diversification of work, greater worker responsibility and job satisfaction; better working climate. DP requires however an extremely active attitude from workers, who are not necessarily prone to it. Sometimes new disputes (eg. between competing teams); or discriminations against individuals in weaker position	HR development and training not only as effect but also as prerequisite of successful DP. This should lead to sharing results and better pay In practice no pay improvement recorded	DP has not brought any real changes in familiar forms of IP. Introd. of DP usually takes place through the Co-operation procedure DP and IP are mutually supportive. To be successfully introduced DP needs to be supported by IP (all personnel groups can be safeguarded and information to all employees easily passed) Met. Work. Union: some danger since employers might give prominence to DP (but no examples of such cases given)

Table 4d - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,		At statutory level no change	
	<i>Union:</i> Chamber of Labour, ÖGB	In union magazine tribute paid to the personnel concept of General Motor, called an exemplary firm		
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)	Lack of information. Only a few companies could be cited. Most of them are metal companies		
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV			
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	No much information at peak levels	No new rules governing IR [In metal sector works agreements in relation to the introduction of team work are not much known at central level: the association is against them]	
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	No much information at peak levels	No new rules governing IR [In metal sector works agreements in relation to the introduction of team work are not much familiar]	
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA			
	<i>Union:</i> LO			
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE			QC and TQM appreciated because they are a source for employee motivation, the big lack in Spanish enterprises.
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT			QC and TQM less appreciated, as they are seen as unbalanced, exclusively managerial initiative, causing stress, which are meant to involve individuals without real participation, and which result in an individualisation of labour relations Work teams are more appreciated, as they make easier the achievement of positive effects. The potential positive effects (which are few) can be increased in a context of different management orientat.

(tab. 4d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPFF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	Each organisation can quote several cases. The most often quoted are Renault (TQM and HR), Steel Industry (new skill evaluation), Pechiney (new work organisation).		
	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	Each organisation can quote several cases. The most often quoted are Renault (TQM and HR), Steel Industry (new skill evaluation), Pechiney (new work organisation).		
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI			
	<i>Union:</i> TUC			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	Handful of cases very uncertainly known		
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	Handful of cases very uncertainly known		
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formerly FIE)	Factors for successful introd. of DP are linked to survival and competitiveness of enterprise: necessary to provide people with relevant information Successful enterprises listed in <i>Teams in Action</i>		Too early to assess impact of DP
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	Successful enterprise case studies in <i>New Forms of Work Organisation</i> study. Cause of failure is when manag introduce DP without involvement or consultation with workforce.		Too early to assess impact of DP
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria	Zanussi (joint committees, advanced training programmes), Fiat (TQM, semi-aut. w. groups, integrated areas), food companies, Montedison (integrated areas)		
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	Zanussi (joint committees, advanced training programmes), Fiat (TQM, semi-aut. w. groups, integrated areas), food companies, Montedison (integrated areas) Critical assessment of developments of cases once seen as successful (Pirelli, Olivetti): lack of long-term strategies in organis. of work		
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. I.L., G.I.S.L.	[see 5d and 6d]	[see 5d and 6d]	[see 5d and 6d]

(tab. 4d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
L	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	[see 5d and 6d]	[see 5d and 6d]	[see 5d and 6d]
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW <i>MHP</i> (managers)	COB-SER case studies of aut. w.g.: AWV: the reasons for implementing and having successful w.g. well illustrated. MHP: Dupont as successful case		
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	CNV: disagreement with conclusion that aut.w.g. are a success formula for any company FNV: negative aspect of aut.w.g is the selection of the best workers only. →dualism of internal labour market		
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP			
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT			
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	Volvo's Kalmar plant (1974): information and communication policies, work teams, job rotation, decentralis. of union work, employee involvement in decision- making in co-determin. committees, etc. [The plant is being closed as well as the Uddevalla, for declining market demand] ABB T50-project: flow oriented production and very few hierarchical levels. It is a <i>fully-autonomy</i> project, not a DP-project.		
	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	Volvo's Kalmar plant (1974): information and communication policies, work teams, job rotation, decentralis. of union work, employee involvement in decision- making in co-determination committees, etc.		
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK			
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA			

Table 5d. Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks		No need of formal adjustments of collective agreements, nor of law.	
	<i>Union:</i> GPA			
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB	No bank actually using DP could be named. There are banks which established practices for the involvement of trade unions or middle management, not of employees		
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK			
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.	Few examples cited. No cases of failure cited	Positive reactions. Learning process (but experience is insufficient)	
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	One case cited, where an area was converted from tayloristic to team working situation Autonomous teamworking not very widespread	No conflict in principle between DP and RP. DP more as complementing than being an alternative to RP	
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA			
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector			DP (ie. QC, TQM) is important because it is a source of worker motivation and involvement, which is most lacking in Spanish culture and practice
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB			QC and TQM appreciated because they are a source for employee motivation, the big lack in Spanish enterprises.

(tab. 5d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
E	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO- UGT			QC and TQM less appreciated, as they are seen as unbalanced, exclusively managerial initiative, causing stress, which are meant to involve individuals without real participation, and which result in an individualisation of labour relations Work teams are more appreciated, as they make easier the achievement of positive effects. The potential positive effects (which are few) can be increased in a context of different management orientat.
F	<i>Employer:</i>			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC			
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank			
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET			
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE	Sporadic cases, less studied and considered as not significant		
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Manag. of large groups	Main banking groups have a range of successful DP programmes	It is an evolving process	Too early to assess impact of DP
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	No comment	No comment	
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	Training programmes in major banks		
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba	Training programmes in major banks		

(tab. 5d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL	Already 170 improvement projects have been presented	The experience is too recent Only informal and internal understandings. No effects on general norms	Comité mixte is informed regularly. Many worker representatives received training or were involved in programmes
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	The experience is too recent	Only informal and internal understandings. No effects on general norms	The experience is too recent
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB			
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstendb ond FNV	[On COB-SER case studies: negative aspect of aut.w.g is the selection of the best workers only. →dualism of internal labour market →new hierarchical style		
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union			
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO			
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbmf (TCO)			
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.			
	<i>Union:</i> Finnish Bank Employee Union			

