

PEACE, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

REPORT

to the 14th ICFTU World Congress
on meetings with the United Nations, NATO, Mr. Gorbachev
and Mr. Reagan

INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS

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INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS

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
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FOREWORD

The ICFTU Executive Board decided in December 1985 to seek a series of meetings with world leaders to discuss peace, security and disarmament. The basis of our approach was the statement on this subject adopted at our 1983 Congress in Oslo. This is the report of our meetings with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan.

We are not experts on military equipment nor are we international diplomats but we do believe that free trade unions can make a contribution to building a more peaceful world. Our message to world leaders is summed up in the ICFTU motto "Bread, Peace and Freedom". After nearly forty years it remains a ringing challenge to the international community. We hope that this report of the ICFTU's efforts to bring the world nearer to these goals will encourage free trade unions to maintain their work for a genuine and lasting peace. For its part the ICFTU will continue its efforts based on the decisions of its 14th World Congress in Melbourne (14-18 March 1988) and on the progress we have made through the discussions described in this report.



John Vanderveken
General Secretary

I. UNITED NATIONS

a) Introduction

1. The Working Party held its first meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 11 and 12 September 1986 with a series of officials on the subject of the UN's role and activities in the field of peace, security and disarmament. Unfortunately, the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar could not meet the Working Party for medical reasons, and both of the Under-Secretaries-General were absent from New York on urgent business. The ICFTU General Secretary subsequently met Mr. Perez de Cuellar in a separate meeting in March 1987. Nevertheless, the Working Party did meet the Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, Mr. Ripert, who was in charge of the UN Secretariat at the time, and the recently retired Under-Secretary-General, Sir Brian Urquhart, who for many years had been responsible for UN peace-keeping activities. The Group also had open and frank discussions with other senior UN officials directly involved in the UN activities concerning peace, security and disarmament.

2. The major theme discussed at all of the meetings was the crisis which the UN was currently facing not only in financial terms but also in the directly related problem of the growing lack of confidence in the UN as an organization for preventing, limiting and settling armed conflicts throughout the world. Other specific issues covered included the UN's disarmament, peace-making and peace-keeping activities, the situation in South Africa, the link between disarmament and development and the role the trade unions should play in peace, security and disarmament issues.

b) The Crisis

3. The crisis in confidence faced by the UN was blamed on an increasing tendency by Member States in recent years to ignore the UN altogether and to resort more and more to unilateral or bilateral action and according to all of the UN speakers, the most important responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the major powers and in particular the two superpowers. There was clearly a lack of responsible international leadership on their part and this was creating frustration among the smaller countries.

4. Added to this was the problem that many of the newly independent countries jealously guard their recently won sovereignty and do not always act in conformity with the UN Charter either. Mr. Ripert emphasized, however, that there is sufficient evidence that when there is a more constructive attitude on the part of the major powers, the other states also act in a more responsible manner. The fact that in 1985 some 80 heads of state and government came to New York to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations and to reaffirm their faith in the organization was not seen as enough. Such conviction, it was felt, should be translated into action and the UN should be better utilized by all Member States for the purpose for which it was founded.

5. The central role in matters regarding peace, security and disarmament was given in the UN Charter to the Security Council but experience had shown that the Security Council had only been able to take effective action when conflicts became so dangerous that they threatened world peace. A more continuous consideration by the Security Council of the many armed conflicts which could degenerate into major threats to world peace was seen as essential. It was also pointed out by UN officials that despite the fact that the present Secretary-General, like his predecessor, had made detailed proposals for an improved functioning of the Security Council in matters of peace and security, no progress had as yet been achieved.

6. The problems of the UN General Assembly were considered to be of an entirely different nature. The importance of the General Assembly was emphasized as a forum where all Member States could reflect their views on the basic issues of peace, security and disarmament, as well as initiate negotiations on arms control and disarmament. It was also generally recognized, however, that the large number of speeches and resolutions was not conducive to its effectiveness - in 1985, for example, no less than 66 resolutions on 25 issues concerning peace, security and disarmament had been adopted by the General Assembly. Some form of streamlining was considered, therefore, to be desirable and this also applied to the functioning of the UN Secretariat.

7. As regards the question of whether the UN Charter should be modified in order to bring it up-to-date and strengthen its provisions concerning the UN's role in questions of peace, security and disarmament, it was felt that apart from the practical impossibility of getting agreement on a stronger text than the present Charter, the real problem was not a matter of modifying the Charter, but rather to ensure that the Charter was properly adhered to by all Member States. Moreover, it had always been possible to create new machinery for disarmament negotiations or to initiate UN peace-keeping activities without any specific reference in the Charter to these mechanisms and activities.

c) Disarmament, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping

8. During discussions on the continuing United Nations involvement in UN negotiated arms control and disarmament treaties, the point was raised that despite the commitment of the nuclear weapon powers, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament, so far negotiations had not led to any significant reductions in the nuclear arms stockpile. This it was felt could have a negative effect on the non-nuclear-weapon states' commitment to the Treaty. It was pointed out by UN officials that this situation had been raised very strongly by the non-nuclear-weapon states at the three NPT Review Conferences in 1975, 1980 and 1985. In 1980 the issue had even prevented the Review Conference from adopting a final declaration and there was indeed a real danger that, if the situation was still the same at the next review conference in 1990, the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself could be jeopardy. The danger of this situation was amplified by UN estimates that some 114 states were currently potential nuclear-weapon states.

9. The supervisory role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under that NPT had so far remained a unique case of international inspection. Other possibilities of using independent experts for the supervision of arms limitation treaties were seen as remote as most states were not willing to accept such supervision in matters regarding their own security.

10. It was pointed out that the UN experts who examined the complaints about the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and by Iraq were not, in fact, able to visit the countries concerned but based their findings on medical examination of the victims of these weapons. Also there were no possibilities for the UN to sanction violations of disarmament treaties, except through the exercise of moral pressure and publicity.

11. As far as UN peace-making and peace-keeping functions were concerned, it was felt that in recent years the mediation role of the UN Secretary-General had not functioned in a satisfactory manner. To remedy this, several proposals had been presented by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, including the possibility of sending fact-finding missions to conflict areas. The delicate nature of each mission was, however, pointed out. Each conflict is unique in itself and the search for a peaceful settlement, it was felt, required not only detailed knowledge of the background to the dispute and the attitudes of the parties involved but also personal diplomatic skills.

12. The UN remained very much in favour of regional efforts to solve armed conflicts but very few successes can be registered among such initiatives. For example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had not been very successful in respect of armed conflicts on the African continent and neither had the Islamic Conference in the war between Iraq and Iran nor the Contadora group in Central America; despite the fact that the UN had supported all of these initiatives.

13. The overall balance sheet of peace-keeping activities of the UN was considered to be mixed. On the negative side was the fact that many local and regional wars had taken place, or were taking place, without any possibility for the UN to intervene. Also in most peace-keeping activities the political problems which lie at the origin of the armed conflict remained unsolved. On the positive side, of the 13 peace-keeping operations, involvement by the UN had resulted in containment of the conflicts and prevented them from transforming into major clashes threatening world peace.

14. Until now the inclusion of troops from the two superpowers in UN peace-keeping forces had always been avoided, but Sir Brian Urquhart believed that this rule should now be reconsidered as the presence of armed forces from the five permanent members of the Security Council in peace-keeping under the UN flag could substantially strengthen their status and prevent UN troop positions being endangered by attacks from warring parties.

d) Other Issues

15. The linkages between peace, security and disarmament, and other areas of UN work, particularly in respect of human rights and economic and social development were emphasized by the Working Party and in this respect details were given of UN action against the Apartheid regime in South Africa and in particular the appeal to Member States to refrain from cooperating with South Africa in the nuclear field. South Africa, although not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, had nonetheless been obliged by France, as supplier of nuclear equipment, to accept supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of all its nuclear installations, except one (a pilot enrichment plant). The assistance provided by certain transnational corporations was, however, much more difficult to verify. As regards the frontline states, the UN had no mandate to provide military assistance in case of armed attacks by South Africa, unless the Security Council or the General Assembly should decide to do so. On the other hand, the UN had provided substantial economic assistance to the frontline states and to their regional organization, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). In the case of Namibia the UN stood ready to take military and civil responsibility during the interim period following a withdrawal of South Africa and prior to elections for a democratic government.

16. With regard to the link between disarmament and development, it was pointed out that the UN had been particularly active in this area since the holding of the two special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 and 1982. A detailed study on this subject had been published and it was planned to hold a special UN conference on this matter. (This was eventually held from 24 August to 11 September 1987 - see Appendix IV for ICFTU statement). It was suggested that a worldwide fund should be established through which expenditure originally meant for armament purposes could be transferred to development programmes.

17. Throughout the discussions with the UN, the important role of trade union organizations in matters of peace, security and disarmament was stressed. The UN emphasized that trade unions had a crucial role to play in mobilizing public opinion for the cause of peace and disarmament and influencing their governments in these directions. It was also stressed that it would be helpful if trade unions could lobby their governments with a view to overcoming the financial crisis of the UN. Reference was also made to the ICFTU action regarding the situation in Cyprus and to the repeated appeals made by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) to the UN and to the warring parties directly to end the attacks on merchant vessels in the Gulf, which had caused numerous victims among the crew members.