Tab.6d - Diffusion and Impact of DP according to the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrial ists		A need for the adaptation of collective agreem because of DP is pointed out; especially because new forms of work affect pay structure ("Law should be changed to give right to company wage agreement"). NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of. But on a related topic (qualification and further training) joint working group has been formed. Statutory distinction between waged and salaried employees discussed: new concepts of organisation are leading firms to introduce uniform employment status.	
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)		A need for the adaptation of collective agreem because of DP is pointed out; especially because new forms of work affect pay structure ("Law should be changed to give right to company wage agreement"). NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of. But on a related topic (qualification and further training) joint working group has been formed. Statutory distinction between waged and salaried employees discussed: new concepts of organisation are leading firms to introduce uniform employment status.	
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimental	Much more knowledge about companies using DP: car assembly plants (GM, Volvo), and others		
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	Much more knowledge about companies using DP: car assembly plants (GM, Volvo), and others		
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamt metall	Fractal factory (prof Warneke) as a positive case - based on information and flexible organiz. Other good examples, where high increases in cost reduction were obtained through DP	Learning effect for companies: they are more prepared to exchange experiences	

(tab. 6d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
D	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	Examples cited of companies where team work has been practised for some time with good combination of RP and DP	Now the majority within TU are in favour of direct election of group spokespersons rather than this being under the control of s.s.: they must represent the group and not the union (and the union must be attractive and not maintain positions through compulsory measures)	
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI			
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union			
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.			QC and TQM appreciated because they are a source for employee motivation, the big lack in Spanish enterprises.
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO, Fed. Sider. de UGT			QC and TQM less appreciated, as they are seen as unbalanced, exclusively managerial initiative, causing stress, which are meant to involve individuals without real participation, and which result in an individualisation of labour relations Work teams are more appreciated, as they make easier the achievement of positive effects. The potential positive effects (which are few) can be increased in a context of different management orientat.
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM	[see peak organis.]		
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM-CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux	[see peak organis.]		

(tab. 6d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF	Rover car company as a good example of changes taking place in many organiz.		
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSFU			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES			
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM	Sporadic cases, little studied and considered as not significant		
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of large American Corporation	DP has contributed to the competitiveness and to maintaining the markets of the enterprise	DP is a developing process	
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	Multi-nationals are well advanced in implementing aspects of DP. Successful examples: Thermo King; Galtee Meats Failure: Usually owner-managed firms looking for a 'quick-fix' solution to problems.	Union is continually assessing impact of DP on business and members.	
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federmeccanica	[see peak organis.]		
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM	[see peak organis.]		
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.IL G.I.S.L. Arbed	Steel company as a case of success	No legislation change. Some influence on collective agreem. (QC are mentioned in collective agreements) Informal understanding on DP do prevail	Collective agreements
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	Steel company as a case of success, as indicated by data on suggestions and participation in QC. But after a maximum, presently some decline	DP does not affect really collective bargaining. The suggestion system is regulated by detailed norms approved by works council	
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME			
	<i>Unions:</i> Industrieboord FNV IVB CNV			
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM			
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP			
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI			

(tab. 6d continued)

Country	Organisation	Cases of success/ of failure	Change after some experimentation of DP	Most/least appreciated aspects of DP (according to experience)
S	<i>Unions:</i> Metall, CF			
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET			
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL			

Table 7a - Activities and Prospects regarding DP in the opinion of the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,	Since DP is not of central importance to the assoc., activities limited to management seminars and advice to companies.		Co-operation between the two sides may be seen in advanced training institutions (Austr. Centre for Productivity and Econ. Efficiency"); but social partnership committees are uninvolved in the topics of DP Both sides recently involved in the promotion of technology
	<i>Union:</i> ÖGB, Federal Chamber of Labour		ÖGB and Fed. Chamb. of Lab.: DP is becoming a central topic in publications (→ educational material)	Co-operation between the two sides may be seen in advanced training institutions (Austr. Centre for Productivity and Econ. Efficiency"); but social partnership committees are uninvolved in the topics of DP Both sides recently involved in the promotion of technology
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)	No initiatives on DP NCMV: much attention on DP, through training and publications	No initiatives on DP NCMV: much attention on DP, through publications	
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV	Pronounced rise of interest in DP in the early 80s, alarmed by the arrival of QC. DP discussed in congresses. Debate in committees, training, publications. It remains all the same marginal ACV: comparatively more interest in DP	Publications DP started to emerge in regular training packages	
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	No initiative taken on DP. It is not their function		Contacts with other party only via the "social dialogue" within the so-called platform organisations Informal discussions at the sectoral level No joint statements and declarations, nor joint conferences
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	DGB occupied with issue of co-determination in the workplace since the mid-80s The National Congress of DGB passed resolutions on future of work, and made proposals for the amendment of Works Council Constitution Act	Research work supported by the trade union Hans-Böckler Foundation (more emphasis should be given to qualitative evaluation of forms of DP)	Contacts with other party only via the "social dialogue" within the so-called platform organisations Informal discussions at the sectoral level No joint statements and declarations, nor joint conferences