18. It was recognized that trade union organizations had hardly any institutional possibility to be directly involved in the UN deliberations and activities regarding peace, security and disarmament, which is quite different from the more structured possibilities for trade unions to make their views known at the UN in respect of economic and social matters and human rights issues. To overcome this obstacle, the importance of including trade union representatives in national delegations to the General Assembly was pointed out. This is already the case in Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, and it was suggested that the ICFTU and its affiliates should renew their efforts to broaden this to other countries.

e) **Meeting between the Secretary-General of the UN and the ICFTU General Secretary (11 March 1987)**

19. In a separate meeting on 11 March 1987 the ICFTU General Secretary met Mr. Perez de Cuellar to take up with him directly many of the issues raised in the earlier meeting of the Working Party with senior UN officials. The discussions centred on the need to develop the role that could be played by the ICFTU in the UN deliberations on a wide range of issues. The ICFTU as a worldwide organization with a large membership in many countries was uniquely placed to contribute to the development of popularly supported international solutions to the world's problems. The UN Secretary-General appreciated the work of the ICFTU and reiterated the view expressed in his 1986 report to the General Assembly on the importance of maintaining closer relations with Non-Governmental Organizations. In this connection he agreed to meet the ICFTU on a more regular basis and welcomed the ICFTU's desire to develop closer relations. The General Secretary also met other UN officials for talks on South Africa and economic and social issues.

II. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

a) Introduction

20. A delegation of the Working Party held a second meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 16 October 1986 with the Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, members of the Military Committee, Ambassadors to NATO and senior officials on the new prospects and problems for peace, security and disarmament following the (October 1986) Reykjavik Summit meeting.

21. The meeting covered the twin topics of NATO as a political alliance and NATO military strategy and included detailed discussions on developments in arms control negotiations, the alliance's view of Soviet policy and military strength, defence planning mechanisms and the consultative process within NATO.

b) The Role of NATO

22. NATO's role and achievements since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 were reviewed, with Lord Carrington emphasizing NATO's success in maintaining 40 years of peace in Europe. The cost of ensuring this peace, he felt, had been too high in terms of the substantial military expenditure that had been necessary, but NATO had achieved its objective of avoiding war. He agreed with the ICFTU that a modern conventional war would be extremely destructive and that the underlying cause of the arms race was lack of trust. It was important to understand the origins of Soviet mistrust of the West. Russia's history had been marked by periodic invasions. The Soviet leaders may also feel surrounded by hostile forces and feared US technological superiority. However, the alliance believed that the USSR had a military capacity for attack which caused serious disquiet. There was a need for dialogue and common security agreements which both sides could be sure would be kept.

23. The problem, he continued, was not arms themselves but the motivation which led states to want arms. Nobody wanted to spend money on arms rather than development or employ workers in producing arms rather than more useful products but disarmament would inevitably be subject to security requirements. It also had to be recognized that at the present time NATO's nuclear deterrent was less costly than the massive conventional forces that would be needed to deter the sort of large-scale conventional attack the Soviet Union could mount. Lord Carrington also recalled the Harmel Report of 1967 which had stressed the two main functions of NATO namely defence and the creation of more stable East-West relations.

24. In response the delegation said that they were pleased to hear that stress continued to be placed on the defence and detente approach of the Harmel Report because there were concerns that NATO gave too much weight to military preparations and too little to dialogue with the East. They also recalled Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty which talks about "strengthening free institutions" and "promoting conditions of stability and well-being". These issues were important because social re-armament was an important contributory factor to a strong defence. The post-war consensus on the relationship between defence, economic progress and democracy had been broken by, amongst other things, the demands of governments for increased military spending and cuts in social programmes.

25. Lord Carrington replied that the post-war consensus on defence had weakened in part because memories were short. NATO was well aware that defence was distorting economies in the West as well as the East and was, therefore, putting considerable effort into improving procurement techniques to minimize cost.

c) Arms Control and Disarmament

26. A major theme at the meeting was the prospect for arms control and disarmament and in particular NATO's attitude to the negative effects on strategic nuclear weapon reductions of the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). It was felt that although NATO Member States had differing views on participation in SDI research and its overall desirability it was not seen as an issue dividing the alliance. There was a general view that members should continue to look at what could be done through the 1972 ABM Treaty. The distinction was stressed between research, where the USA's desire to look into SDI was respected, and deployment, where no NATO position had yet been formulated. SDI had, however, been a factor in bringing the USSR back to the negotiating table. They seemed to fear that SDI would give the West an offensive capability including that of a first strike, whereas NATO viewed it as a defensive system.

27. The offensive strategy of mutually assured destruction it was felt, had kept the peace for nearly 40 years but SDI might offer the possibility of an equal, or even more secure defensive strategy for both sides which could reduce or perhaps eliminate the need for nuclear strike weapons. Changing the nature of the strategic balance would be a very complex process and require great cooperation both within the alliance itself but most importantly between the superpowers.

28. It seemed possible that after the Reykjavik Summit the USSR might have a better understanding of these strategic options even if agreement had not been possible. It was also important to realize that SDI was not just one piece of equipment but a full spectrum of new technologies. Although initial European fears had been of an SDI umbrella over "fortress America", it now seemed that the technologies were applicable to European defence needs also. It was clear that realization of the full potential of SDI as the basis of a new security strategy would require close linkage to East-West arms control negotiations and even technological cooperation with the East and non-aligned countries.

29. It was generally agreed that there had been considerable progress at the Reykjavik Summit meeting on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and agreement had been reached on a 50 per cent, across-the-board, cut in warheads delivered by strategic systems such as Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and bombers. The main point of disagreement had, however, come over space weapon deployment. Prior to Reykjavik the USSR had proposed that both sides commit themselves to non-withdrawal for 20 years from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. (The Treaty allows for research but not deployment of new ABM systems). The USA had proposed a seven and a half year non-withdrawal pact in Geneva and offered a compromise of ten years at Reykjavik. (The ABM Treaty allows only 6 months notice of withdrawal at present). However, in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev insisted on an amendment to the treaty limiting allowable research to laboratories. President Reagan had rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would cripple research on the SDI.

30. Despite this breakdown, the Reykjavik Summit had produced remarkable progress far beyond what had been expected. Lord Carrington said that he would not have believed one week before the talks that the progress made at Reykjavik could have been possible.

31. The delegation asked what the implications of a Reykjavik nuclear agreement would be for the conventional military balance and whether NATO would have to increase its expenditure to build-up a more costly conventional deterrent force. In reply NATO officials referred to major new proposals for conventional arms control for the whole of Europe and not just the Central European front covered by the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR). They agreed that the conventional and nuclear force deployments were linked, but that even if there had been agreement on broad principles at Reykjavik, the subsequent detailed work on treaties would have allowed time to develop the conventional arms negotiations with a view to ensuring adequate security for NATO at controlled levels.

32. The delegation also asked whether the US Congressional decision to allow chemical weapons manufacture threatened a new arms race. NATO replied that although the USA had not produced chemical weapons since the early Fifties, the USSR had continued to stockpile. Although the USSR had said that they wanted a treaty to eliminate chemical weapons and it was 90 per cent complete, the Congress had agreed to authorize new manufacture after 1 December 1987 if there was no new treaty. The decision was

therefore a warning to the USSR that it could not continue to manufacture chemical weapons without a response and it acted as an incentive to reach agreement soon. There was some optimism that a chemical weapons ban could be initiated before the Congressional deadline with adequate verification procedures.

33. Just prior to the Reykjavik Summit, agreement had been reached in Stockholm on an extension of the confidence-building measures initially agreed upon in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The delegation, however, felt that confidence-building measures should not simply be limited to military issues but must also include wider observance of the human rights specified in Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act, not just in the East where little progress had been made but in some NATO Member States too. In this regard reference was made to the situation in Turkey and the attack on trade union rights at GCHQ in Cheltenham, Britain.

34. It was pointed out by NATO that, in general, alliance members did not raise human rights issues with each other within NATO but preferred to discuss them in the Council of Europe and other fora. NATO membership was in itself an indirect long-term pressure on members but because Western societies were more open than those in the East, there were other methods of pursuing human rights problems.

35. It was added that Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act was a political document accepted by all 35 signatory countries and avoided many of the escape clauses usually found in international human rights conventions. NATO saw it as a valuable measuring stick which the West could continue to use to keep pressure on the East. However, progress on human rights was likely to be incremental and a big break through was unlikely.

36. The NATO principle as regards all arms control negotiations was that all moves by NATO Member States in negotiations were subject to advance consultation. Despite differences between various members, which often seemed most apparent on "local" issues such as procurement and standardization of weapons systems, the alliance had held together. The USSR had not been able to divide NATO members and this was a key factor in bringing the Soviet Union back into arms control negotiations and towards any success which had been achieved.

d) NATO as a Political Alliance

37. The consultative process within NATO which aims at ensuring that a common position is reached on the wide range of issues facing the alliance, worked at both a formal and informal level. At the apex of this process, is the Council which meets twice a year at ministerial level and more frequently at ambassadorial level and is chaired by the Secretary-General. Reporting to the Council are a series of committees including the military committee which is the key decision-making body in the military structure of NATO. It is chaired by a 4-star general and includes the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and two allied naval commanders. In the civil structure there are 15 committees including the economic committee and the political committee.

38. The economic committee assesses the performance of the East-bloc economies and also examines the ability of alliance members to contribute to the burden of shared defence. The political committee acts as a focal point for exchange of information on East-West relations and coordinates positions on arms control negotiations.

39. As a political alliance it is clearly important for NATO to have an understanding of and realistic attitude towards Soviet foreign policy. This policy was described by NATO as being closely related to domestic concerns and it appeared that the new Soviet leadership recognized that its global influence was unlikely to grow without significant reforms in its general economic, and perhaps political, arrangements. General Secretary Gorbachev had on taking office, specified the broad domestic policy aims: the revitalization of the Soviet economy through investment in new technology, the maintenance of consumer goods and social services programmes and the provision of the resources necessary for defence. On this latter point it seemed clear that the Communist Party continued to dominate the military structure which would get what it needed but no more.