(tab. 7a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	1983: programme "Renewal from within" (productivity and organiz. development, training of managers, etc.)	[see also DI]	1986: new Co-operation Agreement (clauses on the use of new technol.): →a more participative managerial style. Greater importance to joint initiatives of 2 peak organiz. 1989-92 "The Club of Good Examples" 1993: a forum arranged where 30 enterprises related their experience about DP and IP New joint initiative with public support called "The Co-operation committee as motive power"
	<i>Union:</i> LO	1983: elaboration of a proposal for a change in the Co-operation and Technology Agreement with DA. "The development process in connection with work": recent initiative to orient itself towards new goals which can secure the interests of members both from a collective and an individual viewpoint	In Co-operation with LO Technol. and Research Commit. elaboration of a proposal called "The development process in connection with work"	1986: new Co-operation Agreement (clauses on the use of new technol.): →a more participative managerial style. Greater importance to joint initiatives of 2 peak organiz. 1989-92 "The Club of Good Examples" 1993: a forum arranged where 30 enterprises related their experience about DP and IP New joint initiative with public support called "The Co-operation committee as motive power"
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE	No specific initiatives. DP is not an important issue	[American managerial literature mentioned]	No contact
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	Recently limited attention to DP in seminars and debates	Some publications, research activity	No contact
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPF, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	CNPF: Since the late 70s initiatives to disseminate the ideas of DP		[NB State incited "modernisation négociée" ('88) and "Changer le travail" ('91) projects] CNPF: in 1988 and 1989 proposal of negotiation of modernisation. →agreements signed by CFDT and by CGC, and in some cases by CFTC and FO. CGT always refused.
	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	CFDT: great expectations on express. rights: seminars, training, research on the topic and on work conditions FO: initiatives on the amelioration of working cond. CGT: seminars, debates, study on modernisation	CFDT: <i>Paroles</i> 1 and 2 (research programmes on express. groups, and negotiated modernisation) FO: in the 80s study on participationist ideology CGT: publications on DP and worker intervention	CFDT: doubts on effectiveness of modernisation agreements FO, CGT: criticised the tendency to negotiate the employer rather than the employee requests (CGT has not signed most agreements)

(tab. 7a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI	Workshops and audit service for individual companies. involved in DP Information not only about success stories, but also on realistic, problematic cases	<i>Statement of Principles on Employee Involvement</i> Yearly Summary sheet for members	Few examples of joint ventures
	<i>Union:</i> TUC			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	1991 was celebrated as the 'Year of quality': therefore discussions and incentivation of TQM, and of HRM devoted to employee involvement and job participation		
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE			
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formerly FIE)	A number of seminars and workshops are being organised	<i>Publications:</i> <i>Teams in Action; Guidelines on Employee Involvement.</i>	<i>Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement</i> with ICTU Proposed joint project with ICTU and Irish Productivity Centre to promote involvement, including DP
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	With support of Congress, unions are training their front-line officials and lay representat. to assess management proposals against defined criteria [see 4c]	<i>Publication:</i> <i>New Forms of Work Organisation: Options for Unions.</i>	<i>Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement</i> with FIE (now IBEC) Proposed joint project with IBEC and Irish Productivity Centre to promote involvement, including DP
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria			Tripartite agreement of July 1993, opening spaces for particip. at the workplace. Since mid-80s, diffusion of plant level agreements on specific forms of particip. Increasing importance of contacts between partners, at plant but also at national level Joint discussions, joint declarations, etc. are however rare
	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL	Studies and debates on particip. especially in large establishments Diffusion of experiences	Research and publications on important cases, on TQM, etc	Collective agreements with Fiat, for new particip. models of IR in its new southern plants
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed. I.L. G.I.S.L.	[see 8a and 9a]	[see 8a and 9a]	[see 8a and 9a]
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB OGBL	[see 8a and 9a]	[see 8a and 9a]	[see 8a and 9a]

(tab. 7a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW	AWV: experiments in 'werkoverleg' and aut. w.g NCW: in 80s conferences and open discussions about worker involvement; improvement of worker involvement is part of training programmes for associated organis.	COB-SER case studies ('89-90) NCW: publication on 'working differently'	COB-SER case studies ('89-90)
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	COB-SER case studies ('89-90) CNV: training on how to improve Q of W		COB-SER case studies ('89-90)
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP			
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	CGTP: in the past, participation was seen as discussion of economic perspectives and structural change. Recently, discussion on companies' productivity and competitiveness accepted. UGT: great interest for modernisation in the 80s. A social contract for modernisation prepared and sent to other partners. Recently issue has been put aside		
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	Volvo-Kalmar experiment, about which all organis. were involved	Joint study on Volvo's Kalmar Plant.	
	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	Volvo-Kalmar experiment, about which all organis. were involved	Joint study on Volvo's Kalmar Plant.	
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK	(General information on Co-operation Act)		No separate agreem. or laws on DP. The Co-operation Act (1979) contains many provisions on DP. Collective agreements deal increasingly with matters related to DP. In particular most coll. agreem. of 1993 open (entirely new) spaces for decentralised bargain, where DP related matters could be dealt with

(tab. 7a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
	<i>Unions:</i> SAK, STTK, AKAVA	(General information on Co-operation Act)		No separate agreem. or laws on DP. The Co-operation Act (1979) contains many provisions on DP. Collective agreements deal increasingly with matters related to DP. In particular most coll. agreem. of 1993 open (entirely new) spaces for decentralised bargain, where DP related matters could be dealt with

Table 8a. Activities and Prospects regarding DP in the opinion of the social partners organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks	DP not discussed either by the statutory or the voluntary assoc., because companies are apparently not in conflict with works councils and unions in this connection. Stronger messages might be sent to companies to reconsider their management hierarchies and introduce new forms of organis. "But we don't wish to be patrizing with companies"		
	<i>Union:</i> GPA			
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB	No activities	No research	No agreements
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK	No activities	No research	No agreements
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.			No legislation on DP. No collective agreements relating directly to DP. However the introduction of time.auton team working requires works agreements in accordance with norms set in umbrella agreement Informal discussions on DP are frequent between 2 sides No joint statements, nor joint conferences or workshops
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG			No legislation on DP. No collective agreements relating directly to DP. However the introduction of time.auton team working requires works agreements in accordance with norms set in umbrella agreement Informal discussions on DP are frequent between 2 sides No joint statements, nor joint conferences or workshops

(tab. 8a continued)