40. These three broad aims were influencing Soviet foreign policy which seemed to be moving towards a more responsible status quo phase although it was not clear whether this was merely a short-term tactic or a longer-term shift of some significance. Either way, the Soviet Union remained trapped in Afghanistan with no sign of withdrawal and had a heavy commitment in South-East Asia. The USSR was also developing new bilateral relations of a normal or non-interventionist character with a number of medium sized developing countries in Central and South America which was not an area of traditional Soviet interest.

41. There were signs of some change in the USSR's relations with Eastern European countries except Poland. Political relations had been tightened and the USSR's need for imported technology was stimulating changes in economic relations. Although signals were ambiguous it seemed possible that Eastern European countries may have slightly more room for manoeuvre in their relations with the West and with the USSR in the future.

e) NATO Military Strategy

42. The military strategy of the alliance is primarily based on NATO's understanding of Soviet military strength and capability. The Warsaw Pact had a single strategy for all its forces, a rigid command structure under Soviet control and was equipped with standardized Soviet weapons. The current assessment was that it was particularly strong in helicopters - for use as force transport and as mobile artillery platforms - and in tanks. Ground forces which had grown during the 1970s were largely deployed against NATO and were backed up by 900 short-range missiles capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional weapons with great accuracy into most of Western Europe. Soviet ground forces were also well prepared to move quickly. Warsaw Pact reinforcement lines were generally shorter than those of NATO and, therefore, easier to protect.

43. The Soviet navy had grown rapidly since the 1960s and now had considerable capacity to interdict NATO transatlantic lines of reinforcement, as well as maintain a presence globally. Soviet strategic missile forces had recently been improved with new and improved SLBMs and mobile ICBMs. In conclusion, Soviet strategy was to win any form of war whereas NATO's was to provide adequate defence. The Warsaw Pact was strong in conventional and nuclear systems and the quality of its forces could match NATO. Its planning was geared to initial rapid breakthrough by land. The Warsaw Pact forces were seen as highly disciplined, well trained and in good morale. The centralized pattern of their command structure might give NATO some advantage in terms of local initiative and flexibility but this was very hard to measure.

44. By any standard of judgement, the Warsaw Pact possessed an impressive military capability facing West and NATO had to decide on the military force it needed to deter this threat - in other words "how much is enough?". In part this depended on an assessment of what the other side could do if it chose to and, in part, on the difficult question of whether it had any intention of using its military potential. There was a wide range of views within the alliance on the scale of the threat, but there was a clear consensus that NATO had to have an adequate and balanced defence capable of convincing the Soviet Union that aggression would not be worth the price it and its allies would be forced to pay.

45. NATO defence planning mechanisms endeavoured to create a consensus amongst all those members who participate in the integrated military command (i.e. the 16 less France, Iceland and Spain) which consisted of reconciling the demands of the NATO Military Commands with what Member States reasonably believed they can afford to spend on defence.

46. The end product of this process was the flexible response strategy first decided in 1967 which aimed to give NATO the capability to meet all levels of Soviet threat. Until recently the pre-occupation had been in ensuring that within the approach the US nuclear component was credible, but now there was more emphasis on conventional forces. This was because the military had been warning of the Soviet conventional threat and also because of growing public concern about dependence on the nuclear deterrent. However, conventional weapons were expensive and tended to increase in price faster than the general inflation rate. Virtually all Member States faced economic problems and the current focus was, therefore, on new technologies and more efficient procurement policies. There was great public interest in defence and governments had to show that taxes were not being wasted. NATO had a broad constituency of support because it had a balanced and rational defence policy which it was progressing in parallel with its arms control strategy.

47. In response to questions from the delegation on public fears of nuclear arms associated with nuclear winter and the Chernobyl disaster and the relative merits of a non-nuclear defence strategy, NATO replied that conventional defence alternatives to nuclear weapons to deter a Warsaw Pact conventional attack would not only be very expensive but would require a level of military mobilization such as to turn West Europe into a garrison state.

48. It was also pointed out that in one sense the widespread concern over the effects of nuclear war made the nuclear deterrent more convincing but NATO was looking at ways of providing more conventional defence in order to raise the threshold at which nuclear weapons might have to be used. This might give more time for the negotiated settlement of a conflict but in the end the alliance still relied on a credible nuclear force which the Soviet Union could not discount being used as the ultimate deterrent to aggression.

III. MOSCOW

a) Introduction

49. A delegation of the Working Party held a third meeting in Moscow on 9 October 1987 with Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, on a very wide range of issues relating to peace, security and disarmament as well as human rights, the role of the United Nations, the importance of the ILO and observance of its standards, and the economic development of the Third World.

50. In welcoming the delegation Mr. Gorbachev said that the meeting was a sign that the world was changing for the better which was especially important because difficult international problems could not be solved without the broad participation of the world's population. In preparing for the meeting, he had read the ICFTU's recent statements and was able to agree with 99.9 per cent of their contents. The priority issues, he said, were disarmament and the world situation, and although there were great differences in social and political systems, everywhere trade unions had the task of protecting working people and their interests. This was also the case in the USSR, but in the last few years not everything had been correct and losses had occurred because the opinions of working people, youth and women had not been taken into account. It was important that in working out policies, trade union organizations had their say and although governments should not lose their way there were complex mechanisms for influencing events.

b) Arms Control and Disarmament

51. The main issues discussed at the meeting with Mr. Gorbachev were the prospects for world disarmament and the possibilities for progress at the various arms control fora. Members of the delegation in making statements on international security referred to developments in intermediate range and strategic nuclear arms reductions, and conventional forces and chemical weapon negotiations and of the commitment of the ICFTU to use its influence to persuade world leaders of the need for enhanced security at lower levels of armaments.

52. In this context questions were also raised on specific issues such as the peaceful use of the Arctic region, a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe and the relationship between disarmament and development.

53. Mr. Gorbachev told the delegation that since January 1986 the Soviet Union had made a series of wide ranging detailed and comprehensive proposals on arms control and disarmament issues including a comprehensive nuclear test ban, strategic nuclear arms and intermediate nuclear force reductions, chemical weapons, security issues in Asia, the Pacific and the Northern Region, and conventional weapons and troop reductions in Europe. Disarmament could not be achieved overnight and there was a need to proceed step by step with equal security at each stage. The USSR was not interested in achieving superiority as this would not strengthen security and the USA should realize this and not continue to develop new weapons.

54. It used to be said that the USSR was dodging verification but as Mr. Gorbachev had said to President Koivisto of Finland if the USA wants double verification, then the USSR wants triple. If arms control agreements were to be real they had to be strictly verified but the West now seemed to be less keen on verification.

55. Mr. Gorbachev believed that there was the necessary political will to overcome the remaining obstacles to the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. For its part the USSR would spare no effort to conclude this first arms reduction agreement as it would be of vast political and moral significance showing that disarmament was possible.

56. As far as the strategic nuclear forces were concerned, Mr. Gorbachev said that there was a draft text but it contained many gaps. These negotiations concerned in the first instance the USSR and USA but at a later stage Britain, France and China would also be faced with this problem. At Reykjavik there had been a discussion of the idea of sub-limits for each of the so-called triad of land-based and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. The USSR favoured a 50 per cent cut across all three classes leading to parity but at a lower level. The main obstacle was, however, in attitudes to the 1972 ABM Treaty. The USSR wanted to get back to the agreed interpretation before 1983, but believed that the USA was attempting to use a technological advantage to set up a space-based system which would give them superiority. President Johnson had said, "who rules space rules the world."

57. Mr. Gorbachev, however, believed that this would be destabilizing, disrupt confidence-building measures and be a huge economic burden; a space arms race would be bad for everybody. He welcomed the ICFTU's stand against such an arms race and felt that despite everything a strategic arms reduction agreement was still possible with the current US Administration.

58. Mr. Gorbachev felt that at long last agreement could be reached on the elimination of chemical weapons, while conventional armaments and armed forces should be reduced to a level of reasonable sufficiency; and it was crucial that the process of disarmament should not be confined to Europe but should encompass all parts of the world.

59. As far as the specific problem of the Arctic region was concerned, Mr. Gorbachev referred to his speech in Murmansk in September 1987 which had drawn attention to the huge nuclear forces deployed in and around the Northern seas. If agreements were achieved on intermediate nuclear forces and conventional weapons in Europe, it would be important to block off increased confrontation in the Arctic. The USSR had noticed that as soon as the INF Treaty became a possibility, NATO and Pentagon strategists had started to propose the expansion of submarine and air-launched cruise missile forces. However, this must not be allowed to happen. The confidence-building process should continue and nuclear free zones be established such as in the Baltic. He recognized a positive response from the Nordic countries but reluctance in NATO circles.

60. According to Mr. Gorbachev the Soviet Union wanted to build confidence. Peace was relevant for everybody and he hoped that a concerted effort for peace would be made because, in his view, the world was at a crossroads. There were huge scientific possibilities illustrated by the research into new exotic armaments but the race to build up arms production potential was suicidal when other problems such as the world environment needed urgent attention.

61. Mr. Gorbachev particularly welcomed the broad approach to the issues taken by the ICFTU linking security questions to the need for disarmament and to economic and social progress throughout the whole world. Peace, security and disarmament necessitated the reconversion of military production to civilian purposes and this could create employment. Disarmament would also reduce the militarization of social and political life which made it harder for working class organizations to have influence because their actions were often pictured as contrary to national security. Disarmament and democratization would provide greater opportunities for working people by releasing resources for development, combatting disease, ecological problems and the social time bomb of the debt crisis.

62. Referring further to the link between disarmament and development Mr. Gorbachev spoke of the impermissibility of squandering resources on armaments at a time when more than a billion people live in conditions of poverty, when more than a half of mankind does not have a possibility to satisfy the most rudimentary requirement and when the external debt of many states, like a cancerous growth, puts in question the survival of mankind.

c) New thinking - "Perestroika" and "Glasnost"

63. According to Mr. Gorbachev new thinking was essential and the process underway in the USSR was not a "new terms mania" for publicity purposes. There were very real problems which especially as a result of the information explosion were international. The whole world, despite its diverse traditions and politics, was one system and universal human values therefore had to be given priority - no one nation could determine the course of world politics.

64. There was a need to balance interests just as trade unions have to balance the interests of their members with those of the employers. He was not calling for trade unions to collaborate with employers, but neither was he calling for anarchy which destroyed factories and jobs. Working people had to solve their own problems by thinking through the issues and acting on realities. He did not believe the world could solve its problems on the basis of the Churchill/Truman doctrine. As Lenin had said you do not solve new problems with old approaches. That is why the USSR was looking for new approaches - as realists not daydreamers.

65. "Perestroika" was affecting the whole range of economic, social, political and cultural matters. Many things would have to be abandoned but the USSR wanted to implement this concept, which included a pragmatic process of criticism, self-criticism and democratization, especially through the labour collectives in the enterprises which would be able to determine incomes, dispose of social funds and elect managers under a new law which would come into effect on 1 January 1988. People were exercising their rights, and although the problems were difficult, solutions were being sought democratically. Specific problems of civil and humanitarian rights were also being dealt with.

66. Mr. Gorbachev said that he was aware that some people in the USA wanted to whip up tensions and try to force the USSR to give up "perestroika" and "glasnost". Such people wanted to choke reorganization and destroy the image of the USSR. He warned, however, that this would not work.

d) Human Rights and International Relations

67. In response to an appeal to abide by the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations and to allow all Jews and people of German origin in the Soviet Union who wanted to leave to join their families and communities, to be free to do so, Mr. Gorbachev said (incorrectly) that no mention had been made of the human rights situation in South Africa where the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries had substantial interests. (This was not correct, the delegation had referred to abuses of human rights under apartheid and reminded Mr. Gorbachev of their concerns.) He pointed out that the US Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, seemed to say that there were only human rights violations in Socialist countries, but this was not so.

68. He had told a delegation of British Parliamentarians, "you run your country, we will run ours". It was not possible to tell 280 million Soviet citizens who had chosen socialism, which had helped the country to emerge from backwardness, to abandon their system. The USSR was ready to talk about everything including the humanitarian sphere but would not accept being preached to on human rights.

69. With regard to Afghanistan the USSR had refused eleven invitations to intervene but in the end had decided to go to help avoid bloodshed. Afghanistan was a neighbour and the USSR had not had complicated relations under the kings and other rulers of the country in the past. The USSR wanted to withdraw from that country and was not

looking for a route to a warm sea and had no designs on Pakistan. It was looking for peace in the region but that must mean a stop to foreign interventions and the reconciliation process in Afghanistan should be given a chance. Solutions could be found, he thought, provided the country stayed non-aligned.

70. As far as the situation in Nicaragua was concerned, it was not of the Soviet Union's making. In a country of extreme poverty, people had sacrificed their lives to topple the previous regime. Now it was difficult to predict which way the country would go and whether it would choose pluralism. The USSR again only wanted to help find peaceful solutions and was not acting provocatively.

71. Mr. Gorbachev expressed concern that attempts were being made to by-pass the USSR's interest in the Middle-East. This was not productive. He had agreed with President Mitterand of France on a stage-by-stage process towards an international conference. Unilateral or bilateral arrangements by Israel would not work as the views of Arab states must be taken into account. The USSR was not against Israel but wanted to face up to the problems of the Palestinians and help find solutions.

72. In conclusion Mr. Gorbachev reiterated his view of the interdependence of the world and the fact that each country's actions affected the rest. Nobody had the right to teach others. There had to be a continuous political dialogue not just between leaders but including the public at large, and especially the trade unions. There were opportunities for cooperation and joint work in building security and peace. An Indian Vedic philosopher had said 2000 years ago "the road is traversed by he who walks". We also had to go forward. He said that the ICFTU could depend on his cooperation - "the ice has been broken let us continue".

IV. WASHINGTON

a) Introduction

73. A delegation of the Working Party met President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, National Security Adviser General Powell and other senior officials of the United States Administration on 20 and 21 January 1988. The discussions ranged over arms control and disarmament, regional conflicts, the relationship between peace and economic progress and social justice, and the role of international organizations.

74. President Reagan and his colleagues expressed appreciation for the work of the ICFTU particularly in defending human and trade union rights around the world. They welcomed the breadth of the ICFTU's approach and its linking of policies for the defence of freedom, the strengthening of democracy and the spreading of economic development and growth. Secretary Shultz in particular referred to the parallels between international diplomacy and arms control and the process of collective bargaining.

b) Arms Control and Disarmament

75. The ICFTU delegation congratulated President Reagan on the signing of the INF Treaty which, in their view, pointed the way forward to further agreements on arms control and disarmament and asked about the prospects of further progress in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. He replied that he saw new opportunities in East-West relations. Acceptance of the USSR as a partner would be difficult while repression continued in the Soviet Union and its satellites and pressure had to be maintained on human rights questions, but Mr. Gorbachev had said that peace was inter-related with human rights. Progress had been made on arms control and the INF Treaty was a good beginning. President Reagan said that he wanted to continue the process with an agreement to a 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons at the next Summit but would not be rushed by deadlines because it was important to guarantee security with a good verifiable treaty.

76. President Reagan went on to say that negotiations should continue until all nuclear weapons were eliminated. He believed the USSR shared this goal and had been strongly influenced by the tragic experience of the Chernobyl disaster. Mr. Gorbachev had repeated in his book "Perestroika" one of President Reagan's favourite phrases, without crediting its source, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". He was also encouraged by Mr. Gorbachev's statements regarding the balanced reduction of conventional forces. However, while an imbalance existed in such forces the West would not be able to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.

77. NATO still relied on the deterrent strategy of mutually-assured destruction but the President believed that strategic defence could provide an alternative which would not mean that both sides threatened to retaliate for an attack by destroying cities and millions of people.

78. In response to questions from the delegation Secretary of State Shultz highlighted some of the notable features of the INF Treaty. It was the first to achieve a reduction, in this case the elimination of a whole category of weapons. It was asymmetrical in that the Soviet Union had accepted equality at zero which required the destruction of four times as many Soviet as US missiles. It also contained remarkable intrusive verification procedures. The signing of the Treaty was the end product of the determined and patient pursuit of the NATO dual track policy adopted in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20s. The alliance at the same time as offering negotiations on arms control had shown its preparedness to deploy its own equivalent weapons. This link between power and diplomacy was a characteristic of all successful negotiations, including those between unions and employers.

79. With regard to the ICFTU's concern for progress on the reduction of strategic weapons, Secretary Shultz said that agreement had already been reached on a limit of 6,000 nuclear warheads with various sublimits for different categories of weapons. Progress had also been made on counting rules and the parameters of an extensive verification system. Problems remained on how to deal with mobile weapons, particularly sea-launched cruise missiles, and a tremendous amount of detailed work on

verification had to be completed. The USA and the Soviet Union also held differing views over strategic defence which had yet to be resolved. There was a good chance of agreement by May in time for the next Summit but if it remained only seven-eighths completed, he believed the draft Treaty should be "parked to wait for those who would follow to push it the rest of the way".

80. The ICFTU expressed scepticism over the Administration's policy on strategic defence (SDI) which it was feared could destabilize the balance with the Soviet Union and provoke a further arms race. General Powell responded that the vision of SDI was that it could replace the mutually-assured destruction, or MAD, policy and would provide an insurance after the elimination of nuclear weapons against surprise attack. The Soviet Union was pursuing similar research and the USA had offered to exchange information on the technological possibilities. However, the USSR and the US Congress believed that SDI programme would contravene the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, although the Administration held to a broader interpretation. The USSR feared that the USA might achieve a technical breakthrough in strategic defence and had said that it would therefore need to maintain its offensive capacity. Negotiations were proceeding in Geneva on a period of agreed non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty but the US believed that the promise of the programme was such that research should not be constrained by such an agreement.

81. The ICFTU delegation expressed concern that the talks on conventional weapons appeared to be a backwater and that lack of progress might adversely affect the prospect for the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. In reply the President stated that the START talks were not linked to the conventional talks but that moves away from the policy of nuclear deterrence would not be possible while the Soviet Union maintained a conventional superiority in Europe. Asked to clarify conflicting reports regarding the NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional balance, General Powell recalled his experience as a frontline commander in Germany. He believed that NATO conventional forces could contain a Soviet conventional attack for a period but the Warsaw Pact's ability to sustain an attack by bringing up reserves would eventually force NATO commanders to request the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Essentially NATO conventional defence provided a firebreak which gave some time for a diplomatic solution to an outbreak of hostilities. The USA was hoping that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would shortly receive a new mandate which would give a stimulus to the conventional weapons talks.

82. The ICFTU delegation asked why the USA had recently resumed production of chemical weapons at a time when talks on a ban on production, stockpiling and use of such weapons seemed to be on the verge of agreement. Secretary Shultz answered that the US resumption, after twenty years, of production of chemical weapons was aimed at encouraging the USSR and others to reach an agreement on a ban. Some exchange visits to chemical weapons destruction facilities were taking place. However, the major problem in reaching agreement was that chemical weapons were relatively easy to produce. Factories could be switched over from other products at very short notice. Proliferation of chemical weapons therefore had to be arrested by extremely intrusive verification procedures to which all countries would have to subscribe. Nevertheless the USA remained committed to a multilateral agreement.