Cou ntry	Organisati on	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA	The representative system has been and continues to be the principal way of regulation		Joint Council recently established Recently, setting up of joint conferences for representatives of both sides. In general, less confrontation when parties meet.
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector	The representative system has been and continues to be the principal way of regulation		Joint Council recently established Recently, setting up of joint conferences for representatives of both sides. In general, less confrontation when parties meet.
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB			
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO- UGT		Publications on DP: to be used for training programmes and as a basis for negotiation	
F	<i>Employer:</i>			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC			
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank			
	<i>Union:</i> BIFU			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET			
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE			
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Manag. of large groups	Training and education of staff programmes → to change the organis. to participative/ consensus cultures	Banks have internal documents for staff information and training.	Part of the ICTU/IBEC <i>Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement</i>
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	None	None	Part of the ICTU/IBEC <i>Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement</i>

(tab. 8a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	Seminars on participation organised.	Publication of papers on participation in Europe.	Increasing interest for joint regulation of DP Joint discussions, joint declarations, etc. are however rare
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba			
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL	Discussions on DP organised within training programmes		
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	Continuous training has been inserted into collect. agreements Workers may channel their voice on company journals		
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB	No initiative reported		
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstbond FNV	Experiments on the introduction of DP in single banks (and distribution centre)		
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banking Union			
S	<i>Employer:</i> BAO	(No initiatives recorded. But written documentation available)	Written documentation	Co-determination agreement of 1979 concerning decision-making procedures in workplaces: compulsory formal procedure (involving IP) considered too time demanding Since then no common initiatives
	<i>Unions:</i> Sbnf (TCO)	(No initiatives recorded. But written documentation available)	TCO: booklets on DP	Since 1979 no common initiatives
SF	<i>Employer:</i> Bank Empl. Assoc.	The organis. has a limited staff: no continuous activities on DP. Information, training and activities on DP are produced at the banks themselves. Instructions and guidance provided however on application of Co-operation Act		No separate agreem. or laws on DP. The Co-operation Act (1979) contains many provisions on DP. Collective agreements deal increasingly with matters related to DP. In particular most coll. agreem. of 1993 open (entirely new) spaces for decentralised bargain, where DP related matters could be dealt with

(tab. 8a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
SF	Union: Finnish Bank Employee Union	The organis. has a limited staff: no continuous activities on DP. Information, training and activities on DP are produced at the banks themselves. Instructions and guidance provided however on application of Co-operation Act		No separate greem. or laws on DP. The Co-operation Act (1979) contains many provisions on DP. Collective agreements deal increasingly with matters related to DP. In particular most coll. agreem. of 1993 open (entirely new) spaces for decentralised bargain, where DP related matters could be dealt with

Tab.9a - Activities and Prospects regarding DP in the opinion of the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrial ists (VÖI)	VÖI (dominated by larger firms) is the most active proponent of programmes and publicity on DP The assoc. magazine regularly deals with issues related to DP	VÖI: Elaboration of official position: " <i>Man in the World of Work</i> "	NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of. But on a related topic (qualification and further training) a joint working group has been formed. Statutory distinction between waged and salaried employees discussed: new concepts of organisation are leading firms to introduce uniform employment status.
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	GPA: has been concerning itself with work organisation affairs for many years At general Union Meeting in 1990, said that Co-operation in solving problems at the workplace as a priority for works councils	GPA: policy paper: " <i>Participation a Risk? New Corporate Structures call for Union Action</i> "	NB: DP as such has not yet been spoken of. But on a related topic (qualification and further training) joint working group has been formed. Statutory distinction between waged and salaried employees discussed: new concepts of organisation are leading firms to introduce uniform employment status.
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal	No, except consultation following regional (local) initiatives	No research	No agreements
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	Unions are in general more active than elsewhere. CCMB: considerably active. Large-scale training programme. CMB: recently much effort on teamwork: training course on this in 1993	CCMB: undertaking a survey on the topic (on a sample of 300 shop stewards) CMB: summary report and a campaign (leaflets, press conference) in 1994 on the training initiative	
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamt metall	Repeatedly invitations of the other side to conferences No joint declarations: because of refusal of unions to sign anything which is not a binding agreement	Pamphlets published for their members, where the guidelines of the association are summarised Involvement in projects within the Ministry of Research's "Work and Technology" programme: "Strategies for Production in the 21st Century"	Individual particip. rights already exist in collective agreements They are adequate Many contacts between parties, apart from issuing joint statements Many direct contacts of an informal nature between the individual experts, who meet frequently at conferences Meetings also take place in the so-called "Platform organiz".

(tab. 9a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
D	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	Repeatedly invitations of the other side to conferences No joint declarations: employers' association did not wish to take part in a joint declaration. First conference with emphasis on particip. in 1988: →a new union company policy for the union (=s.s. as moderators in a participation process) In the past "Humanisation of work" programme: discussions and conferences on lean production; "Collective bargain reform 2000" Works councils provided with "comments and suggestions on team working"		Individual particip. rights already exist in collective agreements. They are not adequate: new frameworks necessary (see the "coll. Bargain Reform 2000", experience in Baden-W., which counterpart refuses to discuss) Many contacts between parties, apart from issuing joint statements Many direct contacts of an informal nature between the individual experts, who meet frequently at conferences Meetings also take place in the so-called "Platform organiz".
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI	See peak organiz. Both sides work to a joint programme which includes information activities in favour of quality development in enterprises: they start with few firms and the results are diffused by joint conferences, where managers and shop stewards are invited	In 1992 DI asked the Institute for Future Studies to prepare necessary documentation on new developments towards the year 2000: → "management is going to be an activity in which more and more employees are going to participate. The reason is that the necessary knowledge will be in the domain of more people".	Co-operation on new forms of management at enterprise level Since 1979 Joint Technology Committee
	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	See peak organiz. Both sides work to a joint programme which includes information activities in favour of quality development in enterprises: they start with few firms and the results are diffused by joint conferences, where managers and shop stewards are invited		Co-operation on new forms of management at enterprise level Since 1979 Joint Technology Committee
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.			
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO., Fed. Sider. de UGT	Research activity on the issue	Publications on DP: to be used for training programmes and as a basis for negotiation Research activity on the issue	Recently, agreements in large companies
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM	In the 70s: high contribution to employer mobilisation on DP: →APACT and ERACT		Collective agreements on modernisation in large companies: Renault, the steel industry, Pechiney (all refused by CGT)