83. With regard to the talks on nuclear testing, Mr. Max Kampelman, the chief US arms control negotiator said that these were currently focused on establishing more reliable agreed verification measures which would enable the US Senate to ratify the existing limitation treaties. Further steps towards more limits could be made as nuclear arsenals were reduced but as long as nuclear weapons were needed they would have to be tested.

c) Regional Conflicts

84. During the discussions with President Reagan and his colleagues, the ICFTU stressed their support for the Esquipulas II agreement between five Central American states which had resulted from the initiative of President Arias of Costa Rica. The ICFTU expressed the view that the peace plan provided an opportunity for a political agreement on end to conflict and the development of democracy. Arms supplies to the region should therefore be halted. The President, Secretary Shultz and General Powell in their replies indicated their support for the agreement, although it was felt to be weak on security questions, and their desire to see it implemented. There had been signs of progress toward democracy in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras but these countries, together with the long-standing democracy of Costa Rica, had recently told President Ortega that Nicaragua was not fulfilling the agreement. In the Administration's view the Nicaraguan freedom fighter (the Contras) should be supported because it was their strength which would force Nicaragua to live up to its promises. (Shortly after the meetings the US Congress turned down the Administration's request for further aid to the Contras). The freedom fighters' aim was democracy in Nicaragua and it was now important to set up a dialogue between them and the Sandinistas. The Nicaraguan government was also under economic pressure because of the failure of its planning policies. The Administration officials recalled that on the overthrow of the Somoza regime, President Carter had offered aid to the new government which had said that it wanted to build democracy. But this had been turned down in favour of Soviet military supplies. Nicaragua had a large military force far beyond its immediate defence needs and had interfered in the affairs of neighbouring states.

85. With regard to Afghanistan, Mr. Armacost, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that there was now a possibility of Soviet withdrawal linked to the United Nations's role as a mediator in the proximity talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He believed that the primary reason for the shift in Soviet policy was the growing strength of the resistance over the last four years. Involvement in Afghanistan had been militarily and politically costly, particularly for Soviet relations with Europe, the Muslim world and China. It was also at cross purposes with the domestic policy of "glasnost". The USA was prepared to be a guarantor of an acceptable agreement but this would need to be comprehensive and provide for the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

86. On the Gulf War, Mr. Armacost explained that it had recently proved possible to work with the USSR through the UN and with the other permanent members of the Security Council. There was little common ground between Iran and Iraq; Security Council Resolution 598 had laid out a

basis for a cease-fire and a settlement. It had been accepted by Iraq but Iran was stalling. In the USA's view the next logical step was an arms embargo on Iran, however, the Soviet Union was ambivalent wanting to maintain its relations with Tehran. On the Soviet proposal of a UN naval force, the USA wanted to clarify the UN's follow-up to Resolution 598 before giving active consideration to the idea of a peace-keeping naval force.

87. The ICFTU welcomed the US legislation on trade and investment sanctions against apartheid and pressed the Administration to reinforce the pressure on the South African regime. Mr. Armacost replied that the Administration had had mixed feelings over the Congressional action because it felt that a corporate presence in South Africa had helped to promote collective bargaining and transform race relations. However, that debate was now over. The Administration would continue funding labour and human rights groups in South Africa and would seek to strengthen the frontline states. Talks were now taking place on getting South Africa out of Namibia and Angola. Contacts had also been opened with opposition groups outside South Africa.

d) Peace, Economic Progress and Social Justice

88. The ICFTU referred in its presentation to the President and his colleagues to the links between peace, economic progress and social justice. The Confederation was concerned about the prospects of a further slowdown and recession in the world economy and the tensions this would cause within and between nations. The major economic powers needed to develop a more coordinated approach through the international financial and economic organizations and at meetings such as the forthcoming Toronto World Economic Summit.

89. The Administration presented a much more optimistic view of current economic prospects but agreed with the ICFTU that maintaining growth was important and should be the centrepiece of the Toronto Summit. In their view, however, cooperation should be achieved by opening up trade and financial flows not through increased regulation.

90. Answering ICFTU questions, Administration officials agreed that the pressure on infant democracies of harsh debt-repayment terms was worrying but that the countries themselves had to come to grips with these issues with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. The US supported a big increase in the capital of the Bank. The Administration did not see a direct link between disarmament and development. The US arms industry existed for defence purposes and was a burden on the economy. Development depended on investment which in turn was linked to incentives, especially to farmers. The INF Treaty would not release resources since dismantling the weapons and monitoring the Treaty would be costly. Deep strategic weapons cuts might yield some savings but it should be remembered that conventional deterrence was much more expensive. The USA did not expect to see a big breakthrough in US-Soviet trade.

91. The ICFTU stressed the importance of social clauses in aid and trade agreements as a means of ensuring that development policies helped those in most need. The Administration agreed referring to the existence of workers' rights provisions in US legislation on the promotion of overseas investment and trade preferences, and to an US proposal for a GATT working party on the relationship between workers rights and trade. The Administration took account of the AFL-CIO views on the implementation of this legislation and the ICFTU's Annual Survey on the Violation of Trade Union Rights.

e) International Labour Standards

92. The ICFTU pressed the President and his colleagues on the non-ratification by the USA of many key ILO Conventions and on the importance of full funding of the USA's contributions to the ILO's budget and that of other international organizations. In reply Administration officials explained that ratification of ILO Conventions required a two-thirds majority of the Senate and also raised difficult constitutional questions of the rights of individual states concerning labour law. However, the Administration was in favour of increased ratifications of Conventions and was pleased that the Senate was expected to ratify shortly Conventions 144 on Tripartite Consultation and 147 on Minimum Standards in Merchant Shipping (Senate ratification 1 February 1988). The ICFTU pointed out that many other Federal states had a better ratification record than the USA and that their experience should be studied. The poor performance of the USA in this regard weakened its ability to press for the worldwide application of standards such as the freedom of association.

93. The Administration and the Congress were currently working on the appropriation levels for international organizations consequent upon their recent agreement regarding cutting back the budget deficit. This involved difficult selections since it would not be possible to meet all the USA's contributions. The ILO had a high priority as far as the Administration was concerned and account would be taken of the ICFTU's concerns.

MEMBERS OF THE ICFTU WORKING PARTY ON
PEACE, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE/FUNCTION</u>	<u>ORGANISATION</u>
Dr. P.P. Narayanan	President	ICFTU
John Vanderveken	General Secretary	ICFTU
Ernst Breit	President	DGB, FRG
Phiroshaw Camay	General Secretary	NACTU, South Africa (until November 1986)
Shirley Carr	President	CLC, Canada
José J. Del Pino	President	CTV, Venezuela
Gopeshwar	General Secretary	INTUC, India
Lane Kirkland	President	AFL-CIO, USA
Stig Malm	President	LO Sweden
Franco Marini	General Secretary	CISL, Italy (from November 1986)
Dimitri Saleshando	Executive Board member	BFTU, Botswana (from November 1986)
Tadanobu Usami	Vice-President and President	RENGO, Japan ICFTU/APRO
Norman Willis	General Secretary	TUC, Great Britain
Luis Anderson	General Secretary	ICFTU/ORIT
Amos Gray	General Secretary	ICFTU/AFRO

Peace, Security & Disarmament

The 13th World Congress of the ICFTU, meeting in Oslo from 23 to 30 June 1983, having examined the proposals for an ICFTU policy on peace, security and disarmament elaborated by the enlarged Executive Board meeting on 4 November 1981, adopts the following (updated) statement:

The arms race and the sophistication and ever-widening proliferation of nuclear weapons confront mankind with an unparalleled threat to its very existence in a period when progress to reduce tensions and to promote détente have suffered serious reversals.

WHERE WE STAND

Peace is a condition for economic progress and social justice. It must be based on respect for national sovereignty, the elimination of poverty, the exercise of human freedoms, collective security, and disarmament.

Lasting peace is a prerequisite for achieving full employment and income security. Unemployment, hunger and poverty cause tensions and war.

Living in peace means enjoying freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement. All nations have the right to full national independence and governmental autonomy. Oppression of individuals, peoples and nations is a threat to peace.

HENCE THE ICFTU COMMITMENT TO BREAD, PEACE AND FREEDOM FROM ITS BEGINNING.

Peace also means that nations should be able to defend their values, their way of life, their culture.

Defence requirements do not under any circumstances justify the arms race and should not be used as a pretext for the forcible occupation of territory.

Every effort must be made to eliminate sources of tension, to give fresh impetus to confidence-building measures, to strengthen the machinery for resolving conflicts peacefully and to assure global collective security.

All nations must rededicate themselves to the principles of the United Nations Charter and promote respect for the UN and their decisions based on these principles.

The arms race involves a shameful waste of precious human, natural and capital resources. These should be turned to meeting the basic needs of hundreds of millions of people living in dire poverty throughout the world.

WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS

Since the last World War, there have been over 130 armed conflicts. Most of them took place in developing countries. Their causes are many. The legacy of colonialism, racism, competition for trade and resources were at the root of them. Some regimes have used arms against their own people to stay in power. The development of international terrorism increases insecurity and instability.

These conflicts have carried the risk of world disaster through the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union. The ever-widening chasm between North and South adds a new dimension of danger.

Today peace is in greater danger than ever. The occupation of Afghanistan, violating the right of self-determination, dealt a severe blow to the process of détente. Further military action of this kind could end it. There is little sign that either of the world powers are ready to respond to the present wish of people throughout the world for an easing of tension and a drawing back from the nuclear precipice.

THE ARMS RACE, ARMS INDUSTRY AND TRADE

In 1982, a total of more than 600 billion dollars was spent on military expenditure.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organisation account for most of it but other industrialised countries have their share.

A considerable number of developing countries have joined the arms race. Their share is now estimated to be over 15 % of global military expenditure as against 8 % in 1976.

The development of military technology, including space technology, has an escalating effect on the arms race. The development of new weapons leads to development of similar weapons or systems to counter them in a vicious spiral. Rumours about the development of hideous chemical and biological weapons are being confirmed. The number, diversity and sophistication of conventional weapons have reached unprecedented levels. Centres of production have spread over more countries. The continuous expansion of ever more sophisticated conventional weapons itself creates a motive for their use.

The full extent of arms sales is unknown. Much of it is cloaked in secrecy but it is absolutely clear that it has increased enormously with the entry of new suppliers and clients on the arms market.

Trade in arms is not confined to industrialised countries or areas of tension. Demand has increased not only to meet security but also for reasons of prestige.

THEREFORE THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ARMS TRADE.

NUCLEAR ARMS

The United States and the Soviet Union possess over 95 % of the existing 40-50,000 nuclear warheads. Other nations which have nuclear weapons are China, France and the United Kingdom.

There are frightening reports that several other nations have or are developing nuclear devices.

The delivery systems of nuclear weapons are increasingly accurate.

The sophistication of nuclear arms and equipment brings new uncertainties and instability.

Nuclear arms represent an immediate threat to the existence of mankind.

They give neither peace nor security.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the threat every day.

THEREFORE IMMEDIATE STEPS TOWARDS GENERAL BALANCED DISARMAMENT UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ARE IMPERATIVE.

ARMS AND JOBS

Military activities and the manufacture of armaments employ about 60 million people throughout the world. Half of them are in industry, the other half in the armed forces.

A considerable part of military expenditure is devoted to producing arms and equipment requiring major capital investment.

National and international companies have a vested interest in maintaining this production, and often have close access to and great influence over governments and legislatures. The arms lobby must be brought under control. The resources wasted on arms could be devoted to production for peaceful and constructive purposes which would create more jobs than the capital-intensive defence industries.

This requires early planning of measures for reconversion and retraining to take full advantage of the potential for creating additional jobs and meeting social needs. Reconversion cannot be left to chance. It needs to be integrated in a national active economic and industrial policy. It requires public control and the involvement of working people through their trade union organisations. The commitment to reconversion has to be part of future disarmament agreements.

THEREFORE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON RECONVERSION AND THE CREATION OF ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT IS ESSENTIAL.

ARMS AND DEVELOPMENT

The arms race diverts resources which are crucial for the development of Third World countries.

The military expenditure of half a day would suffice to finance the whole malaria eradication programme of the World Health Organisation. The cost of a modern tank could provide 1,000 classrooms for 30,000 children.

The arms race gives rise to distorted national and international economic development. It neglects the needs of workers and the rural masses and reinforces oppressive structures.

The consequences are grinding poverty, hunger and disease.

THE ARMAMENT BUDGETS OF ALL NATIONS SHOULD BE CUT AND RESOURCES REALLOCATED TO DEVELOPMENT.

THE ILLUSION IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The myth that nuclear weapons are only for defence must be exposed. By their very nature, they are weapons of mass destruction.

Their deterrent effect is outweighed by the threat to security associated with the growing number of warheads on both sides, the sophistication of delivery systems and the risk of accidents.

It is a fatal illusion that a limited nuclear war could be fought. The use of medium-range and tactical weapons — such as SS 20, Cruise and Pershing II missiles, enhanced radiation weapons — would trigger inexorably global nuclear annihilation.

The maintenance of the existing high level of conventional forces is at the root of tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons.

ANY NUCLEAR STRATEGY ENDANGERS SECURITY.

OBSTACLES TO DISARMAMENT

The governments are aware of the dangers inherent in the arms race but they have not succeeded in putting a stop to it.

They cling to the illusion they can achieve security through increasing nuclear and conventional forces.

The struggle for economic and political dominance feeds the lack of trust between States and induces them to arm themselves. Further distrust is fed by the build-up of arms.

As long as this attitude prevails, the machinery aimed at promoting security, that exists in the United Nations, or is provided through the Committee on Disarmament, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Vienna Talks (MBFR), the SALT process or bilateral negotiations on arms limitation, will not be used effectively.

Governments — East and West — have not drawn the inescapable conclusion of their self-destructive policy: THEY MUST DISARM OR LIFE WILL BE OBLITERATED.

WHAT WE WILL DO

The ICFTU and its affiliates, voicing the great concern of working people throughout the world,

- demand that the pursuit of peace should have priority over all political objectives;
- reject the use of force to resolve political and economic problems;
- commit themselves to promoting détente between East and West and the resolution of conflicts through negotiation and agreement;
- condemn the reliance on nuclear weapons and the build-up of conventional arms;
- demand immediate cessation of nuclear weapons production and testing;
- support national trade union policies for the abandonment of nuclear weapons in the spirit of this document;
- demand effective national and international control of the arms trade.

The ICFTU and its affiliates will press

- for the unceasing pursuance of negotiations leading to general disarmament under international control through the UN Disarmament Commission, the Disarmament Committee, the MBFR Talks and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
- for the pursuance and conclusion of bilateral agreements between the USA and the USSR on the reduction, limitation and control of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons and in particular for withdrawal and termination of production of SS 20 missiles by the USSR and abandonment by the USA of production and deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles and production of enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons;
- for national governments and international institutions — the UN and the ILO — to develop most urgently policies of reconversion in close cooperation with representative trade union organisations;
- for the genuine application of confidence-building measures;
- for agreement on the creation and progressive enlargement of nuclear free zones;
- for ratification and the most generalised implementation of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The ICFTU and its affiliates will

- assess the employment, growth and trade implications of disarmament, and pursue a programme of reconversion and re-training, as part of disarmament negotiations and agreements;
- keep a close watch on the international disarmament negotiations and advance their own proposals;
- develop policies for the reduction of trade in arms;
- promote the re-deployment of resources from arms production to meeting basic needs and to the transition to a new economic and social order;

- promote education, discussion and exchange of information on problems of peace, security and disarmament.

The ICFTU will invite the International Trade Secretariats and friendly trade union organisations to assist in promoting ICFTU policies on peace, security and disarmament

The ICFTU and its affiliates will make every possible effort to create the political will to achieve these peace objectives

- by informing workers and the public at large of what is at stake;
- by exercising their influence directly on governments and inter-governmental organisations.

WORKING FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The ICFTU's Contribution to the International Year of Peace

Adopted by the Executive Board, November 1985

The ICFTU adopted at its founding Conference in 1949 the motto Bread, Peace and Freedom. They remain the indissolubly linked aims of the international free trade union movement. As we mark the end of the United Nations' fortieth year - the International Year of Peace - we reiterate our commitment to the establishment of lasting worldwide peace.

We remain convinced that lasting peace is a prerequisite for economic progress and social justice. And we know that frustrated aspirations for economic progress and social justice fuel tensions within and between nations encouraging those who see weapons as a means to achieve their ends or even as ends themselves.

We remain convinced that living in peace means enjoying freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement. And we know that oppression of individuals, peoples and nations adds to deeply felt grievances which can all too easily escalate into violent conflict.

We remain convinced that all nations have the right to full national independence and governmental autonomy. And we know that without respect for national sovereignty, without an international framework to guarantee collective security and without worldwide disarmament, lasting peace will remain a dream.

Making the dream a reality requires hard work. The international machinery for resolving conflicts peacefully must be maintained and developed. Channels for communication and negotiation must be kept open. The authority of the United Nations must be strengthened to enable it to carry out its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24 of the UN Charter).

The massive quantity of military hardware at the disposal not just of the great powers but of virtually all nations heightens the danger of outbreaks of war. Now, in the increasingly inter-dependent world of 1986, any war, anywhere is a threat to world peace. Unresolved conflicts can suck into their whirlpool of destruction more and more nations, each with a frightening technologically enhanced firepower. The nightmare of nuclear escalation is ever present.

The world's military expenditure dwarfs the resources allocated to combatting poverty and unemployment. Surely, if a fraction of the human ingenuity applied to weapons development over the last forty years had been devoted to social and economic development we could by now have scourged the spectre of famine and disease. Yet governments, many of them democratically elected by the majority of their citizens, continue to believe that the threat to national security is so acute that weapons must come before the basic needs of millions of the world's people.

The international free trade union movement cannot accept this state of affairs, but we know that it cannot be changed by a few speeches and resolutions. That is why, as our contribution to the International Year of Peace, the ICFTU has undertaken a series of meetings with world leaders to study in depth the international machinery for conflict resolution and arms negotiation and how we can strengthen our work for peace, security and disarmament.

We welcome the holding of the Summit meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We believe that the arms control negotiations between East and West and within the multilateral United Nations framework have progressed to a point where a number of significant steps towards disarmament can be taken. We are hopeful that in the near future the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to take the final pace and sign new arms control agreements which will reduce the threat of conventional and nuclear conflict and thus release resources for the war against poverty and unemployment. The world's most powerful nations must lead the way towards peace, security and disarmament.

Arms control is a complex technical process in which relative strengths must be carefully measured and agreed, but it is also a political process of confidence-building. In examining any eventual agreement, the ICFTU will not only look at the headlines about the depth and coverage of cutbacks, but will also study closely the procedures established for maintaining the integrity of the treaties. Durable agreements which hold the prospect for further progress depend on the parties knowing and being able to convince their citizens that the other side will fully respect the letter and the spirit of the concessions made. The intangible qualities of trust and confidence which mark any successful international agreement are also linked to measures that go beyond the military sphere. In this respect the ICFTU attaches great importance to the adherence of all parties to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

The issue of human rights and its relationship to peace, security and disarmament is sometimes used by those who appear to have no interest in either arms control or the fundamental freedom of all citizens of the world as an excuse for drawing back from improved international relations. That is not the case for the ICFTU. We see parallel progress in the observance of internationally agreed standards on human rights and internationally agreed disarmament treaties as vital one to the other. If the old adage that "war is too important to be left to the generals" is ever to acquire its full meaning, ordinary citizens must have the right to express their thoughts freely, form associations of their own choosing and to travel without hindrance to meet and exchange views. Full respect by all states for international human rights standards and the institutions that uphold those standards, such as the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation, is the way to ensure that defending freedom can be achieved without resort to arms.