(tab. 9a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
F	Unions: FTM-CGT, FGMM- CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux			Collective agreements on modernisation in large companies: Renault, the steel industry, Pechiney (all refused by CGT)
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF	General statements of support for DP produced. 'Investors In People' and 'British Standard SS750' promoted Programme of Chief Executive networking Critical examination of different DP techniques	Detailed information on each area produced	Few examples of joint ventures. In 1993 jointly sponsored conference on future of manufacturing.
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSFU	TGWU: sessions on changes of w.o. (with participation of other side) intensified in last 3 years		TGWU: Joint training and education session on changes in work practices
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES			
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM			
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of large American Corporation	Participated in AEEU conference in 1992. Internal publication of information documents	Internal publication of information documents	Part of the ICTU/IBEC <i>Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement</i>
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	1992: first union conference on the topic Organised seminars and training programmes	Papers from 1992 conference available. A proposal to hold more conferences and training sessions on DP and related issues.	Part of the ICTU/IBEC <i>Joint Declaration on Employee Involvement Agreement</i> with individual enterprises on introduction and support for DP arrangements
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federmeccanica			Tripartite agreement of July 1993, opening spaces for participation at the workplace. Since mid-80s, diffusion of plant level agreements on forms of participation. Increasing importance of contacts between partners, at plant but also at national level Joint discussions, joint declarations, etc, are however rare
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM	Workshops and seminars. Debate within training programmes research initiatives Publications		Collective agreements with Fiat, for new participation models of IR in its new southern plants

(tab. 9a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.IL G.I.S.L. Arbed	Arbed: the implementation of the programme	High involvement of employees (1/3 participates actively). widespread training. Frequent consultation through questionnaires, etc.	
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	No specific initiative. Works council involved		
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME	70s: elaboration of very positive positions about DP by some members; but not an official position Since '87 with other party information and promotion on ways to improve quality of w. Training programmes on 'werkoverleg' and 'working in team'	Brochure on DP in the 70s ('heading for a participative democracy' in 70s)	COB-SER case studies ('89-90) Since '87 with other party information and promotion on ways to improve quality of w. Common projects for the improvement of quality of w., which led to the establishment of a bipartite commission by ROM (=council for metal industry in which all social printers co-oper.)
P	<i>Unions:</i> Industriebo nd FNV IVB CNV	Since '87 with other party information and promotion on ways to improve quality of w. Ind.FNV: involvement in projects concerning the introduction of aut. w.g.: → protection of most vulnerable groups; .coll. bargain. resulting in agreements on training, HR dev. IVB CNV: research projects, coll. bargain, for implementing DP in companies	IVB CNV: launched research projects on improvement of Q of W	COB-SER case studies ('89-90) Since '87 with other party information and promotion on ways to improve quality of w. Common projects for the improvement of quality of w., which led to the establishment of a bipartite commission by ROM (=council for metal industry in which all social partners co-oper.)
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM			
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP			
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI	Volvo-Kalmar experiment, about which all organis. were involved		
	<i>Unions:</i> Metal, CF	Volvo-Kalmar experiment, about which all organis. were involved		

(tab. 9a continued)

Country	Organisation	The organisation's past activities	Research and publications on DP	Agreements, contacts and initiatives with other partner
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET	Members are provided with training and information about DP. Employers use also extensively Union training centre (they found that employees are more receptive to training arranged by their union)		No separate agreem. or laws on DP. The Co-operation Act (1979) contains many provisions on DP. Collective agreements deal increasingly with matters related to DP. In particular most coll. agreem. of 1993 open (entirely new) spaces for decentralised bargain, where DP related matters could be dealt with Examples in the metal sector.
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL	Members are provided with training and information about DP Met. Work. UN: Well-organised training centre .Research department established. . Extensive work on DP by full-time researcher at workplaces TL: training programmes to encourage supervisors to engage in changing their role STL: works to promote the smoothest possible introd. of DP. Preparation of training material	STL: ' <i>Let's develop office work</i> ', training material (1992)	No separate greem. or laws on DP. The Co-operation Act (1979) contains many provisions on DP. Collective agreements deal increasingly with matters related to DP. In particular most coll. agreem. of 1993 open (entirely new) spaces for decentralised bargain, where DP related matters could be dealt with Examples in the metal sector.

Table 7b - Activities and Prospects regarding DP in the opinion of the social partners' organisations at the national level (peak organisations) in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
A	<i>Employer:</i> Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber,		Further diffusion of DP anticipated	A spread in DP does not affect empl. associations
	<i>Union:</i> ÖGB		Further diffusion of DP anticipated	DP does affect the unions in their specific task: therefore intensification of activities in the fields is needed
B	<i>Employer:</i> VBO, NCMV (represents Flemish SMEs)		In general, a rise of interest in DP is not expected NCMV: increasing importance of DP in SMEs (because of complexity of modern management, new technol., need for better management, arrival of young highly educated employees)	
	<i>Unions:</i> ACV, ABVV		In general, a rise of interest in DP is not expected	
D	<i>Employer:</i> BDA	No initiative planned, since it is not their function	DP will become more widespread despite recession The internalisation of industry and increasing competitive pressure will continue to require DP for comp. efficiency	DP as in integral part of future rationalisation measures, which will not vanish
	<i>Unions:</i> DGB	Workshops on work and technology, where DP issues will be discussed, are planned	DP will become more widespread. But fears it will be abandoned after the recession	DP as an opportunity Different the picture regarding the new German federal states: here there is still room for a successful implementation of Fordism
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DA	[see also D1]		
	<i>Union:</i> LO	"The development process in connection with work": the consequences from the viewpoint of increasing DP are being negotiated with the employers' side		
E	<i>Employer:</i> CEOE	DP is not priority on agenda	Different expectations for future	
	<i>Unions:</i> CC.OO., UGT	CCOO: other issues are presently more important UGT: debate on DP		
F	<i>Employer:</i> CNPf, PM, CJD, "Entreprise et progrès"	CNPf: less directly involved on DP at present: topic delegated to "Progrès du management", or the MFQ	The issue is going to be less important	