Although East-West negotiations between essentially industrialized countries are vital to disarmament it must also be recognized that developing countries have increased their share of world military expenditure. Millions of lives have been lost over the last forty years in conflicts between countries which can ill afford to divert resources from the pressing needs of their people for decent lives free of hunger and misery. The ICFTU is therefore alarmed that the authority of the United Nations to prevent conflict, to separate warring parties and to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes appears to be declining. We therefore offer our full support to the newly re-elected Secretary-General of the United Nations Sr. Javier Perez de Cuellar and urge all Member States, particularly those who are members of the Security Council to do likewise. We trust that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will include on the agenda of their talks an exchange of views on how their two nations can contribute to the reinvigoration of the United Nations.

International Conference on the Relationship between
Disarmament and Development
New York, 24 August - 11 September 1987

"Global Security Through Disarmament and Development"

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions welcomes the United Nations' initiative to hold this International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Both issues are of major world-wide concern, and while public awareness of the arms race on the one hand and mass starvation on the other has been constantly growing, this Conference may further highlight the complexity and interdependence of the grave problems of the world today, thus assisting the search for multilateral cooperation in the pursuit of global solutions. We, the international free trade union movement believe that progress towards global security, in its broadest sense, cannot be achieved without strengthening the role and relevance of the United Nations system as envisaged by the UN Charter.

Excellent reports are available, including the recently published study on disarmament and development by the United Nations Organisation, and the earlier reports of the independent Commissions led by Willy Brandt, on international development, by the late Olof Palme, on disarmament, and by Gro Harlem Brundtland, on environment and development. World public opinion is well aware of the horrifying contrast between the levels of military and development expenditure. This broad base of support must now be translated into action.

High-level summits, proposals and counter-proposals on arms control and disarmament talks have repeatedly generated disappointment or hope. There is no shortage of fine speeches on the need for peace. Trade unionists, negotiators themselves, know the value of rhetoric but there comes a time and place when rhetoric has to give way to hard bargaining. We believe this moment has arrived. However, even after the political will of all concerned has been established, the process will be lengthy. Effective disarmament and arms control agreements are based on verifiable commitments about the deployment of weapons systems which can only be achieved through painstaking negotiation and upheld by continuous dialogue.

Governments' military spending for the development, production and deployment of more and more sophisticated conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons is motivated by national interest in security. The fear of use of the world's existing massive arsenal is one argument put forward for continued military expenditure in the name of national security. But this upward spiral of armaments reduces rather than increases security. It is therefore vital that international agreements are reached to put a stop to the arms race, to begin the process of disarmament and to build confidence amongst potential adversaries.

Arms are produced for security reasons, but it is also true that governments sometimes argue that the military industry helps to overcome unemployment. The ICFTU is pledged to resist with all its strength the abuse of the goal of employment creation by those whose prime interest is increased weaponry not jobs. Increased public expenditure on

development aid would create far more jobs, both in industrial as well as developing countries, than increased military spending. We know, too, that the much vaunted benefits of technological spin-off are largely an illusion; it is more productive to invest directly in non-military technological research than to rely on some haphazard side effects of research into arms systems. Furthermore, high military spending both in industrialised and developing countries use resources which should be invested in economic and social progress which in the long run, is more effective and relevant to security than military hardware.

The ICFTU and its affiliates have been striving for peace, security and disarmament - one of the three principal goals summarised in its motto "Bread, Peace and Freedom" since our foundation nearly forty years ago. In doing so, we have not contented ourselves with the formulation of statements but used the experience and expertise as well as the representativity of our movement to elaborate proposals for submission to governments and regional and international fora. Both as a general principle and with regard to a number of specific areas of conflict, we have actively supported the United Nations' efforts towards peaceful solutions.

Free trade unions have also evaluated the impact of disarmament on employment, growth and trade. More than one study emanating from within the free trade union movement has shown that conversion of arms production into manufacture of peaceful and constructive goods is possible and would create more jobs than the capital-intensive defence industry. Reconversion must therefore be integrated into an active national economic and industrial policy, and requires public control and the involvement of working people through their trade union organisations. Financial and human resources of highly skilled technicians and scientists engaged in military research would no longer be lost for social progress. It will certainly require large scale efforts to adjust resources away from the massive industrial complex that has been built up to supply the military, but we are ready to pursue a programme of reconversion within the framework of disarmament negotiations and agreements.

The trade union struggle carried out daily for economic security and social justice makes our movement one for peace. Working people, being the larger part of all populations can guarantee peace if they have the freedom to participate in the political process. The free trade union movement therefore always links its work towards establishing a permanent basis for peace to freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of movement. The absence of these freedoms means oppression of individuals and peoples which in turn creates tensions and is ultimately a threat to peace and security. Economic development and social justice for working people are equally a basic precondition for peace. Unemployment, lack of shelter, hunger and poverty cause tensions and war within and between nations. For example the debt crisis is a threat to peace. Austerity policies are causing immense social and political frustrations which could all too easily be exploited by those more interested in armed conflict than development. However, acceptance of co-responsibility for solutions between both debtor and creditor nations could equally contribute to increased international understanding, and thus to peace through development.

There are of course no automatic solutions to the problems of disarmament and development. The two problems are interwoven in the effort to create through the United Nations a system of international cooperation for economic justice and global security. Steps forward in one area support progress in the other. Failures are damaging to both. However, a fundamental prerequisite for a more rational distribution of the world's resources away from destruction towards the fulfillment of human needs is the full and active participation of all Member States in the United Nations' work. This will only be achieved in full when the International Bill of Human Rights is universally respected and trade unions amongst others are free to play their full part in the struggle for disarmament and development. We trust the Conference will take this fully into account when elaborating its conclusions.

PEACE, SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The 14th World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, meeting in Melbourne from 14 to 18 March 1988;

- RECALLING the Statement on Peace, Security and Disarmament, adopted at the ICFTU Congress in Oslo in 1983 and the resolutions of the 84th (December 1983) and 87th (April 1985) Executive Board meetings on the renewal of international negotiations;
- ENDORSING the resolution on Terrorism adopted at the 90th Executive Board meeting (November 1986) of the ICFTU;
- NOTING that a credible process of building genuine detente requires increased political, economic and cultural contacts and cooperation between East and West; such contacts at the trade union level, that are or may be established, should be of mutual usefulness, contribute to a better understanding among peoples and openings towards the wider exercise of trade union and other human rights;
- HAVING EXAMINED the report of the ICFTU Working Party on Peace, Security and Disarmament and in particular the results of the meetings which the Working Party had with leaders of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr M. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, and President Reagan of the USA;
- REAFFIRMING the ICFTU's fundamental commitment to the goals of peace, security and disarmament and its belief in the inseparable link between these objectives and the struggle for economic progress and social justice, and respect for basic human and trade union rights;
- CONSIDERING that lasting peace is conducive to achieving full employment and the eradication of poverty and that, conversely, frustrated aspirations for economic development and social justice cause conflict within and between nations which may lead to violence and war;
- CONSIDERING that living in peace means more than the absence of war; it means enjoying freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association and assembly, and freedom of movement within as well as between countries, and that oppression of human beings, peoples and nations is a threat to peace;
- EMPHASIZING that peace must be founded on respect for the rights of peoples to self-determination and democratic government; for territorial integrity, national sovereignty of all states, and the obligations arising from international law; and on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;

- STRESSING** that, while nations should be able to defend their values, their ways of life and their freedom, their security requirements do not justify in any way efforts to achieve military superiority which would only lead to a further escalation of the arms race resulting in increasingly destructive weapons without creating more security;
- CONSIDERING** that the current massive expenditure on armaments is an enormous waste of human and material resources while hundreds of millions live in conditions of hunger, poverty and disease;
- EXPRESSING ALARM** that the threat of mass destruction and death posed by nuclear arms and chemical and biological weapons looms over all people and that a nuclear war would result in a total annihilation of mankind;
- NOTING** with utmost concern that, according to United Nations estimates, more than one hundred states are to be considered as potential nuclear-weapon states;
- DEPLORING** that the many armed conflicts since the last World War have caused millions of victims and untold misery among the populations concerned and that on several occasions dictatorial regimes have used arms against their own people to stay in power;
- DEEPLY DISTURBED** that human rights violations and armed conflicts continue to cause massive exoduses of refugees and displacements of populations in many regions of the world, imposing an unduly heavy burden particularly upon developing countries with limited resources of their own;
- CONDEMNING** the threat that international terrorism, actively supported by certain governments, poses to the safety of workers and their families worldwide, and to the basic values of freedom, democracy and peace;
- EMPHASIZING** that armed conflicts and aggression carry the seeds of escalation, in particular through the involvement of the world's major powers with substantial risk of a global confrontation;
- STRESSING** that every effort must be made by all states, and in particular by the world's major powers and military alliances, to reduce and eliminate the sources of tension and war and to strengthen military and political confidence building between states and understanding among peoples;
- UNDERLINING** that effective measures of disarmament should be accompanied by adequate verification procedures and that the machinery of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the development of collective security must be strengthened;