(tab. 7b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
F	<i>Unions:</i> CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC	Some initiatives on DP (within the general framework of "modernisation") continued. CFTC: study on participative management CFDT: programme <i>Paroles2</i> on employees' expression CGT: joint programme with researchers on the involvement of some categories of workers in the management of work (CGC: no initiative presently)	The issue is going to be less important	
GB	<i>Employer:</i> CBI	[see 7a]	CBI is the most optimistic: the ideas of last 5-8 years will become received wisdom.	Companies now understand terms as communication, empowerment, quality, but not everyone knows what to do. In the future the young will just do it.
	<i>Union:</i> TUC		In general: things will continue much as they have done.	Feeling that changes would be made on a relatively piecemeal basis Employee reactions would depend on the manner DP was introduced and on the tradition of workplace union organisation TUC: great interest for the possible links between DP, joint consultation and collect. bargaining (within the prospect of EC initiatives)
GR	<i>Employer:</i> SEV	No initiatives on the agenda (nor in the past)		As long as DP is a value, it is looked at with favour. If it is a managerial technique, it is not a matter for the organis.
	<i>Unions:</i> GSEE	No initiatives on the agenda (nor in the past)		To promote DP the organis. is willing to reinforce works councils rather than company unions
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> IBEC (formally FIE)	IBEC intends to promote concept of DP through seminars and conferences It proposed to set up a network of enterprises already involved in implement. DP → good practice examples for others	DP will stay, in ten years will be the norm in employee-managem. relations	DP programmes have a role to play in the future competitiveness of Irish enterprises within the European single market.
	<i>Union:</i> ICTU	ICTU: on the basis of motion adopted in 1993 conference, → series of training programmes for officials and lay activities	DP will stay, in ten years will be the norm in employee-managem. relations	DP programmes have a role to play in the future competitiveness of Irish enterprises within the European single market.
I	<i>Employer:</i> Confindustria		Further diffusion of DP anticipated	

(tab. 7b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
I	<i>Unions:</i> CGIL, CISL, UIL		Further diffusion of DP anticipated	
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.I.L., G.I.S.L.	[see 8b and 9b]	[see 8b and 9b]	[see 8b and 9b]
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	[see 8b and 9b]	[see 8b and 9b]	[see 8b and 9b]
NL	<i>Employers:</i> AWV, NCW	AWV: only employer organ. which has DP on agenda: the acquisition of knowledge on the topic is seen as very important (government incentives for improv. of QofW); presently involved as consultant in implementation of DP	AWV: although hierarchical Dutch culture, and slow diffusion of DP up to now, more DP expected because of pressure to improve efficiency	AWV: → gap between high skilled employees involved in DP and low skilled worker with unattractive jobs And gap between large DP companies and no-DP traditional companies
	<i>Unions:</i> FNV, CNV	FNV: anniversary congress of 1995 devoted to organis of work		
P	<i>Employer:</i> CIP		CIP: DP is expected to develop as a matter of course; even if DP is not looked at with favour by both social partners (the unions preferring revendicative approaches) EC intervention on the subject would be opposed by employers	CIP: DP development, and social dialogue on it, might be positive if it helps unions assume responsibility in the perspectives of economy. Presently unions are uncertain because of representative problems; but they will become more interested in DP, unless they accept to fade away. DP will be the outcome of better education and new social demands. It will require change in IR, and indirect, not statutory, forms of regulation. There are however other priorities. Therefore change is expected for the late '90s
	<i>Unions:</i> CGTP, UGT	CGTP: necessary more active intervention, to control correct implementation of agreements, to establish clearer boundaries between competencies of QC and union organis., to negotiate consequences of DP (compensation, working hours, qualifications, etc) UGT: an extensive discussion of relationship between unions and worker committees needed		CGTP: DP practices will necessary spread, because of social change. But necessary to establish a channel for information and consultation within enterprises to have DP developed with success UGT: DP as an irreversible trend, which will have economic effects for both sides

(tab. 7b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
S	<i>Employer:</i> SAF	Promotion of change from societal to managerial corporatism: expected to give the individual employer greater flexibility in organis. matters	A very extreme form of DP will prevail: ie. <i>complete particip. and responsibility</i> . Seen as natural behaviour of many Swedish companies today. Outcome of need for more competent workers	
	<i>Unions:</i> LO, TCO, SIF, SALF	LO: it will continue advocating "The developing job" Debates on employers' move toward managerial corporatism (fears that decentralis. of coll. bargain. may be negative for employees in periods of unemployment) TCO: Fully-auton. groups advocated: → more training and more modest demands on career. The organis. is going to assist members with programmes that can change daily routines: programmes established by Working Life Fund SALF: advocates for DP, and will continue in the 90s. → information of members about how to develop their tasks as leaders in constructive ways. SIF: their members are going to disappear in the 90s	TCO: in future group organis. and training will be more important than DP. Structural change will require high degree of competence	Fundamental values for future: altruism, right for personal development, right to influence one's work. Employees will have not to expect traditional career and high differences in salary in the advocated fully-autonomous groups
SF	<i>Employer:</i> TT, LTK		DP will become more established There is great deal of room for future development, in the depressed economic situation of Finland	<i>Positive expectations:</i> greater productivity; greater work diversification, increasing work satisfaction and worker influence. Enhanced sense of workplace solidarity and better climate. <i>Blurring boundaries between occupational groups.</i> <i>Negative expectations:</i> no threats if properly implemented (training required)

(tab. 7b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
SF	Unions: SAK, STTK, AKAVA		DP will become more established There is great deal of room for future development, in the depressed economic situation of Finland	<p><i>Positive expectations:</i> greater productivity; greater work diversification, increasing work satisfaction and worker influence. Enhanced sense of workplace solidarity and better climate.</p> <p>Blurring boundaries between occupational groups: some concern about the future of organis. representing different groups.</p> <p>- <i>Negative expectations:</i> possible growing competition between groups, discrimination of individuals; possible threat on existing coll bargain (no examples are however given): joint agreements on the implem of DP required.</p>

Table 8b. Activities and Prospects regarding DP in the opinion of the social partners organisations in the banking sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
A	<i>Employer:</i> Assoc. of Austrian Saving Banks			
	<i>Union:</i> GPA			
B	<i>Employer:</i> BVB		In general, a rise of interest in DP is not expected	
	<i>Unions:</i> LBC, BBTK		In general, a rise of interest in DP is not expected BBTK: further loss of interest foreseen LBC: DP could become more important for core workers	
D	<i>Employer:</i> Banking Employer Assoc.		Both internal communication with workforce and WC and external communication with union expected to intensify	DP is in accord with social development and business management requirements. It will increase
	<i>Unions:</i> HBV, DAG	U. preparing negotiating positions for collective barg. U. want to propose experiments of DP to be introduced and monitored scientifically	Both internal communication with workforce and WC and external communication with union expected to intensify	DP as a work form of the future NB DP has narrow empirical basis in the sector. But the parties show high interest in it.
DK	<i>Employer:</i> FA			
	<i>Union:</i> Fed. Employees of the Finance Sector			
E	<i>Employer:</i> AEB	DP is not a priority	DP will not be an important issue	
	<i>Unions:</i> FEBA-CCO FEBASO-UGT	More importance to DP than at central level Training programmes and documentation to be used in negotiations are being prepared		
F	<i>Employer:</i>			
	<i>Unions:</i> Banque CGT, Banque CFDT, Banque FO, Banque CFTC			

(tab. 8b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
GB	<i>Employer:</i> Manager from large clearing bank			
GB	<i>Union:</i> BIFU			
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EET			
	<i>Unions:</i> OTOE		No diffusion of DP foreseen also in the future. DP is not suited to banking. Also in other Eur. countries it did not perform properly	DP could work if IP works Fears that if introduced DP weakens worker solidarity
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Staff Relations Manag. in large groups	Ongoing programmes of training and education	DP will stay, in ten years will be the norm in employee-managem. relations	Any enterprise which does not recognise the contribution of its staff will not survive
	<i>Union:</i> IBOA	IBOA will participate in ICTU seminars and training programmes.	DP will stay, in ten years will be the norm in employee-managem. relations	The position of ICTU and the PWC (National Agreement) will influence the development of DP
I	<i>Employer:</i> Assicredito	Continuous attention to DP development.		
	<i>Unions:</i> Fisac, Fiba			
L	<i>Employer:</i> ABBL	Issues related to safety (computer safety, hold-ups, money laundering) have to be paid attention to	Develop. and consolidat. of team work employee involvement and higher responsibility better internal communication job enlargement, flexibility	Quick obsolescence of technologies: therefore stricter relations between education and production needed
	<i>Union:</i> ALEBA	No particular initiative	Consolidation of DP: attention to quality, improvement groups DP should help reduce costs by motivating employees	
NL	<i>Employers:</i> WGVB			
	<i>Union:</i> Dienstendbond FNV			
P	<i>Employer:</i> [CCP]		CCP: DP is spreading slowly. Economic recession has favoured however co-operative relations within service enterprises	CCP: new, more harmonised, less authoritarian, relations are expected to develop, supported by training and worker assumption of responsibility DP which is nearly unknown, will be necessary if quality has to be assured

(tab. 8b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
P	Unions: Banking Union	Future initiative → promotion of collective bargain. campaign to regulate new HR practices. Legislation needed, as already established by Economic and Social Agreement	Pessimism for future of unionism, although union is very strong. Fears for individualisation of labour relations	DP will perhaps be the future outcome of rationalisation and change in enterprises, if future management will be more open to devolve responsibility to employees
S	Employer: BAO			
	Unions: Sbmf (TCO)			
SF	Employer: Bank Empl. Assoc.		DP will become more established There is great deal of room for future development, in the depressed economic situation of Finland	<i>Positive expectations:</i> greater productivity; greater work diversification, increasing work satisfaction and worker influence. Enhanced sense of workplace solidarity and better climate. Blurring boundaries between occupational groups. <i>Negative expectations:</i> no threats if properly implemented (training required)
	Union: Finnish Bank Employee Union		DP will become more established There is great deal of room for future development, in the depressed economic situation of Finland	<i>Positive expectations:</i> greater productivity; greater work diversification, increasing work satisfaction and worker influence. Enhanced sense of workplace solidarity and better climate. Blurring boundaries between occupational groups: some concern about the future of organis. representing different groups. <i>Negative expectations:</i> possible growing competition between groups, discrimination of individuals; possible threat on existing coll bargain (no examples are however given): joint agreements on the implem of DP required.

Tab.9b - Activities and Prospects regarding DP in the opinion of the social partners' organisations in the manufacturing sector in 15 European countries

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
A	<i>Employer:</i> BWK, Fed. of Austrian Industrialists			
	<i>Union:</i> GMBE (blue-collars), GPA (white collars)	GPA: negotiation of a draft collective agreement on the avoidance of stress = GPA's reaction to increasing pressure on productivity due to DP; it includes elements of DP, as systematic involvement of employees in works council policy		
B	<i>Employer:</i> Fabrimetal		In the short run, temporary slowing down in DP, because many companies are focusing on applying for the ISO-norms. But soon they will realise that DP rather than ISO is at the heart of the matter	
	<i>Unions:</i> CCMB, CMB	CCMB: Development of an "internal co-de": having accumulated enough knowledge, it believes it is time to set clear rules and principles. In the long run, the issue of DP should be brought into collect. bargaining CMB: after a new recent training initiative, plans to follow-up these events on teamwork	A growth in interest for DP not expected	
D	<i>Employer:</i> Gesamtmetall	Are not planning any further activities	Positive effects expected : DP can serve interests of companies and of workforce	Particip. will become more widespread, but not necessarily in the union sense
	<i>Union:</i> IG Metall	New topics for future: . new qualitative bargaining where DP has central role; . new union company policy, within context of reorganising representation of workers	Positive effects expected: DP as a way of leaving behind old system of representing workers. necessary to develop from reactive to proactive form of organisation	Particip. will become more widespread, but not necessarily in the union sense Unions rather sceptical: economic crisis as a hindering factor. But people desire more particip. Have experimented some particip with team work; and expectations will increase further
DK	<i>Employer:</i> DI	Project on 'The Firm of the Future' Strategic development of employee qualifications (together with unions)		