- EXPRESSING the hope that moves to create a new forum for conventional weapons reductions and to reach agreement on a ban on chemical weapons will lead to progress in those vital areas;
- WELCOMING the progress towards a peaceful solution of the conflicts in Central America and in Afghanistan;
- WELCOMING ALSO the improved climate of international relations which has led to certain major achievements notably the outcome of the 1986 Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, agreement between the USA and the USSR to eliminate all intermediate and shorter range land-based nuclear missiles, the conclusions of the December 1987 Washington Summit and the commitment expressed by both Mr Gorbachev and Mr Reagan in their meetings with the ICFTU to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons;
- CALLS for further immediate steps towards effective and verified arms reduction and disarmament, in particular in the following areas:
- deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons as a first step towards the progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons;
 - a comprehensive nuclear test-ban and, as an initial step, agreement on a reduction of the number of underground tests and the yields of the explosions;
 - the consideration of proposals for the negotiation of regional treaties aimed at reducing and eliminating the deployment of nuclear weapons in specified regions of the world;
 - a worldwide ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of chemical arms;
 - an agreement to reduce substantially conventional armed forces in Europe while maintaining the common security of the nations concerned by removing any disparities in military strength;
 - similar agreements for the reduction of conventional armed forces in other parts of the world;
- INSISTS on the orderly conversion of military production into civilian industries and the use of resources currently devoted to armaments for employment and development purposes;
- RECOGNIZES that the application of the resources released by such conversion for development will be assisted by coordination between nations through the United Nations system;

URGES

that all states adhere strictly to the existing arms limitation and disarmament treaties and in this connection calls for:

- the universal ratification and most generalised implementation of all parts of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its procedures for on-site verification;
- the strict implementation of the Convention banning Biological Weapons;
- the strict adherence by the USA and the USSR to the Treaty of 1972 on Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM-Treaty), as well as the full observance by all states of the Outer Space Treaty, in order to prevent the militarization of space;

CALLS

on all states to strengthen the United Nations and dedicate themselves to uphold its Charter, so as to enable it to carry out its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24 of the United Nations Charter), and in this framework to:

- respect fully the Charter;
- be ready at all times to contribute to the United Nations efforts to resolve armed conflicts, whenever called upon to do so by the Security Council;
- reinforce the mediatory role of the UN Secretary-General;
- increase and strengthen the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations by placing them on a more structurally and financially sound basis and by agreeing that the Member States should make troops available for such tasks as may be requested under the procedures of the United Nations;
- establish mechanisms for the regulation, monitoring and control of the international trade in armaments and for the suppression of illegal arms exports;
- take coordinated and effective measures against international terrorism;
- strengthen the UN research activities on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and the deadly threat to the survival of mankind in the event of a nuclear war, and to disseminate the research results widely;

DEMANDS

that the United Nations actions and regional peace initiatives for the cessation of armed conflicts and for just solutions to the problems causing tensions and strife in certain regions should be strongly supported,

on the basis of the principle of self-determination of the peoples concerned and respect for relevant Security Council resolutions, and in this connection calls for:

- peaceful withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan on the basis of a timetable agreed between the parties concerned and the rapid establishment of a democratically elected government there so as to enable the Afghan people to determine their own future free from external interference;
- the full implementation of the peace agreement for Central America (the "Arias Plan"), which provides for the cessation of internal hostilities and external military assistance, the establishment of a dialogue between the opposing parties and the elaboration of guarantees for democratic and pluralistic societies;
- the immediate application of Security Council resolution 598 on the Iran/Iraq conflict, which calls amongst other things for a cease-fire on land, at sea and in the air, the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries and a negotiated comprehensive, just and honourable settlement, together with the resolution concerning attacks on merchant shipping adopted by the 74th (Maritime) Session of the International Labour Conference regarding an immediate end to attacks on merchant shipping in international waters and the protection of seafarers;
- a negotiated settlement between the different groups in Kampuchea creating the conditions, including the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, by which the democratic rights of the Kampuchean people can be freely and safely exercised;
- the convening of an International Conference on the Middle East as a framework for negotiations between all parties concerned, including Palestinian people's representatives, leading to a lasting peace in that region based on the recognition of the rights of all peoples concerned and in line with Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be asked to issue invitations to the parties concerned;
- effective and mandatory economic sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa and the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia;
- the full implementation of the pledges and commitments in the Helsinki Final Act concerning cooperation and security in Europe and improved political, economic and cultural contacts between East and West;

URGES

all states to cooperate in order to create the conditions for a more peaceful world and in particular to:

- strengthen measures for confidence-building between states and among peoples and by that work for genuine detente and for better understanding between nations;
- strengthen exchange of information on levels of armament and to promote agreements for observation and verification in all areas of military activity with a view to building on the achievements of the Stockholm Conference;
- develop and increase educational activities on peace, which should include initiatives to combat prejudice, xenophobia, extreme nationalism and militaristic behaviour;
- improve international cooperation aimed at avoiding circumstances which might create new massive flows of refugees in parallel with the provision of adequate solutions to current refugee situations;
- involve fully the trade union movement in policies and activities related to peace and disarmament, including in respect of programmes for conversion of military production to civilian purposes and the use of resources currently devoted to armaments for employment creation and development cooperation;

RECOGNIZES

that the development of trade and other economic cooperation as well as widening open and free social and cultural contacts between people make for common understanding and a widening of mutual interests in the maintenance of peace which contribute to the reduction of international tensions;

CALLS

on all affiliated organizations to work actively in their own countries and regions for peace, security and disarmament, and for the reduction of distrust through increasing contact between working people, on the basis of this resolution; and

REQUESTS

the ICFTU Executive Board to continue its work for the realization of world-wide peace, security and disarmament by developing a programme of activities, meetings and publications, monitoring developments in the field of disarmament and, together with affiliated organizations and International Trade Secretariats, taking action to exercise maximum pressure on national governments and the United Nations.

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

The 14th World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, meeting in Melbourne from 14 to 18 March 1988;

REAFFIRMS the support which the ICFTU has always given to the United Nations as a unique multilateral framework for cooperation among its members with a view to finding solutions for the many global problems confronting mankind in an increasingly interdependent world;

NOTES with alarm that the United Nations system is faced with an erosion of public opinion support in a number of democratic countries and therefore emphasizes the urgent need to maintain and strengthen the United Nations while supporting the necessary reforms, for example in management and financial control, proper identification of technical assistance projects geared to countries in need, nonpoliticization of specialized agencies and programme coordination in order to avoid duplication of activities in the field of economic and social affairs;

URGES governments to rededicate themselves to the United Nations Charter and to enable the UN to play an active and authoritative part in keeping the peace between nations in conflict, in providing a forum for international treaties for disarmament, and in assisting in the negotiation of lasting and binding solutions to conflicts between nations;

EMPHASIZES the absolute need to maintain and strengthen the United Nations while supporting the necessary reforms which will enhance its role as forum for negotiated solutions on a world-wide basis;

REQUESTS an increase in funding for the technical assistance activities from the United Nations system;

EXPRESSES deep concern over the present financial crisis confronting the United Nations system which threatens the foundation of multilateral cooperation and provides no sound basis for introducing the reforms needed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN in performing its crucial international role on behalf of all peoples;

STRESSES the importance of safeguarding and reinforcing the possibilities for the ICFTU to play its role in the activities and deliberations within the different United Nations bodies and meetings and the need to strengthen the consultative status with a view to enhancing the impact and contribution to the UN system of worldwide representative organizations such as the ICFTU;

REQUESTS

affiliated organizations to support the work of the ICFTU within the United Nations system by, for example, making representations to governments and seeking to include union representatives in national delegations to the United Nations General Assembly and other important conferences;

URGES

all Member States to respect fully the obligations deriving from the United Nations Charter, and the principles of international law as recognized by the International Court of Justice;

REQUESTS

all Member States to provide the United Nations with adequate financial resources so as to enable the organization to continue its constructive and indispensable work in various areas of global concern, notably peace, security and disarmament, human rights and economic and social development;

RENEWS

the ICFTU's commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter and pledges the full support of the international free trade union movement to the United Nations system in the pursuit of our common goals of peace, human dignity and social justice for all;

CALLS ON

affiliated organizations to press nationally for stronger dedication of governments to the United Nations Charter and to report to the General Secretary replies received.

THE ICFTU

The **INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS** is the representative at world level of free labour organisations on all five continents. Established in 1949, it now has 141 affiliates, for the most part national trade union federations, with a total membership of 87 million.

The **INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS** seeks to achieve the aims summarised in its motto - Bread, Peace and Freedom. It puts forward policy proposals for coordinated international action to end poverty and unemployment, and assists the strengthening of free trade unions through education and development aid projects. It campaigns for peace, security and disarmament. The ICFTU condemns discrimination of all kinds - whether on grounds of race, colour, creed or sex. It defends trade union and other basic human rights whenever and wherever they come under attack. By acting together ICFTU affiliates are able to help each other achieve shared objectives for the dignity and wellbeing of all working people.

The **INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS** speaks for workers in international intergovernmental organisations, notably the various bodies and agencies of the United Nations system. Among these, the tripartite International Labour Organisation occupies a place of special importance. The ICFTU has helped formulate the ILO Conventions and standards which serve as a yardstick against which to measure individual countries' observance of fair labour standards and trade union rights. In this context, the ICFTU can and does lodge complaints with the ILO against countries which infringe these rights and standards. By virtue of its consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council, the ICFTU is able to represent the workers' interests in the Council and its subsidiary bodies, such as the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women and the Commission on Transnational Corporations. It also maintains close working relations with other UN bodies and organisations, such as the special Committee Against Apartheid, UNCTAD, the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and other specialized agencies.

The **INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS** helps channel information between member organisations in different countries, and publicizes the trade union movement's international objectives — or more local issues when these have a wider significance. Each year it issues a "Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights". The ICFTU's fortnightly newspaper "Free Labour World" provides regular news on the activities of the international free trade movement.

The **INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS** cooperates closely with the International Trade Secretariats, which group national unions concerned with a particular trade, profession or industry. Basic policy is decided by the Executive Board, supreme authority rests with Congress, at which all affiliated organisations are represented.