(tab. 9b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
DK	<i>Union:</i> Danish Metal Worker Union	Strategic development of employee qualifications (together with employers)		
E	<i>Employer:</i> Unión Patr. Metal.			
	<i>Unions:</i> Feder. Met. de CC.OO, Fed. Sider. de UGT	More interest and attention than in peak organiz. Recently agreements in large companies Training programmes and documentation to be used in negotiation are being prepared	HR practices will go on along the present direction	New developments will meet with problems as they break both with managerial and union routines.
F	<i>Employer:</i> UIMM			
	<i>Unions:</i> FTM-CGT, FGMM- CFDT, FO-Métaux, CFTC Métaux			
GB	<i>Employer:</i> EEF	[see 9a]	Rather cautious for future. Concern that political realities may interfere	One scenario: a 'fortress Europe' protectionism leading to fixed positions, with the risk of statutory intervention at the European level (eg., statutory EWC)
	<i>Union:</i> AEEU, TGWU, MSFU		In general: things will continue much as they have done. AEEU: DP critical to competitiveness, therefore likely to remain high on the agenda TGWU, MSF: team working likely to be permanent feature, but British manag. had a long way to catch up with Jap. compet.	Feeling that changes would be made on a relatively piecemeal basis Employee reactions would depend on the manner DP was introduced and on the tradition of workplace union organisation
GR	<i>Employer:</i> EES		DP will become more widespread (not clear differentiation between DP and IP)	
	<i>Unions:</i> POEM		DP will become more widespread. But negotiation on objectives, scope and ways of implementation required. (not clear differentiation between DP and IP)	
IRL	<i>Employer:</i> Subsidiary of large American Corporation	Continual assessment and development.	DP will stay, in ten years will be the norm in employee-managem. relations	A committed workforce which contributes to the competitiveness of the company

(tab. 9b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
IRL	<i>Union:</i> AEEU	AEEU intends to continue to promote a debate on DP. Conference on IR implications of partic. proposed	DP will stay, in ten years will be the norm in employee-managem. relations	Concern at trends in other countries towards using DP as a way of derecognition of unions
I	<i>Employer:</i> Federnmeccanica			
	<i>Unions:</i> FIOM, FIM, UILM			
L	<i>Employer:</i> Fed.IL G.I.S.L. Arbed	Extension of DP to the company's services	Consolidation of the system	
	<i>Union:</i> LCGB, OGBL	--	The system is functioning and will continue to	
NL	<i>Employer:</i> FME			
	<i>Unions:</i> Industrieboord FNV IVB CNV	IVB CNV: attention on improvement of QofW	Ind.FNV: more DP expected because of pressure to improve efficiency	IVB CNV: → gap between high skilled employees involved in DP and low skilled worker with unattractive jobs Ind FNV: gap between large DP companies and no-DP supplier companies
P	<i>Employer:</i> AIM		DP will be the natural outcome of efforts to improve economic performance. Presently employers are absorbed by other priorities	Necessary to reform and develop education system
	<i>Union:</i> Met.CGTP		Teamworking will spread within some industries, with positive effects for employers, while reducing union rights	
S	<i>Employer:</i> VI	It will continue arranging annual "joint" conferences (started in 1991) on topics of interest to both sides (eg, about 'joint responsibility agreements')		

(tab. 9b continued)

Country	Organisation	Activities on the agenda	Expectations about DP	Hypotheses of future scenarios
S	<i>Unions:</i> Metal, CF	In general, Co-operation with employer initiatives (eg. the implementation of ABB T50), to save jobs and maintain industrial sector in Sweden Union role for the future is to help workers supporting learning process CF: in 1992 organised a survey to better know members' demands: work organis. change seem to be welcome. Since members are a group affected by crisis, CF is concentrating in supporting them against dismissal, rather than on DP matters	Metal: Complete worker autonomy is the challenge for future CF: DP is not expected to become a central matter in the 90s	
SF	<i>Employer:</i> FIMET		DP will become more established There is great deal of room for future development, in the depressed economic situation of Finland	<i>Positive expectations:</i> greater productivity; greater work diversification, increasing work satisfaction and worker influence. Enhanced sense of workplace solidarity and better climate. Blurring boundaries between occupational groups. <i>Negative expectations:</i> no threats if properly implemented (training required)
	<i>Unions:</i> Met. Worker Union, STL, TL		DP will become more established There is great deal of room for future development, in the depressed economic situation of Finland	<i>Positive expectations:</i> greater productivity; greater work diversification, increasing work satisfaction and worker influence. Enhanced sense of workplace solidarity and better climate. Blurring boundaries between occupational groups: some concern about the future of organis. representing different groups. <i>Negative expectations:</i> possible growing competition between groups, discrimination of individuals; possible threat on existing coll bargain (no examples are however given) joint agreements on the implem of DP required.

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Humanize Work and Increase Profitability?

Direct participation in organisational change viewed by the social partners in Europe

The 1990s have seen a strong revival of the debate on work organisation, optimal use of human resources and direct participation of employees. Within the European Union, the Commission, the Social Partners and governments started a large debate, which was further advanced, as Europe was slipping into its worst post-war recession demonstrating the need for structural adjustment.

However, many questions remain unanswered. How do the European experiments on direct participation eg. in France (groupe d'expression), in Sweden (Volvo experiments on group work) and Germany (Humanisierung der Arbeitslebens) compare with the Japanese approach? Do these new developments only represent a new rationalization strategy with negative impact on employment? To what extent does direct participation diminish the influence of employee representatives and trade unions on the company level?

In order to fill this information and discussion gap, the European Foundation initiated the EPOC project, (Employee Direct Participation in Organisational Change).

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